Exegesis and Theology

The Blog of Brian Collins

Who is the man dressed in linen in Daniel 10?

by Leave a Comment

When Daniel 10:5–6 is read in light of Rev 1:12–17 (cf. Acts 9:4, 7; 22:9; 26:14), it is hard to deny a messianic identification of the man clothed in linen. However, when verse 13 records the speaker saying that the “prince of the kingdom of Persia withstood me twenty-one days” and that the angel Michael “came to help me,” it is hard to see how the divine Son could be in view. Note that if this figure is the Son, he would not be the incarnate Son, for this precedes the incarnation.

Stephen Miller (NAC) and Tanner (EEC) cut the knot by proposing that there are two beings in view: the divine Son in verses 5–9 and an angel in verses 10–21. Steinmann (ConcC) and Chase (ESVSC), however, argue strongly that the text does not clearly distinguish two persons. Instead, in both cases there is a “man” who speaks to Daniel and touches Daniel.

And yet without Miller and Tanner’s solution, I don’t see a way forward. The intertextual connections are too strong to deny a messianic identification in verse 5, and verse 13 cannot be reconciled with the person being the divine Son.

Perhaps, despite Steinman and Chase’s arguments, there is a way to justify the Miller/Tanner position. Daniel 10 begins a section that concludes with Daniel 12:13. Note that in Daniel 12:5–6 the man clothed in linen is still standing above the waters. Note also that there are two other figures present. These are not Daniel’s companions because they ran away (10:7). These are likely angelic beings. If we come back to chapter 10 with the understanding that the man clothed in linen remained positioned above the waters and that there were also angels present, then it becomes more plausible that the hand that touches Daniel in 10:10 is of an angelic being.

This can be further substantiated by a close reading of chapter 10. The figure who touches Daniel is identified in Daniel 10:16 as “one in the likeness of the sons of men” (LSB). Steinmann wants to link this phrase with the Daniel 7 vision of the Son of Man, but the plural “sons” points in a different direction. This is a being with “human likeness” (CSB) in contrast to the theophanic appearance of the man clothed in linen. This identification is reinforced in Daniel 10:18, where it is stated that the one who touched Daniel had the “appearance of a man.” With verse 18’s connection to Daniel 10:20 and verse 20’s allusion back to Daniel 10:13, the text may draw a distinction between the man clothed in linen (the divine Son) and the one in the likeness of the sons of man (an angel).

The ἄγγελοι of the Seven Churches: Pastors or Angels?

by Leave a Comment

What is the identity of the ἄγγελοι of the seven churches?

Possible Interpretations

1. The ἄγγελοι are angels (Oecumenius, Caesarius of Arles [as an option]), Alford, Charles, Thomas, Michaels, Beale, Osborne, Hamilton, Koester, Fanning)

a. Elsewhere in Revelation ἄγγελος is only used of angels (Alford, 4:560; Charles, ICC, 34; Michaels, IVPNTC; Beale, NIGTC, 217; Hamilton, PtW, 51, Koester, 60–61).

b. Stars are a common symbol for angels (Osborne, BECNT, 99; Beale, NIGTC, 218).

c. In the NT there seem to be angels who “are allotted to persons, and are regarded as representing them” (Mt 18:10; Acts 12:15) (Alford, 4:560, Charles, ICC, 34).

d. In Daniel there are angels who represent nations, making it reasonable that there could be angels that represent churches (Alford, 4:560, Charles, ICC, 34; cf. Beale, NIGTC, 217).

e. Church leaders are not addressed in these letters; churches as a whole are addressed through the angel (Alford, 4:560).

f. Oecumenius, acknowledging the absurdity of a letter being written to an angel in the presence of God and of rebukes to a holy angel regarding sin, concludes that Christ “speaks periphrastically of the church” when he references its angel (Greek Commentaries, ACC, 10; cf. Caesarius of Arles, Latin Commentaries, ACC 66; Charles, ICC, 34).

g. Another option is that the angels are held culpable for the failures of the churches due to “corporate representation” (Beale, NIGTC, 217–18).

