González, Justo. The Story of Christianity. Volume 1. Revised edition. New York: HarperCollins, 2010.
Thoughts on Luther’s Works, Vol. 31
Grimm, Harold J., ed. Career of the Reformer I
. Luther’s Works, Volume 31, ed. Helmut T. Lehmann. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1957.
This volume of Luther’s works covers his early writings at the time that he was breaking from Rome. It includes: “Disputation against Scholastic Theology,” Ninety-Five Theses,” Heidelberg Disputation,” “Preface to the Complete Edition of a German Theology,” Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses,” “Proceedings at Augsburg,” “Two Kinds of Righteousness,” “The Leipzig Debate,” “The Freedom of a Christian,” and “Why the Books of the Pope and His Disciples Were Burned.”
“The Ninety-Five Theses” is, of course, a must read for its historical significance. I also especially benefited from the “Heidelberg Disputation,” “Two Kinds of Righteousness,” and “The Freedom of a Christian.” In these works Luther is abundantly clear why good works are completely unable to save a person while at the same time defending the importance of good works for the Christian. These works also provide a window into the kinds of abuses within the Roman Catholic church that spurred Luther to press for reformation. Finally, reading these works first hand was also a helpful reminder about Roman Catholic teaching at this time. For instance, Luther’s attack on the authority of the pope was not an innovation. He’s drawing on medieval thinkers who thought the pope should be subject to counsels, for instance. Some of the positions that later became hardened into a Roman Catholic position and a Protestant position were still open questions as Luther was raising them.
Here are some samples from this volume:
Therefore, since the spirit of Christ dwells within Christians, by means of which brothers become co-heirs, one body, and citizens of Christ, how is it possible for us not to be participants in all the benefits of Christ? Christ himself has all that belongs to him from the same Spirit. So it happens through the inestimable riches of the mercies of God the Father, that a Christian can be glorified with Christ and can with confidence claim all things in Christ. Righteousness, strength, patience, humility, even all the merits of Christ are his through the unity of the Spirit by faith in him. All his sins are no longer his; but through that same unity with Christ everything is swallowed up in him. And this is the confidence that Christians have and our real joy of conscience, that by means of faith our sins become no longer ours but Christ’s upon whom God placed the sins of all of us. He took upon himself our sins [Cf. Isa. 53:12]. Christ himself is “the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world” [John 1:29]. All the righteousness of Christ becomes ours. He places his hand upon us and all is well with us [Cf. Mark 5:23]. He spreads his cloak and covers us [Cf. Ruth 3:9], blessed Savior throughout all ages, Amen.
LW 31:190
Against the doctrine of supererogation (and thus against a treasury of the saints’ merits):
Second, no works of the saints are left unrewarded, for, according to everybody, God rewards a man more than he deserves. As St. Paul says, “The sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be” [Rom. 8:18].
Third, no saint has adequately fulfilled God’s commandments in this life. Consequently the saints have done absolutely nothing which is superabundant. Therefore they have left nothing to be allocated through indulgences. I believe that the inference is clear enough. But I shall prove the major premise so that there is no doubt about it, but that it must be believed in such a way that the opposite view would be considered heretical.
I prove this argument first by that saying of Christ, “When you have done all that is commanded, say ‘We are unworthy servants’ ” [Luke 17:10]. But the term “unworthy servant” is understood to refer to one who has done less and not more than he should. . . . I prove this argument secondly by that passage in Matt. 25[:9] which says that the wise maidens had no desire to share their oil for fear that there would not be enough also for themselves. Third, Paul says, I Cor. 3[:8], “Each shall receive his wages according to his labor.” He does not say, “according to another’s labor.”
