Exegesis and Theology

The Blog of Brian Collins

Conservative and Liberal Purposes for Government

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Readers should keep in mind Terry Nardin’s insight that the significant divide in modern political thought is not between left and right; it is between those who see the state as an instrument for promoting particular purposes, a conservative view, and those who see it as a framework within which people can pursue their own self-chosen purposes, a liberal view.

. . . . . . . . . .

“The terms conservative and liberal have their traditional political theory meanings here and not their meanings in contemporary U. S. political dialogue. The conservative view rests on the assumption that any authority is based on shared beliefs. In other words, a common set of beliefs is constitutive of authority in a social order (de Tocqueville [1835] 1956; Durkheim [1915] 1965: 236-245). The influence of authority is a function of the existence of shared beliefs, values, and practices within a given social setting (Durkheim [1915] 1965: 207; Parsons 1960). The liberal view is that the lack of shared beliefs is what makes authority crucial in social relations. In this view, authority solves the inherent problem of chaos in situations with no substantive agreement between the actors. Having a person in authority solves the predicament of disagreement over what is to be done; in other words, when actors cannot agree on a course of action, they select an actor to make the decision for them (Friedman 1973: 140). This view of authority, often associated with Thomas Hobbes, is based on procedural and not substantive agreement. Any social action is part of what Terry Nardin calls a practical association, which assists not in generating shared goals but in tolerance between people (Nardin 1983: 10-14).”

Robert B. Shelledy, in Church, State, and Citizen: Christian Approaches to Political Engagement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 17, 29-30, n. 5.

Review of Jim Hamilton’s With the Clouds of Heaven

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Hamilton, James M., Jr. With the Clouds of Heaven: The Book of Daniel in Biblical Theology. New Studies in Biblical Theology. Edited by D. A. Carson. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2014.

I found much to appreciate in Hamilton’s biblical theology of Daniel. Hamilton forthrightly holds to the early date for the book and defends the necessity of this understanding for right interpretation of the book. Hamilton also has his eye on both the theology of Daniel and how that theology connects to the rest of the canon. Finally, I found the book full of exegetical insights. For instance, I thought his treatment of the parallels between various visions well-done.

I have three criticisms, however. First, I do not find Hamilton’s chiastic structure for the book compelling. I rarely find chiastic structures for books compelling. Too often the sections are unbalanced and the parallels created by the author’s wording rather than by the text. This is the case with Hamilton’s structure of Daniel. For instance, Hamilton labels chapter 1 “Exile to the unclean realm of the dead.” Yet chapter 1 does not clearly identify Babylon as the realm of the dead. The parallel closing section, 10-12, Hamilton labels “Return from exile and resurrection from the dead.” This label works for chapter 12, but it doesn’t really work for chapters 10-11.

Second, I find Hamilton’s approach typology to be somewhat over-imaginative. For instance, I see the parallels that Hamilton draws between Joseph and Daniel, but whether that makes Joseph a type of Daniel is unclear to me. What is more I think it is a stretch to use these parallels to connect Daniel to the New Exodus theme.

Third, I find Hamilton’s interpretation of Daniel’s 70 sevens unconvincing. One of my motivations for reading Hamilton was to examine alternatives to the dispensational approach to this passage in which the first 69 sevens stretch from a decree of a Persian monarch related to the rebuilding of Jerusalem to the first coming of Christ and in which the 70th seven awaits a future fulfillment. Hamilton takes the first seven weeks to refer to the “time between the revelation of these things to Daniel and the conclusion of Malachi’s prophetic ministry.” The troubled sixty-two weeks are the intertestamental period. The seventieth week extends from the establishment of the church to the return of Christ, the last half of the week being the time of Antichrist (131-32; 215-16).

