Books

Jackson, Andrew. Mormonism Explained: What Latter-day Saints Teach and Practice. Wheaton: Crossway, 2008.

In this brief (200 pp.) book Jackson provides a helpful overview of basic Mormon history and teaching drawn primarily from official Mormon sources and major Mormon teachers and apologists such as Bruce McConkie, Stephen Robinson and Robert Millet. He also compares and contrasts Mormon teaching with basic Christian doctrine. A helpful book.

Deutsch, Kenneth L. and Ethan Fishman, eds. The Dilemmas of American Conservatism. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010.

The essays collected by Duetsch and Fishman investigate tensions within American conservatism by looking at key figures in its 20th century history. In an introductory essay Fishman and Deutsch argue that conservatism is not monolithic but contains three competing strains: traditional, laissez-faire, and neoconservatism.

The traditionalist conservative finds his roots in Aristotle and Edmund Burke. Recent representatives include Russell Kirk, John Hallowell, and Richard Weaver. They value historical communities and institutions and are concerned about individualistic and libertarian ideologies that undermine them. They emphasize the rule of law as necessary to secure liberty; the role of "aristocracy" in providing moral example; liberty and the individual exist in a social context. They affirm the existence of natural law.

F. A. Hayek stands as the exemplar of laissez-faire conservatism. Many conservatives are traditional in the social realm and laissez-faire in the economic realm, but others apply the laissez-faire philosophy across the spectrum of life. In this approach, liberty is defined as "the state in which a person is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another. The supreme good emerges for Hayek when there is the absence of external restraints. Social justice or equality is a delusion; they only serve to diminish freedom. A free society is self-adjusting, leading toward greater productivity and public order, and this means inequality. Such a robust view of freedom makes the claim that the freedom to pursue one’s private vices, such as greed, will somehow produce public benefits. Traditional conservatives and laissez-fair conservatives inevitably find themselves in conflict over the issue of amoral capitalism" (p. 3).

Iriving Kristol represents neoconservatism, with Leo Strauss mentioned as a influence. Neo conservatives oppose the welfare state, "idealist foreign policies", and "world tyranny" (p. 3). They favor spreading democracy around the world, and they believe that the United States, as the world power, has the responsibility to promote the spread of democracy.

Attempts have been made, notably through the National Review, to unite these three strands of conservatism, but Deutch and Fishman are not convinced that a synthesis is truly possible.

The remainder of the book is a series of essays that cover significant conservative figures: John Hallowell, Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss, Richard Weaver, Robert Nisbet, John Courtney Murray, Russell Kirk, F. A. Hayek, and Willmoore Kendall. The bibliographies following each of these essays are valuable.

Sproul. R. C. Are We Together? A Protestant Analyzes Roman Catholicism. Orlando: Reformation Trust, 2012.

As the West secularizes the similarities between Roman Catholicism and conservative Protestantism seem highlighted. Both believe in the Trinity, the atoning death of Christ, justification by faith, supernatural reality, the importance of moral norms in public life. Both oppose great national evils such as abortion, divorce, and, now, homosexual marriage. Furthermore Roman Catholic philosophers and theologians often provide analyses and resources that conservative Protestants find useful in navigating the culture wars.

Which raises the title question of Sproul’s book: Are we together? In answering this question Sproul is ready to grant the agreements. Protestants and Catholics agree, for instance, on Trinitarian formulations or in their denial of naturalism and secularism. But they agreed about these things at the time of the Reformation as well. To claim the Reformation is over because of agreement in the culture wars is to miss the point of the Reformation.

The Reformers split from the Roman Church over the nature of the gospel. That issue has not changed or gone away. The current Catechism of the Catholic Church still affirms as doctrine errors that brought about the need for the Reformation. Sproul walks his reader through these fundamental difference is six chapters: Scripture, Justification, the Church, the Sacraments, the Papacy, and Mary. In each of these chapter Sproul fairly lies out the Roman Catholic position form their own documents, sometimes clarifies common Protestant misunderstandings or mischaracterizations, and discusses the biblical reasons why Protestants must still protest the doctrinal deviations of Rome. In short, the reasons boil down to a different source of authority and a different gospel. Roman Catholics and conservative Protestants differ on where the Word of God may be found and on how God brings about the salvation of sinners. To the secularist these may be minor issuers, but for both Protestant and Catholic these are issues of fundamental importance. Thus the question, Are we together? must still be answered in the negative.

Daniell, David. William Tyndale: A Biography. New Haven: Yale, 1994.

Daniell’s biography of Tyndale is a scholarly treatment that pays close attention not only to the events of Tyndale’s life but also to his writings and translations. Daniell, whose specialty is Shakespeare, gives close attention to Tyndale’s style and his influence of the English langauge and subsequent Bible translations. Daniell all stands firmly opposed to revisionist accounts that minimize Roman Catholic opposition to seeing the Scriptures in English or that paint Thomas More in glowing colors. Though not written as a devotional biography, Daniell so highlights the skill with which Tyndale translated the Scriptures that the Christian cannot be but grateful for God’s gifting the church with such a man.

Guelzo, Allen C. Fateful Lightning: A New History of the Civil War and Reconstruction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Guelzo’s history is notable for its significant treatment of the years leading up to the Civil War as well as for a brief treatment of Reconstruction. The book is light on military history; the major battles are recounted but with great brevity. The book instead focuses on the political and cultural aspects of the war. Though McPherson’s work remains the best single volume work on the Civil War for its comprehensive treatment of all aspects of the war, Guelzo’s insightful analysis makes this well worth the read. For instance, in discussing popular sovereignty, Guelzo notes, "Most of all, Lincoln condemned popular sovereignty because it tried to dodge the moral issue of slavery. . . . Even if all the voters of a territory unanimously demanded [slavery], their demanding it did not make it morally right. Liberty was not an end in itself, as popular sovereignty seemed to claim; it was a means, and it was intended to serve the interests of the natural rights that Jefferson had identified in the Declaration of Independence–life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. Otherwise, liberty would itself be transformed into power, the power of a mob to do whatever it took a fancy to." Insights like these throughout the book make it a worthy read.