2. The ἄγγελοι are  church leaders (Caeasarius of Arles [as an option]; Perkins; Gerhard; Dabney, Bavinck, de Burgh, Elliott, Tenney, Leithart)

a. The term ἄγγελος can be used of human preachers (Mt. 11:10; 1 Cor 11:10) (Perkins, Works, 4:441; cf. Leithart, ITC, 122).

b. The letters are addressed to them (Bavinck, RD, 2:467). “If Jesus actually appeared to John, dictated the actual words we read in the text, and expected John actually to send the messages to the churches, then the notion that the recipients are angel-spirits makes little sense. … To put it provocatively, or snarkily: Where do angels receive their mail? And, how does John know the addresses?” (Leithart, ITC, 123).

c. The ἄγγελοι are held responsible for for the conduct of the churches (de Burgh, 23). Notably, “in Greek most of the exhortations of the messages are explicitly addressed to a single person—the angel. … Now, as difficult as it might be to imagine that Jesus holds the some human leader of a city church responsible for the condition of his flock, it is far more difficult to determine what these charges and exhortations mean when addressed to an angel-spirit” (Leithart, ITC, 123–24).

d. Since holy angels have no need to repent, church leaders are in view (Caesarius of Arles, Latin Commentaries, ACC 66).

e. “Jesus threatens to remove the lampstand (the church, 1:20) from Ephesus if the angel fails to repent. That leaves the future of the Ephesian church dependent not on the repentance of the community or its leader, but on the repentance of his spiritual guardian, over whom the community can exert no influence” (Leithart, ITC, 124).

3. A “symbol to represent the heavenly or supernatural character of the church” (Ladd, 35; cf. Oecumenius under 1.g.).

a. The pastor interpretation is ruled out since the term ἄγγελος is not used of pastors in the NT.

b. The pastor interpretation is ruled out since the letters rebuke the whole church rather than a church leader.

c. The angel interpretation is ruled out because apocalyptic literature never has angels representing men.

d. Ladd reaches his conclusion by process of elimination.

Rejected Interpretations

 1. The ἄγγελοι are angels

a. This is the strongest argument for this position. However, chapters 2-3 connect to the rest of the book in an interesting way. For instance, the coming of Christ in these chapters refers to a coming in judgment on individual churches during the present age whereas the coming later in the book refers to the coming in final judgment on the whole earth. Thus, for terms to be used somewhat differently in chapters 2-3 is not surprising.

b. The term star is used variously in Revelation of actual stars (6:13; 8:12; 9:1), of angels (8:10–11), of the patriarchs (12:1), of Israel (12:4), and of Christ (2:28; 22:16). It is not inconceivable then that it is here used of pastors.

c. I reject (along with most Reformed interpreters) the interpretation that sees these texts as teaching the existence of guardian angels. For instance, Turretin rejects Matt. 18:10 as a prooftext on the grounds that “it cannot be gathered from this that a certain particular and peculiar angel is granted to individual infants for a perpetual guard” (Institutes, 7.8.9-14 [1:558-59]; cf. Hodge, ST, 1:640; Bavinck, RD, 2:467; Erickson, CT, 2nd ed., 469; McCune, STBC, 1:371–72). Regarding Acts 12:15, Turretin notes, “Nothing prevents us from taking the word angelou here for ‘messenger (a frequent use of the word, Mt. 11:10; Lk. 7:24, 27; 9:52), for ‘it is a messenger sent by him’ to announce something concerning him (as they who are in chains are accustomed to use messengers to report their condition)” (Turretin, Institutes, 7.8.9-14 [1:558-59]; cf. Peterson, PNTC, 365–66).

d. The angels in Daniel 10 are not territorial spirits or representatives of particular nations but demonic spirits seeking to influence those nations. J. Paul Tanner notes with regard to Daniel 10:13, “Care should be taken here, however, not to label this a “territorial spirit,” as though a geographical assignment is the issue. More accurately, the stress is on sociopolitical structure, meaning that this demon was targeting the empire and the human authorities behind that empire” (Tanner, EEC, 635–36).