Fourth, I adduce Galatians 6, “Everyone must answer for himself” [Cf. Gal. 6:4–5], as well as the saying, “So that each one may receive … according as he has done in the body” [II Cor. 5:10]. Fifth, every saint is obligated to love God as much as he can, indeed more than he can, but no one has or can do that. Sixth, the saints, in their most perfect work, that is, through death, martyrdom, and suffering, do no more than is required. Indeed they do what is required and scarcely that. Therefore they have done much less than they should in other works. Seventh, although I have produced so many reasons, they, on the other hand, to support their position, have not produced one, but only a recital of the circumstances, speaking without proof from the Scriptures, the teachers of the church, and sound reasons. For that reason we can, indeed we must, completely ignore their opinion.
LW 31:212-13.
Should you ask how it happens that faith alone justifies and offers us such a treasure of great benefits without works in view of the fact that so many works, ceremonies, and laws are prescribed in the Scriptures, I answer: First of all, remember what has been said, namely, that faith alone, without works, justifies, frees, and saves; we shall make this clearer later on. Here we must point out that the entire Scripture of God is divided into two parts: commandments and promises. Although the commandments teach things that are good, the things taught are not done as soon as they are taught, for the commandments show us what we ought to do but do not give us the power to do it. They are intended to teach man to know himself, that through them he may recognize his inability to do good and may despair of his own ability. That is why they are called the Old Testament and constitute the Old Testament. For example, the commandment, “You shall not covet” [Exod. 20:17], is a command which proves us all to be sinners, for no one can avoid coveting no matter how much he may struggle against it. Therefore, in order not to covet and to fulfil the commandment, a man is compelled to despair of himself, to seek the help which he does not find in himself elsewhere and from someone else, as stated in Hosea [13:9]: “Destruction is your own, O Israel: your help is only in me.” As we fare with respect to one commandment, so we fare with all, for it is equally impossible for us to keep any one of them.
LW 31:348
The Danger of Political Worldliness
Yesterday Rod Dreher posted a piece, noting, “You can’t build a movement on the rage and unreason of radio talkers and expect that the weaponized grievance will stay pointed at liberals only.” This has long been a concern of mine for biblical reasons. As we say in our book, Biblical Worldview: Creation, Fall, Redemption:
Christians are sometimes in danger of becoming so accustomed to the status quo that they fail to realize that the way things work is worldly in the negative biblical sense. Worldliness isn’t limited to entertainment or dress. Worldliness can be found in every aspect of life, including political activities. It is possible for worldliness to be present in political discourse–even the political discourse of people who are right about the issues.
Paul admonished Christians to render to Nero the honor that God said he was due (Rom. 13:7), and Paul himself determined to render the biblically required honor to a corrupt high priest (Acts 23:4-5). So today Christian citizens ought to render the honor their leaders are owed by virtue of their office.
Honoring leaders doesn’t mean they’re above critique, even searching critique. If they’re acting unlawfully (by God’s law or just human laws), then the Christian, like John the Baptist, can forthrightly state this even if it results in being jailed. But Christians should be able to deliver these critiques in a way that still renders due honor.
Even if the political opponent could be considered an enemy in the fullest sense of the term, Christians are to love their enemies. This means that the Christian should treat his political opponents with kindness (1 Cor. 13:4). He shouldn’t rejoice when political opponents are caught in wrongdoing (13:6). Believers shouldn’t be arrogant or rude when dealing with poltiical opponents (13:4-5). Nor should they be irritable or resentful when their opponents win (13:5). The Christian shouldn’t believe every negative assertion made against his opponents, nor should he dismiss negative reports about his own side. The Christian should be scupuous about being fair and truthful to all parties.
Biblical Worldview: Creation, Fall, Redemption, Teacher’s Edition, 275.
Later we note:
Within the context of government, Paul tells Christians to ‘speak evil of no one, to avoid quarrelling, to be gentle, and to show perfect courtesy toward all people’ (Titus 3:2).
This sounds unrealistic. Is Paul really saying that a Christian can’t say anything negative about a political opponent? Can he not argue with his policies or expose his corruption? That isn’t what Paul means when he says, ‘Speak evil of no one,’ but he’s still saying something that serves as a sharp critique of American political practice. The Greek word that underlies ‘speak evil’ is the verb from which we get the word blaspheme. Paul is prohibiting angry or abusive speech, insults, slander, and defamation.
