Exegesis and Theology

The Blog of Brian Collins

Warfield on Darwin and Evolutionary Science

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Warfield, Benjamin B. “Darwin’s Arguments against Christianity and against Religion.” In Benjamin B. Warfield: Selected Shorter Writings. Volume 2. Edited by John E. Meeter. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1973.

Warfield opens this article by noting that numbers of scientific thinkers had abandoned religion. Here he examines Darwin’s autobiography to understand why. Darwin observes that he rejected Christianity when he could not harmonize Genesis with his theory of Evolution. In addition, Darwin said he could find no irrefutable proof for the veracity of the rest of Scripture. In his discussion of this last point, Warfield observes, “Nothing short of a miracle would then have convinced him, and nothing short of a miracle could have convinced him of a miracle. Surely a man in such a state of mind would be refused as a juror in any case.”

Darwin later rejected theism on the grounds that the argument of design falls to natural selection, the argument of the good order of the world falls in the face of suffering, the argument that most people in the world throughout history have been inwardly convinced of a god is unreliable (Darwin observed he once had such feelings and lost them). Darwin granted that the argument that the universe could not arise by chance had some weight with him. But then he thought, “Can the mind of a man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions.” Warfield observes, “Thus the last and strongest theistic proof fails, not because of any lack in its stringent validity to the human mind, but because so brute-bred a mind as man’s is no judge of the validity of the proof.”

Warfield concludes that Darwin’s “absorption in a single line of investigation and inference had so atrophied his mind in other directions that he had ceased to be a trustworthy judge of evidence. Whatever may be true in other cases, in this case the defection of a scientific man from religion was distinctly due to an atrophy of mental qualities by which he was unfitted for the estimation of any other kind of evidence than that derived from the scalpel and the laboratory, and no longer could feel the force of the ineradicable convictions which are as ‘much a part of man as his stomach or his heart.'”

Of course, the deep question is whether this was due merely to an atrophy that came about by working in a single direction of whether this is an example of “suppressing the truth” (Rom. 1).

Warfield, B. B. “On the Antiquity and the Unity of the Human Race,” The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield, 9:235-58.

The thesis of this article is that the age of humanity has no theological significance whereas the unity of mankind is highly significant to theology.

As to the former, Warfield argues that science and Scripture are not as much at odds as was often supposed. For one, the evolutionary scientists shortened their estimates of the age of mankind. On the other hand, Warfield argues that the genealogies prior to Abraham were not meant to provide chronological data. That that was not their purpose may be agreed on. That they don’t actually provide this data is another matter. Warfield’s assertion that they do not seemed superficial and not up to his usual work. He doesn’t satisfactorily account for the details of the text, such as the fact that Genesis 5 provides the length of time that a person lived until he fathered the next person in the genealogy.

More enduring is Warfield’s argument for the theological necessity of a unitary human race descended from Adam. The unity of the human race is still granted by evolutionists, but the descent from Adam is denied by may theistic evolutionists, leading them to revise key doctrines. Here Warfield’s insistence on the theological necessity of a unified human race descended from Adam remains relevant and necessary.

One could adapt Warfield’s thesis to the present debates and say that the age of the earth has no theological significance whereas the unity of the mankind is highly significant to theology. This sounds persuasive in the abstract, but when one asks what was happening in the long ages before the creation of Adam and Eve, the answer typically entails death, suffering, and natural evil. As I’ve noted elsewhere:

The problem of death and suffering before the Fall is far more serious than most theologians seem to realize. The conflict between evolution and Scripture is often seen as the chief apologetic challenge of the present time. But the chief philosophical challenge to Christianity is the problem of evil, and attempts to harmonize Scripture with evolutionary theory make defending Christianity against this challenge difficult if not impossible. The problem of evil has become more pointed as scientists learn more about certain animals’ sentience, capacity to experience pain, abilities to remember, and so forth. This has led many to conclude that animal suffering and death is a great evil. On this point the Bible is in agreement with modern science and philosophy. The Bible evidences concern for the wellbeing of animals (Prov. 12:10). The suffering of the non-human world is described as a condition of bondage, groaning, and pain as a result of sin (Rom. 8:20; Gen. 3:17-19). The earth awaits redemption (Rom. 8:23), and included in that redemption is the end of animal suffering and pain (Isa. 11:6-9; 65:25).