e. This seems factually inaccurate. The address in the letters is in the singular, not plural. In other words, the messengers are singularly addressed by Christ. To be sure, they are addressed as representatives of the churches, but they are also addressed in such a way that they bear responsibility for the churches. It seems unlikely that unfallen angels can be held responsible for the straying and sinning of churches (cf. Bavinck, RD, 2:467; de Burgh, 23; Leithart, ITC, 1:123).

f. Fanning notes the difficulty with this view:  “But such a sequence of images seems too convoluted to follow (star in his hand equals an angel over the church equals the ethos of the church addressed as a person). Moreover, it is hard to see how “angel” could represent such a meaning” (ZECNT, 107–8).

g. It seems difficult to see how unfallen angels could be held responsible for sin.

3. A “symbol to represent the heavenly or supernatural character of the church”

a. The stars are already a symbol of the angels. To make the angels a symbol of the church means to have a symbol symbolize a symbol. See also the quotation from Fanning under 1.g.

b. Ladd does not offer positive argumentation for this view.

Accepted Interpretations

2. The ἄγγελοι are church leaders

a. There is precedent for this term to be applied to human messengers (Mt 11:10).

b. If John were to obey, he would of necessity be writing to other humans because he could not send what he wrote  to a heavenly angel. As Leithart notes, “The more we try to imagine a set of letters sent to angel-spirits, the more implausible it becomes. And then we are left with the unhappy (perhaps unfair) suspicion that commentators do not think Jesus really intended John to write to the angels at all” (Leithart, ITC, 1:123).

c. The ἄγγελοι are held responsible for for the conduct of the churches.

d. A call to repent (2:5, 16) can only be addressed to a human. Even if this is understood as a call for the whole church to repent, as I think it should be, it would be hard to exclude the messenger from the call to repentance since it is addressed to him. It would seem inappropriate to command an unfallen angel to repent (cf. Caesarius of Arles in Latin Commentaries on Revelation, ACC, 66; Leithart, ITC, 1:123).

e. It would be difficult to imagine a church being judged for the failure of its representative angel.

Scapegoat or Azazel in Leviticus 16:8, 10, 26

by Leave a Comment

Introduction

Commentators debate the meaning of the Hebrew word עֲזָאזֵל as applied to the goat that was sent into the wilderness. This word occurs only in Leviticus 16:8, 10, 26.

Proposed Solutions

1. עֲזָאזֵל refers to “the goat that departs” (Rooker 216; cf. ABD, 1:536; Morales, 178),or the “scapegoat” (KJV, NIV).

a. This word is made up of the terms for “goat” (`ēz) and “depart” (’āzal) (EDBT, 253; cf. Sklar, 209; Vasholz, 188).

b. This understanding is reflected in the ancient Greek translations and the Vulgate (Bonar, 303; Vasholz, 188).

c. This meaning tracks closely with what was done with the goat (Vasholz, 188) and thus draws the understanding of the obscure term from what is clear in the text (EDBT, 253).

2. עֲזָאזֵל means “entire removal” (Feinberg, 331)or “total destruction” (Wenham, 235).

a. The word is derived from a word for “removal” (‘zl), reduplicated to indicate intensification, “entire removal.”

b. The LXX rendering, using the word ἀποπομπή, “sending away” supports the idea of removal (Feinberg, 331-32; Harrison, 173).

c. The phrase “land of cutting off” in v. 22 could interpret the term עֲזָאזֵל, and support the idea that the term means “total destruction” (Wenham, 235).

3.  עֲזָאזֵל refers to the wilderness terrain.

a. The word could be related to “the Arabic word ‘azâzu (‘rough ground’)” (Sklar, 209).

b. The phrase “land of cutting off” in v. 22 could interpret the term עֲזָאזֵל, and support the idea that the term refers to the “land of cutting off.” (Wenham, 235).

c. The phrase “into the wilderness” could be “an appositional explanation of” עֲזָאזֵל (Rooker, 217).

d. This view is found in the Talmud (Feinberg, 325; Milgrom, 1020) and held by Rashi (Wenham, 235).