Biblical Worldview: Creation, Fall, Redemption, Teacher’s Edition, 281.
I’ve wondered more than once this election season about the potential that our electoral choices in November might reflect a judgment of God. If it is a judgment, we might do well to consider that it may be a judgment upon us for our own sins and not only for the sins of others.
The Pastor as Public Theologian
Vanhoozer, Kevin J. and Owen Strachan. The Pastor as Public Theologian: Reclaiming a Lost Vision. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2015.
There are certain books whose effect largely depends on the time in life when you read them. For instance, I’d say that Frank Thielman’s Paul and the Law: A Contextual Approach was one of the most significant books that I read while in seminary. It was while reading that book that I understood for the first time the significance of the biblical covenants. I know that I had read about the covenants before, but their role in Scripture and my relation to them clicked for the first time while reading Thielman. That book may not have been as significant to my thinking had I already developed my thinking on the covenants and on the Mosaic Law. I have the sense that Vanhoozer and Strachan’s could have a similar effect on a seminarian or pastor—it could reshape the way they think about ministry. Others will already share their vision, making the book less significant to them.
Vanhoozer and Stachan’s basic message is that pastors need to reclaim their vision of the pastorate from secular sources and seminaries need to be reshaped so that pastors rightly see their mission to be that of theologians. The pastor theologian is not an academic. Rather, he is a public theologian in the sense that he helps God’s people live out God’s Word in all of life. There are a number of ways that a pastor achieves this goal (e.g., pastoral visitation, counseling), but the sermon ought to be the central means.
I’m in agreement with the central message of the book, but some things gave me pause. I remain unconvinced that Rowan Williams, for instance, is really the most faithful model to set before readers. I also remain skeptical that the Christological offices of prophet, priest, and king are a model for pastoral ministry.
Does Romans 4:13 Expand the Land Promise?
Hsieh, Nelson S. “Abraham as ‘Heir of the World’: Does Romans 4:13 Expand the Old Testament Abrahamic Land Promises?” Master’s Seminary Journal 26, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 95-110.
Hsieh notes the tendency of non-dispensationalsits to move away from allegorical or spiritualizing arguments which state that the church has replaced Israel and to move toward arguments that the promises, such as the land promise, have been expanded beyond Israel in the NT to include the whole church and the whole world. Thus the land promise for Israel is fulfilled not in the restoration of the nation of Israel to a land but in the blessing of the new earth for all of God’s people.
Romans 4:13 is one of a handful of texts used to make a case for this perspective. Hsieh notes, however, that this text is employed with little argumentation. Proponents typically assume that it teaches the extension of the land promise. Those who do argue for this view typically appeal to second temple literature that expands the land promise to encompass the world. In response, Hsieh argues that the second temple literature does not have a uniform position on the land promise. Some literature does extend the promise to the world while other literature sees a localized fulfillment for the nation of Israel. What is more, at least in Jubilees, the expansion of the land promise to the world is held alongside the view that Israel rules over the nations of the world from its own land.
Hsieh proposes a different interpretation. He argues that contextually Paul defines the promise noted in 4:13 “in terms of Abraham becoming the father of many nations and having innumerable descendants (vv. 17-18)” (107). To be heir of the world thus means that Abraham is heir of a seed from many nations who have faith in God as he did. Not only does this reading make better sense of the context, but also, Hsieh argues, because this is a promise that Abraham believed. Abraham knew of the promise that he would be the father of many nations. Abraham did not know (and thus could not believe) and expanded land promise. Hsieh closes his article by making the case that κόσμος and κληρονόμος can refer to seed and need not point to the land promise.