Traditionally, Christians have defended against the problem of animal suffering and death by pointing to the Bible’s teaching that it is a result of the Fall (Rom. 5:12; 8:20). In seeking to defend Christianity against those who say it is scientifically ill-informed, Christians who seek to harmonize the Bible and evolution have removed the biblical explanation of the problem of evil in the animal world.

I would therefore argue that both the age of the earth (not in the abstract, but given the theological implications that attend an old earth) and the unity of mankind are highly significant to maintaining orthodox theology.

Related Posts:

Accommodating Evolution and the Problem of Evil

Review of Article on the Problem of Evil and Animal Death

Review of Article on the Problem of Evil and Animal Death

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Faro, Ingrid. “The Question of Evil and Animal Death Before the Fall,” Trinity Journal 36 (2015): 193-213.

Faro begins her article by seeking to determine what should be considered evil. She argues that too often English speakers read the English sense of the word into Hebrew words with much broader semantic domains. Though not explicit, she seems to indicate that natural events like hurricanes, or falling off a cliff due to gravity, etc. should not be classified as evils because it is the way God designed natural laws to work in the world. Gravity and hurricanes both have good effects too. As the article develops Faro seems to extend this logic to predation as well. When she defines evil she leaves aside senses from Hebrew words such as “deficient,” “displeasing,” or “unpleasant.” He definition reads: “Evil, then, from God’s perspective is presented predominately as choices that conflict with God.”

The advantage of this approach is evident for the Christian who wishes to escape the problem of animal death. It simply redefines animal death as not evil. However, I’m not convinced of the sufficiency of this argument. The philosophers who are concerned about the problem of evil in the animal world are not thinking that the pain and suffering and death in the animal realm is evil because they’re reading narrow English senses into words with broader Hebrew senses. They’re looking at death and pain and suffering and recoiling with horror at it. In addition limiting evil to actions chosen by humans seems too narrow theologically. If God has built creational norms into his world, and if sin has disrupted these norms across the board, then it would seem that evil is anything contrary to these norms whether or not the violation is due to human choice in an immediate sense.

The latter part of Faro’s article seeks to find biblical support for the possibility of animal death prior to the Fall. She appeals to three passages: Genesis 1-2, Psalm 104; Job 38-41.

She mounts a number of arguments from Genesis 1-2. First, she says the numbering of the days of creation reveal that “the universe was not created to be eternal in its original physical form” (206). She appeals to several cross references in support: Psalm 102:25-26; Isaiah 34:4; 51:6; Revelation 6:12-14; 21:1-4. It is not clear how the numbering of the days in Genesis 1 indicates that the present earth will be destroyed. The other passages all refer to a post-Fall reality and does not speak of what would have happened had there been no Fall.

Second, while acknowledging that plant death is different from animal death, she thinks it is significant that the seed and the “cycle of plant life” is a picture of death and resurrection (206-7). It is not clear how this argument advances Faro’s point. She could be arguing that if death was not present from the beginning, God would not have built in a sign of death and resurrection into plant life. But does this does not seem to be a sound argument given God’s foreknowledge.

Third, she claims that both Adam and the animals were formed from the dust of the ground, which she says indicates they were created mortal (appealing to Genesis 3:19). Humans were to eat from the tree of life to avoid death, but animals were not to eat of the tree of life. Thus animals were created mortal, and God intended for them to die. But Genesis 3:19 presents death as a punishment for sin, not as something built into the nature of the creation. The historic position is that Adam was created immortal but was not confirmed in his immortality. This position best accounts for all of the data: death as a punishment, the possibility of receiving that punishment, and the tree of life as a sign of confirmation in immortality. Furthermore, Genesis nowhere implies that animals would have needed to eat from that tree to avoid death. Faro’s reading makes it seem as if the tree has some kind of magical power rather than recognizing that the trees are sacramental in nature.

The argument from Psalm 104 is simple. This is a creation psalm that celebrates animal predation as part of God’s wise ordering of the earth (v. 24). In response, Psalm 104 is clearly a reflection on a creation that has been affected by the Fall (v.35). God’s provision of food for animals (and humans) now includes the death of other animals. But from the beginning it was otherwise. Genesis 1:29-30 gives plants as food to humans and to animals. It is only after the Fall that God permits the eating of meat (Gen. 9:3-6; note that the passage places limitations on what animals can and cannot eat as well as humans). Whether or not Genesis 9 is establishing something new or reiterating a permission given before the Flood is open for debate, but it is clear that the shift to eating meat happened after the Fall for both humans and animals.