Articles

Strauss, Mark L. "Gender-Language Issues in the NIV 2011: A Response to Vern Poythress," WTJ 74 (Spring 2012): 119-32.

Poythress, Vern S. "Comments on Mark Strauss’s Response," WTJ 74 (Spring 2012): 133-48.

Poythress lays his finger on the nub of the disagreement: "It seems to be that Dr. Strauss does not think that ‘he’ is usable in generic statements. I think that it is. Dr. Strauss thinks that it seriously distorts meaning (at least ‘potentially’); I do not . . . . If Dr. Strauss is right, the NIV 2011 is doing more or less the best it could, and I should stop complaining. If, on the other hand, Dr. Strauss is wrong, his mistaken conviction leads him to eschew the use of generic ‘he’ in many situations where its use would result in a very good, superior match in meaning between the original languages and the rendering in English translations" (136).

Anderson, Lee, Jr., "A Response to Peter Enns’s Attack on Biblical Creationism," Answers Research Journal 6 (2013):117–135.

Anderson, surveys Enns’s proposal that genomic research has demonstrated that humans did not descend from one couple and that the Bible thus should be reinterpreted so that the opening chapters of Genesis are read with Adam as a literary "proto-Israel" and not as the first human. This necessitates understanding the New Testament to have wrongly assumed the historicity of Adam but to have rightly drawn theological conclusions from this assumption.

Anderson critiques Enns along three lines. First, despite Enns’s affirmation of inerrancy, he actually operates with a paradigm for inspiration that rejects inerrancy as it has historically been formulated. Second, he believes that Enns has been to credulous regarding the conclusions of the Human Genome Project. Finally, he critiques Enns’s exegesis of relevant passages.

Tyndale, William. "A Prologue by William Tyndale, shewing the use of the Scripture, which he wrote before the Five Books of Moses." In The Works of the English Reformers: William Tyndale and John Frith. Vol. 1. Edited by Thomas Russell. London: Ebenezer Palmer, 1831.

Tyndale opens the prologue: "Though a man had a precious jewel, and a rich, yet if he wist not the value thereof, nor wherefore it served, he were neither the better nor richer of a straw. Even so though we read the Scripture, and babble of it never so much, yet if we know not the use of it, and wherefore it was given, and what is therein to be sought, it profiteth us nothing at all. It is not enough, therefore, to read and talk of it only, but we must also desire God, day and night, instantly to open our eyes, and to make us understand and feel wherefore the Scripture was given, that we may apply the medicine of the Scripture, every man to his own sores ; unless then we intend to be idle disputers, and brawlers about vain words, ever gnawing upon the bitter bark without, and never attaining unto the sweet pith within." The prologue continues on in this devotional strain, but also with solid observations and applications of the text.

Hennigan, Thomas D. "Is There a Dominion Mandate? Discussion: A Response to Darek Isaacs," Answers Research Journal 6 (2013): 137-138.

Kulikovsky, Andrew S. "Is There a Dominion Mandate? Discussion: In Defense of Human Dominion," Answers Research Journal 6 (2013): 139-143.

McDurmon, Joel. "Is There a Dominion Mandate? Discussion: The Dominion Mandate: Yesterday, Today, and Forever," Answers Research Journal 6 (2013): 145-155.

Isaacs, Darek. "Is There a Dominion Mandate? Reply: A Response to Hennigan, Kulikovsky, and McDurmon." Answers Research Journal 6 (2013): 157-177.

Hennigan contests Isaacs definition of dominion such that "dominion [is] humans having complete victory and domination in this world or that creatures must bow in submission to mankind." Hennigan contends this reads the word rādâ too narrowly. He asserts that the term is broad enough to include subduing powerful animals to radio tag them or engage in ecological management or to provide medicines that combat illnesses such as malaria or to harness energy from various natural resources.

Kulikovsky begins his response by critiquing Isaacs’s claim that God never gave Adam and Eve a command to have dominion over the earth. He argues that Isaacs’s parameters for what may constitute a command are so narrow that even some of the Ten Commandments would be excluded. Kulikovsky agrees with Hennigan that Isaacs’s definition of dominion is too narrow. Isaacs asserts that if humans had dominion over creation, they could command it at will the way Jesus did in his earthly ministry. Thus farmers could command weeds not to grow among their crops or insects not to feed on them. Kulikovsky notes that such absolute control is not necessitated by the terms dominion or sovereignty in any dictionary definition of the terms. Finally Kulikovsky rejects Isaacs’s claim that if dominion includes resisting the effects of the Fall at present, it follows that the original creation was not good. It does not necessarily follow.

McDurmon’s article maintains that the dominion exercised by Adam was not lost to Satan. He also argues that the dominion mandate is a true command given to Adam and Eve.

Isaacs provides a long and rambling reply to these three responses to his original article. The pith of his argument however is that the dominion mandate is not a command given to Adam and Eve but a blessing which was lost. Furthermore, he defines dominion as absolute power or control over the world. So when Jesus heals a disease with a word he is exercising the dominion that Adam was originally given. Humans do not have the blessing of dominion granted to Adam, but disciples of Christ can by faith exercise this dominion and raise people from the dead or command a tree to uproot itself and be planted in the sea (Acts 9:40; Lk. 17:6).

