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Unanimity of the Early Church’s Polemic against Pagan Music

May 30, 2012 by Brian

An interesting observation from Calvin’s Stapert’s study of musical thought in the early church [see review here]:

I have quoted above James McKinnon’s characterization of their [the church fathers] polemic against it [some of the pagan music that surrounded them]: their response is characterized by ‘vehemence and uniformity.’ That uniformity is especially striking considering how different those writers were in other respects. Whether they were Greek-speaking or Latin-speaking, pre- or post-Constantine, conciliatory or antagonistic toward pagan learning, lifelong Christians or converts—whatever their background or personality, they agreed that Christians should distance themselves from some of the music of the surrounding culture.

Calvin R. Stapert, A New Song for an Old World: Musical Thought in the Early Church (Eerdmans, 2007), 131.

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Books and Articles Read in April

May 28, 2012 by Brian

Books

Stephenson, Paul. Constantine: Roman Emperor, Christian Victor. New York: The Overlook Press, 2009.

Stephenson has produced a workmanlike biography of Constantine. It is consistently informative, if not always engaging. On the issue of Constantine’s conversion, Stephenson steers a middle course between Eusebius’s glowing portrait of the Christian emperor and those who argue it was an insincere political machination. Stephenson believes the evidence points to a sincere but gradual conversion. In other words, Constantine did sincerely convert, but he was emperor over a religiously diverse empire, and he had religious duties as emperor. Thus there is some ambiguity between 312 and 317. But the trajectory is that of a man with a deepening commitment to Christianity. Stephenson also discusses Constantine’s roles in the Donatist and Arian controversy. His view is that Constantine saw the doctrine differences as trivial, but he nonetheless demanded a unified Christian church. Thus he imposed unifying solutions on the church. This led the emperor who proclaimed toleration of all religions to persecute Christian heretics and schismatics. If there is any part of the book that church historians are likely to disagree with, it would be the section on the councils. Constantine’s role is placed in the foreground and the bishops’ roles are minimized. Nonetheless, Stephenson has produced a helpful biography of Constantine, and the bibliographical essays that conclude the work contain a wealth of information.

Letham, Robert. Through Western Eyes: Eastern Orthodoxy A Reformed Perspective. Mentor, 2007.

Letham’s book contains a great deal of useful material. He is also very evidently seeking to accurately represent the Eastern Orthodox position. Unfortunately, this often means that he fails to deliver on the subtitle’s promise of a Reformed perspective. This failure is not entire, but the book would have been stronger if it had less generic early church history up front and more room for a critique towards the end. As it stands Letham spends a great deal of space presenting the Orthodox views (e.g., on icons, Scripture and tradition, synergistic soteriology, etc.). He notes the Reformed views to the contrary (where applicable), but he does not develop them in any detail. Formally, Letham does raise the Reformed objections to Eastern Orthodoxy on these points, but the feel of the book is to diminish the differences.

McArthur, John and Richard Mayhue, eds. Christ’s Prophetic Plans: A Futuristic Premillennial Primer. Chicago: Moody, 2012.

As with most books of collected essays the quality varies by the contributor. The best essays in this volume are the three by Michael Vlach that deal with the topics of Dispensationalism and Israel. Mirroring his work in Dispensationalism: Essential Beliefs and Common Myths, Vlach defines Dispensationalism and clarifies misunderstandings. He demonstrates that Dispensationalism does not demand a particular soteriology (Calvinist or Arminian, progressive sanctification or Keswick, etc.). It certainly does not teach two ways of salvation, and it is not antinomian (though it does not hold that the Mosaic code directly applies to the believer). He defines Dispensationalism in terms of "six essential beliefs." First, the NT does not reinterpret the OT in such a way that the OT authorial intent is canceled out. Second, Israel is not a type of the church. Third, "Israel and the church are distinct, thus the church cannot be identified as the new or true Israel" (29). Fourth, the salvific unity of Jew and Gentile does not remove a future national purpose of Israel. Fifth, Dispensationalists believe in the future salvation, national restoration of Israel during the Millennium. Sixth, Dispensationalists affirm that "seed of Abraham" has multiple senses. It can refer to national descent or to Gentiles connected to Abraham in Christ. In defining Dispensationalism, Vlach is also careful to correct Dispensational errors in self-definition. For instance, Ryrie asserted that the glory of God as God’s purpose in the world was a Dispensational distinctive. Vlach notes that it would be better to say that Dispensationalists have a greater tendency to understand God’s purposes in a holistic manner that incorporates "social, economic, and political issues" in God’s plan for glorifying himself along with soteriological and spiritual issues (21-22). He also highlights the problem of Dispensationalists defining themselves in terms of consistently literal hermeneutics. He quotes Feinberg, "The difference is not literalism v. non-literalism, but different understandings of what constitutes literal hermeneutics" (22). Vlach is correct that the hermeneutical discussion must go deeper to wrestle with the reasons for different approaches to prophetic material. Vlach’s essays on dispensationalism along with his essay arguing for the future restoration of Israel are highly recommended.

Church historians of many different persuasions have long recognized the earliest Christians were premillennial in orientation. Nathan Busenitz’s essay helpfully provides for lay readers the quotations from the church fathers that underlie this consensus. He also provides a historical argument for why Amillennialism became the dominant view in the church from Augustine through the middle ages and beyond.

Matthew Waymeyer presents a standard defense of the premillennial reading of Revelation 20. He argues from Scripture passages about Satan’s current activity for the impossibility that Satan is currently bound and unable to deceive the nations. He argues against the idea that the first resurrection in Revelation 20 refers to regeneration. He argues in favor of a 1,000 year millennium. And he argues in favor of a chronological reading of Revelation 19 and 20.

John MacArthur contributed three essays to this volume, including a version of his controversial address about why Calvinists should be Premillennialists. His other essays address the timing of the last things. He opposes both preterism and date-setting, but he affirms the general dispensational sequence. In another essay he argues that no New Testament passage precludes the premillinnial position.

Richard Mayhue’s contributions were the weakest. At several points his chapters read like speaking notes in which greater explanation would have been provided in the course of the lecture. These parts were written in a bullet point fashion that succinctly stated his position, but he needed to provide greater development and argumentation for his assertions. MacArthur and Mayhue also repeatedly make the error of appealing to literal interpretation as if it settled the debate. This was especially disappointing because Vlach demonstrated this line of argumentation to be erroneous in the book’s first chapter.

This book is for a lay reader who wishes to have a basic orientation to dispensational premillennialism (the authors have coined the term futuristic premillennailism, which is an odd choice since historic premillennialists also believe that the millennium is future). Those who wish to dig deeper into this perspective of eschatology would want to track down the sources listed in the endnotes.

Figes, Orlando. The Crimean War: A History. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010.

Figes does an excellent job not only recounting the war but also describing its causes (especially the religious dimensions) and its effects.

Murray, Iain H. David Martyn Lloyd-Jones: The Fight of Faith 1939-1981. Banner of Truth, 1990.

An 800 page biography that covers forty years of a man’s life cannot be reduced to a theme or two. Nonetheless two themes especially struck me as I read Murray’s sympathetic, yet not uncritical, biography of David Martyn Lloyd-Jones.

The first was the importance that Lloyd-Jones placed on preaching. I found myself encouraged to value to a greater extent the preaching that I hear each week. Lloyd-Jones’s thoughts on the new technology of cassette tapes are also worthy of consideration. Though he permitted his sermons to be taped, he did register a concern that sermons played in the background as people do other things may lead to a devaluing of the Word preached. Furthermore, such preserved preaching cannot replace the gathered church listening to a sermon.

The second theme that pushed itself to the fore was Lloyd-Jones’s concern for true church unity. He believed that the false unity of the ecumenical movement made it necessary for evangelicals to develop a theology of true Christian unity. Sadly, the true unity was shattered by those evangelicals who insisted on participating in the ecumenical movement and thus broke ties with Christians who could not give Christian recognition to unbelievers nor work with unbelievers on Christian endeavors. While Lloyd-Jones was doubtless correct in his general stance, he did fail to clearly articulate his alternative. He seemed to desire some form of visible, organizational unity that was neither a new denomination nor merely a parachurch organization.

All in all, Murray has written a thought-provoking biography that remains timely. Highly recommended.

Stapert, Calvin R. A New Song for an Old World: Musical Thought in the Early Church. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007.

Historical theology provides a great service to the church, especially when applied to matters that are fiercely debated among God’s people today. C. S. Lewis, in his famous celebration of old books, observes that the errors of older writers "are not the same mistakes. They will not flatter us in the errors we are already committing." Calvin Stapert’s, A New Song for an Old World, provides this service to the present-day debate over church music. By ushering them into the old world, Stapert hopes to give readers a fuller perspective on their own.

Stapert begins by extending Lewis’s argument. He first provides a more theological reason for understanding the thought of earlier Christians: obedience to the command to honor one’s father and mother—applied here by extension to our spiritual forebears—of necessity involves understanding what these spiritual parents thought. In addition to this (and here Stapert gives some specificity to Lewis’s practical observation), the Enlightenment has so influenced Christian thought on music that a pre-Enlightenment perspective on music becomes important for Christians. Stapert’s point is not that all post-Enlightenment music or thought on music is problematic. His point is Lewis’s: Christians will find it more difficult to evaluate post-Enlightenment music and thought without knowing the earlier views.

The body of the book begins with a survey of New Testament musical teaching and example. Stapert highlights two major themes in biblical song: rejoicing and triumph balanced by sorrowful cries for mercy. He also distinguishes biblical song from pagan songs which were used to summon divine beings. Christian songs call upon God, but they have no magical power. New Testament songs also have two audiences: God and other believers. Finally, Stapert notes that the emphasis on the unity that characterized New Testament and early church practice of teaching and singing. Singing together with one voice made audible the unity of the church.