The passages from Job are of the same nature as Psalm 104. They refer to God providing food for predatory animals or to death among animals. Faro’s argument would seem to be that God’s wisdom is on display even in situations that include animal death. But she is able to take this a step further with Job 40—we should not claim that animal death is an evil, for to do so would be to find fault with God or to contend with him. The difficulty with Faro’s argument is that Job 38-41 is dealing with God’s wisdom in providentially ruling over a fallen world. It makes no claims about what life would ideally have been like before the Fall.

Later Faro appeals to Job to make the case that death and suffering do not “exist in the world due to human sin” alone. She notes that one of the points of the book of Job is that death and suffering have causes other than sin (here she also appeals to John 9:2). Yet, while it is true that Job’s sufferings were not caused by his own sin, it is difficult to move from this to the conclusion that the suffering he experienced was in no way connected to the Fall brought about by Adam’s sin. Were the loathsome sores that covered Job from head to foot the kind of thing that could have occurred to a man had Adam not sinned?

Faro wraps up her article by taking into account the Scripture passages that look toward a future in which animals live together in harmony. She claims,  “Although animals of prey kill for food, animals are not capable of the savagery, cruelty, and terror that humanity can display. Humans, however, can teach animals cruelty, such as training pit bulls or roosters to fight and attack” (209). The human responsibility summarized in the creation mandate point in a different direction, Faro argues. She seems to indicate that part of the creation mandate is to improve animals from their original condition. The claim that animals are not capable of savagery or cruelty is a doubtful claim. Yet without this supposition Faro’s explanation fails to conform to the Creation, Fall, Redemption structure of Scripture. Key to this structure is an affirmation of the original goodness of creation.

The problem of evil as it pertains to animal death is one of the major philosophical challenges to forms of Christianity that seek to accommodate the current evolutionary consensus. Faro attempts to address this problem by claiming that animal death and suffering is actually not an evil. However, this claim rests on weak exegetical support and, at least in this article, fails to engage the philosophical/theological arguments to the contrary.

Accommodating Evolution and the Problem of Evil

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I recently provided a guest post at the BJU School of Religion blog about Evolution and the Problem of evil. My main point was that evangelicals often seek to harmonize Scripture with Evolution for apologetic reasons. But the consequences of the proposed harmonizations create further theological and apologetic problems. 

Read the whole thing here.

Warfield on Agnosticsm

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"In effect, therefore, agnosticism impoverishes, and, in its application to religious truth, secularizes and to this degree degrades life. Felicitating itself on a peculiarly deep reverence for truth on the ground that it will admit into that category only what can make good its right to be so considered under the most stringent tests, it deprives itself of the enjoyment of this truth by leaving the category either entirely or in great part empty."

B. B. Warfield, “Agnosticism,” in Selected Shorter Writings, 1:36

Book Report for September 2012

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Books

Hall, David D. A Reforming People: Puritanism and the Transformation of Public Life in New England. New York: Knopf, 2011.

Hall carefully debunks the idea that the Puritans were religious authoritarians who opposed liberty in the new world and oppressed those who differed from their theology. In doing so, Hall demonstrates that the liberal idea of freedom that dominates contemporary culture is not the only possible conception of freedom. The Puritans did not understand authority and liberty as opposites. Rather, they are interrelated and mutually checked by recognized "obligation and limits."

Kruger, Michael J. Canon Revisited: Establishing the Origins and Authority of the New Testament Books. Wheaton: Crossway, 2012.

The canon is an inherently difficult topic because it reaches down to the foundations of Christian authority. To ask the Christian to justify his belief that the 27 books and only the 27 books of his New Testament are God’s new covenant revelation is akin to asking the rationalist to justify his rationalism or the empiricist to justify his empiricism. Canonicity has become even more complicated today with claims that a New Testament canon was not conceived until centuries after Christ and with assertions that various Gnostic or otherwise unorthodox texts have just as much a claim to represent authentic Christianity as the books of the New Testament.

Michael Kruger enters this discussion with a specific aim. This book is not an apologetic designed to win over the skeptic. He is instead seeking to provide the Christian with a model that can show his embrace of the New Testament canon is epistemically justified.

Kruger begins by surveying and evaluating three broad approaches to determining the canon: (1) "community determined," (2) "historically determined," and (3) "self-authenticating."