I think Isaacs is basically correct to see Genesis 1:26-28 as a blessing rather than a command. But as with the image of God in man, the blessing of multiplying and exercising dominion, is marred but not destroyed. The image and the dominion blessing work together. The Hebrew grammar may indicate that the image is given so that the dominion blessing may be carried out. Thus, whatever else the image might entail, in the original context the image of God seems to include at least the capacities for carrying out the dominion blessing. Finally, that blessing included being fruitful, multiplying, and filling the earth—something that has been and is being fulfilled. Isaacs is overly speculative when he asserts that dominion is absolute, God-like control over creation. This is neither demanded by the vocabulary or the context. It is better to see the dominion as all those capabilities that humans have for ruling and managing this world—capabilities which set them apart from the animal creation. Even granting that these capabilities were greater before the Fall, this would only demonstrate the marring of the blessing. It would not necessitate its absolute removal.

Rhodes, Stan. "Was John Wesley Arguing for Prevenient Grace as Regenerative?" Wesleyan Theological Journal 48, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 73-85.

Rhodes investigates the significance of this paragraph in Wesley’s works:

It is such a divine conviction of God and of the things of God as even in its infant state enables everyone that possess it to ‘fear God and work righteousness.’ And whosoever in every nation believes thus far the Apostle declares is ‘accepted of him.’ He actually is at that very moment in a state of acceptance. But he is at present only a servant of God, not properly a son. Meantime let it be well observed that ‘the wrath of God’ no longer ‘abideth on him.’*

Rhodes argues that Wesley reference to a state of acceptance connects back to a Puritan discussion about works of preparation that precede justifying grace. William Perkins and the British delegation to the Synod of Dort: "While the Orthodox Continental Reformed theologians attending the synod insisted that the elect are unwilling to turn to God until their effectual calling, the preparationists believed that God gave the will to convert and thus allowed for a measure of cooperation on the part of the elect" (pp. 77-78). In this context, Rhodes holds that Wesley meant by acceptance something short of salvation. Thus he concludes, "Appreciating the larger context and the nuances which permitted Wesley to speak both of wrath no longer abiding and of wrath intensely abiding—both in relation to the same person!—suggests that his aim in making the declarations in On Faith was not to argue that prevenience is itself regenerative in the sense of crossing over from death to life.

*John Wesley, Sermon 106, "On Faith," §10, in Sermons III, ed. Albert C. Outler, vol. 3 of The Bicentennial Edition of the Works of John Wesley (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1976-), 497.

Poythress, Vern S. "Adam Versus Claims from Genetics," Westminster Theological Journal 75 (2013): 65-82.

In this article Poythress deals with three challenges that modern genetics has made against a historical Adam: the large percentage (96% / 99%) common DNA between humans and chimpanzees, the alleged existence of junk DNA, and the claim that there is a "minimum population bottleneck" of around 5,000 to 10,000 that indicates that humans could not have descended from a single pair.

Poythress notes that evolutionary scientists are themselves moving away from the junk DNA claims. Yet even if we do have non-functional DNA, Poythress argues that we cannot conclude from that why or why not God would have included it.

Similarly, Poythress says that even if the Christian grants a 99 percent similarity between chimpanzee and human DNA, he need not deny that God created humans directly or that humans are qualitatively superior to chimpanzees due to the image of God. Even so, Poythress demonstrates the percentage of similarity is less than the often quoted 99% or 96%.

Regarding the population bottleneck, Poythress notes these studies assume gradualism: "The paper assumes that a purely gradualist process led to the human race, and then tries to calculate, based on that assumption and others, what might be the average population size at the time at which the proto-chimp and proto-human lineages initially diverged." Poythress argues that without the assumption of gradualism, descent from a single human pair cannot be ruled out. Poythress is willing to grant from these studies that humans lived up to 40,000 to 100,000 years ago, which he harmonizes with Scripture by proposing gaps in the genealogies. (Gaps in some genealogies do exist, but these would be massive gaps; furthermore, given the structure of the genealogies of Genesis 5, it is not clear that gaps are possible there.)

Poythress concludes that in discussing Adam an Eve one must take into consideration not only the science, but also the biblical data and the theological implications.

Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, chapter 8.

Book II, chapter 8 of the Institutes presents Calvin’s interpretation of the Ten Commandments. He begins with a defense of the relevance of these commands to the Christian and with a proper method of interpretation: Calvin argues that the meaning of the commandments goes beyond a strict reading of the words to the purpose for which each is given. Thus the fifth commandment strictly enjoins obedience to one’s parents, but Calvin argues the Christian should discern from this the necessity of obeying all God appointed authority. He concludes this section with a discussion of the love commandments which summarize the law. He also has an interesting discussion about why the Scripture sometimes summarizes the law with reference to the second table alone. Calvin says that this is because the First Table deals more with the internal, thus the second table provides more proof of piety.

Books

McGraw, Ryan. By Good and Necessary Consequence. Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2012.

In some circles the myth has taken root that sola scriptura means that Scripture does not apply to those matters that it does not directly address. In other circles systematic theology has gained a bad name and the doctrines of the Reformation (such as justification by faith alone) or classical theism (such as God’s omniscience and foreknowledge) are dismissed as rationalistic speculations at odds with Scripture.

Ryan McGraw addresses these errors in this brief book. The title of the book is drawn from the Westminster Confession of Faith, and McGraw is concerned to defend this teaching of that confession (the London Baptist Confession of 1689 uses a parallel expression; see pp. 51-52, n. 10). In sum, the Confession teaches all things necessary for salvation and the Christian life are found in Scripture. The phrase "by good and necessary consequence," however affirms that these things may be inferred from Scripture. Not everything necessary is explicitly stated.