Hamilton begins by discounting the literal nature of Jeremiah’s 70 year prophecy. Hamilton says, “If Daniel counted from the time of his own exile to Babylon in 605 BC, the first year of Darius in 539/538 BC would be roughly seventy years.” He concludes from this “Daniel seems to take the seventy years as a round number that broadly corresponds to an individual’s  lifespan” (123). This leads to another conclusion, in turn. Since the 70 years of Jeremiah were not literal years, “I do not think Daniel intended the seventy weeks to be understood literally either” (124). But there are several weak links in this chain of reasoning. First, even if one does not adopt one of the interpretations that finds Jeremiah’s prophecy fulfilled precisely (Hamilton calls these interpretations “strained” but fails to engage with them), the years may still be literal rather than figurative. As Hamilton notes, the time span was “roughly seventy years.” A “round number,” as Hamilton designates Jeremiah’s seventy years, is not necessarily a figurative number. In fact, if the number is a round number it would seem that it is not merely a symbolic number. Furthermore, if the number is a round number that is fulfilled in roughly seventy years rather than in exactly seventy years, why would Daniel conclude that the number is symbolic of a lifespan? Hamilton appeals to Isaiah 23:15 and Psalm 90:10 as evidence that the Bible uses 70 symbolically for a lifespan. But even if Isaiah 23:15 is referring to an idealized period of time with regard to Tyre, this does not mean that Jeremiah is doing so with regard to Israel. Second Chronicles 36:20 says that the exile was for seventy years so that the land would enjoy its Sabbaths. This would be an inspired indication that the 70 years for Israel should be taken more literally than that for Tyre. Furthermore, understanding the seventy years for Tyre literally is not beyond the realm of possibility. Erlandsson notes that “between the years 700 and 630 . . . Assyria did not permit Tyre to engage in any business activity.” S. Erlandsson, The Burden of Babylon: A Study of Isaiah 13:2-14:23 (Lund: Gleerup, 1970), 102 as cited in Geoffrey Gorgan, “Isaiah,” Expositor’s Bible Commentary, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986), 6:147.

Hamilton also argues that the 70 sevens of Daniel 9 are not to be taken as actual years because Ezekiel speaks of differing period: a 430 year period of judgment (430 years being symbolic of the sojourn in Egypt) (124-25). The comparison between Ezekiel 4 and Daniel 9 is far from apt. Ezekiel is obviously working with symbols throughout Ezekiel 4, so for his numbers to symbolically represent exile in Egypt/Mesopotamia is understandable. However, the prophecy of the seventy sevens follows on a prophecy of seventy years that was fulfilled in “roughly seventy years.” We would expect then the seventy sevens to follow to be actual years rather than merely symbolic years unless there is some compelling reason to the contrary.

The only other reason that Hamilton gives for taking the 70 sevens as symbolic is that 490 amounts to a tenfold jubilee. This is interesting in light of the fact that Jeremiah’s 70 year prophecy dealt with giving the land its Sabbath rest. I’m not entirely convinced in light of the in fact that 9:24 provides readers with the purposes for the seventy sevens prophecy and does not raise mention the jubilee. In any event, granting the symbolism does not eliminate the possibility of literal years. Hamilton would likely grant two literal trees stood in the Garden of Eden from one of which Adam and Eve literally ate fruit. Yet at the same time these trees bore a profound symbolic significance.

I found Hamilton’s reasons for rejecting a literal 490 years view similarly dissatisfying. He writes: “Questions multiply for those who would take the 490 years literally, involving both the date from which to count (from 538, 458, or 445 BC?) and the event that marks completion (until the birth of Jesus, until his triumphal entry, until the destruction of Jerusalem in AD 70, or until his return?) And do we factor in a ‘parenthesis’ that is the church age, leaving a literal seventieth week, or do we switch from a literal understanding of the first sixty-nine weeks to a symbolic understanding of the seventieth? In addition to these would seem to be an additional question: How are Daniel’s 490 years to be harmonized with Ezekiel’s 430?” (126, n. 13) This is one of the few places where I thought Hamilton was actually unfair. Of course, historical questions multiply if a text is understood historically rather than merely symbolically. But this is true throughout the whole book. Questions multiply for those who believe Daniel to be a historical figure who wrote in the reigns of the kings mentioned in the book that don’t arise if he were merely a symbolical character created by an author in Maccabean times. Nonetheless, Hamilton rightly mounts a strong defense of the historicity of Daniel. The questions of terminus ad quo and terminus ad quem should not prejudice interpreters against a historical understanding of the 490 years. Similarly, if one understands the exodus as a historical event, “questions multiply”: several dates are possible and several attempts at harmonizing biblical and Egyptian chronology have been proposed. The fact that these multiple proposals exist doesn’t invalidate the historicity of the event.