The core of the book surveys early church thought on church music from the second through the fifth centuries. A survey of the second and early third centuries is followed by more detailed studies of Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian. This pattern is repeated with a survey of the late third through fifth centuries once again followed by two more detailed studies: Ambrose and Chrysostom. Two chapters then summarize the findings. Positively, the fathers urged their people to sing songs and hymns to familiarize them with sound doctrine and to guard them against heresy, to calm negative passions to raise their affections toward God, and to praise the Creator and Savior. Negatively, the fathers polemicized against pagan music. They did not target all music of unbelievers; they "aimed no polemic at the nobler art music or the folk music of their day" (145). Their critiques were "aimed at a few well defined targets: the music of the popular public spectacles, the music associated with voluptuous banqueting, the music associated with pagan weddings, and the music of pagan religious rites and festivities" (145). They described the music they rejected as "licentious, voluptuous, frenzied, frantic, inebriating, titillating, scurrilous, turbulent, immodest, and meretricious" (54, here describing Clement of Alexandria’s writings). They were concerned that his music would deform a person’s character and would arouse deformed passions that were governed by neither reason nor love (55, 86-90). Interestingly, this view of music remained constant despite the variety of views about pagan culture. The critique of pagan music existed in both Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian.

Stapert concludes the body of the work with a chapter on Augustine and inordinate loves. Augustine warns that beautiful sacred music can be dangerous because it draws the mind from God to the music itself. This is a sin, not because such music is not to be loved, but because no earthly thing is to be loved for its own sake. All earthly goods are to be loved as vehicles to love God. Stapert shares the concerns of those who wish to guard against an asceticism which shirks from taking delight in God’s good creation, but he also thinks that Augustine’s discussion of ordering loves contains important insights from which modern readers will especially benefit.

Though Stapert’s work is primarily historical, he does not write for mere antiquarian interest. He believes the contemporary church needs to recover the musical insight of the early church. His concluding chapter, a postlude he calls it, asks what the early church can teach the present-day church. Positively, Stapert hopes for four things: (1) a recovery of the centrality of the psalms in worship, (2) the incorporation of the best patristic hymn texts in our worship, (3) contemporary hymns modeled on ancient hymns—"texts that address God communally in language that is simple yet dignified, poetically excellent, and redolent with scriptural vocabulary, stories, sentiments, and imagery" (194), (4) a recovery of psalm and hymn singing as a part of the Christian’s daily life. Negatively, Stapert hopes that modern Christians will follow the church fathers in rejecting pagan music. He especially hopes the father’s reasoning about music will puncture three modern myths: (1) "It’s just a song"—and therefore no ethical concerns should be raised, (2) music is a creation of God and therefore no ethical criticism may be mounted, and (3) "if we wish to see the church grow, we must adopt the music of the ambient culture" (199).

A New Song in an Old World is a work of scholarship aimed at serving the church. It deserves a wide reading in the hope that it would make a small contribution toward Christians singing together with one voice that makes audible the unity of the church in Christ by the Spirit.

Articles

Marsden, George M. "Perry Miller’s Rehabilitation of the Puritans: A Critique." In Reckoning With the Past: Historical Essays on American Evangelicalism from the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals. Edited by D.G. Hart. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995.

Marsden gladly grants that Miller’s main thesis—that the Puritans were rational humanists concerned with the intellect (though not to the exclusion of piety)—stands. But Marsden argues that Miller minimizes aspects of Puritanism that moderns may find "unattractive," namely, "Puritan biblicism, doctrinal formulations, emphasis on the place of Christ, and their Calvinism" (26). Minimizing these aspects of Puritanism, Marsden argues, causes Miller to distort his treatment of the Puritan view of the covenant. He treats their covenant theology as a softening of Calvinism (Marsden maintains that Miller rehabilitated the Puritans but consistently embraced caricatures of Calvin’s thought) and to misunderstand the careful distinctions between the covenants of works and grace in Puritan thought.

Stout, Harry S. "Word and Order in Colonial New England." In Reckoning With the Past: Historical Essays on American Evangelicalism from the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals. Edited by D.G. Hart. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995.

Stout argues that the Puritans, especially those in New England, shifted from the Geneva Bible to the KJV because the notes of the former presented the Old Testament in personal, spiritualized terms whereas by the time of New England’s settlement, the Puritans had a more developed covenant theology that made room for national covenants modeled on those with Israel. This led to a more literal, historical reading of the Old Testament since Israel was now needed as a model for the political functioning of the Puritan government. Stout’s essay includes a good thumbnail history of the Geneva Bible.

Svigel, Michael J. “The Apocalypse of John and the Rapture of the Church: A Reevaluation.” Trinity Journal 22, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 23-74.

Micahel Svigel surveys attempts to locate the rapture in the book of Revelation. He rejects Rev. 3:10; 4:1-2; 4:4; 5:9-10; 7:9-17; 11:11-19; 14:14-20; 19:11-20:6. He then argues that Revelation 12:5 is the sole passage in Revelation that presents the rapture of the church. Svigel understands the woman in Revelation 12 to be the elect remnant of Israel (with a possible secondary application to Mary), the dragon to be Satan and, corporately, the nations throughout history who have opposed God’s people, and the male child to be Jesus Christ and his corporate body, the church. He identifies the catching up of the child to God and his throne as the rapture. Svigel does not deal explicitly with the timing of the rapture in this article, though his discussion of 19:11-20:6 does preclude a post-tribulation rapture.

Svigel’s arguments against locating the rapture in other places in Revelation were convincing, except in the case of Revelation 3:10. He concedes more than necessary to contrary positions. Svigel himself seems to think that this passage is at least a cooborative passage. His argument against the post-tribulational Rapture in 19:11-20:6 is strong. The main argument of the paper, that Revelation 12:5 presents the rapture of the church, is forcefully made and interesting.

Arguments against a Post-Tribulational Rapture in Rev. 19:11-20:6: After noting that the rapture is not mentioned in this passage (not a decisive factor), Svigel notes that if one grants the premillennial contention that Revelation19:11-20:6 is chronological and sequential, the post-tribulational position has to wrestle with the occurrence of the resurrection(/Rapture?) at a time after the Second Coming and defeat of God’s enemies (Rev. 20:4). This does not easily harmonize with 1 Thess. 4:16-17 and 1 Corinthians 15:52 which "make the descent of Christ, the trumpet, and the resurrection/Rapture all simultaneous events" (50-51). In addition, those coming with Christ in 19:14 are resurrected saints (contra Ladd, who sees them as angelic hosts; see Svigel, 51 for arguments). Thus saints must have been raptured/resurrected before the return of Christ. Finally, the antecedent to the third person plural in "and I saw thrones, and they sat on them" (2:4, NKJV, cf. NASB) is best understood to be Christ and the saints who came with him. This means those resurrected in 20:4 are best understood as saints who died during the tribulation. There is thus a distinction between already raptured/resurrected saints who return to earth with Christ and saints who died during the tribulation and are resurrected afterwards.

Warfield, Benjamin B. “Hosea VI.7: Adam or Man?” In Selected Shorter Writings, edited by John E. Meeter, 1:116-29. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1970.

In this article Warfield surveys the translational and interpretive positions taken on this text from the the LXX and Targums to the critics of his own day.

He notes that the ancient translations and interpreters were divided over translating the word in question as a common noun or a proper noun down through to the time of the Reformation. The emergence of federal or covenant theology inclined federal theologians toward the translation "like Adam." But, Warfield notes, most were fair in recognizing the translational difficulties and did not rest their entire theology on this one verse. It served them in a more confirmatory role than in a foundational role.

The modern critics, satisfied with neither the common noun nor personal name options propose various emendations. Michaelis conjecturally emended the word to read "Edom" and interpreted the sense as Edom’s abandonment of the Abrahamic covenant. Others suggested that "Adam" refers to the city mentioned in Joshua 3:16 and that this city Adam was the location of the events of Numbers 25. Others suggest emending the text from ke’ādhām to bā’adāmah, that is, to "in the land," meaning in Judah. In favor of this view is the word "there" in the second half of the verse.

Though Warfield finds the place name proposition attractive because of the presence of "there" in the second half of the verse, he does not see how it can be adopted as the text now stands. It is true that an emendation from a כ to a ב (letters easily confused) would solve the problem, but there is no evidence of such a corruption in any of the manuscripts or versions. Warfield therefore proposes that the principle of allowing the more difficult reading to stand tells against emending the text. Warfield is also suspicious that the push to emend the text stems from the bias of the modern interpreters: "Speaking broadly, these critics are agreed that an allusion to Adam’s sin in Hosea would be too unexpected to be admitted. . . . The very name Adam we are told occurs very seldom in the Old Testament, and only in certain later strata of its formation: his sin is not emphasized and the sinfulness of man is not traced back to it; least of all is the transaction between God and Adam in the Old Testament called, or thought of, as a covenant" (125). Warfield notes the modern critics are biased against understanding the term as Adam, but though they wish another interpretation, they are not satisfied by taking the disputed term as a common noun. Hence the other expedients such as emendation.

Since Warfield, is not satisfied with the arguments for emendation, and since taking the noun as a common noun has not gained wide consent, this pushes Warfield toward accepting it as the personal name Adam. He is confirmed in this position upon further examination of the common noun reading. He notes that "the translation, ‘They have transgressed as if a man’s covenant’ may be pronounced at once impossible, because forcing a construction upon the Hebrew which it cannot fairly be made to bear. But on the other hand the translation, ‘they have like men transgressed the covenant’ remains vapid and meaningless until a sense beyond the suggestion of the words themselves is forced upon it." That is they must be "mere men, as opposed to God, or as common men as opposed to the noble . . . or as heathen as opposed to the Israelites—to none of which does it seem naturally to lend itself here" (127). In the end the rendering "like Adam" does not face the exegetical difficulties of the other renderings. "Any difficulties that may be brought against it, indeed, are imported from without the clause itself. In itself the rendering is wholly natural" (128).

Warfield, Benjamin B. “Jesus Christ the Propitiation for the Whole World.” In Selected Shorter Writings, edited by John E. Meeter, 1:167-77. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1970.

Warfield surveys various interpretive options for 1 John 2:2. He rejects standard theories such as world stands for Christians scattered throughout the world (on the grounds that John is already speaking so generally that the "our" already encompasses all Christians) or that Christ is the propitiation for all men but not the advocate of all men (on the grounds that it empties "the conception of propitiation of its properly expiatory content"). Warfield suggests that John is emphasizing the universal nature of Jesus’s saving work. He has come to save the entire world, which does not mean that every individual will be saved, but it does give in broad terms the scope of his saving activity. Perhaps. But at least one of Warfield’s critiques is deserving of critique. Like John Owen Warfield makes the argument that the sin of rejecting Christ is propitiated by Jesus as well as every other sin, so a general atonement tends toward universalism (172). This is based on the assertion that "the propitiation . . . not merely lays a foundation for a saving operation, to follow or not follow as circumstances may determine. It itself saves" (174). But this conflates the accomplishment and the application of the propitiation, and that causes theological problems, for it would mean that the elect ceased to be under the wrath of God at the time of the crucifixion (contrary to Ephesians 2). It is best, therefore, to keep the accomplishment of propitiation and its application to individuals separate.