4.  עֲזָאזֵל refers to demon in the wilderness.

a. By metathesis, the name could be understood to have been based on words meaning “fierce god” (AB, 1:536; Milgrom, 1021).

b. עֲזָאזֵל best parallels  לַיהוָ֔ה (vv. 9-10) because on this view both would be supernatural beings (AB, 1:536; Milgrom, 1020).

c. The Bible presents the wilderness as the dwelling place of demons (Isa. 13:21-22; 34:11-15; Matt. 12:34; Luke 11:24; Rev. 18:2; cf. Bar. 4:35; Tob. 8:3) (Milgrom, 1020; Hartley, 238).

d. This interpretation appears in intertestamental literature (1 Enoch 8:1; 9:6; 10:4–8; 13:1; cf. 54:5–6; 55:4; 69:2; Apoc. Ab. 13:6–14; 14:4–6; 20:5–7; 22:5; 23:11; 29:6–7; 31:5) (AB, 1:536; Milgrom, 1020-21; Hartley, 238).

e. This does not imply a sacrifice to a demon since it was not slain. Nor does it have any propitiatory role (Milgrom, 1021). It could just be a way of indicating that the sins were returned to the demon (Hartley, 238).

Rejected Solutions:

2. עֲזָאזֵל means “entire removal”  or “total destruction.”

a. The LXX doesn’t truly establish this position; it refers to “to the one carrying away” (cf. Hartley, 222).

b. The lack of parallelism between  לַיהוָ֔ה (“for Yhwh,” v. 9) as parallel to לַעֲזָאזֵ֔ל (“for entire removal,” v. 10) tells against this view (Hartley, 237), though it is not decisive.

3.  עֲזָאזֵל refers to the wilderness terrain.

a. The lack of parallelism between  לַיהוָ֔ה (“for Yhwh,” v. 9) as parallel to לַעֲזָאזֵ֔ל (“to a rough place,” v. 10) tells against this view (Hartley, 237-38), though it is not decisive.

b. Though “into the wilderness” could be appositional, it would also be redundant on this view. It is unclear why two terms would be needed here.

4.  עֲזָאזֵל refers to demon in the wilderness.

a. The intertestamental literature at this point is fanciful, and it cannot be relied on to give an accurate interpretation of Lev. 16 (cf. Feinberg, 328-29; Vasholz, 188).

b. Leviticus 17:7 forbids sacrifices to goat demons, which makes a practice that could be construed that way unlikely (EDBT; 253; Feinberg, 329; Vasholz, 188; Wenahm, 234). Despite a construal that clearly disclaim the sending of a goat is a sacrifice (Milgrom, 1021; Hartley, 238), it is unlikely that something akin to an offering to a demon would be part of the central act of atonement in Israel (cf. Wenham, 234). As Sklar says, “the Lord typically tells his people to have absolutely nothing to do with false gods (Exod. 23:24; 34:13; Deut. 12:3), as he in fact does in the very next chapter (17:7). One wonders whether he would involve a demon in this rite, even in such a negative way, and risk the Israelites turning the rite into some form of appeasement to this demon” (Sklar, 209).

c. This view is too easily construed as teaching that Satan must be paid something as part of atonement (EDBT, 253).

Accepted Solution:

1. עֲזָאזֵל refers to “the goat that departs” or the “scapegoat.”

a. Despite the objection that this view does not treat לַיהוָ֔ה (“for Yhwh,” v. 9) as parallel to לַעֲזָאזֵ֔ל (“as the scapegoat,” v. 10 NIV) (DOTP, 59; Feinberg, 327), this solution is still grammatical. Further, there is still a parallelism: one lot is “in relation to Yhwh” and the other lot is “in relation to the scapegoat” (cf. EDBT, 253; Sklar, 209).

b. The claim that this view requires the translations “to send the goat to the scapegoat in the wilderness” (v. 10) and “and he who taketh away the goat to the scapegoat” (v. 26) (Feinberg, 327) is incorrect. The NIV translations, “by sending it into the wilderness as a scapegoat” (v. 10) and “The man who releases the goat as a scapegoat,” are acceptable (Sklar, 209).

c. There is little dispute that this goat symbolized the taking away of the sin of the people, and this view captures this message most clearly (Sklar, 210).