There are several ways by which 69 sevens can be seen to extend from a decree of a Persian monarch related to rebuilding the city to the life of the Messiah prior to his crucifixion. The fact that these calculations can be made in a number of different ways (that is, from different starting points, using solar years or 360 day years, etc.) should not obscure the amazing fact these years at the very least roughly span the period of time from decrees to rebuild to the time of Christ. In fact the timing is so close that I find it odd, then, to dismiss a literal interpretation of these years. What is more, one does not have to be a dispensationalist to understand these years literally. Hamilton’s colleague Peter Gentry does so in Kingdom through Covenant. Gentry, contrary to a dispensational view, locates the seventieth week within the ministry of Christ. Hamilton, however, makes cogent arguments against Gentry that the seventieth is eschatological. Of course if the years are literal, and if the sixty-ninth year terminates sometime in Jesus’s ministry, and if the seventieth week is still future, the means that there is a lengthy gap between the sixty-ninth and seventieth years. Personally, I don’t find that troublesome as there are numerous Old Testament prophecies that are fulfilled partially in the first come and partially in the second.

The lengthy critique of Hamilton’s position on Daniel 9 should not detract however from my recommendation of this book. Disagreements aside, I filled my notes on Daniel with many helpful observations from this book.

Kuyper on the Purpose of Government

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A state is not an end in itself. On the contrary, the life of a state, too, is only a means to prepare for a communal life of a still higher order, a life that is already germinating and someday will be gloriously revealed in the kingdom of God.

In that kingdom there will be perfect harmony. Tensions between maximum freedom for the individual and optimal development of communal life will there be replaced by the worship and adoration of God.

To prepare for that, and to contribute to the coming of that kingdom, the state has the calling to provide already now that higher form of community life that can do what family life is not able to do: namely, to ensure a social life where human persons can deploy their latent strengths in the most untrammeled fashion possible.

Abraham Kuyper, Our Program: A Christian Political Manifesto, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, Melvin Flikkema, and Harry Van Dyke, trans. Harry Van Dyke, Abraham Kuyper Collected Works in Public Theology (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press; Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty, 2015), 44.

Any form of government, however tyrannical and despotic, is still preferable to complete anarchy. And anarchy, we all know, can be created not only by a revolution with incendiary bombs and pavement stones in the palace courtyard, but just as well by a revolution with slogans and ideas aired in cabinet or parliament!

Government is quite different from administration. The deteriorated constitutional situation into which we are gradually entering increasingly encourages putting administration in the foreground and leaving genuine governance in the background, as though it represents an abuse of power or a luxury we can do without.

Abraham Kuyper, Our Program: A Christian Political Manifesto, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, Melvin Flikkema, and Harry Van Dyke, trans. Harry Van Dyke, Abraham Kuyper Collected Works in Public Theology (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press; Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty, 2015), 46.

Jonathan Edwards on the Purpose of Government

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It’s helpful when answering big questions like these to look at the answers of people in other times and other places. Their answers may or may not be right, but they likely share different biases that people of our own time. It’s therefore instructive to look at these answers, to ask if they are biblical, and to ask if they reveal any blind spots we might have as creatures of our own time and place.

Over the next couple days I’ll post quotations from various persons on the question of the purpose of government.

Edwards “preached that magistrates were to ‘act as the fathers of the commonwealth with that care and concern for the public good that the father of a family has for the family, watchful against public dangers, [and] forward to improve their power to promote the public benefit’ [WJE 8:261-62]. Their first three functions of government were to secure property, protect citizens’ rights, and—toward that end—maintain order. . . . Related to these first two functions—protecting property and keeping order—government was also to ensure justice. For Edwards justice was recompense of moral deserts. The evildoer would have evil returned in proportion to his or her evil deeds. Similarly, justice would prevail when the person who loved other received the proper return of his or her love” [WJE 25:321; WJE 8:569].