The legitimacy of inferring good and necessary consequences from Scripture is grounded in Scripture. McGraw notes that Jesus uses an inferential argument for the resurrection of the body in Matthew 22:29-32. Luke 24:24-27 reveals that by good and necessary consequences the Messiah may be seen throughout the Old Testament. The apostles are dependent on good and necessary consequence in selecting Judas’s replacement (Acts 1:20-21). Paul makes use of this principle in arguing for pastoral remuneration from Deuteronomy 25:4 (1 Cor. 10:9-10). Though some of these passages provide stronger support than others, McGraw is able to demonstrate that good and necessary consequence is a biblical concept.

In his second chapter McGraw examines the historical background for the concept of good and necessary consequence. With the Reformation came the rejection of allegorical interpretation of Scripture. Since allegory was a key method for applying Scripture, this raised a problem. Critics of Scripture were happy to reject allegory and reduce Scripture study to mere historical study, but orthodox Protestants were not willing to travel that road. Good and necessary consequence allows the Bible to be applied to new contexts. McGraw notes, "The principle allows the contemporary interpreter to apply an ancient text to a modern context. When a necessary doctrine or application is legitimately drawn from the text of God’s Word, then that doctrine or application has the very power of the authority of God to enforce it. On the contrary, if good and necessary consequences are denied, then application is impossible" (27-28). McGraw makes two other important points in this chapter. First, the principle of good and necessary consequence is not rationalism. Reason is not the source of authority (Scripture is); reason remains a tool for discerning the divine teaching of Scripture. Second, it is important to distinguish between good and necessary. Some consequences may be good but not necessary while others may be both good and necessary.

In chapter four, McGraw demonstrates the importance of affirming good and necessary consequence by demonstrating that it is necessary for formulating orthodox views regarding the person of Christ and the Trinity. He also argues that it is necessary for establishing biblical worship practices and a Presbyterian understanding of baptism.

Chapter four addresses common objections to the principle, and chapter five reaffirms the importance of the principle for exegesis (understanding how the New Testament interprets the Old), application of Scripture, and doctrine.

Overall, this is an excellent book on a much needed subject. It also has the advantage of being concise and easy to read without sacrificing depth and accuracy. If the book lacks anything it would be a coverage of how to guard against abusing this principle. For instance, a Baptist might well agree with the principle, but he would disagree with the way he applies it to baptism. Are the objective grounds for determining when the principle is misused? This would be a fruitful avenue for further study.

Chernow, Ron. Washington: A Life. New York: Penguin Press, 2010.

Chernow does a good job of chronicling Washington’s life in its complexity. At times I found Chernow speculating beyond his cited evidence as to Washington’s motive, but overall it is a solid work. I did not, however, find it as engaging as his biography of Hamilton.

Bauckham, Richard. Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006.

In this volume Bauckham provides a trenchant critique of form criticism and makes a strong case for the pervasive role of eyewitness testimony in the Gospels. While I was not convinced with his discussion about the authorship of John and still have questions to Bauckham’s suggestion that many of the named individuals in the Gospels are the sources for those accounts, Bauckham nonetheless provides a wealth of information about oral tradition, memory in ancient times, and Jewish names, along with close readings of Papias’s comments about the gospels.

Shippey, T. A. J.R.R. Tolkien: Author of the Century. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000.

Koyzis, David T. Political Visions and Illusions: A Survey and Christian Critique of Contemporary Ideologies. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2003.

Koyzis’s thesis is that politics is dominated by various ideologies. From a Christian perspective, these ideologies are idolatrous. Thus Christians must therefore transcend the ideologies and approach politics with an eye firmly fixed on the biblical themes of creation, fall, and redemption.

Political ideologies are idolatrous because they seize on one aspect of the way God made the world and make it ultimate. If only the ideology could take root, the thinking goes, then the nation or community or world could be saved by the evil which threatens it. The "fundamental evil" identified by the various ideologies is often itself another aspect of God’s creation. As a result of deifying one part of the creation and demonizing others, the ideologies developed warped soteriologies that often lead to more evil and suffering because governing moral principles built by God into his world are subverted by the salvific goal set up by the ideology. This does not mean that the ideologies are all wrong or equally wrong. Because they are deifying parts of creation, they each have grasped fragments of truth, to greater or lesser extents. Thus the ideologies must be examined. Koyzis proposes six evaluative questions:

First, what is their creational basis? Second, what facets of God’s creation have they rightly focused on even as they have effectively deified them? Third, what inconsistencies have led to internal tensions within the ideology itself? Fourth, what do they see as a source of evil? Fifth, where do they locate the source of salvation? Sixth and finally, to what extent are they able to account for the distinct place of politics in God’s world?

In the central section of the book Koyzis surveys and critiques various ideologies. He begins with liberalism. As used here, liberalism embraces both contemporary American conservatives (classical liberalism) and liberals (reformist or revisionist liberalism / social democrats). In Koyzis’s analysis the "sovereignty of the individual" is the cornerstone of the liberal ideology. The classical liberals focused on restricting the state from infringing on personal liberties. At first liberals focused on protecting individuals rights to self and property. The state’s role was to ensure a fair playing field for individuals. But as non-government entities (e.g., business monopolies) gained power reform liberals began to use government power to protect individual freedom from these entities. Others pointed out that poverty limits people’s opportunity, and thus reform liberals seek to use government to level a playing field that is unequal by virtue of the different ways individuals have used their freedoms. Already the tensions within the liberal ideology are apparent. Also in the later stages of liberalism is the concern for laws not to infringe on the moral choices that citizens make; to do so infringes on individual liberty. Yet individual moral choices have social consequences, and the government is often invoked to mitigate those social consequences. Liberalism’s chief evil is authority located outside the human self, and its soteriology is a quest for freedom from external authority. It’s fatal flaw is its refusal to submit to God’s standards of justice, and this leads to the internal contradictions between classical and reformist liberals. On the other hand, liberals have rightly recognized the importance of the individual and the significance of human rights.