I think that Hsieh mounts a good argument for his position, and he may well be right about this text. However, as he indicates at the close of his article, other texts are also in play in this discussion and in need of more careful study. I’m not convinced that his major concern (which I share) is harmed if some of these texts do validate the thesis that the land promise is expanded. Psalm 72:8 expands the land promise within the Old Testament itself. Indeed, this expansion may go back to Abraham himself. In Genesis 22:17, God promises that Abraham’s seed will possess the gates of their enemies. Linked tightly to this promise is the promise that in Abraham’s seed all the nations of the earth will be blessed (22:18). If these promises are meant to be tightly linked, the promise of 22:17 would not be limited to the conquest of Canaan but would be extended to the reign of the Messianic King over all the nations. Further, if the expansion of the land promise to the nations extends all the way back to Abraham itself, then the expansion need not be played off against the specific land promises given to Israel (and Hsieh’s suvey of Jubilees shows that at least in one text it was not). It is, after all, an Israelite king that rules from Jerusalem over all the nations. If other nations exist in their lands under the Messianic king, why not allow a restoration of Israel to its land under the Messianic king? Finally, Hsieh may be correct that Romans 4:13 does not contribute to an expansion of the land promise theme, but if my proposal is correct, Abraham as father of many nations and the expansion of the land promise many be themes that are more closely linked than one might first think.
Was Edwards an Intellectualist, Voluntarist, or Concurrentist
Waddington, Jeffrey C. “Which Comes First, The Intellect or the Will? Alvin Plantinga and Jonathan Edwards on a Perennial Question,” The Confessional Presbyterian 11 (2015): 121-28, 252-53.
Alvin Plantinga, in Warranted Christian Belief, proposes a concurrentist model of the relation between the intellect and the will while identifying the position of Jonathan Edwards as intellectualist, or giving priority to the intellect. Waddington argues that Edwards’s position was closer to Plantinga’s than Plantinga realized.
In the course of the article Waddington helpfully classifies various positions on the relation of the intellect and will. The first noted is “absolute intellectualism,” a position associated with Thomas Aquinas. On this view “the will is considered blind, and is seen as a slave of sorts to the intellect.” A second position is “functional intellectualism.” In this view the intellect is primary because it presents the will with the “object to which it is either attracted or repulsed.” But ontologically the will and intellect are equals. Waddington notes this view is akin to the Trinity in which each of the persons are ontologically equal while a functional order among the members exists. A key difference between these two positions is that the sin has only affected the intellect in the first, since the will is a slave to the intellect. But on the second view, both intellect and will are affected by sin and in need of regeneration. A third position is “scholastic voluntarism.” On this view the will takes such priority that it is “self-determining.” A fourth position is “Augustinian voluntarism.” In this view, the will is the orientation of the person toward or away from God. This orientation his primacy over the intellect. Finally, there is the concurrentist position is which there is no primacy of intellect or will over the other.
Though Plantinga identified Edwards as an intellectualist, Edwards scholars such as Norman Fiering and Allen Guelzo have identified Edwards as an Augustinian voluntarist. Waddington notes that this is a valid option, and the view that he had held. However, he now recognizes the legitimacy of functional intellectualism to describe Edwards. Both categories seem to fit elements of Edwards work. In the end, however, Waddington now thinks that Edwards fits best into the concurrentist position
Review of Article on the Problem of Evil and Animal Death
Faro, Ingrid. “The Question of Evil and Animal Death Before the Fall,” Trinity Journal 36 (2015): 193-213.
Faro begins her article by seeking to determine what should be considered evil. She argues that too often English speakers read the English sense of the word into Hebrew words with much broader semantic domains. Though not explicit, she seems to indicate that natural events like hurricanes, or falling off a cliff due to gravity, etc. should not be classified as evils because it is the way God designed natural laws to work in the world. Gravity and hurricanes both have good effects too. As the article develops Faro seems to extend this logic to predation as well. When she defines evil she leaves aside senses from Hebrew words such as “deficient,” “displeasing,” or “unpleasant.” He definition reads: “Evil, then, from God’s perspective is presented predominately as choices that conflict with God.”