. . . . . . . . . . .

A fourth responsibility of government for Edwards was national defense. Military force was justified when the ‘rights and privileges’ of a people were threatened or when the ‘preservation of the community or public society requires it.’ If ‘injurious and bloody enemies’ molest and endanger a society it is the duty of government to defend that society by the use of force [WJE 25:133; sermon on Neh. 4:14, WJEO 64].

The next two functions of government referred not to preventable evils but to positive goods—promoting a common morality and a minimum level of material prosperity. The fifth function was to ‘make good laws against immorality,’ for a people that fail in morality would eventually fail in every other way. Rulers therefore were not to ‘countenance vice and wickedness’ by failing to enact legislation against it or enforcing what had been legislated. Sixth, governments were to help the poor. Edwards believed that the state—in his case, a town committee in Northampton—had a responsibility to assist those who were destitute for reasons other than their own laziness or prodigality. The state was also obliged to help the children of the lazy and prodigal. Governmental involvement was necessary because private charity (here Edwards had in mind the charity of churches) was unreliable: ‘In this corrupt world [private charity] is an uncertain thing; and therefore the wisdom of legislators did not think fit to leave those that are so reduced upon such a precarious foundation for subsistence.’ Because of the natural selfishness of all human beings, including the regenerate, it is therefore incumbent upon the Christian to support the state’s efforts to help the destitute [Sermon on Prov. 14:34, WJEO 44; WJE 17:403.]

The seventh and final item in Edwards’s job description for the magistrate was religious. The good ruler was expected to give friendly but distanced support to true religion. During a revival, the magistrate should call a day of prayer or thanksgiving. But he should not try to do much more than that. . . . . In his private notebooks, Edwards reminded himself that the civil authorities were to have ‘nothing to do with matters ecclesiastical, with those things that relate to conscience and eternal salvation or with any matters religious as religious.’ In other words, he would not allow any magistrate to tell his parishioners what church to attend or tell him what to preach .

McClymond & McDermott, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 515-17.

The Creation Blessing and the Origin of Governments

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If the Creation Blessing of Genesis 1:26-28 is the foundational text for a biblical theology of government, as argued earlier, then how does one move from the dominion that all mankind is blessed with to a government in which some men rule over others?

Interestingly, this is a matter that engaged political theorists such as Robert Filmer and John Locke. Filmer argued that all governmental authority is patriarchal. Adam was the first ruler because he was the the first father. He sees further evidence that patriarchs were rulers in the fact that Abraham and Esau oversaw armies, that Abraham entered into treaties with kings, and that Judah had the power to sentence Tamar to death. When God established a king in Israel, he did so on a dynastic principle (All of these arguments are found in the first chapter of Filmer’s Patriarcha). The upshot of Filmer’s argument was support for monarchy and opposition to increasing republican and democratic elements.

Locke rejected Filmer’s argument in his First Treatise of Government. Greg Forster summarizes Locke’s counter-proposal:

Locke argues that in God’s design of human nature, the relevant point for this question is that the capacity to have dominion over—to use and destroy—other things, meaning especially the capacities of intellect and will, are present in the entire human species. The need to exercise dominion—the need for food, clothing, etc.—is also diffused throughout the species. Every human being is therefore constructed by God to be an Exerciser of dominion. This implies that no human being is made to be an object of dominion. By nature, then, the human race is in a state of freedom and equality.

Greg Forster, Starting with Locke, loc. 1440.

And the rule of everybody over everybody is not government. Forster again summarizes Locke’s way of thinking:

So someone must have authority to enforce the natural law, since it is God’s law and cannot be void. Yet no particular person has a specific mandate to such authority, either from nature or revelation.

Locke takes these premises and makes a bold deduction. If someone must have authority to enforce the natural law, yet no particular person has a specific mandate for it, it must follow that—at least by nature—everyone has that authority equally.