Warfield, Benjamin B. “True Church Unity: What It Is.” In Selected Shorter Writings, edited by John E. Meeter, 1:299-307. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1970.

Warfield believes that the unity of the church is visible. But it does not exist in a single universal church government since such a government did not exist in the time of the New Testament. Nor is it "grounded in uniformity of organization, forms of worship, or even details of faith." Warfield detects legitimate variation on these elements in the New Testament church. Nor is it grounded in apostolic origin, for the New Testament does not evince any care of who founded the churches or Rome or Alexandria or Antioch. "In a word, the unity of the apostolic churches was grounded on the only thing they had in common—their common Christianity. Its bond was the common reception of the Holy Spirit, which exhibited itself in one calling, one faith, one baptism" (302). Thus Christians should not seek unity by attempting to include all Christians in one organization, or with a single form of government or worship, or through attempting to establish some apostolic succession. "Least of all, are we to seek unity by surrendering all public or organized testimony to all truth except that minimum which—just because it is the minimum, less than which no man can believe and be a Christian—all Christians of all names can unite in confessing" (305). Rather, "If we are to find the unity for which our Master prayed, we are to seek it in our common relation as Christians to our common head . . . as mediated by our common possession of one Spirit" (305). In practical terms Warfield says this means recognizing as Christian all gospel-proclaiming denominations, a firm commitment to God’s truth as that which all his people should confess, cooperation in good works with brothers in Christ, and formal means of working together as denominations for the pursuance of common ends "so far as such federation involves no sacrifice of principle or testimony" (307).

Saucy, Robert L. "Israel and the Church: A Case for Discontinuity." In Continuity and Discontinuity: Perspectives on the Relationship Between the Old and New Testaments. Edited by John S. Feinberg. Westchester, IL: Crossway, 1988.

Saucy’s article is more nuanced that Woudstra’s counterpoint essay in the same volume. Despite the chapter title, Saucy argues for both continuity and discontinuity in the relationship of Israel and the church. Continuity exists in the fact that both the Israel and the church are called the people of God. Furthermore, many of the images for Israel are carried over to the church. Nonetheless, the church and Israel are distinct entities. Israel is a national entity, and it retains this significance in the New Testament notwithstanding a few debated passages (Gal 6:16; Rom. 9:6). Saucy presents abbreviated but compelling arguments against understanding these passages or the application of Israel symbols on the church to communicate the replacement of Israel with the church. Saucy further argues that Israel will maintain its role of mediating revelation and furthering God’s plan of salvation in the future.

VanDrunen, David. "A System of Theology? The Centrality of Covenant for Westminster Systematics." In The Pattern Of Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology At The Westminster Seminaries. Edited by David VanDrunen. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2004.

VanDrunen surveys the approach to systematic theology at the Westminster seminaries in light of Otto Weber’s criterion that a true system of theology should have a central "principle" that "contains potentially the one and total content which is ten explain in greater detail in the systematic exposition" (199). VanDrunen finds Westminster systematics to be heavy on exegesis and to lack a central principle around which the synthesis of systematic theology should take place. While affirming the need for exegetical grounding, VanDrunen argues that covenant can serve as the unifying central principle of a Westminster systematic theology. He then sketches out how the covenant can center prolegomena, theology proper, anthropology, Christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and ethics. If systematic theology must have a central dogma, the covenant concept is certainly a contender. But VanDrunen fails to establish why Weber’s criterion is correct. This is especially important in light of Richard Muller’s expose of neo-orthodox attempts to impose central dogma’s on Lutheran and Reformed Orthodox theologies where none existed. If the Protestant Orthodox did not conceive of theology in terms of central dogmas, what is the compelling reason for Westminster theologians to begin now?

Warfield, Benjamin B. “The Resurrection of Christ a Historical Fact.” In Selected Shorter Writings, edited by John E. Meeter, 1:116-29. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1970.

Warfield mounts an apologetic for the resurrection by arguing that even if the Christian limits himself to the Pauline epistles granted by the critics to be authentic, testimony to the resurrection can be shown to be early and widespread.

Monson, John M. “Enter Joshua: The ‘Mother of Current Debates’ in Biblical Archaeology.” In Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith?: A Critical Appraisal of Modern and Postmodern Approaches to Scripture. Edited by James K. Hoffmeier and Dennis R. Magary. Wheaton: Crossway, 2012.

Well over a century ago scholars like C. H. Toy, scholars who began their careers in conservative schools, began to doubt the scientific and historical accuracy of Scripture. They took Genesis to be an accommodation to prescientific man. They adopted critical methods for understanding the composition the Old Testament books, casting doubt on the historical veracity of the Old Testament materials. And they argued that the New Testament authors adopted rabbinic methods of interpretation that caused them to misinterpret Old Testament texts as they applied them to Jesus as Messiah. Men like Toy professed personal piety, and they insisted on their belief in the basic message of Scripture. Nonetheless, they argued that Christian scholarship must adapt itself to the intellectual realities of their time. Their deviations form orthodoxy set off the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy. Now, these many decades later, Peter Enns and Kenton Sparks are replaying the controversy. Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith? is a response to the claims of Enns and Sparks that evangelicals must finally capitulate to the modernists.

John Monson’s article addresses the historicity of Joshua. In the face of those who claim that no archaeological evidence for any kind of invasion from Israel exists, Monson argues that a closer reading of the Scripture text reveals that the conquest of Canaan was a more modest affair than the Albright school made it out to be (e.g., the text only claims that the Israelites burned three cities in the course of the conquest). When this is taken into account, the archaeology does fit with kind of conquest presented in Scripture. Monson uses Ai as a case study for showing how archaeology and a close reading of the text work together. Whether Monson’s reconstruction is the correct one (he footnotes an alternative solution by Bryant Wood; see his Rice lectures at DBTS), he does demonstrate at least one plausible interpretation of both the textual and archaeological evidence.

Ferguson, Sinclair B. “Christus Victor Et Propitiator: The Death of Christ, Substitute and Conqueror.” In For the Fame of God’s Name: Essays in Honor of John Piper, 171-189. Wheaton: Crossway, 2010.

Oftentimes the Christus Victor atonement theme and the propitiatory nature of Christ’s atonement are set against each other. Ferguson notes that within the Reformed tradition, the debate between Anselm and Abelard set the parameters of the theological discussion, that Puritan theology tended to focus on the Christian’s battle and triumph over Satan rather than Christ’s, and that those in the Reformed tradition recognized the problems with the patristic explanation of how Christ conquered the devil. More recently evangelicals have recognized the problematic denial of a satisfaction view of the atonement in Aulen’s Christus Victor. Nonetheless, Ferguson argues that Christ’s victory over Satan remains an important aspect of the atonement. He traces this theme through the gospels and epistles to demonstrate not only that Christ’s victory over Satan is present in Scripture but also that his propitiatory sacrifice is the means by which Christ triumphs over Satan. When Christ stands in the place of the sinner, satisfies the wrath of God, and frees him from death and the power of sin, he frees him from the dominion of Satan and triumphs over him. Chistus Victor is not an alternative to penal substitutionary atonement, for penal substitutionary atonement is the mechanism of the victory.

VanGemeren, Willem A., and Jason Stanghelle. “A Critical-Realistic Reading of the Psalm Titles: Authenticity, Inspiration, and Evangelicals.” In Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith?: A Critical Appraisal of Modern and Postmodern Approaches to Scripture. Edited by James K. Hoffmeier and Dennis R. Magary. Wheaton: Crossway, 2012.

The authors begin with a survey of evangelical scholarship on the issue of Psalm titles. Most evangelicals have not attempted to argue that the Psalm titles are inspired, though several have argued for their general reliability and even an early affixation to the Psalms. The authors then note that the real problem with the Psalm titles is the variation (and occasional contradiction) found between the Masoretic text, Qumran texts, and the Septuagint. This is followed by a very brief discussion of the canon which serves to emphasize that canonical books developed in a historical process, and that they sometimes existed in different editions (here the differences between the Hebrew and the Greek versions of Jeremiah are appealed to). Thus the titles to the Psalms may be canonical even if they were added to the book at a later date. In the end, they conclude "the titles are authentic, not because the titles are original or because the psalms were written by David, but because of their relationship to the Davidic vox. . . . Like the voice of Jesus in the Gospels and that of Moses in the Pentateuch, we hear the voice of David in the Psalter. The titles are authentic in the sense that they were part of a historical process of editing that led to its final canonical shape. As such they have great authority in helping us to interpret the Psalter, and they form the canonical function pointing us back to the Davidic persona within the Psalter" (300).

This essay contains a number of weaknesses. Foremost is a failure to set out a theology of canonicity to serve as a check on the thesis they are proposing. There is no doubt that the books of Psalms and Proverbs developed over time in ways that Galatians certainly did not. But what are the theological limits to this development? How do doctrines such as inspiration relate to the development of canonical books? Earlier in the book Graham Cole warns against "historyless" systematic theology, but there is also the danger of an atheological approach to historical matters. Second, how closely connected is the vox of David connected to the verba of David. It is one thing to say that the verba of Jesus, spoken in Aramaic, is rendered in Greek and summarized so that the Sermon on the Mount is not a verbatim record such as would have been recorded by a stenographer but a sometimes periphrastic summary of what Jesus said. It is another thing to say that Jesus never preached the Sermon on the Mount but that it preserves his "voice," it resonates with the kinds of things that he said. An evangelical view of the vox of Jesus would, it seems, need to operate with the first view. But with written material, such as the Psalms references to the vox of David would seem to fall into the latter paradigm (it would seem odd to argue that a late writer paraphrased David’s poetry into a new poem). This raises a third question, do the authors understand ledawid to indicate authorship or not? If yes, their view would seem to raise theological problems, if no, there seems little theological problems. Finally, the authors should have done a more thorough job of stating why they feel driven to deny Davidic verba for many of the Psalms and argue for a Davidic vox that points toward a Davidic "persona." The variations in the manuscript traditions are obviously a key factor. But why do they drive the authors to this solution? In the end this essay lacked the necessary argumentation to demonstrate that the proposed solution was both historically necessary and theologically acceptable.