From liberalism, Koyzis turns to conservatism. He acknowledges up front that conservatism is not as ideological as the other ideologies covered. Indeed, in some respects it opposes ideologies (it is important to note at this point that Koyzis locates much of American conservatism on the right wing of liberalism; Reagan’s "optimistic view of human nature," "his celebration of limitless material progress," and "his devotion to the free market" are all marks of classical liberalism rather than traditional conservatism). Nonetheless, conservatism can be defined with enough specificity to invite evaluation. In the first place conservatives have a deep sense of the human tendency to evil and thus oppose all utopianism. This means that if a tradition is working adequately, the conservative will oppose a sweeping change to fix an evil because he is sure that the sweeping change will have negative side effects. The conservative must be convinced that the benefits of the change will outweigh the inevitable negative side effects. The conservative is not opposed to any change, but he prefers to see the changes take place on a local level where the negative effects are constrained. If the experiment works it can be implemented more broadly. At its best conservatism remains rooted in traditions that work while making necessary adjustments to fix what is not working. At its worst, conservatism can lapse into a traditionalism in which the traditions cease to carry meaning and a romanticism which projects a utopia into the past. This leads to Koyzis’s first critique: the traditions of any society are "inevitably a ‘mixed bag’ . . . . The wisdom of past generations is intermingled with a large measure of folly." But conservatism lacks "a generally accepted transhistorical criterion by which to distinguish what in a tradition is worthy saving and what ought to be discarded." Koyzis’s second critique centers on the need for genuine progress. He notes that "God’s creation is not static but contains great potential for development and improvement." The Christian ought to support progress, but he should do so cautiously (recognizing with the conservative the potential for evil side-effects) and with a careful evaluation of the direction of the change. Is it directed to greater conformity to God’s norms or away from such conformity. Overall, Koyzis renders a more favorable evaluation of conservatism while still warning about idolizing tradition and locating evil in the kinds of progress that societies should experience.

Koyzis next considers nationalism. On the positive side Koyzis argues that nationalism values the real communities of which people find themselves a part. There is something good in sharing "love for the cultural traditions of one’s own ethnic community" or in sharing a commitment as a citizen to the government of one’s nation. But nationalism becomes an ideology when it is elevated to the place of supreme importance over other loyalties such as family, region, or religion. As with liberalism, autonomy is the ultimate goal (in this case the autonomy of the national community) and rule by the other (whether the racial, cultural, or linguistic other) is the ultimate evil. The falsity of this claim is demonstrated by the great evils done by dictators who liberated their states from colonial powers. This observation in no way justifies colonialism, but it does demonstrate the folly of identifying ultimate evil in being ruled by the other and ultimate redemption in national liberation. Nationalism also becomes dangerous when it takes the place of religion, "complete with its own liturgical ceremonies, Te Deums, sacraments, icons and feast days." This can be especially dangerous for certain American Christians who link Old Testament promises to Israel to the United States.

Democracy, though "merely a form of government" in some ways, becomes ideological when "it embodies a belief in the near infallibility of the vox populi—the voice of the people. A limited democracy can be argued for on Christian principles. Thus because of the fall, power should be diversified instead of centralized. A fallen person with unlimited power is a great danger. But democracy as an ideology is grounded on anti-Christian ideas. As with liberalism, the autonomous self is the great good. The great evil is any authority that rules over the individual without his consent. Thus "the people" become the highest authority by which anything is justified. This stands against the conservative principle that a representative is a trustee who is to use his knowledge and wisdom to act in the best interest of those he represents; he does not necessarily simply do whatever they desire. Without checks such as this, democracy too can become totalitarian. The majority may run roughshod over the minority. Or, democracy may become totalitarian by insisting that all of life, not only the government, must be run on democratic principles. In the end, the Christian must recognize that democracy is not the only, or even always the best, form of government for bringing about justice. And when democracy is the form of government chosen, the people must recognize they still exist under the authority of divine Law.

Socialism is the final ideology that Koyzis covers. He does an excellent job of walking readers through the different varieties of socialism with their different approaches for implementing their program. Socialism sees inequality as the great evil and it promises salvation in the form of radical social change. Koyzis is willing to grant socialism some real insights. In the first place he grants the reality of communal ownership (he gives the family as an example). He also grants that socialists have sometimes highlighted real economic evils. He grants that a nation’s economic system may prevent a good number of people from owning productive property, and may permit the exploitation of labor. These are real evils. But socialism goes further to locate evil in any division of labor and in any inequality. Its salvation is communal ownership of everything. But, Koyzis, notes God designed the world to work with various forms of individual and communal ownership. Thus a totalizing, state-managed communal ownership runs up against creational limits. The communist nations must attempt to force the soteriology to work, and this is leads to the totalitarianism by which such nations are known: "Ideologies are typically motivated to achieve some overarching goal deemed to take precedence over other legitimate human concerns. The ultimate danger, of course, is that followers will come to believe that the end justifies the means and that this goal could demand the sacrifice of millions of human lives."

Koyzis closes the book with two chapters in which he seeks to offer a way to transcend the ideologies. In this section he examines both the Catholic idea of subsidiary and the Kuyperian idea of sphere sovereignty. He finds both useful, but prefers the less hierarchical sphere sovereignty.