Greg Forster, Starting With Locke, loc. 1448.

From this starting point Locke reaches government by consent of the governed. Since all have equal authority, government must have that authority by the consent of all over whom it rules.

Both of these theories have significant problems. For instance, how would Filmer account for the authority of kings who could not trace their geneology back to the line of kings that flowed from Adam or Noah?

Forster points out one of the large problems for Locke:

This theory of consent is subject to a number of problems; the most important of these is the problem of establishing that people do in fact consent. Consent theory implies—and Locke explicitly affirms—that people are not born as members of the community. Because people are by nature free and equal, they are free and equal when they are born. Only when they give their consent do they become members of the community, and thus obligated to obey its authority (see T II. 119, 176). …

Locke, like most consent theorists, argues that any adult who chooses to remain in a country and live there rather than leave it has consented—implicitly or ‘tacitly,’ even if not explicitly—to be ruled by its laws. . . . Only explicit consent can make a person a member of society, but this implicit or tacit consent is all that is needed to legitimately enforce the law. ….

The theory of tacit consent is subject to a number of objections. Is it reasonable to expect people to undertake the burden of leaving the country as the price of not giving their consent? And where will they go without having to face the same problem elsewhere?

Locke considers these questions, but only briefly and without much attention to the objections.

Greg Forster, Starting with Locke, loc 1533-1556.

It seems to me that there is little problem in affirming an authority structure in a world in which all humans are given the blessing of dominion over the earth. We see this with Adam and Eve in the first family. Yet how the first governmental structure of authority emerged is not specified by Scripture.

I think the silence of Scripture on this point is intentional. If Scripture told us how the first government formed, we would want to test the legitimacy of all subsequent governments on whether or not they were formed in the same way. But that is not what God would have us to do. God wants his people to submit to the existing authorities because “there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God” (Rom. 13:1).

Review of Beeke, Family Worship

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Beeke, Joel R. Family Worship. Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2009.

In this book Joel Beeke makes the case that family worship is a concept rooted in the Bible and which should therefore be practiced by Christians. I found the book stimulate my desire to worship God with my family. Beeke also provides practical suggestions for what to do in family worship. It’s a small book, but it is packed with helpful material.

Government: A Divine Creation among Mankind

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On Tuesday I indicated that I think 1 Peter 2:13 teaches that God established government, like marriage, into the structures of the creation. Today I’d like to justify that claim.

1 Peter 2:13 is translated in several different ways:

ESV: Be subject for the Lord’s sake to every human institution . . .

Achtemeier (Hermeneia): Be subject to every human creature because of the Lord . . .

RSV mg.: Be subject for the Lord’s sake to every institution ordained for men . . .

I favor the translation:

Be subject for the Lord’s sake to every [divine] creation among mankind.

In the context it is clear that the creation in view is government.

Institution, Creature, or Creation?

It is common for translations to translate κτίσις in this verse as “institution.” But against this translation Achtemeier notes this “meaning is nowhere to be found in Greek literature” (1 Peter, Hermeneia, 182). He comments, “The closest one can come to such a meaning [human institution] is to point to the regular use of κτίσις in secualr Greek to mean ‘founding a city’ (e.g., Selwyn, 172; Goppelt, 182) but that is hardly the meaning here” (ibid., 183, n. 40). Elliot adds to this critique: “The rendition of ktisis as ‘institution’ (RSV, NRSV, NEB, Selwyn) is inappropriate, for the abstraction ‘institution’ is a modern rather than an ancient concept” (1 Peter, AB, 489).

Both Achtemeier and Elliot favor the translation “Be subject to every human creature.” But Grudem provides a cogent response to this translation: “The context (vv. 13b-14, 18-20, 3:1-6) makes it clear, however, that it is not every human being in the world to whom we are to be subject (a meaning that the verb hypotasso could not bear in any case, since it refers to subjection to an authority)” (1 Peter, TNTC, 118; note: Grudem favors the translation “institution”). It doesn’t make sense to begin a command to submit to the governing authorities with a command to submit to all humans.