Millard, Alan R. “Daniel in Babylon: An Accurate Record?” In Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith?: A Critical Appraisal of Modern and Postmodern Approaches to Scripture, 263-80. Wheaton: Crossway, 2012.

In this essay, Alan Millard helpfully summarizes alleged problems with Daniel’s historicity and proposed solutions.

Date of the Exile: On an initial reading the date Daniel gives for the exile in 1:1 is too early. But by understanding different ways of calculating years provides a way of harmonizing Daniel’s chronology with secular chronology.

Nebuchadnezzar’s Madness: Millard notes that a records of Nebuchadnezzar’s life in the non-biblical records provides space in which Nebuchadnezzar’s madness may have occurred. He also provides precedent for mentally deranged monarchs retaining their thrones.

Use of Chaldean to refer to a class of people: Millard argues that there is a possible parallel situation with the term Magi, which designated a Median tribe as well as a class of people. He further notes that Chaldean was not used as an ethnic term in contemporary non-Biblical records. So there is no textual basis for claiming the term could have only been used in one way during the time of Daniel.

Belshazzar: Some claim that it is inappropriate to identify him as a king, but Millard demonstrates that term was used of lesser rulers at that time. Second, some argue that it is inappropriate to identify Belshazzar as Nebuchadnezzar’s son since he was not related to Nebuchadnezzar. Millard notes that the evidence is not full enough to rule out the relation.

Darius the Mede: Daniel identifies him as the conquer of Babylon while historically it is clear that Cyrus conquered Babylon. Millard interprets Daniel 6:28 as equating Darius the Mede and Cyrus the Persian (cf. 1 Chron. 5:26).

Satraps: Herodotus says Darius I created twenty of these whereas Daniel says Darius the Mede/Cyrus created 120 of them. Millard says the term may be flexible enough to indicate different administrative divisions.

Language: Driver had argued that the use of Greek words and Aramaic pointed toward a date of authorship after the conquest of Alexander the Great. Millard notes subsequent discoveries have demonstrated that such a conclusion from the language is not necessary.

Overall, Millard demonstrates that the evangelical claims for Daniel’s accuracy need not give way to critical reconstructions as Sparks claims.

Schultz, Richard. “Isaiah, Isaiahs, and Current Scholarship.” In Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith?: A Critical Appraisal of Modern and Postmodern Approaches to Scripture. Edited by James K. Hoffmeier and Dennis R. Magary. Wheaton: Crossway, 2012.

A certain segment of ostensibly evangelical authors are adopting an increasingly harsh tone toward evangelicals who resist the conclusions of modernist scholars. Kenton Sparks claims that conservative evangelicals maintain their position for the following reasons: "theological immaturity, an overly pastoral focus, a ‘desire to sell books to conservative readers,’ a self-protective impulse (i.e., seeking to retain their teaching posts at conservative institutions), and poor training and a general lack of knowledge regarding contemporary critical scholarship," (260, n. 80, summarizing Sparks, God’s Word in Human Words, 167-68). Evidently Sparks finds it impossible to believe that any well-educated scholar would continue to believe Scripture’s self-testimony and historically orthodox doctrine when it conflicts with whatever happens to be the current critical (and typically unbelieving) scholarly consensus.

In this essay Richard Schultz defends the integrity of Isaiah from attacks by Sparks in his God’s Word in Human Words and by John Halsey Wood in an article critiquing O. T. Allis’s defense of Isaiah’s unity. Wood argues that since Allis allowed that Moses used sources in constructing the Pentateuch and allowed for post-Mosaic updating, it was inconsistent for him to adhere to a unified Isaiah. Wood thinks that Allis is wrongly motivated by a desire to maintain the predictive quality Isaiah. He further thinks that while prophets were able to predict the future there is no compelling reason to affirm that they actually did so. Wood also critiques Allis’s messianic reading of Isaiah 53. He says that since Allis acknowledged that Deuteronomy 18 envisioned a succession of prophets culminating in a Messiah, he should be willing to concede the same for Isaiah 53. Sparks objects to the unity of Isaiah on the grounds that the earlier part of the book is addressing those in Judah threatened by Assyria whereas the latter part of the book is addressed to the Babylonian exiles in the next century. He also finds it hard to believe that detailed prophecies would have been given to people who lived so long after the prophecies were given. He thinks the prophecies in Isaiah were genuine prophecies, but he argues they were delivered at a much closer time period to the events that they address. Next, Sparks notes Isaiah is named 16x in chapters 1-39 whereas he is not named at all in the latter half of the book. In addition, he argues that Jeremiah’s silence regarding Isaiah’s prophecies demonstrates the latter half of the book had not been written by Jeremiah’s time. Sparks also argues that differences in emphases and styles point to multiple authors. Finally, Sparks says "a sober and serious reading of Isaiah" can only lead to a rejection of the traditional view and an embrace of the critical consensus.

Schultz responds to each of these claims. He notes that acknowledging the possible use of sources for the construction of the patriarchal narratives or the later updating of place names is a far cry from saying a large section of a book was added well over a hundred years later by one or more authors.

Schultz also argues that Allis was not solely motivated by a desire to defend the predictive quality of Isaiah. He does note that the text makes the claim that God fulfills the predictions of his prophets—a claim Allis wished to affirm. This is major claim in the book of Isaiah and one that Schultz could have stressed more in his defense. In response to Sparks’ similar claim, Schultz notes that some of Isaiah 40-66 may be addressing Assyrian exiles in Isaiah’s day. He note that some verses do not fit well with the end of Babylonian exile (e.g., Isa. 43:28).

Schultz responds to Wood’s argument regarding Isaiah 53 by noting the great differences between Deuteronomy 18 and Isaiah 53 make it perfectly plausible to see a prophecy of a succession of prophets in the one and a detailed messianic prophecy in the other. It is not an inconsistency to affirm this.

Schultz finds the argument form the distribution of Isaiah’s name a weak argument considering that many of the occurrences of Isaiah’s name in chapters 1-39 occur in the narrative section in which he is a character. In addition, there are large stretches of text in the first part of the book in which his name does not occur.

The argument that Jeremiah does not reference the latter chapters of Isaiah is doubly weak. In the first place it is an argument from silence—a silence that might be expected given that scholars still discuss the silence of the eighth century prophets regarding their contemporaries, not to mention Jeremiah’s own (often commented upon) silence regarding Josiah. But in addition to the fact that a silence might be expected, Schultz notes that a number of scholars claim they see a dependence of Deutero-Isaiah upon Jeremiah. If the presumption of order is challenged, then there may indeed be evidence for Jeremiah’s recognition of the latter part of Isaiah.

Regarding differences in emphasizes and styles, Schultz demonstrates from the work of Christopher Seitz and others that many of these arguments are now doubted. It seems that Sparks himself recognizes this to be among his weaker arguments.

Sparks’ claim that a "sober and serious reading of Isaiah" can only result in adopting his own conclusions is more bluster than argument. Schultz nevertheless engages it. He selects a few examples from critical scholars who divide up a single passage among into several redaction layers (thus seeing not three but a multitude of authors contributing to Isaiah. He examines the presuppositions of such an approach (e.g., "that a prophet would not reuse, allude to, or elaborate upon his own (earlier) oracles," 256) to demonstrate that such readings are neither sober nor serious.

At the very least Schultz demonstrates that respectable argument can be made for the integrity of Isaiah. This being the case, the question is raised why Sparks and other left-leaning evangelicals are so vitriolic in their opposition to the conservative position? Why the questioning of motives, the impugning of scholarship? Why the name-calling? Why the denigration of pastoral care?

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation. Edited by Timothy McDermott. Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1989. pp. 541-500 (III.60-90).

McDermott has reformatted and abridged the Summa from Thomas’s scholastic form into a more modern paragraph form that focuses on Thomas’s affirmative teaching. This concise translation cannot, of course, replace the unabridged Summa in its original form, but it does provide a helpful summary of Thomas’s thought in his own words.

Filed Under: Uncategorized

Preliminary Thoughts on Homosexual Practice and Revisionist Definitions of Marriage

May 10, 2012 by Brian

The debate over the definition of marriage has risen to prominence once again due to North Carolina voter approval of a constitutional amendment that affirmed the traditional view of marriage and due to the president’s now public advocacy of a revisionist definition of marriage.

Christian reflection on this issue, as on all moral issues, must be grounded in Scripture. The Bible is unambiguous in its rejection of homosexual practice. Furthermore, given that Scripture consistently condemns illicit affections as well as actions, Christians must recognize both homosexual practice and passions as sin. That said, sexual temptation (whether homosexual or heterosexual) and sexual sin (in thought or deed) are distinct. While it is true that numerous attempts have been mounted to reinterpret Scripture’s teaching regarding homosexual practice, these attempts are neither exegetically nor hermeneutically convincing. The best treatment of the relevant passages and the best response to common arguments is Robert A. J. Gagnon, The Bible and Homosexual Practice: Texts and Hermeneutics (Abingdon, 2001).[1]

Natural revelation certainly testifies against homosexual practice as Paul notes in Romans 1, and it may be possible to mount a natural law case against revisionist definitions of marriage as well. The best effort currently is Sherif Girgis, Robert George, and Ryan T. Anderson, “What is Marriage?” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 34, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 245-87. The difficulty in appealing to natural revelation on a controversial issue is twofold. Natural revelation is always seen most clearly through the spectacles of Scripture; Scripture has a clarity that natural revelation does not have. Second, fallen people are just as prone to suppress general revelation as they are to reject special revelation. This does not vitiate natural law argumentation, however. Even if the positive argumentation for a conjugal definition of marriage is not as clear as explicit biblical statements, the argumentation may still be helpful. Furthermore, Girgis, George, and Anderson raise telling critiques against a revisionist definition. For instance, if marriage is defined in terms of two people who love each other, what logical reason is there for limiting marriage to two? They note this is not a slippery-slope argument. It is a question about coherence. Or, if civil recognition is about homosexual couples receiving legal benefits since they live in a shared domestic situation, on what ground does the government deny these benefits to two widowed brothers who now share a home and domestic responsibilities? Can a coherent alternative definition of marriage be developed. Girgis, George, and Anderson demonstrate that none has been developed thus far.