The advantage of this approach is evident for the Christian who wishes to escape the problem of animal death. It simply redefines animal death as not evil. However, I’m not convinced of the sufficiency of this argument. The philosophers who are concerned about the problem of evil in the animal world are not thinking that the pain and suffering and death in the animal realm is evil because they’re reading narrow English senses into words with broader Hebrew senses. They’re looking at death and pain and suffering and recoiling with horror at it. In addition limiting evil to actions chosen by humans seems too narrow theologically. If God has built creational norms into his world, and if sin has disrupted these norms across the board, then it would seem that evil is anything contrary to these norms whether or not the violation is due to human choice in an immediate sense.
The latter part of Faro’s article seeks to find biblical support for the possibility of animal death prior to the Fall. She appeals to three passages: Genesis 1-2, Psalm 104; Job 38-41.
She mounts a number of arguments from Genesis 1-2. First, she says the numbering of the days of creation reveal that “the universe was not created to be eternal in its original physical form” (206). She appeals to several cross references in support: Psalm 102:25-26; Isaiah 34:4; 51:6; Revelation 6:12-14; 21:1-4. It is not clear how the numbering of the days in Genesis 1 indicates that the present earth will be destroyed. The other passages all refer to a post-Fall reality and does not speak of what would have happened had there been no Fall.
Second, while acknowledging that plant death is different from animal death, she thinks it is significant that the seed and the “cycle of plant life” is a picture of death and resurrection (206-7). It is not clear how this argument advances Faro’s point. She could be arguing that if death was not present from the beginning, God would not have built in a sign of death and resurrection into plant life. But does this does not seem to be a sound argument given God’s foreknowledge.
Third, she claims that both Adam and the animals were formed from the dust of the ground, which she says indicates they were created mortal (appealing to Genesis 3:19). Humans were to eat from the tree of life to avoid death, but animals were not to eat of the tree of life. Thus animals were created mortal, and God intended for them to die. But Genesis 3:19 presents death as a punishment for sin, not as something built into the nature of the creation. The historic position is that Adam was created immortal but was not confirmed in his immortality. This position best accounts for all of the data: death as a punishment, the possibility of receiving that punishment, and the tree of life as a sign of confirmation in immortality. Furthermore, Genesis nowhere implies that animals would have needed to eat from that tree to avoid death. Faro’s reading makes it seem as if the tree has some kind of magical power rather than recognizing that the trees are sacramental in nature.
The argument from Psalm 104 is simple. This is a creation psalm that celebrates animal predation as part of God’s wise ordering of the earth (v. 24). In response, Psalm 104 is clearly a reflection on a creation that has been affected by the Fall (v.35). God’s provision of food for animals (and humans) now includes the death of other animals. But from the beginning it was otherwise. Genesis 1:29-30 gives plants as food to humans and to animals. It is only after the Fall that God permits the eating of meat (Gen. 9:3-6; note that the passage places limitations on what animals can and cannot eat as well as humans). Whether or not Genesis 9 is establishing something new or reiterating a permission given before the Flood is open for debate, but it is clear that the shift to eating meat happened after the Fall for both humans and animals.
The passages from Job are of the same nature as Psalm 104. They refer to God providing food for predatory animals or to death among animals. Faro’s argument would seem to be that God’s wisdom is on display even in situations that include animal death. But she is able to take this a step further with Job 40—we should not claim that animal death is an evil, for to do so would be to find fault with God or to contend with him. The difficulty with Faro’s argument is that Job 38-41 is dealing with God’s wisdom in providentially ruling over a fallen world. It makes no claims about what life would ideally have been like before the Fall.
Later Faro appeals to Job to make the case that death and suffering do not “exist in the world due to human sin” alone. She notes that one of the points of the book of Job is that death and suffering have causes other than sin (here she also appeals to John 9:2). Yet, while it is true that Job’s sufferings were not caused by his own sin, it is difficult to move from this to the conclusion that the suffering he experienced was in no way connected to the Fall brought about by Adam’s sin. Were the loathsome sores that covered Job from head to foot the kind of thing that could have occurred to a man had Adam not sinned?