Hort says, “Put briefly, the main question is this,—does ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις mean here a κτίσις by men or a κτίσις by God among men?” Hort rejects “a κτίσις by men” in favor of “a κτίσις by God among men.” He writes, “But the former of the two interpretations, though thus prima facie natural, cannot without straining be reconciled with the context. Wide as is the use of κτίσις, to speak of the supreme ruler or subordinate rulers, or their office or function, as a κτίσις on the part of men is without example or analogy in Greek usage. . . . Moreover, human authorship, put forward without qualification as here, and yet more emphasised by the addition of πάσῃ, is not likely to have been laid down by an apostle as a sufficient reason for subjection: he could not but remember for how many evil customs human authorship was responsible. If however we take κτίσις as implying Divine authorship, as in every other place where κτίζω or any of its derivatives occurs in the O.T. or N.T. (or in the Apocrypha, 1 Esd. iv. 53 excepted), all these difficulties vanish. The effect of ἀνθρωπίνῃ is accordingly to limit the κτίσεις spoken of to such elements of God’s universal κτίσις as are characteristically human. . . . Here then we have an adequate explanation of St Peter’s meaning. Biblical associations defined the founding spoken of to be the founding of the commonwealth of mankind by God Himself, and the Greek usage suggested that the founding implied a plan of which mankind were to be organised. By an ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις then St Peter means a fundamental institution of human society. Before Christ came into the world, mankind already possessed a social order of which the chief elements were the state, the household, and the family; and here St Peter declares that they were not to be slighted or rejected because they were found among heathen. On the contrary, they had a divine origin, and they were distinctively human: without them man would sink into savagery. It was needful to say this after the previous verses, which might seem by contrast to condemn heathen society absolutely” (F. J. A. Hort, The First Epistle of St. Peter, I.1-II.17 [London: Macmillan, 1898], 139-40).

I think Hort is on the right track, though he does use the word “institution.” Yet, if what is really in view is an institution created by God, then the normal sense of “creation” would hold here and the meaning of the passage would would be similar to the one the Hort proposes. 

Best also comments along the same lines: “When the word and its cognate forms appear in the LXX they almost always denote something created by God, e.g., man (Dt. 4:32), the universe (Gen. 14:19,22), agriculture (Sir. 7:15; 40:1), wisdom (Sir. 1:4); see w. Foerster, T.D.N.T., III, pp. 1023-8. Sir. 39:30 says that God created ‘the sword that punishes the ungodly with destruction’ (cf. 40:9f.), and this is very similar to the conception of 1 Pet. 2:14. The principle objection to this view is the adjective ‘human’ attached to ‘institution’; it suggests that man creates the state, but it can be taken as in the RSVmg in the sense that God (not mentioned but understood) creates in the sphere of human affairs; thus civil authority may be considered as instituted by God. This is similar to Paul’s teaching in Rom. 13:1-7, and to that of the OT (Isa. 5:25-30; 45:1) which became more explicit in Judaism (Dan. 2:21,37f.; 4:17,32; Wisd. 6:3). . . . Consequently the state is viewed as deriving from God’s appointment” (1 Peter, NCB, 113).

If Hort and Best are right, then government is a structure of the created order created by God himself. This is a strange way of thinking because here we are not talking about a particular government or even anything physical. But it is not a unique concept in Scripture. As Al Wolters notes, “There are a few places in Scripture where the basic confession of God’s creational sovereignty is specifically applied to such non-physical realities. According to Paul, marriage is among the things ‘which God created to be received with thanksgiving.’ It is therefore a demonic heresy to forbid marriage, ‘for everything God created is good, and nothing is to be rejected’ (1 Tim. 4:3-4)” (Creation Regained, 2nd ed., 24).

 

Review of Reinke, Newton on the Christian Life

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Reinke, Tony. Newton on the Christian Life. Theologians on the Christian Life. Edited by Stephen J. Nichols and Justin Taylor. Wheaton: Crossway, 2015.