Bibliography: Dictionaries: “Garrett, “Feasts and Festivals of Israel,” EDBT; Hartley, “Atonement, Day of,” DOTP; D. Wright, “Azazel,” ABD; Commentaries: Bonar; Harrison, TOTC; Hartley, WBC; Milgrom, AYB; Rooker, NAC; Sklar, TOTC; Vasholz, Mentor; Wenham, NICOT; Other: Feinberg, “The Scapegoat of Leviticus Sixteen,” BibSac 115 (1958): 320-33; Morales, Who Shall Ascend the Mountain of the Lord? A Biblical Theology of the Book of Leviticus, NSBT.

Thoughts on the Translation of Leviticus 26:40–42

by Leave a Comment

The ESV provides a typical translation of Leviticus 26:40–42:

But if they confess their iniquity and the iniquity of their fathers in their treachery that they committed against me, and also in walking contrary to me, so that I walked contrary to them and brought them into the land of their enemies—if then their uncircumcised heart is humbled and they make amends for their iniquity, then I will remember my covenant with Jacob, and I will remember my covenant with Isaac and my covenant with Abraham, and I will remember the land.

Since the KJV, English translations have tended to translate these verses as conditionals (“but if they”), and since the RSV, English translations have tended to translate a key phrase in verse 41, “and they make amends for their iniquity,” or some variant of the same.

A better translation is as follows. Here I use the CSB as main translation, but the bold text is brought over from the NKJV:

40 “But when they confess their iniquity and the iniquity of their ancestors—their unfaithfulness that they practiced against me, and how they acted with hostility toward me, 41 and I acted with hostility toward them and brought them into the land of their enemies—and when their uncircumcised hearts are humbled and they accept their guilt, 42 then I will remember my covenant with Jacob. I will also remember my covenant with Isaac and my covenant with Abraham, and I will remember the land.

The CSB, along with the Geneva Bible and the NET Bible, rightly recognize that there is no conditional particle in the Hebrew (as there is earlier in the chapter when the blessings and curses of the Mosaic covenant are outlined). Thus, it is best to translate, as the CSB does, “But when they confess their iniquity” and “when their uncircumcised hearts are humbled.”

Regarding the contested phrase in verse 42, the key verb in the sentence (רצה), translated “make amends” by the ESV and “accept” by the NKJV,” is commonly understood be from one of two identically spelled roots. The first means “to be pleased with, to enjoy, to accept.” The second means “to pay for, to restore.” However, I wonder if the second root with its meaning is necessary to posit. The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew cites texts in support of this sense the verse under consideration (Lev 26:41) as well as earlier verses in Leviticus 26 which state (in common translation) that the land will “enjoy its Sabbaths.” In fact, the few other verses cited in support of the second root could be translated in line with the first root and its senses.

In addition, the Hebrew word translated by the ESV as “iniquity” can also be understood to indicate “guilt” (as in the NKJV) or “punishment.” Thus, the translation of the NKJV, “and they accept their guilt.”

The UBS Handbook on Leviticus advocates the same translation I’m advocating in this post:

 Make amends for their iniquity: this phrase presents difficulties with regard to the understanding of both the verb, make amends, and the noun, rendered iniquity in RSV, and consequently for the interpretation of the whole. A number of versions have adopted essentially the same interpretation as RSV (NIV, NJV, and NAB). But the noun used here may mean either “guilt” or “punishment for guilt.” The idea of punishment seems more probable in this context, as in 5:1, 7; 10:17; and 16:22; as well as Gen 4:13. The verb translated make amends in RSV is sometimes used in the sense of “accept.” An example of this in Leviticus is God’s accepting a sacrifice in 1:4. MFT translates the whole phrase “submit to be punished for their sins,” while NEB has “accept their punishment in full,” leaving the idea of guilt implicit. It is especially significant that, while JB (1966) rendered the whole phrase “atone for their sins,” the more recent NJB (1985) has “accept the punishment for their guilt.” The latter interpretation is therefore recommended to translators.

