Much of this opening chapter is methodological. The most important methodological comments for understanding Swain’s argument are as follows:
“(1) Because God is the “Father of all” (Eph 4:6), “from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named” (Eph 3:15), there are “family resemblances” between God and his creatures. These family resemblances are the ontological basis of the divine names. (2) In terms of the order of being, these family resemblances flow from God the Father of all to his creaturely offspring, and not vice-versa. Creatures are like God because God created them; however, God is not like creatures. (3) In terms of the order of naming, the order is reversed. God names himself in our language using names originally applied to creatures. This is true whether it is said that God is good or whether it is said that God is a rock: in both instances the creature provides our primary context for understanding that which is good and that which is a rock.13 (4) These two different orders (the order of being and the order of naming) explain the difference between proper and metaphorical names of God. (a) Some names apply properly and primarily to creatures and only metaphorically and secondarily to God. God is a rock, to be sure, but God is not literally a rock. When we say that God is not literally a rock, however, we are not denying his steadfast nature or strength in relationship to his helpless people. We understand that even rocks reflect something of God’s greatness and therefore that their characteristics are susceptible to secondary, metaphorical application to God, the one who birthed the mountains (Ps 90:2). (b) Other names apply properly and primarily to God and only secondarily to creatures: God alone is wise; God alone is good—not in the sense that creatures cannot be wise or good but in the sense that they cannot be supreme and simple wisdom and goodness. God alone is wise and good in that sense, and all gifts of creaturely wisdom and goodness proceed from him (Jas 1:5, 17). (5) These two different orders (the order of being and the order of naming) also explain the epistemological and linguistic “grammar” whereby we interpret the family resemblances that exist between God and his creatures, the Dionysian threefold way (triplex via). Because God is the Father of all creatures and their perfections (via causalitatis), we understand and assert that he prepossesses all perfections that appear in the creature in their primary and supreme form (via excellentiae) without any creaturely limitation (via negativa)” (35-36).
The substance of the chapter is the argument that God is identified biblically as Father on several different level. Adam’s fathering of Seth is modeled on God’s fathering of Adam. There is an analogy between the two. God’s fathering Adam or the lights (James 1:17) is a metaphorical use of the concept.
These passages then inform passages that speak of the divine Father and Son:
“First, we have noted a series of “family resemblances” across each ontological register. In each register, we have seen (1) two relatives, (2) the activity of one relative that defines the relationship between the two relatives, and (3) a similarity that obtains between the two relatives.
Second, looking more closely at these family resemblances, we may observe a couple of common features that obtain across the various ontological registers. In each case, there is a discernible order in relation to the action or activity that defines the relationship between the two relatives: God makes Adam (not vice versa); Adam fathers Seth (not vice versa); God radiates his Son (not vice versa). The first relative is the principle of the action that constitutes the relationship between the two relatives. Furthermore, in each case the likeness between the two relatives follows a discernible order as well: Adam is like God; Seth is like Adam; the Son is the exact imprint of his Father’s substance. Here too the order is not reversible” (40-41).
The passage that Swain primarily has in view is Hebrews 1:3, the Son “is the radiance of the glory of God.” Along with this passage, Swain notes in passing,
“we would discover, along with the divine glory that radiates a divine effulgence, a divine speaker who utters a divine word (John 1:1–18) and a divine exemplar who produces a divine image (Col 1:15–18). In terms of the various actions that amplify the nature of the Father-Son relation, we would discover a Father who has life in himself and who has granted his Son to have life in himself (John 5:26), and we would discover a Father who possesses the unique divine name and who has granted his Son to possess the unique divine name (John 17:11–12)” (42-43).
Third, Swain seems to argue that the relation between Father and Son in the Trinity is not analogical or metaphorical, but proper. This leads Swain to his fundamental conclusion:
“Fourth, the relation between the divine Father and the divine Son whereby the Father naturally radiates the Son and consequently the Son is the exact imprint of the Father’s substance is in essence all that the doctrine of eternal generation seeks to identify” (41).
In connection with this, Swain asserts this doctrine is only ever identified. It is never explained how eternal generation takes place.
The weakness of Swain’s argument is his concession that Hebrews 1:3 could refer to the incarnate ministry of the Son. Swain responds to this weakness by noting that the focus of the verse is not ministry but the relation between Father and Son.