John Newton provided a wealth of spiritual counsel in his numerous letters. One disadvantage of receiving Newton’s counsel in this form is that the various topics he covers are scattered through numerous letters. Tony Reinke addresses this challenge by presenting Newton’s counsel topically. Reinke has carefully read Newtons letters and gives readers a rich entrance into his thought about the Christian life.

Reinke summarizes Newton’s teaching thus:

John Newton’s vision for the Christian life centers on the all-sufficiency of Jesus Christ. Awakened to Christ by the new birth, and united to Christ by faith, the Christian passes through various stages of maturity in this life as he/she beholds and delights in Christ’s glory in Scripture. All along the pilgrimage of the Christian life—through the darkest personal trials,. And despite indwelling sin and various character flaws—Christ’s glory is beheld and treasured, resulting in tastes of eternal joy, in growing security, and in progressive victory over the self, the world, and the devil—a victory manifested in self-emptying and other-loving obedience, and ultimately in a life aimed to please God alone (30).

The book unpacks this summary by presenting John Newton’s teaching on each point. Read worshipfully, this book really does increase one’s longing to love Christ and live for him.

Government and the Structures of Creation

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What does it mean to say that government is a structure that God built into creation? It means, in part, that not all of God’s creation is physical. God created the physical world: land and seas, moon and stars. But God created more than just the physical world. He created non-physical realties, such as marriage (Gen. 2:18-24). When people try to live contrary to God’s design for marriage or government they societies experience negative consequences just as surely as people who tried to live as though gravity did not exist would experience consequences for trying to live contrary to the way God designed His world to work.

Proverbs speaks of this reality in terms of wisdom being built into the very creation. Proverbs 3:21 says, “The LORD founded the earth by wisdom and established the heavens by understanding” (HCSB). Proverbs 8:22-31 (HCSB) makes the same point:

The Lord made me

at the beginning of His creation,

before His works of long ago.

I was formed before ancient times,

 from the beginning, before the earth began.

I was born when there were no watery depths

and no springs filled with water.

I was delivered

before the mountains and hills were established,

before He made the land, the fields,

or the first soil on earth.

I was there when He established the heavens,

when He laid out the horizon on the surface of the ocean,

when He placed the skies above,

when the fountains of the ocean gushed out,

when He set a limit for the sea

so that the waters would not violate His command,

when He laid out the foundations of the earth.

I was a skilled craftsman beside Him.

I was His delight every day,

always rejoicing before Him.

I was rejoicing in His inhabited world,

delighting in the human race.

 

In the past this passage has often been read as if it spoke of the pre-incarnate Christ. The chief difficulty with this is that Wisdom in Proverbs 8 is created. Because קנה in 8:22 has a disputed semantic range, the versions translate the word variously: “The Lord possessed me” (KJV, NKJV, NASB, ESV); “The Lord created me” (RSV, NRSV); “The Lord made me” (HCSB); “The Lord brought me forth” (NIV). But from the use of חיל, “be brought to birth” (CHALOT), in vv. 24, 25, it seems clear that “created” is the appropriate sense here. (Passages that indicate “create” is within the semantic range of קנה include: Gen. 14:19, 22; Ex. 15:16; Deut. 32:6; Ps. 78:54; 104:24; 139:13. See also NIDOTTE, 3:941; TLOT, 3:1152-53.)

Translating “The Lord made me” (HCSB) is only problematic if Wisdom here refers to the Son or to an attribute of God. But neither is likely here. Garrett correctly notes, “Woman Wisdom of Prov 8 does not personify an attribute of God but personifies an attribute of creation. She is personification of the structure, plan, or rationality that God built into the world. She is created by God and fundamentally an attribute of God’s universe” (Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, NAC, 113).