René Péter-Contesse and John Ellington, A Handbook on Leviticus, UBS Handbook Series (New York: United Bible Societies, 1992), 420.

What is the theological significance of these translation differences? Leviticus 26 (much like Deuteronomy 28) outlines the covenant blessings and curses of the Mosaic covenant. If Israel kept the covenant, it would enjoy the blessings of the covenant (26:1–13). If Israel spurned and loathed the covenant, and if Israel thus broke the Mosaic covenant and its laws, then all the covenant curses would come upon Israel (26:14–39). But Leviticus 26:40–45 (like Deuteronomy 30) looks ahead to the new covenant. These verses predict Israel’s repentance. Someday Israelites will confess its guilt and the guilt of their fathers, and they will accept their guilt. At that point God will bring to pass the promises of the Abrahamic covenant.

Initial Thoughts on Patrick Schreiner’s Recovery of the Quadriga

by

In a recent article Patrick Schriener seeks to recover the Quadriga.

A few thoughts:

1. Schreiner seems concerned that redemptive-historical readings of a text can marginalize application to the moral life of the Christian. This is a legitimate concern. I recall this concern being raised several decades ago in the book Feed My Sheep. But the Quadriga isn’t the only or best way to ensure that both redemptive-history and personal application are included in readings of Scripture. 

2. Schreiner operates with an idiosyncratic and ahistorical definition of allegory:  “We must read according to salvation history and typology—what the Church Fathers generally called the allegorical sense.” He grants in the conclusion, “In the history of interpretation, people have strayed too far from authorial intent. Other times, an extra-textual philosophical grid was employed to conduct allegory.” But in the patristic and medieval periods these were not just occasional corruptions of the allegorical sense; these were characteristic of the allegorical sense (See: Origins of Allegorical Interpretation and Christian Theology). In the footnote, he appeals to Paul’s use of “allegory” in Galatians 4, but Paul was doing something different from the Fathers. (See: Galatians 4:21-31: An Allegory?) Thus, there is a great deal of equivocation on the term allegory. 

3. In his description of the literal sense, Schreiner says that Saul’s armor symbolizes “earthly methods of warfare” while the sling and staff represent “simple shepherd’s tools, entirely inadequate by worldly standards.” But it simply isn’t true that slings and stones were inadequate military weapons. Steinman notes, “Slings, along with bows, were the artillery of Iron Age warfare (cf. 2 Ki 3:25; 2 Chr 26:14) (1 Samuel, ConC, 341).  Steinman draws something else from this exchange: “Here another subtle contrast with Saul is brought into play. Saul, the king from Benjamin, ought to have confronted Goliath with a sling. Benjaminites were renown for their skill as slingers—they were even expert left-handed slingers (Judg 20:15–16; 1 Chr 12:2)” (Ibid., 341).

4. There is a great deal of Schreiner’s allegorical section that I would agree with as textually rooted typology. David is a type of Christ. At least some of the serpent connections are valid. What the NASB translates as “scale armor” is used of “scales” of animals in all its other uses. I can see the striking of the head and the cutting off of the head evoking Genesis 3:15. Some of the connections Schreiner makes in this section are a stretch. David being sent by his father to his brothers, bringing bread, is not, I think, typological. David as a type of the Messiah and Goliath as a seed of the serpent could be author-intended typology that was accessible to original readers. Some of the other connections Schreiner is trying to make (like the bringing of bread could not have been author-intended typology or accessible to the original readers). 