Christians should be clear both in word and deed that their concerns about redefining marriage are not limited to concerns about homosexual behavior alone. Nor do their concerns extend only to so-called slippery slope situations: polyandry, polygamy, or incestuous marriages. Christians are concerned about rises in divorces (and about no-fault divorce law), in cohabitation, and in out of wedlock pregnancies. They should also be concerned about distortions in the biblical roles and responsibilities given to husbands and wives. Distortions of the biblical marital ideal are personally and societally disastrous because they run against the creational norms that God has placed in his world.

Christians must reject the claim that revising the definition of marriage is a civil rights issue for those who engage in homosexual behavior. This claim assumes that homosexual inclinations are biologically determined in the same way that skin color is biologically determined. The scientific evidence for this assumption is lacking. For a recent review of the data, see Stanton L. Jones, “Same-Sex Science,” First Things (February 2012): 27-33. Even if genetic predispositions to homosexual desires are discovered, Christians should recognize that this would only confirm the Scriptural teaching that the Fall has radically affected God’s good creation and that humans are sinners from conception and beset with sinful inclinations from the time they have inclinations. See chapter 8 of Ed Welch, Blame It on the Brain (P&R, 1998) and part of David Powlinson’s essay in Psychology & Christianity: Five Views (InterVarsity, 2000) [relevant portion available here].

When the redefinition of marriage is cast as a civil rights issue it inevitably raises religious liberty issues. Will churches be permitted to refuse to perform same-sex marriage ceremonies? May homosexual practice be grounds for denying employment in Christian organizations or for denying membership in Christian churches? If the redefined marriage becomes a civil right, it will be increasingly difficult for Christians to maintain their religious liberties with regard to biblical understandings of marriage. This being the case, why should same-sex couples who already have the freedom to cohabit, who may receive a religious recognition of their relationship from certain religious groups, and who may receive joint benefits if they work for any number of companies demand the civil government redefine marriage in such a way that large numbers of religious citizens are deprived of their freedom?

Given the scope of the discussion, citizens should be discussing the qualifications for a given activity or status to be considered a civil right. They should discuss the nature and extent of religious liberties. They should seek to understand the implications declaring something a good simply on the basis that it extends equality or liberty (for some). They should discuss not only the biblical position on marriage but the reasons why the Christian Scripture has framed marriage the way it has. But for this kind of discussion to take place religious reasoning cannot be excluded from public discussion. For this to take place opponents of the revised view of marriage cannot be denounced (intolerantly) as intolerant. There must be space for public discussion of the merits and demerits of the various proposals. It is certainly inappropriate for those advocating a revised view of marriage to shout down those who wish to have this discussion.

Most importantly, Christians should pray for all that are in authority so that they may live quiet and peaceable lives—lives that model God’s vision for marriage and family so that despite speaking evil of Christians, unbelievers will by observing the good works of Christians be saved and so glorify God when he returns to judge the world and set all things right (1 Tim. 2:2; 1 Pet. 2:12).


[1] Gagnon does not fall into the fundamentalist or conservative evangelical category, as is seen by his reference to some New Testament material as Deutero-Pauline.

Filed Under: Christian Living

Books and Articles Finished in March

April 2, 2012 by Brian

Books

Oswalt, John. The Bible among the Myths: Unique Revelation or Just Ancient Literature?. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009.

Oswalt argues that the recent trend toward classifying parts of the Bible as myth is not due to new evidence that has arisen over the past several decades. He further argues that despite surface similarities (e.g., tripartite temples or similar laws) a great difference in worldview separates Israel from the surrounding cultures. Oswalt finds the surface similarities expected. Cultures of particular times and places will share features. He finds the worldview differences striking because Israel’s worldview of transcendence has only appeared in the world in the religions that have some connection to the Bible: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. All other worldviews are worldviews of immanence. Oswalt concludes the book with defenses of the Bible’s historicity (and the importance of its historicity) against critics such as Bultmann and William Dever.

Carson, D. A. The Intolerance of Tolerance. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012.

What explains a bank’s unwillingness to retain the bank account of a Christian organization that adheres to traditional Christian views on human sexuality? How do universities justify requiring Christian student organizations to admit officers who hold views contrary to Christian doctrine and practice? Why are doctors in some regions required to perform abortions and pharmacists required to carry and distribute abortion inducing drugs—despite their conscientious objections?

In The Intolerance of Tolerance D. A. Carson argues that these incidents follow from a new definition of tolerance, a tolerance that is remarkably intolerant. The old tolerance permitted a wide variety of views—each strongly held. Diversity existed, and so did debate. The old tolerance also functioned within a moral framework. People might disagree about aspects of the framework, but all believed that the "common good" included moral norms.

The new tolerance rejects all dogmatism as intolerant. According to the new tolerance, all views must be accepted as true (or, at least, potentially true). The moral framework that the old tolerance functioned within is rejected by the new tolerance as intolerant. In the end, significant moral discussion becomes impossible. Instead of discussing the rights and wrongs of various theories of poverty and crime, conceptions of marriage, or the origins, nature, and value of human life, "the public discourse focuses on what sanctions should be imposed on those who do not ‘tolerate’ (definitely the new sense!) the abolition of what were once the moral standards" (133-34).

Intolerance becomes the only vice when the new tolerance is dominant. Yet, ironically, those who function under the old view of tolerance must not be tolerated. This, Carson says, is "worse than inconsistency." The new tolerance views secularism as a neutral arbiter when it fact, as Carson takes the time to demonstrate, it has all the marks of a religious view in its own right. So ironically the free exercise of other religions must give way to the establishment of secularism.

The demand that religion retreat into its own private sphere is bad enough for Christianity and other religions for whom privatization contradicts core beliefs. But worse, even a privatized religion will not suit the secularism of the new tolerance. Even the internal affairs of religious groups are censured under the new tolerance. For instance, the Catholic Church is denounced as intolerant for denying the Eucharist to members who publically oppose its abortion policies, and evangelical Anglicans are castigated for not permitted heretical bishops to preach from their pulpits. Doctors in some areas are told they must perform abortions despite personal religious objections. When a government sanctions those who seek to uphold morality (rather than those who seek to undermine it), not even a privatized religion or a personal conscience offers protection. Democracies too, Carson warns, can be tyrannical.

At this point Carson’s book could grow dark and discouraging or angry and shrill. But Carson avoids this. He concludes with ten "ways ahead." Several of these suggestions center on ways of thinking and speaking which undermine the pretentious but hollow claims of the new tolerance. The last three ways forward deserve special mention: "evangelize," "be prepared to suffer," and "delight in God, and trust him." Though making the United States (or wherever) "a better place" is not the motive for evangelism, Carson notes "when the gospel truly does take hold in any culture, changes in that culture are inevitable" (174). But if suffering and persecution rather than cultural change awaits Western believers, it will be nothing more than the New Testament tells Christians they should expect–and nothing more than what many Christians around the world experience (175). Therefore: "Delight in God, and trust him. God remains sovereign, wise, and good. Our ultimate confidence is not in any government or party, still less in our ability to mold the culture in which we live." Our hope is in God.

This review first appeared on the BJU Campus Store Blog.

Plantinga, Jr., Cornelius. Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995.

Plantinga examines sin from a number of different angles and provides helpful categories for understanding sin. He particularly addresses sins that moderns are inclined to dismiss. Negatively, he’s abandoned the concept of original guilt.

McQuilkin, Robertson. A Promise Kept. Tyndale House, 2006.

This book is the personal story of Robertson McQuilkin’s care for his wife as she struggled with Alzheimers. McQuilkin organized the book around key phases in the standard marriage vows, and he speaks candidly about both the struggles and delights of keeping those vows.

Kraynak, Robert P. Christian Faith and Modern Democracy: God and Politics in the Fallen World. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001.

In this book Robert Kraynak explores a dilemma brought about by the affirmation of two theses. First, liberal democracy depends upon Christianity to justify its claims. Second, Christianity for most of its history has preferred illiberal forms of government. The dilemma these theses raise is this: are the majority of modern Christians correct in affirming liberal democracy as "the form of government most compatible with the Christian religion" (1).

In establishing the first thesis, Kraynak notes that liberal democracy (in distinction from ancient democracy) is based on a particular notion of human dignity that emphasizes personal autonomy. But none of the liberal philosophical schools, whether those of Hobbes, Kant, Mill, or Rorty, are able to establish a ground for this human dignity. Kraynak demonstrates that various schools of thought have sought to find this basis only to have the next philosophical school reject it as insufficient. In the end, the postmoderns give up and assume human dignity without having a basis for the assumption. Kraynak quotes Richard Rorty:  "it is ‘part of our tradition . . . that [a] stranger from whom all dignity has been stripped [should] be  taken in and re-clothed with dignity. This Jewish and Christian element in our tradition is gratefully  invoked by freeloading atheists like myself’ who think that metaphysical debates are futile" (36, ellipses,  brackets, and emphasis from Kraynak).

Christianity is able to provide a basis for human dignity, but that does not necessarily mean that liberal democracy is the governmental system that best fits Christianity. Kraynak establishes his second thesis by surveying Scripture and church history. He establishes the Old Testament to be patriarchal and monarchical. The New Testament does not endorse any form of government, though it does enjoin submission to the reigning monarch. Furthermore, he argues that the dignity that humans have from the imago Dei is not the dignity of autonomy as in the liberal conception. The case from church history is easy to make: Augustine praised various forms of government including both the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire (when governed by Christian emperors); Aquinas and other medieval theologians preferred a monarchy with various checks; Calvin preferred an aristocracy with some democratic elements; Luther and the Anglicans defend monarchy; Wesley clearly opposed republicanism; the Roman Catholic Church has only recently reconciled itself to democracy.