Articles

Luther, Martin. "A Sincere Admonition By Martin Luther to All Christians to Guard Against Insurrection and Rebellion." In Luther’s Works. Volume 45. Edited by Helmut T. Lehmann and Walther I. Brandt. Translated by W. A. Lambert and Walther I. Brandt. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1962.

Luther argues that insurrection is not permitted by God. First, the troubles that they are facing are decreed by God and are part of his wrath. Magistrates have the responsibility to moderate this wrath (Exodus 32:27-28), but the populace does not. Second, insurrection never brings about "the desired improvement" because "insurrection lacks discernment. Thus, "it generally harms the innocent more than the guilty." Third, insurrectionists set themselves up as their own judges and avengers, but this is the prerogative of God only. Fourth, in this particular instance insurrection is a tool of the devil to discredit the Reformation.

Rather that insurrection, Christians should confess their sins, pray against their enemies, and preach the word of Christ.

Luther, Martin. "Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed." In Luther’s Works. Volume 45. Edited by Helmut T. Lehmann and Walther I. Brandt. Translated by W. A. Lambert and Walther I. Brandt. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1962.

In the first part of this discourse Luther seeks to reconcile passages which give the sword to the civil government and those which forbid Christians to resist evil or to take vengeance. Luther affirms that the sword was given by God to government and that only when the entire world is converted will it be unnecessary. The passages about not taking vengeance or resisting evil refer to Christian individuals. Christians must individually accept being wronged. But a Christian magistrate acts not for himself but for his neighbor.

In the second part of this discourse Luther affirms that temporal government may rule over property and the external things that people do. But the government may not command that people believe certain things; the government has no authority over the soul.

In the third part of the discourse Luther discusses the manner in which rulers should rule. 1. They should rule for the benefit of the people and not for their own benefit. 2. They should delegate their authority, but they should also responsibly manage those who act in their name (trust but verify). 3. They should administer justice so that evildoers are punished but others are not adversely affected. 4. Most importantly, a ruler must rule in the fear of God an in dependence on him for wisdom.

Books

Tolkien, J. R. R. The Annotated Hobbit. Revised Edition. Annotated by Douglas A. Anderson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002.

Anderson fills the margins of The Hobbit with commentary and notes detailing revisions to the text. The most interesting revision is the reworking of the "Riddles in the Dark Passage." The book is also filled with artwork by Tolkien himself as well as by artists for the various editions of the book both in English and in translation.

Dickens, Charles. A Tale of Two Cities.

Athenagoras. Embassy for the Christians, The Resurrection of the Dead. Ancient Christian Writers. Translated and edited by Joseph Hugh Crehan. Westminster, MD: Newman, 1956.

In the Embassy Athenagoras address Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus to refute common accusations against Christians: that they were atheists, cannibals, and licentious. In the Resurrection Athenagoras defends the resurrection from the dead. He first answers objections to the idea. He notes that if one believes that God created all things, he should have no difficulty believing that God can resurrect people. He notes the objection that humans who decay are eaten by creatures and therefore cannot be reconstituted. He notes that not all that is eaten becomes part of the creature; some passes through. And even what is eaten does become part of another creature it does not become so permanently. Finally, he argues that it is not unjust for bodies to be raised. It is unclear why he thinks some consider resurrection unjust. Athenagoras then moves to positive arguments for resurrection. First, God’s motive for creating man argues for the resurrection. Athenagoras denies that God made man for his own needs, for he has no needs, nor did he make man for the needs of other creatures, for man stands at the pinnacle of creation. Rather God made man so His goodness and wisdom would :be manifest upon the face of all His handiwork." This purpose argues for an eternal existence for God’s image bearers. Second, man’s nature argues for the resurrection. Man is comprised of both an immortal soul and a body. Since God created man with these two parts, the body must be raised, for it would be inappropriate to man’s nature for the soul to exist alone for eternity. Third, Athenagoras notes that justice is clearly not meted out in this life. Thus, for the whole man, body and soul, to receive justice either in reward or judgment the body must be raised.

Chesterton, G. K. The Everlasting Man. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2011.

This is a witty apologetic that advocates original monotheism, as opposed to an evolutionary account of religion, and the supernatural origins and distinct status of Christianity, as opposed to a higher critical and comparative religions approach. The book is not academic or annotated, and Chesterton grants this weakness. But Chesterton’s mind is sharp and he is quick to point out fallacies and inconsistencies in unbelieving thought. Though Chesterton writes as a committed Roman Catholic,* his critiques of modern thought are incisive and worth reading.

A few examples:

The point of this book, in other words, is that the next best thing to being really inside Christendom is to be really outside it. And a particular point of it is that the popular critics of Christianity are not really outside it. They are on a debatable ground, in every sense of the term. They are doubtful in their very doubts. Their criticism has taken on a curious tone, as of a random and illiterate heckling. Thus they make current and anticlerical cant as a sort of small talk. They will complain of parsons dressing like parsons, as if we should be any more free if all the police who shadowed or collared us were plainclothes detectives. Or they will complain that a sermon cannot be interrupted, and call a pulpit a coward’s castle, though they do not call an editor’s office a coward’s castle. It would be unjust both to journalists and priests, but it would be much truer of journalists. The clergyman appears in person and could easily be kicked as he came out of church; the journalist conceals even his name so that nobody can kick him. . . . They will suddenly turn round and revile the Church for not having prevented the War, which they themselves did not want to prevent and which nobody had ever professed to be able to prevent, except some of that very school of progressive and cosmopolitan skeptics who are the chief enemies of the Church. It was the anticlerical and agnostic world that was always prophesying the advent of universal peace; it is that world that was, or should have been, abashed and confounded by the advent of universal war. As for the general view that the Church was discredited by the War—they might as well say that the Ark was discredited by the Flood. When the world goes wrong, it proves rather that the Church is right.