5. I’m not opposed to making moral application to individual Christians from this passage. Some of his applications are valid. For instance, the need to trust the Lord and the importance of recalling the Lord’s past faithfulness are valid applications.  But Schreiner also moves back to his flawed amor = self-reliance symbolism. Making Goliath a symbol of personal vices and the stone a symbol of “repentance, prayer, and reliance of the Spirit” do not have textual warrant. There is something that could be done with the vice of pride. That is a theme of both this narrative and the book of Samuel as a whole. But it wouldn’t be addressed the way Schreiner is doing it.

6. Given my willingness to see a typological aspect to the David and Goliath story, I’m not opposed to seeing it prefigure the final victory of Christ over Satan. Indeed, that is inherent in the typology. But again, Schreiner over-eggs the details. Many of them lack textual warrant. 

7. Schriener concludes by claiming, “But if an interpreter stays ruthlessly tied to authorial intent, literary structure, and canonical fulfillment, rather than viewing this as a type of reader-response interpretation, then many missteps can be avoided. To put this another way, a fourfold reading must be found within the text.” The problem is, this did not characterize historical practitioners of the Quadriga, and Schriener in this very post is positing readings that are not rooted in the text or ruthlessly tied to authorial intent. 

8. The Reformation opposed the Quadriga. (See The Reformation and the Fourfold Sense of Scripture). Instead of trying to repristinate the Quadriga, it would be better to insist that redemptive-historical readings of the text also be accompanied with personal application and to encourage sensitivity to authorially intended, textually rooted typology. 

See also

Notes on Leithart’s Deep Exegesis

Mitchell Chase, 40 Questions about Typology and Allegory

Fall 2025 issue of the Journal of Biblical Theology and Worldview released

by

The newest issue of the BJU Seminary journal has been released.

I wrote a review critiquing Simon Kennedy’s book Against Worldview. Here is my concluding paragraph:

Simon Kennedy is correct that the term worldview has proliferated in discussions of Christian education. There is certainly much that flies under the banner of worldview that deserves critique, and some of Kennedy’s critiques legitimately apply to some who claim the worldview label. Nonetheless, Kennedy’s critique falls short on three grounds. First, he has not substantively engaged the thought of the best worldview thinkers. Second, his protest against the intrusion of worldview into the academic subjects and his assertion of the Bible’s irrelevance to much of academic life reveals a superficial approach to the application of Bible to life as well as lack of awareness regarding the theological issues raised in the teaching of the various academic disciplines. Third, Kennedy’s rejection of the antithesis between the wisdom of God and the wisdom of the world is an overreaction to the apologetic emphasis of some worldview thinkers.  

I would also commend Layton Talbert’s article, “A Proverb in the Hand Is Worth Two in the Bush: A Hermeneutical Proposal for Handling Biblical Proverbs.” This article is especially helpful for thinking through what kinds of proverbs may have exceptions and which do not.

Thoughts on Proverbs 1:8–19

by

These verses form the first section of Proverbs after the Prologue. It begins with the words “Hear, my son,” and the phrase “my son” is repeated three times in this section: vv. 8, 10, 15. Thus Proverbs opens with instruction from a father and mother to a son. More particularly, it opens with instruction from the Davidic king to the Davidic son.

Steinmann argues that there are ten of these “my son” sections in Proverbs 1–9: “(1) 1:8-19; (2) 2:1-22; (3) 3:1-20; (4) 3:21-35; (5) 4:10-19; (6) 4:20-27;(7) 5:1-23; (8) 6:1-19; (9) 6:20-35; and (10) 7:1-27” (Steinmann, ConcC, 61). He excludes 4:1–9 from this count on the grounds that sons, plural, are addressed. I don’t find this entirely convincing. And yet, there is something different about 4:1–9. Much of this section is a quotation of the father’s father’s instructions. Also, the latter verses of the section are similar to a personified wisdom section (e.g., “love her, and she will guard you,” “She will honor you if you embrace her,” etc.). Perhaps Steinmann is correct, and perhaps these ten addresses are intended to evoke the Decalogue.