If neither Scripture nor church history predisposes Christians to embrace liberal democracy as the best form of government why do most Christians now hold that view? Kraynak notes six common suggestions:

  1. Modern democracy arose from medieval ideas about natural law and from the Conciliar movement (Lord Acton, Brian Tierney, Richard Tuck).
  2. Modern democracy is rooted in the Reformation doctrines of justification by faith alone, the priesthood of the believer, and the supremacy of Scripture.
  3. Modern democracy emerged from Neo-Scholastic theories of popular sovereignty.
  4. Modern democracy arose from Enlightenment ideas.
  5. Christian acceptance of modern democracy grew from struggles against colonialism, slavery, and industrial abuses.
  6. Christian acceptance of modern democracy grew form the struggle against totalitarianism in the twentieth century.

Kraynak rejects the first three reasons. In other words, he rejects the idea that liberal democracy emerged from the nexus of Christian ideas. He affirms that liberal democracy grew from Enlightenment soil (and especially from Kant), which means that points five and six explain why Christians have embraced a system foreign to its thought for so many years.

Kant’s view of the autonomous man whose dignity is grounded in his own determination of his good is obviously at odds with Christian thought. Christians who embrace liberal democracy therefore modify Kant. But Kraynak doubts that tweaking Kant is enough. Though he grants that liberal democracy has done good by resisting tyranny and mitigating religious warfare (among other goods), Kraynak also highlights the dark side of democracy.

Many of his criticisms focus around the importance of "rights" to liberal democracy. Kraynak believes that the rights talk is subversive to legitimate human authorities such as parents, government, and even Scripture. It undermines Christian charity and fosters an entitlement mentality because rather than loving people and giving out of compassion, people in need now receive that which is their right.

Kraynak also believes that democracy achieves equality by brining people down to the lowest common denominator. He says, "The whole tradition of liberal arts education . . . seem[s] too aristocratic or too  ‘high brow,’ too judgmental and demanding, for most people in a democratic society. Not only do the  masses of people feel justified in ignoring them, but the educated elites themselves lose confidence in  their enduring values and treat them with irony and contempt, becoming corrupt elites with a  mission to subvert or deconstruct high culture. The strongest pressures in a democratic age are always  downward from high culture toward popular entertainment, which originally meant replacing  aristocratic and religious culture with middle-class and working-class culture but now means sinking to the lowest common denominator of the rebellious avant-garde and raucous youth culture, often of the crudest kind. When, for example, Mozart is replaced by the Beatles as the standard for music, or when  Gregorian chant and Bach are replaced by folk music and guitars in Christian liturgy, a dramatic cultural revolution has occurred"(27).

Finally, while liberal democracy does protect religious freedom, it does so at the expense of embracing pluralism. Kraynak grants that one can always ‘tolerate’ error as a matter of prudence, based on the recognition that error and sin are intractable problems of the fallen world. But from the perspective of ultimate truth, diversity is not a right" (179).

Kraynak’s preferred government is a constitutional monarchy that operates within the constraints of Augustine’s Two Cities paradigm. He grants however that in the present age a democracy based on moral law rather than on Kantian liberalism may be the best kind of government presently achievable.

Kraynak’s work suffers from several weaknesses. His categorical rejection of rights language rests on a less than persuasive view of the imago Dei, which he believes is "man’s original immortality" (57). Wolterstorff’s discussion of the imago Dei in Justice: Rights and Wrongs is exegetically more persuasive than Kraynak’s. Also, Kraynak’s Catholicism intrudes when he bases parts of his argument on the hierarchical structure of the Roman Church. Finally, much of Kraynak’s argument depends on the hierarchy of being. While Scripture does indicate some hierarchy exists if only in humanity’s role as image bearers of God over the rest of creation, the medieval hierarchy of being seems to have a number of serious defects. Not only did it over-analyze the hierarchy on slim biblical evidence (note the ascending chain of angels, archangels, virtues, powers, principalities, dominions, thrones, cherubim, seraphim), but it seems to devalue the material world by placing pure spirits above embodied spirits. It also seems to engender a false idea of how a being draws near to God.

Despite these weaknesses, Kraynak has produced a book well worth reading. Christians who today embrace democracy as the best form of government do well to ask themselves why Christians in earlier generations were suspicious of republican and democratic forms of government. Kraynak is wise to critique democracy for its leveling tendencies. When democracy reduces all cultural evaluations to mere personal preference, it impoverishes society. When democratic tendencies undermine the legitimate authority of parents, pastors, teachers, and rulers, it harms society. When religious freedom undermines the exclusive and universal claims of Christianity, at that point it has ceased to be a good.

Dickens, Charles. Little Dorrit. Incorporated Books, 1868.

Horton, Michael. The Gospel Commission: Recovering God’s Strategy for Making Disciples. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011.

Michael Horton writes on a variety of levels. This book is pitched as a meaty popular level book. It seems to be the final book in an informal trilogy begun with Christless Christianity and The Gospel-Driven Life. Perhaps most helpful in this volume is the discussion of how the Reformation marks of the church (preaching, sacraments/ordinances, discipline) relate to discipleship. Also helpful were trenchant critiques of the emergent church, of a certain kind of missional conception of the church, and of the discipleship models of Richard Foster and Dallas Willard. Horton also addresses church and culture, Christianity and culture issues. He adopts the exegetically problematic Klinean two-kingdoms view, but his application of this view does not seem as radical as VanDrunen’s.

Articles

Stitzinger, James F. "The Rapture in Twenty Centuries of Biblical Interpretation," Master’s Seminary Journal 13, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 149-171

Stitzinger seeks to demonstrate some historical precedent for a pre-tribulational rapture prior to Darby. He weakens his case by trying too hard to find it implied in the writings of the early fathers. His citations from Ephraem of Nisibis (306–373) and The History of Brother Dolcino (1316) are more convincing. In the post-Reformation period he cites primarily those who teach the imminent return of Christ, but it is not clear that they actually held to a pre-tribulation rapture. In some cases, those he cites held to a pre-Armageddon rapture. His citation of Morgan Edwards (1722-1795) is the most persuasive citation form this period.

Woudstra, Martin H. "Israel and the Church: A Case for Continuity." In Continuity and Discontinuity: Perspectives on the Relationship Between the Old and New Testaments. Edited by John S. Feinberg. Westchester, IL: Crossway, 1988.

Gumerlock, Francis. “A Rapture Citation in the Fourteenth Century,” Bibliotheca Sacra 159, no. 635 (July 2002): 349-362.

Gumerlock argues that attempts to discredit the pre-tribulation rapture by linking it to Margaret Macdonald are historically irresponsible. He notes several pre-nineteenth century pretribulationalists, and he focuses on one reference in The History of Brother Dolcino (1316). Brother Dolcino was the leader of a group that broke away from the Roman Church between 1300-1307. A crusade launched against them destroyed the group in 1307. Dolcino and his group believed that they would be preserved from the persecution of the Antichrist by being translated to heaven before the last three and a half years of the Antichrist’s reign. Revelation 11 (especially a figurative understanding of 11:12) as correlated with 1 Thessalonians 4:17 forms the exegetical basis for this belief. Gumerlock notes that more work needs to be done to understand the context in which this thought arose (he does cite Joachim of Fiore as an influence) and to see the extent of its influence. Pre-tribulationalists should be careful in their appeal to this work since Joachim of Fiore held to some heretical ideas (e.g., the end of the church in 1260). A fourteenth-century breakaway group influenced by Joachim is likely to hold doctrines, even eschatological doctrines, with which pre-tribulationalists will not wish to identify. Gumerlock, who is not pre-tribulational, was not seeking to make a historical argument in favor of the pre-tribulational position in this article. His goal was to demonstrate that the doctrine did not originate in the nineteenth century and that more historical work is needed to trace the history of this idea.

Peter Lombard. The Sentences, Book 4: On the Doctrine of Signs. Translated by Giulio Silano. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2010. Pp. vii-lxxv + 1-38.

Peter Lombard’s Sentences is one of the most influential theology textbooks in church history. It was the text that all medieval theology students studied and wrote commentaries on (see Rosemann’s excellent The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard’s ‘Sentences’). It has finally been translated into English. This month I read Silano’s helpful summary of book 4 and Lombard’s distinctions on baptism. Though Lombard teaches that faith and contrition without baptism brings justification, remission of sins, and removal of eternal punishment, baptism is expected of all who have the opportunity to be baptized (bk. 4, dist. 4, chs. 4-5; cf. ch. 6, n. 1; ch. 7, n. 1-2).What benefit does baptism bring if those with faith and contrition are justified, forgiven, and no longer in danger of eternal punishment? Lombard says that baptism cleanses a person from any sins committed since conversion, absolves from external satisfaction, increases virtue, and reduces temptation (bk. 4, dist. 4, ch. 5; cf. ch. 6, n. 1; ch. 7, n. 1-2). Earlier he stated that baptism removes original sin from infants, and original sin and all subsequent sins (prior to baptism) from adults (bk. 4, dist. 4, ch. 1, n. 2).

Filed Under: Book Recs

Carson comments on Webb’s Slaves, Women and Homosexuals

March 20, 2012 by Brian

In January I noted that “I find it surprising, and even disturbing, that so many top evangelical NT scholars praise Webb’s problematic approach.” I was therefore pleased to come across D. A. Carson’s critical evaluation of Webb’s redemptive movement hermeneutic, particularly as it relates to slavery. Carson’s view of the NT situation, his exegesis of Philemon, and the Christian abolition movement coheres with the research that I’ve done in these areas. I think he’s spot on, and commend his comments.

Resources I’ve found helpful in researching Philemon and slavery:

Barth, Markus and Helmut Blanke, The Letter to Philemon, Eerdmans Critical Commentary. Edited by David Noel Freedman. Eerdmans, 2000.

Bercott, David. W. A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1998.

Finley, M. I. Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology. Penguin, 1980.

Fitzmyer, Joseph A. The Letter to Philemon. Anchor Bible. Edited by David Noel Freedman. Doubleday, 2000.

Harris, Murray J. Slave of Christ: A New Testament Metaphor for Total Devotion to Christ. New Studies in Biblical Theology. Edited by D. A. Carson. InterVarsity, 1999.

Lohse, Eduard. Colossians and Philemon. Hermeneia. Ed. Helmut Koester. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971.

Noll, Mark A. The Civil War as a Theological Crisis. The University of North Carolina Press, 2006.

O’Brien, Peter T. Colossians, Philemon. Word Biblical Commentary. Ed. David A. Hubbard and Ralph P. Martin. [Waco, TX]: Word, 1982.