Faro wraps up her article by taking into account the Scripture passages that look toward a future in which animals live together in harmony. She claims, “Although animals of prey kill for food, animals are not capable of the savagery, cruelty, and terror that humanity can display. Humans, however, can teach animals cruelty, such as training pit bulls or roosters to fight and attack” (209). The human responsibility summarized in the creation mandate point in a different direction, Faro argues. She seems to indicate that part of the creation mandate is to improve animals from their original condition. The claim that animals are not capable of savagery or cruelty is a doubtful claim. Yet without this supposition Faro’s explanation fails to conform to the Creation, Fall, Redemption structure of Scripture. Key to this structure is an affirmation of the original goodness of creation.
The problem of evil as it pertains to animal death is one of the major philosophical challenges to forms of Christianity that seek to accommodate the current evolutionary consensus. Faro attempts to address this problem by claiming that animal death and suffering is actually not an evil. However, this claim rests on weak exegetical support and, at least in this article, fails to engage the philosophical/theological arguments to the contrary.
Thinking about the Development of Doctine
One question I face in class as a church historian is, ‘If doctrine develops, does this mean that what unites us to Christ changes over time too?’ This is an excellent question and, indeed, a rather obvious one when one is investigating the history of doctrine. Two things need to be borne in mind here.
First, Scripture gives no hint that that which saves changes: it is always trust in Christ that unites one to Christ. Thus, someone who was a believer in the first century is saved in the same way as someone who believes in the twenty-first.
Second, as noted above, the public criteria for what constitutes a credible profession of faith do change over time, as do the standards for office-bearing. As the church reflected upon the identity of Christ and upon Scripture over time, the limitations and inadequacies of certain formulations became more apparent. We noted above that in the third century, the view that Christ was subordinate to the Father in terms of his being was considered acceptable because the implications of that position had not been fully worked out. Once this had been done, and the unacceptable, unbiblical implications of such a position had become clear, the church put in place statements that ruled such views out of bounds. It is not that people who believed in Christ’s subordination in the second century could not therefore have been saved—we are all, after all, saved despite some of the things which we believe. It is rather that the church had come to an understanding that to protect and to articulate the gospel, accurate concepts and appropriate language were necessary, and some of these had to change over time as the in adequacy and abuse of earlier forms became clear.
Carl R. Trueman, The Creedal Imperative, (Wheaton: Crossway, 2012), 96-97.
Hans Madueme Reviews Three Books on Adam
Madueme, Hans. “Adam and Eve: An Evangelical Impasse?” Christian Scholar’s Review 45, no. 2 (Winter 2016): 165-183.
Madueme reviews three books on Adam: Karl Giberson’s Saving the Original Sinner, William VanDoodewaard’s The Quest for the Historical Adam, and John Walton’s The Lost World of Adam and Eve.
Madueme finds the strength of Giberson’s book its study of the history of varied interpretations regarding Adam. He also finds instructive the chapter on racism, which recounts why belief in the historical Adam did not prevent racism, as it ought to have, namely, becuase racists held the view that non-Europeans had degenerated from a superior white race. Nonetheless, Madueme finds problems in Giberson’s account. He notes that Giberson’s use of one frequently cited book “is hard to square” with what that source actually says. Giberson also misreads the early church’s view of original sin prior to Augustine. Most significantly, Giberson holds that the Bible itself must submit to “challenge from the advancing knowledge of the present.” Thus Paul is in error. Finally, Madueme notes that Giberson critiques creationist popularizers but fails to interact with creationists who are “reputable scientists (such as Leonard Brand, Arthur Chadwick, Paul Garner, Andrew Snelling, Kurt Wise, Todd Wood) and respected theologians (such as Douglas Kelly, John Mark Reynolds, Iain Duguid, Todd Beall, John Frame).” A critic should always critique his opponents where they are strongest.