In any event, the command not to murder is the first command of the second table of the law after the transitional command about obedience to parents. Thus, it is notable that after an exhortation to obey the fifth commandment (1:8-9), the father speaks to his son regarding the sixth commandment.

Thoughts on Proverbs 1:7

by

I owe the following insights to a conversation with Bryan Smith:

יִרְאַ֣ת יְ֭הוָה רֵאשִׁ֣ית דָּ֑עַת חָכְמָ֥ה וּ֝מוּסָ֗ר אֱוִילִ֥ים בָּֽזוּ׃

Note that the first and last words of the verse relate to dispositions: fear and despise.

Note that there is no waw after the athnach. It is possible, this being poetry, that “knowledge, wisdom, and instruction” should be read together as applying to both those who fear Yhwh and those who are fools who despise: “Fear of Yhwh is the beginning of knowledge, wisdom, and instruction; fools despise knowledge, wisdom, and instruction.” Subsequent verses indicate that fools hate knowledge (דַּעַת, Prv 1:22, 29).

This kind of thick, poetic meaning is the kind of thing one would expect in the thesis statement for the book.

Notably, Bruce Waltke says something similar:

The punctuation of the MT in this verse creates an enjambment. The parallel in 1:2a suggests that knowledge (da’at) in v. 7a spills over into wisdom (hokmâ) and instruction (mûsār) in verset B. Mutatis mutandis, “wisdom and instruction” in verset B spill over into “knowledge” in verset A. Fools (wîlîm; see pp. 112 13), however, are incapable of this prerequisite for understanding the sage’s teaching and knowing wisdom, for they willfully make the corrupt moral choice to refuse the sage’s moral teachings.

Waltke, NICOT, 1:181.

Three Views on the Rapture, 2nd edition on Sale

by

Amazon has the second edition of Three Views on the Rapture on sale today. Criag Blaising defends the pretribulational position, Alan Hultberg the prewrath position, and Doug Moo the postribulational position.

In the first edition, I thought that Doug Moo had the strongest argued essay even though I was not ultimately persuaded of his position. Moo’s essay is updated and reprised in this edition. The essays by Blaising and Hultberg are new to this edition. I think Blaising’s essay is the strongest defense of pretribulationalism that I’ve read. Also, though Blaising was a pioneer of Progressive Dispensationalism, he constructed his argument in a way that it does not rely on any specifically dispensational commitments.

Related:

Review of Three Views on the Rapture by Craig Blaising, Alan Hultberg, and Douglas J. Moo
Resources on the Pretribulation Rapture

Thoughts on the Purposes of Proverbs according to Proverbs 1:2–7

by

  • The first purpose is general: to know wisdom and instruction. Note the three words knowledge, wisdom, and instruction all appear in verse 7, creating an inclusio.
  • The second purpose is “to understand words of understanding.” This parallels verse 6, “to understand a proverb and a saying, the words of the wise and their riddles,” which indicates that the “words of understanding” = proverbs, sayings, words of the wise, and riddles of the wise.
  • The third purpose is to receive instruction in wise dealing, which is explicated as righteousness, justice, and equity. Thus wisdom involves not just the mind (to know, to understand) but also action (righteousness, justice, and equity) (Brown, “Righteousness, Justice, and Rectitude,” in The Old Testament Yesterday and Today: Essays in Honor of Michael P. V. Barrett, 202). These words also clarify that wisdom is not just cunning (Waltke, NICOT, 1:177).
  • The fourth purpose highlights and audience “to the simple”, “to the youth.” They especially need prudence, knowledge, and discretion.
  • Verse 5 breaks the pattern with a command. The command is addressed to the wise. This is a second audience. They have learning, but they are to increase in it. They understand, but they still need guidance.
  • This fifth purpose is directed at the wise. They need to understand a proverb, a saying, the words of the wise and the riddles of the wise. This links back to 2b, but it is an advance upon “words of insight.”
  • The prologue comes to a climax in verse 7.