NB: Several of the above works are modernist rather than orthodox in their approach to Scripture.

Filed Under: Uncategorized

Athanasius on Fundamentalism

March 10, 2012 by Brian

"I thank the Lord who has given to you to believe in Him, that you too may have eternal life with the saints. But because there are certain persons who, while they affirm that they do not hold with Arius, yet compromise themselves and worship with his party, I have been compelled to write at once . . . For when any see you, the faithful in Christ, associate and communicate with such people, certainly they will think it a matter of indifference and will fall into the mire of irreligion. Lest, then, this should happen, be pleased beloved to shun those who hold the impiety of Arius. We are specially bound to fly from the communion of men whose opinions we hold in execration. If then any come to you, and, as blessed John says, brings with him right doctrine, say to him, All hail, and receive him as a brother. But if any pretend that he confesses the right faith, but appear to communicate with those others, exhort him to abstain from such communion, and if he promise to do so, treat him as a brother, but if he persist in a contentious spirit, him avoid."

Letters of Athanasius, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, 4:564.

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Tolerance apart from Morality no Virtue

March 10, 2012 by Brian

Tolerance in its conception took on the cast of a virtue because of its concern for the common good and its respect for people as persons. We endure particular customs, behaviors or habits—sometimes even (relatively) bad habits—of people in the interest of preserving a greater unity. In the Lockean context, tolerance was advocated for religious non-conformists. Never was it construed, however, to imply—much less sanction—morally questionable behavior. Consider, however, the devolution of a concept. What was a public virtue in its prior state becomes a vice if and when it ceases to care for truth, ignores the common good, and disdains the values that uphold a community. The culture of ‘tolerance’ in which we presently find ourselves is a culture in which people believe nothing, possess no clear concept of right and wrong, and are remarkably indifferent to this precarious state of affairs. As a result this transmutation of ‘tolerance’ becomes indistinguishable from an intractably intolerant relativism.

J. Daryl Charles, ‘Truth, Tolerance, and Christian Conviction: Reflections on a Perennial Question—a Review Essay," Christian Scholar’s Review 36 (2007): 212 in D. A. Carson, The Intolerance of Tolerance (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 75.

Filed Under: Christian Living

On the intellectual unseriousness of much secular discourse on moral issues

March 9, 2012 by Brian

"The charge of intolerance has come to wield enormous power in much of Western culture. . . . It functions as a ‘defeater belief.’ A defeater belief is a belief that defeats other beliefs—i.e., if you hold a defeater belief to be true "(whether it is true or not is irrelevant), you cannot possibly hold certain other beliefs to be true: the defeater belief rules certain other beliefs out of court and thus defeats them. . . . Put together several such defeater beliefs and make them widely popular, and you have created an implausibility structure: opposing beliefs are thought so implausible as to be scarcely worth listening to, let alone compelling or convincing." For this reason, "the new tolerance tends to avoid serious engagement over difficult moral issues, analyzing almost every issue on the one axis tolerant/intolerant, excluding all others from the pantheon of the virtuous who do not align with this axis."

D. A. Carson, The Intolerance of Tolerance (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 15.

Filed Under: Uncategorized

Books finished in February 2012

March 3, 2012 by Brian

Books

Stapert, Calvin R. Handel’s Messiah: Comfort for God’s People. ChristianAudio, 2010.

Stapert begins this work by tracing the development of the oratorio and the development of Handel as a musician. He also discusses the changes in the performance of Messiah over the years from the smaller choirs and orchestras to massive settings in the nineteenth century and then back toward more authentic performances. The latter part of the book examines the Messiah itself. Stapert examines the organization of texts in the  libretto, and he discusses how Handel utilized various musical techniques to wed the text to music that enhances its meaning. This is the most fascinating part of the book as it explains how Handel harnessed both Baroque conventions and elements inherent in sound and music to communicate. The audiobook includes selections from the Messiah after some of the discussions. More selections would have been welcome Negatively, the reader of the book has an affected style of speech that made listening less enjoyable than it could have been. Thankfully, this was more pronounced at the beginning and less pronounced as the book went on.

Sandel, Michael J. Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.

Sandel does an excellent job of making complex philosophical issues clear and relevant through the many concrete examples that fill this book. His skill as an educator makes this book an enjoyable read. The content makes the book a worthwhile read.

Sandel argues that conceptions of justice are oriented "around three ideas: maximizing welfare, respecting freedom, and promoting virtue. Each of these ideas points to a different way of thinking about justice" (6). Among philosophers, the former two perspectives have proved the most popular, since justice that promotes virtue must judge what is virtuous and what is not—a difficult task in a pluralistic society with no agreed upon moral foundation. Sandel thus begins by examining utilitarianism and libertarianism.

Utilitarianism falls by the wayside in short order. It’s critics charge that it does not give adequate weight to human dignity and individual rights, and that it wrongly reduces everything of moral importance to a single scale of pleasure and pain" (49). John Stuart Mill sought to answer these critics, but Sandel demonstrates that in doing so he "appeals to moral ideals beyond utility—ideals of character and human flourishing" (52). Thus Mill’s attempted defense the "maximizing welfare" approach to justice ends up rooted in a "promoting virtue" approach.

Sandel spends a greater part of the book on the "respecting freedom" conception of justice. He does this with good reason, for while many debates about justice are debates about the three orientations (welfare, freedom, virtue), "some of the most hard-fought political arguments of our time take place between two rival camps within [the freedom group]—the laissez-faire camp and the fairness camp" (20). Since "the philosophies of Kant and Rawls represent the fullest and clearest expression of" the "ambition" to "spare politics and law from becoming embroiled in moral and religious controversies" (243), Sandel devotes a chapter to each. He concludes, however, that their "ambition cannot succeed.” He reasons, “Many of the most hotly contested issues of justice and rights can’t be debated without taking up controversial moral and religious questions. In deciding how to define the rights and duties of citizens, it’s not always possible to set aside competing conceptions of the good life. And even when it’s possible, it may not be desirable. Asking democratic citizens to leave their moral and religious convictions behind when they enter the public realm may seem a way of ensuring toleration and mutual respect. In practice, however, the opposite can be true. Deciding important public questions while pretending to a neutrality that cannot be achieved is a recipe for backlash and resentment. A politics emptied of substantive moral engagement makes for an impoverished civic life" (243).

Thus Aristotle and virtue-ethics come under consideration. This is the view that Sandel himself embraces: "Justice is inescapably judgmental" (261). This view is not a panacea to the conflict of values. Sandel supports abortion, embryonic stem cell research, and extending the definition of marriage to include pairings of the same sex. But he does not take these positions on the grounds that women have the right to choose (for they do not have the right to choose to kill their toddlers) or that it violates a homosexual’s freedom and rights to be denied marriage. Instead, he argues that participants in these discussions must determine the moral issues of whether an embryo or fetus are persons and what the telos of marriage is. The hard work of debating justice in particular instances remain, but Sandel has cleared away problematic general approaches and laid a foundation for those particular discussions to take place.

Keller, Timothy. Generous Justice: How God’s Grace Makes Us Just. New York: Dutton, 2010.

I started this book with chapter seven since the discussion of justice and Christian involvement in the public square coincided with a research project I was working on. In my estimation, this was the best chapter of the book. Keller mediates the insights of Sandel’s Justice and Steven Smith’s The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse through his own Christian understanding. In doing so he demonstrates that freedom, and equality, concepts closely related to justice, are "empty concepts." Freedom and equality are not simply good or bad. They are good or bad in relation to something else. In general, freedom to harm others is not good. But what is harm? Moral disagreement over what is or is not harm demonstrates the impossibility of value-neutral justice. To achieve true justice, Christian morality must enter the public square. Keller believes this is possible because secular theories of justice are each partially true due to the natural law that all people know. There is therefore the possibility of Christians and non-Christians working together for justice in the public square. Keller does not, like some natural law theorists, believe that the Bible must be left to one side. He believes that Scripture, including the Old Testament is relevant to current public policy debates (though he also steers clear of theonomy). In my estimation, this is the best chapter of the book.

The remainder of the book is mixed. Positively, Keller demonstrates that poverty is a concern to God. He addressed it in the legislation given to Israel. The prophets addressed injustice directed toward the poor in their denunciation of Israel’s sin, and Jesus maintained the same perspective in his preaching. In his discussions of helping the poor Keller conveys many helpful insights. For instance, he notes that a barrier to the poor receiving the gospel is raised if the poor hear their denounced by preachers but not the sins of those who oppress the poor. He also helpfully distinguishes between three levels of help: relief, development, and social reform. He notes that the church can help in the first and in lower levels of the second, but as development becomes more complex the institutional church should allow other institutions with more expertise to fulfill their roles in addressing those needs (and Christians should work in such institutions for Christian motivations). On the one hand, Keller says churches should "always try to err on the side of being generous" (138) as they consider helping their communities. On the other hand, he rejects the idea that doing justice is doing evangelism: "Evangelism is the most basic and radical ministry possible to a human being. This is true not because the spiritual is more important than the physical, but because the eternal is more important than the temporal" (139).

Negatively, though Keller is right that historically the poor are more often treated unjustly, his exclusive focus on rendering justice to the poor in chapters 1-6 skews the discussion. Keller’s exhortations to generosity are scriptural, but prudential guidelines on how that generosity is practiced is also biblical (1 Tim. 5).

Keller also seems to think that not giving to the poor is an injustice. But the fact that Matt. 6:1-2 teaches that giving to the needy is righteous does not necessarily mean that it is a matter of justice rather than charity. To be a matter of justice means that the individual has a right to my giving to him (based on Wolterstorff’s theory of justice, which Keller builds upon). But in what way does a poor person have a right to my giving to him? Which poor people? How much? Keller would be better off following Wolterstorff on the issue of charity. Charity is not a matter of giving the poor his rights; it is a matter of fulfilling obligations to God.

Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Justice: Rights and Wrongs. Princeton University Press, 2008.

Wolterstoff’s premise is that justice is a matter of rendering to people their rights. He defends this thesis against those who argue that the rights focus is the bad fruit of the Enlightenment. To the contrary, says Wolterstorff. In a fascinating historical survey he demonstrates that the theory of rights-grounded justice emerged in the medieval period. He continues to move backward through history to demonstrate that the Bible, though not developing a philosophic theory of justice, implies a rights-based approach.