Madueme holds out VanDoodewaard’s book as an example of excellent young earth creationist writing. Madueme notes that “of the three books under review, VanDoodewaard’s is the strongest theologically.” He praises VanDoodewaard’s critique of the claim that the creationist tradition is due to the literalist hermeneutic of Seventh Day Adventism. VanDoodewaard shows a heritage with roots in Scottish Presbyterianism, Southern Presbyterianism, the Dutch Reformed, and Lutheranism (both Missouri and Wisconsin synods). Madueme’s critiques are largely that he wishes VanDoodewaard had written a different or an expanded work. He wishes VanDoodewaard had interacted with the writings of more scholars outside the Reformed tradition. He also wishes that VanDoodewaard’s argument regarding a link between the denial of a historical Adam racism also dealt with the racism that existed among literalists. Finally, Madueme wishes that VanDoodewaard had provided more social context in his historical sections. The most substantive critique has to do with VanDoodewaard’s use of the term literalistic. Madueme thinks that adoption of this term both unnecessarily plays into the hands of critics and reflects that fact that VanDoodewaard sometimes sets up a false dichotomy.
Madueme is unconvinced by Walton’s continued work in the opening chapters of Genesis. A foundational premise of Walton’s is that the creation narrated in these opening chapters is functional rather than physical. Madueme thinks this sets up a false dichotomy. Being formed from the dust can both be a literal, historical statement as well as maintain some symbolism. But Walton will only see it one way or the other. Madueme sees it particularly devastating to Walton’s thesis the concession that aside from Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 15, the New Testament does not treat Adam as an archetype. This shows to Madueme that the dichotomy between first historical human and archetype should not be maintained. Madueme is also concerned that Walton’s approach amounts to an embrace of Stephen Jay Gould’s Non Overlapping Magisterium. While “Walton insists, repeatedly that we should read the Bible on its own terms without imposing modern scientific questions,” the approach is driven (though not “solely” driven, Madueme hastens to add) by scientific concerns. Finally, Madueme is troubled by Walton’s view of accommodation. “On this view, God accommodated his Word to the erroneous beliefs of the biblical authors.” Thus “the background beliefs” of Paul—even as expressed in the text—can be rejected though his “explicit statements” cannot be. But, Madueme notes, “ancient people believed in God or gods, that they exist, that they act in the world, that they engage with humanity, and so on. [Walton] is counseling readers of Scripture ex hypothesi to dismiss those portions as an incidental part of their cognitive environment. Presumably Walton would reply that his methodology only applies to those parts of the Bible that relate to scientific questions; that is, issues in cosmology, biology, and so on. But that proves my point—modern science is having an undue influence. Is this biblical scholarship with a Kantian twist, Scripture within the bounds of a naturalistic science?”
Madueme concludes that Giberson’s book has the advantage of avoiding conflict with the present scientific consensus but suffers from the fatal defect of reconfiguring Christianity in the process. He appreciates VanDoodewaard’s book but finds it too parochial. He urges evangelicals to show young earth creationists more academic respect and for these creationists to argue for their positions without attacking other evangelicals. He thinks that Walton’s book at its best shows “that evangelical biblical scholarship has the resources to engage difficult questions raised by modern science.” But, “at its worst, the picture that emerges is a theologically anemic, hermeneutical mirror dancing to the scientific consensus.”
Luther on the Futility of Trusting in Good Works for Salvation
To trust in works, which one ought to do in fear, is equivalent to giving oneself the honor and taking it from God, to whom fear is due in connection with every work. But this is completely wrong, namely to please oneself, to enjoy oneself in one’s works, and to adore oneself as an idol.
Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, Vol. 31: Career of the Reformer I, ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann, vol. 31 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1999), 46.
- « Previous Page
- 1
- …
- 41
- 42
- 43
- 44
- 45
- …
- 84
- Next Page »