Though most translations locate this “in the beginning” (KJV) or “at the beginning” (HCSB, ESV, NASB) there is no beth prefix in Hebrew, making the NIV’s translation of v. 22 preferable: “The Lord brought me forth as the first of his works.” Garrett notes that “may imply that Wisdom herself is the ‘beginning’ of creation” (108, n. 65), the idea being that “Wisdom is claiming to be the first principle of the world and the pattern by which it was created” (Garrett, 108). Consistent with this, I would prefer the NIV’s translation of verse 23, “I was formed ages ago, at the very beginning, when the world came to be” (cf. HCSB), over the KJV’s “I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, Or ever the earth was” (cf. NASB). (This requires translating עוֹלָם “ages ago” rather than “everlasting” and translating נסך “formed” rather than “set up.” On the former, see NIDOTTE, 3:346. On the later see Longman III, Proverbs, BCOTWP, 205.)

In what follows, Wisdom affirms that she was prior to the ordering of the world and present at the ordering of the world. Wisdom concludes in v. 30 that she was an אָמוֹן beside God during the creation. The translation of אָמוֹן is highly contested, with “skilled craftsman,” “blueprint,” “child,” “foster-father,” binding,” and “faithful” all being suggested (see R B Y. Scott, “Wisdom in Creation: The ’Amôn of Proverbs 8:30.” Vetus Testamentum 10, no. 2 [April 1, 1960]: 213-223). If there is a favored translation by commentators and Bible translations, it is probably along the lines of “skilled craftsman.” If this translation is accepted, however, it should be made clear that in this passage Wisdom is not doing the creating. God is clearly the Creator throughout this passage, and Wisdom is standing beside God. Since Wisdom is beside the God who creates and is not the creator, Van Leeuwen suggests that Wisdom is “personified as the king’s architect-advisor, through whom the king puts all things in their proper order and whose decrees of cosmic justice are the standard for human kings and rulers (v. 15)” (“Proverbs,” NIB, 5:94). Or, as Bryan Smith has noted, a master craftsman could be the personification of a blueprint (personal conversation, 17 May 2011). Gordon Fee also sees the personification in terms of a blueprint: “Prov 8:22-26 asserts in a variety of ways that Wisdom was the first of God’s creation, emphasizing her priority in time, so that her being present with God when he alone created the universe would thus reflect—as it actually does—God’s wise blueprint” (Fee, Pauline Christology, 611). However the personification is understood, Garret once again captures the significance of the passage: “If Wisdom is here an artisan, the message again is that the principles of wisdom are woven into the fabric of the created order.”

I would argue that some of these principles of wisdom woven into the fabric of the created order are principles relating to the institution of government. Indeed, I would argue that the institution of government itself is woven into the fabric of creation. This, I think, is the teaching of 1 Peter 2:13.

Government in Creation, Fall, and Rememption

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In Federalist no. 51 James Madison wrote, “But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature. If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” Madison is right, in part, to note that in a fallen world government must reckon with the reality of fallen human natures. Madison goes on to say, “In forming a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”

But is Madison correct to say that “no government would be necessary” if humans were not fallen? I would argue that the biblical answer to that question is, “no.” In Revelation, the eternal state still has government. In the New Jerusalem there remains a throne of God and the Lamb (Rev. 22:3). Kingship continues into eternity, and the reign of the Messiah is not simply the reign of God but is also the reign of man. When Jesus was born he was declared to be both the heir of the Davidic throne and to receive an eternal kingdom (Luke 1:32-33). When Isaiah declared, “For to us a child is born, to us a son is given; and the government shall be upon his shoulder,” he is speaking of a real government. This is why the prophets look forward to the Messiah’s rule to bring about justice in the earth.

The kingdom the Messiah rules over for eternity is not ruled over by he alone. Under him others rule. Revelation 22:5 says of the saints, “and they will reign forever.” There is also a structure to this rule. Revelation 21:24 speak of the kings of the earth bringing their glory in to the New Jerusalem. Jesus said to the apostles, “In the new world, when the Son of Man will sit on his glorious throne, you who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel” (Matt. 19:28). Government persists for all eternity.

There is good reason for this. Government was part of God’s created order from the beginning. In Genesis 1:26-28 God promised mankind dominion over the world. The promises of a Messianic king are rooted in God’s purpose to restore the dominion of all mankind that was corrupted by the Fall. Government is not a necessary evil. It is a structure that God built into his creation from the beginning.