. . . . . . . . . .

The more we look at man as an animal, the less he will look like one. . . . What for him would be the simplest lesson of that strange stone story book [that is, the cave man’s cave]? After all, it would come back to this: that he had dug very deep and found the place where a man had drawn the picture of a reindeer. But he would dig a good deal deeper before he found a place where a reindeer had drawn a picture of a man. That sounds like a truism, but in this connection it is really a very tremendous truth.

. . . . . . . . .

The freethinker frequently says that Jesus of Nazareth was a man of his time, even if he was in advance of his time; and that we cannot accept his ethics as final for humanity. The freethinker then goes on to criticize his ethics, saying plausibly enough that men cannot turn the other cheek, or that they must take thought for the morrow, or that the self-denial is too ascetic or the monogamy too severe. But the Zealots and the Legionaries did not turn the other cheek any more than we do, if so much. The Jewish traders and Roman tax gatherers took thought for the morrow as much as we, if not more. We cannot pretend to be abandoning the morality of the past for one more suited to the present. It is certainly not the morality of another age, but it might be of another world.

. . . . . . . . . .

Christ said, ‘Seek first the kingdom, and all these things shall be added unto you.’ Buddha said, ‘Seek first the kingdom, and then you will need none of these things.’

. . . . . . . . . .

"They are always telling us that priests and ceremonies are not religion and that religious organization can be a hollow sham, but they hardly realize how true it is. It is so true that three or four times at least in the history of Christendom the whole soul seemed to have gone out of Christianity; and almost every man in his heart expected its end. This fact is only masked in medieval and other times by that very official religion which such critics pride themselves on seeing through. Christianity remained the official religion of a Renaissance prince or the official religion of an eighteenth-century bishop, just as an ancient mythology remained the official religion of Julius Caesar or the Arian creed long remained the official religion of Julian the Apostate. But there was a difference between the cases of Julius and of Julian, because the Church had begun its strange career. There was no reason why men like Julius should not worship gods like Jupiter forever in public and laugh at them forever in private. But when Julian treated Christianity as dead, he found it had come to life again. He also found, incidentally, that there was not the faintest sign of Jupiter ever coming to life again. This case of Julian and the episode of Arianism is but the first of a series of examples that can only be roughly indicated here. . . . Now if we were to dip below the surface of history, as it is not in the scope of this argument to do, I suspect that we should find several occasions when Christendom was thus to all appearance hollowed out from within by doubt and indifference, so that only the old Christian shell stood as the pagan shell had stood so long. But the difference is that in every such case, the sons were fanatical for the faith where the fathers had been slack about it. . . . The Faith is not a survival. It is not as if the Druids had managed somehow to survive somewhere for two thousand years. That is what might have happened in Asia or ancient Europe, in that indifference or tolerance in which mythologies and philosophies could live forever side by side. It has not survived; it has returned again and again in this Western world of rapid change and institutions perpetually perishing. . . . At least five times, therefore, with the Arian and Albigensian, with the Humanist skeptic, after Voltaire and after Darwin, the Faith has to all appearance gone to the dogs. In each of these five cases it was the dog that died.

. . . . . . . . . . .

An old don with D.D. after his name may have become the typical figure of a bore; but that was because he was himself bored with his theology, not because he was excited about it. It was precisely because he was admittedly more interested in the Latin of Plautus than in the Latin of Augustine, in the Greek of Xenophon than in the Greek of Chrysostom. It was precisely because he was more interested in a dead tradition than in a decidedly living tradition. In short, it was precisely because he was himself a type of the time in which Christian faith was weak. It was not because men would not hail, if they could, the wonderful and almost wild vision of a Doctor of Divinity.

*It is probably worth addressing why Chesterton as a Roman Catholic can be so helpful to Christians combatting modernism, since Christians standing in opposition to abortion or contraception mandates (that include abortifacients) or so-called same-sex marriage often find the writing and works of contemporary Roman Catholics helpful. The reason for this is undoubtedly that that Roman Catholics retain a great deal of Christian truth in their thinking. Thus a doctrinally conservative Roman Catholic and an orthodox Protestant both agree against the Unitarian in defense of the Trinity or in favor of the deity of Jesus against the critics. They also agree on a number of moral issues. But it is important to remember that the Reformers were never unaware of the great deal of truth held in common between themselves and the Romanists. The common truths do not negate the differences nor minimize the seriousness of those differences. The differences between Rome and the Reformation center on the gospel, and it would be much better to lose the debate in the public square over same-sex "marriage" than to win that debate and lose the gospel.

Trueman, Carl R. The Creedal Imperative. Wheaton: Crossway, 2012.

The title of this book reveals its thesis. Healthy churches must have creeds. Trueman realizes that this thesis flies in the face of a culture that has its gaze firmly fixed to the future and back set against the past (a stance strengthened by scientism, consumerism, and technological change). Furthermore, contemporary culture doubts that the capacity of words to stably bear meaning. On top of it all, once it is noted that creeds are enforced by church authorities to exclude some people, the conclusion must be drawn creeds are truly swimming upstream against powerful cultural currents.

Trueman, however, remains undaunted: Creeds remain imperative for healthy churches. He argues that words are adequate to communicate doctrine. Indeed, to concede this point would not only be to concede the value of creeds but would also be to concede the authority of the Bible. He further argues, against the sense of continual cultural transformation, that our shared human nature means that Scripture and creeds alike can speak across time and place. And though our culture rejects authorities, the Scripture establishes a church with authority structures. God charges those who lead churches to hold fast to sound doctrine. To do this, churches must explain what they believe the Bible does and does not teach. Thus creeds. The creed is always subject to Scriptural authority, and thus may be revised. But within a church it bears an authority under Scripture, because it is a statement of what the church believes the Bible to teach.