What do people have rights to? Here Wolterstorff argues against the eudaimonistic approach to ethics (he also rejects the deontological and consequentialist approaches) on the grounds that it is incompatible with a rights-based approach to justice. The Christian, vision, he argues is one not merely a well-lived life but an anticipation of flourishing, or shalom, in all aspects of life. Thus the love command grounds Christian ethics.

What is the grounding for rights? Wolterstorff argues that duties, capacities, and even the image of God in man cannot provide a grounding for natural human rights. He argues that human rights are bestowed by God in that he loves all humans.

In general, I enjoyed following Wolterstoff’s argumentation, and I learned a great deal about philosophy and ethics along the way. I’m open to his thesis about justice being grounded in rights, though I’d like to read some further interaction from scholars who take the other positions. I was not persuaded, however, with his dismissal of the image of God as the basis for natural human rights. His discussion of the image itself was excellent. He seemed to build a fairly good case for the image as the basis of these rights before dismissing the idea with little argumentation. It was a strange turn. Overall, I found the book a very profitable read.

Shaw, Mark. The Kingdom of God in Africa: A Short History of African Christianity. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996.

Shaw provides a good short history of Christianity in Africa from a generally evangelical perspective. He is strongest when simply relating historical events. He is weakest when providing analysis. He is not theologically discriminating enough about the orthodoxy of various forms of Christianity. Nonetheless, this is a recommended read for anyone who wants a basic overview of African Christianity from the first century through the late 1990s.

MacArthur, John. Slave: The Hidden Truth About Your Identity in Christ. Nashville: Nelson, 2010. [skimmed]

The sensationalism on the dust jacket and in opening chapters prevented me form paying this book much attention for some time. As even MacArthur’s own comments demonstrate there has been no "fraud" or "cover-up" or anything "purposely hidden" by Bible translators. MacArthur rightly notes that older English translations used the word "servant" because of its connections to the Latin word for slave "servus" and because "slave" in the early modern era meant something different that slavery at that time. It is for this reason that many modern translations opt for an alternative such as "bond-servant" (17-18). Once the sensationalism was cleared away, my skim showed that MacArthur did produce a helpful treatment of what it means for Christians to be bond servants of Christ. MacArthur drew heavily on Murray Harris’s Slave of Christ in the NSBT series. For those looking for a more in-depth treatment of the topic, Harris’s book is the one to turn to.

Gowan, Donald E. Eschatology in the Old Testament. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986.

Gowan helpfully identifies the big categories of Old Testament eschatology: The transformation of human society, the human person, and nature. He also rightly sees Jerusalem at the center of Old Testament eschatology. His development of these themes was, in my estimation, disappointing. He takes a Childs-type approach to the text. Though this leads him to focus on the final form of the text, he nevertheless does so in terms of what he thinks the religious state of Israel was at the time. So, to give only two examples, he denies that bodily resurrection is significant to OT eschatology and he thinks messianic ideas are of little importance. Nonetheless, his insight that Ezekiel 36 contains all the elements of OT eschatology is worth pondering.

The structure of his work along with the Scripture he references is useful:

Transformation of Human Society

Restoration to the Promised Land: Isa. 27:13; 35:10; 51:11; 60:4; 66:20; Jer 3:14; 32:37; Ezek 20:33-44; 37:26; Joel 3:20; Mic 4:6-7, 10; Zeph. 3:20; Zech. 2:7; 8:7-8.

 

The Righteous King: Isa. 11:9; 44:28; Jer. 33:16; Zech 4:5-10; 6:12-13; 9:9-10.

 

The Nations (victory over): Isa 34:8; Joel 3:1-21; Obadiah 16; Mic. 4:11-13; Zech. 1:14-15; 12:2-9; 14:1-3, 12-19.

 

The Nations (peace with): Isa 2:2-4 = Mic. 4:1-4.

 

The Nations (conversion of): Isa. 66:18-23; Jer. 3:17; Zech. 2:11; 8:20-23.

 

Transformation of the Human Person

Eschatological Forgiveness: Isa. 33:24; 40:2; Ezek. 20:40-44; 43:7-9; Zech. 13:1; cf. repentance in Isa. 59:20; Jer. 39:10-14; Ezek. 16:59-62.

 

The means of Re-Creation: Isa. 30:20-21; 59:21; Jer. 32:39-40 (cf. v. 36—city).

 

The New Person: Isa. 33:24; 35:5-6 (cf. v. 10—Zion); 65:20; Jer. 33:6; 50:5; Ezek. 16:60; Joel 3:17.

 

Transformation of Nature

Abundant Fertility: Isa. 4:2; Joel 2:23; 3:17-18.

 

A New Natural Order: Isa. 11:6-9; 65:25.

 

A New Earth: Isa. 35:1-10; 65:17-18; Ezek. 47:1-12; Zech. 14:4-8, 10.

p. 10

Wright, Nigel G. Free Church, Free State: The Positive Baptist Vision. Paternoster, 2005.

I found Wright most helpful in arguing for believers baptism and a gathered church ecclesiology. I found him less helpful in his section on government. He leans toward an anabaptist view in which the state is defined in terms of having the monopoly on sanctioned violence. Since, in his view, Christians are committed to following Christ in a path of non-violence, Christians who serve in state capacities place themselves in a difficult position. His ecumenical leanings also show through at various places throughout the book, so a section on religious tolerance in society is followed by a section on tolerance within the church.

Johnson, Julian. Who Needs Classical Music? Cultural Choice and Musical Value. Oxford University Press, 2002.

Johnson argues against the currently popular view that cultures and cultural choices are relative. He argues that far from cultural choices being matters of mere preference, some cultural choices are more valuable than others. More specifically, he argues that classical music has more cultural value than pop music. This is in part because it requires a level of thought and a way of thinking not demanded by pop music. To those who charge Johnson with elitism, he replies that the way to counter elitism is not to bring everyone down to the lowest common denominator. The way to counter elitism is to ensure that education (in this case in classical music) is provided to people of every walk of life.

Veenhof, Jan. Nature and Grace in Herman Bavinck. Translated by Albert M. Wolters. Sioux Center, IA: Dordt College Press, 2006.

The essence of Bavinck’s view, as explicated by Veenhof is that "Grace does not abolish nature, but affirms and restores it" (17). In expounding this view, Bavinck sets his view apart from both Roman Catholicism and Protestant pietism. According to Bavinck, Roman Catholicism teaches that nature is good, but that it does not reach to the supernatural. Grace is needed to elevate nature to the supernatural. The Protestant conception of grace, Bavinck says, is ethical. The purpose of grace is to remove sin, not to raise man above his nature.

Bavinck’s disagreement with the Pietists rests not on their understanding of the nature of grace but with their understanding of its extent. The danger Bavinck sees in pietism is that the grace, the gospel, and salvation is placed in a personal spiritual sphere and the rest of culture and life is placed an another sphere. But sin has invaded all of life, and man must function in all of life, not just in the spiritual part. The pietist therefore is in danger of aiding and abetting secularism. His critique is not one-sided, however. Bavinck realizes that the pietists have seen the real dangers of "unbridled and unbroken cultural optimism" (29). They also have centered their attention on "the one thing needful"—personal fellowship with God (30). Bavinck appeals to his readers to maintain this as the center of the Christian life while also recognizing that as a human other aspects of life are good, necessary, and in need of grace.

To state Bavinck’s view positively, nature is the good creation of God, but it has been pervasively affected by sin (thus the negative use of "world" in Scripture). This corruption is not something essential to nature, but (in Aristotelian terms), accidental. Thus God’s grace will restore nature (but merely by a return to Eden but in eventually achieving the goal God had for his creation from the beginning).

Jordan, William Chester. Europe in the High Middle Ages. Penguin, 2004.

Jordan’s history of the high middle ages is less detailed than Chris Wickham’s study of the previous era (both are in the Penguin History of Europe). Jordan is much more readable, however. His chapters can be read in a sitting and provide a good overview of the time and place covered. He does a good job of covering both what some historians seem to consider the "core" of Europe: Holy Roman Empire, France, Britain along with what they seem to consider fringes: Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. Jordan also covers the Crusader kingdoms in Middle East. Jordan did not cover religion as deeply as Wickham, though he does have brief coverage of both the investiture controversy and the realism/nominalism controversy.

Articles

Harmless, William. "Confessions." In Augustine in His Own Words. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010.

Harmless, William. "Augustine the Philosopher." In Augustine in His Own Words. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010.

Harmless does a good job of selecting significant selections that exemplify key aspects of Augustine’s thought and of selecting important excerpts from his major works. Brief commentary places each selection in context.

Filed Under: Book Recs

Justice requires virtue, not merely freedom to choose

February 23, 2012 by Brian

Does a just society seek to promote the virtue of its citizens? Or should law be neutral toward competing conceptions of virtue, so that citizens can be free to choose for themselves the best way to live?

 

According to the textbook account, this question divides ancient and modern political thought. In one important respect, the textbook is right. Aristotle teaches that justice means giving people what they deserve. And in order to determine who deserves what, we have to determine what virtues are worthy of honor and reward. Aristotle maintains that we can’t figure out what a justice constitution is without first reflecting on the most desirable way of life. For him, law can’t be neutral on questions of the good life.

 

By contrast, modern philosophers—from Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century to John Rawls in the twentieth century—argue that the principles of justice that define our rights should not rest on any particular conception of virtue or, or of the best way to live. Instead, a just society respects each person’s freedom to choose his or her own conception of the good life. So you might say that ancient theories of justice start with virtue, while modern theories start with freedom. . . . But it’s worth noticing at the outset that this contrast can mislead.

 

For if we turn our gaze to the arguments about justice that animate contemporary politics—not among philosophers but among ordinary men and women—we find a more complicated picture. It’s true that most of our arguments are about promoting prosperity and respecting individual freedom, at least on the surface. But underlying these arguments, and sometimes contending with them, we can often glimpse another set of convictions—about what virtues are worthy of honor and reward, and what way of life a good society should promote. Devoted though we are to prosperity and freedom, we can’t quite shake off the judgmental strand of justice. The conviction that justice involves virtue as well as choice runs deep. Thinking about justice seems inescapably to engage us in thinking about the best way to live." 9-10

Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 9-10.

Filed Under: Christian Living

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