Martin begins chapter 2 arguing for a reader-response approach to Scripture interpretation. Martin repeatedly says that this approach is "common sense," that it is "empirically" the way things are, and that it is accepted by almost all people except a few holdout theologians. This reader interpreted these statements intertextually with the works of Shakespeare: methinks he doth protest too much.
To argue his case Martin gives several examples in which readers created meaning other than the original intention of the author: the famous Stanley Fish poem of author names, Culler’s nonsense sentence, misspoken Spanish in which the speaker meant one thing and the hearer understood another, the placement of a STOP sign in a museum (giving it a different meaning than it has on the road), and a class assignment to read a phone book as poetry.
But do these examples really demonstrate that readers (as opposed to authors or texts) create meaning? The first two examples merely demonstrate that when a professor gives misleading clues about words stripped of context, divergent understandings can be reached. They seem to say little about normal communication (see Carson, Gagging of God, 114f.). The third statement is an example of miscommunication because the speaker did not know how to ask a question in the correct Spanish idiom. Nonetheless, even in the example, the hearer was after a moment’s reflection able to comprehend the speaker’s intention, and the speaker received the answer to the question he asked. The fourth example merely demonstrates, as Martin intended, that people need to be socialized into a common understanding of symbols. But this does not necessitate an embrace of reader-response theory. Most simply it is a way of saying that people need to learn vocabulary and grammar if they are to read a language. This example also shows the importance of context. The final example shows how existing texts can be creatively reused. Many lines from Shakespeare and the King James Version of the Bible show up in a myriad of contexts, many far removed from the original contexts in which those lines appeared. There is no problem with this unless people try to import these foreign contexts back into Shakespeare or the Bible. In other words, turning the phone book into poetry may be a fine exercise, but if those engaged in this exercise fail to understand that the phone book was created to help people find others’ phone numbers and addresses, there is something wrong.
Martin is aware of objections to his approach. He focuses on the objection that if reader-response theory is correct, then people can make texts mean anything. The result of this is social chaos. Imagine if everyone read the STOP sign as he pleased. Martin replies that this is not the case because people are socialized into how to read. Thus those in a shared community of readers know how to interpret texts together. Thus drivers are socialized to know to stop their vehicles at a STOP sign. Nonetheless, Martin insists that the reader is always the one who gives meaning to the text. The reason so many readers give the same texts the same meaning is due to their common socialization on how to read that text. He intimates that to say that texts have meaning is to say "words [as "marks on the page"] magically or metaphysically have their meaning within themselves" (17).
But those who argue for authorial intention and textual meaning don’t claim that words magically or metaphysically contain meaning. They are happy to view words as signs. Nor does Martin’s talk about socialization undercut a historical-grammatical approach to reading. It simply means that to understand an author a reader must be socialized to read the text according to the norms of the author. In other words, interpreters of Shakespeare are concerned to understand if a meaning of a word has changed between his time and ours. They are concerned to know the various kind of genres in which drama was performed in the 17th century. In other words, one could say that the historical approach to interpretation means that readers should be socialized into the world of the author to understand him. If so, this makes sense of all the empirical, common sense observations made by Martin. It also relieves him of a problem with one of his examples. When he ordered breakfast in Spanish, he expected to receive breakfast. The waiter wasn’t satisfied with his misreading of Martin’s mis-spoken Spanish. Instead he tried to make sense of the authorial intention. Because the waiter did not share Martin’s approach to making sense of texts, Martin received breakfast.
David Shallenberger says
I watched Martin’s Yale series on Youtube and I found him to be replete with incomplete factual information, a lot of misleading statements that create ridiculous ramifications, and I am daunted at the difference in quality between the scholarship of say, Richard Bauckham, and the often ridiculous conjecture that characterizes Martin’s teaching approach.
I feel badly for Yale students that they could receive such a shallow presentation of facts, generally about as accurate as a cursory examination of Wikipedia (and even that affords a broader spectrum of views).
"Moruti" Lutz says
I am currently litening to that lecture series (have reached lecture 22 by now) on “New Testament History and Literature” (http://oyc.yale.edu/religious-studies/rlst-152) and I find it very enriching. Of course one could argue, that Prof Martins way of presenting current biblical scholarship is JUST ONE WAY of doing it (an I think he does admit that from time to time). But I certainly would not call his presentation “shallow”.
Brian says
One of Martin’s goals in Pedagogy of the Bible is to reduce historical criticism (here he includes any interpretation that seeks to understand authorial intent) to one approach among many ideological, reader-determined approaches. Through as his argument develops he actually says that the reader-response approach is not just one way of reading. It is the way all people read (32-35).
I am happy to grant that the reader plays an important role in Bible interpretation (Pro. 1:7; 1 Cor. 1:28-25; 2:6, 10-16; John 8:43-47).
And yet, Scripture is also clear that God speaks with intentions. For instance, When God prohibited Adam from eating of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, he expected that his intentions would be understood. The fact that the Speaker had intentions and that the listener could not make of them what he would is clear from the penalty attached to the failure to observe the Speaker’s intentions (Gen. 2:16-17; 3:6; 5:5). The emphasis on God’s speech continues throughout Scripture. The number of times that the reader encounters the statement, “Thus says the LORD,” “declaration of Yahweh,” or some similar phrase is staggering. These words often contained commands, and God executed judgments on those who failed to obey him.
Whether Martin’s presentation is shallow or sophisticated is beside the point, for measured against Scripture, he is wrong.