Trueman takes two chapters to survey creeds and confessions from the early church and from the Reformation era. He makes the important point that creeds develop as doctrinal controversies develop. He also argues that the division between the Lutherans and the Reformed over the Lord’s Supper was not entirely negative. While Christian unity might be preferred, Trueman argues against a unity that minimizes the importance of a right understanding of the Lord’s Supper.

Trueman concludes the work by highlighting the practical benefits of creeds and confessions. He notes in the first place that creeds are not dry and dusty technical documents. They are documents that ought to provoke God’s people to worship and praise God. Also, creeds and confessions succinctly summarize the Christian faith. Creeds actually place a check on arbitrary exercises of authority in a church by outlining ahead of time what beliefs are significant for the assembly.

House, H. Wayne, ed. Israel: Land and the People. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1998.

Books that cover Israel as a theological topic are difficult to find. This volume covers issues such as the land of Israel, Israel in Romans 9-11, Israel’s purpose and mission, Israel and the church, and Israel and the nations. The best essays in this volume are Hoehner’s treatment of Israel in Romans 9-11, Jelinek’s treatment of Israel’s dispersion and restoration, and Robert L. Thomas’s essay on the mission of Israel in God’s plan.

Brueggemann, Walter. The Land: Place as Gift, Promise, and Challenge in Biblical Faith. 2nd ed. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002.

The virtue of Brueggemann’s work is that he takes land seriously as a biblical theme. Unlike W. D. Davies, who wrote the other major theology of land, Brueggemann affirms the remaining relevance of the land theme in the New Testament. Unfortunately, he often adopts ideological readings or counter reads the text. For instance, in this book Brueggemann consistently pits the themes of land and monarchy against each other contrary to the way Scripture develops the messianic theme in connection with the land theme.

Articles

Haas, Guenther. "The Kingdom and Slavery: A Test Case for Social Ethics." Calvin Theological Journal 28 (1993): 74-89.

Haas applies Al Wolters’s concepts of structure/direction and reformation not revolution to the issue of slavery in the New Testament. His dismisses approaches similar to William Webb’s later proposal of a redemptive movement hermeneutic (labeled here as "progressive moral norms"). Haas note that to hold to this position implies biblical toleration of that which is "inherently evil." Second, it leads to the supposition that biblical principles are authoritative for believers but that applications of those principles within the New Testament are not authoritative. Third, Haas, notes a "tendency toward relativism."

Haas sees a way forward in the concepts laid out by Al Wolters in Creation Regained. In this approach, one recognizes that every social structure reflects some elements of good creational norms (structure) and that every structure also has been corrupted and stands in need of redemption (direction). From these facts emerges the idea that reformation is needed but not revolution. More concretely, every social structure has at least some element of God’s good creational norms in it that is worth preserving. Second, redemption must happen internally and not by mere external force. As applied to slavery there is the recognition of legitimate authority structures in work relationships. Due to sin this legitimate authority structure has been perverted. The New Testament reforms this relationship by defining the worth of all people in terms of their relation to God (image-bearers) and relation to Christ (Christian slaves and masters are brothers in Christ). If a master treats his slave with this recognition, then he undermines the Roman view of the relation of slave and master. He in effect treats his slave as one with the rights of a free man. Nevertheless, the New Testament affirms the good authority structure of the work relationship.

Peter Lombard. The Sentences, Book 4: On the Doctrine of Signs. Translated by Giulio Silano. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2010. Pp. 69-135.

Lombard’s Sentences is one of the most influential theology textbooks in church history. It was the text that all medieval theology students studied and wrote commentaries on. The section read this month covered the sacrament of penance. In medieval Catholic theology, the sacrament of baptism cleansed from sin. But sins subsequent to baptism needed further cleansing by the sacrament of penance (Book 4, dist. XIV, c1, n. 1 (4:69)). Unlike baptism penance may be repeated (Book 4, dist. XIV, cc4-5 (4:74-77)). In this way penance seems to be a relaxing of a rigorous view that developed in patristic times that caused many people to delay baptism until just before they died lest they commit sins that later could not be purged. Penance involves three things: heartfelt remorse, verbal confession to a priest, and actions that make satisfaction for the wrong done (Book 4, dist. XVI, c1, n1 (4:88)). Lombard is clear that good works are necessary to escape punishment, and that accruing merits is involved (Book 4, dist. XV, c2 (4:78); Book 4, dist. XV, c7, n2 (4:85)). He addresses why the deeds of satisfaction are necessary beyond mere contrition and confession: the sin may be "blotted out" in contrition, but the punishment must still be born. Confession is necessary so the priest knows what judgment to prescribe (Peter Lombard, Book 4, dist. XVII, c5 (4:85)). Lombard also discusses the power of the keys (cf. Book 4, dist. XVIII, c5-66 (4:110-112)) and purgatory (cf. Book 4, dist. XX, c2 (4:122-23); Book 4, dist. XXI (4:126-32)).

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation. Edited by Timothy McDermott. Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1989. [II-I.1-48]

Questions 1-5 deal with man’s last end, which Aquinas takes to be happiness in God (understanding happiness in its full philosophical sense). This section was reminiscent of the first part of Edwards’s The End for Which God Created the World. Questions 6-1 deal with the will. Questions 22-48 deal with affections and passions. The discussions here were thoughtful and thus helpful, but I was left wishing for Aquinas to do what Edwards did in following the philosophical section with a rich section of exegesis to establish his philosophical meditations.