Within these broad categories are found several diverse models. For instance, the Roman Catholic model, the historical-critical model, and Childs’s canon-criticism are all "community determined" despite the great differences between them. Historically, orthodox Protestants from the Reformation onward have eschewed the "community determined" approach, though Craig Allert has recently attempted to popularize it among evangelicals. Many of the current challenges to the traditional cannon come from models in this category. In this chapter Kruger evaluates each model individually, but his basic overall critique is that "these models are left with a canon that is derived from and established by the church, and thus is unable to rule over the church" (66).

The second broad approach, "historically determined," is more familiar to evangelicals. Contained under this category is the "criteria-of-canonicity" model advocated by the Princetonians and many modern evangelicals. In this model religiously neutral historical investigation seeks to establish that the books of the canon match such criteria as apostolicity, antiquity, and orthodoxy. Kruger doubts, however, that Christians should approach theological questions with studied historical neutrality. He notes, "to authenticate the canon on the basis of a supposedly independent, neutral standard ultimately subjects the canon to an authority outside itself. It allows autonomous human assessment of historical evidence to become an external authority over God’s Word" (79-80). Kruger also notes three problems with the criteria themselves. First, there is no evidence that the early Christians did any choosing of which books were and were not canonical based on the proposed criteria. They received, rather than chose, the canonical books. Second, even if the early church did use the various proposed criteria, one must establish that they used the correct criteria. Third, it is not clear that criteria such as apostolicity can be established by neutral historical work.

Kruger argues that the canon is self-authenticating. He is not arguing for a subjective, fideistic approach to the canon. He will, in fact, incorporate the strengths of both the community and historically-determined models into his own. Rather Kruger is advocating an approach that is already found in Calvin, Turretin, and the Westminster Confession of Faith. The Reformers and their heirs argued for canonicity on the basis of divine qualities found in the canonical books themselves. Kruger makes this one plank of his model. However, he also says that that the canon itself gives other criteria. Because the testimony of the Spirit to the voice of the Lord is corporate and not merely individual, the reception of books by the church is another plank in Kruger’s model. Also, since the New Testament gives a foundational role to the apostles and their teaching, apostolicity forms the third plank. In Kruger’s model the Holy Spirit testifies to the authenticity of the canon by enabling the church to see its divine qualities, its apostolic origins, and the confirming reception by the church throughout history.

In the remainder of the book, Kruger explains and defends these three planks. For instance, he includes a chapter in which he defines and defends the internal divine qualities of the Scriptural books. He has a chapter on apostolicity in which, among other things, he demonstrates from Scripture that the apostolic writers knew they were writing Scripture. He spends most of his time (three chapters) on the third plank, community reception, since this is where most of the current debate takes place. Kruger effectively challenges the late canon views of men such as Lee Martin McDonald. He also helpfully discusses what may be termed "problem books"—books whose canonicity was not immediately and universally recognized.

Kruger has done an excellent job updating and extending the classic Protestant approach to canonicity in light of present day challenges. This is now the best book on the canon available.

Wright, N. T. How God Became King: The Forgotten Story of the Gospels. New York: HarperOne, 2012.

In this book N. T. Wright explores the purpose of Jesus’s earthly ministry as presented in the Gospels. He is concerned that historically, the church has focused on the incarnation and passion of Christ and ignored his ministry (apart from appeals to its proving his deity or making possible his active obedience). Wright realizes that major problems ensue when the middle of the Gospel story is divorced from the ends (incarnation and cross), and he highlights the Social Gospel as the primary example of that problematic approach. His goal in this volume is to integrate the whole.

Before preceding with his positive argument Wright first surveys six inadequate (though not entirely wrong) answers:

  • "To teach people how to go to heaven" (42)—Wright focuses on the fact that heaven is not the biblical goal but a renewed earth. Eternal life is not about disembodied souls in a timeless state but about life on earth in the age to come. He is correct about this. But if going to heaven is translated "to enjoying eternal life in the age to come," this is a question that Jesus addresses at key points in his ministry, Nicodemus and the Rich Young Ruler being key examples.
  • To provide people with an ethic for life—Wright is rightly concerned that Jesus not be reduced to another Buddha or Muhammad who taught religious truths to people. However, when contextualized in the larger picture of Jesus’s ministry, Wright correctly embraces the idea that Jesus was teaching people how they ought to live.
  • To provide a moral example—Wright grants that Jesus is an example to be followed in some particular ways (e.g.,, 1 Cor. 11:1 or Mark 8:34). But he rejects this answer for two reasons. First, Jesus is not an example that we are able to copy. We just can’t live up to his standard. Second, Jesus is doing unique things in his life that no one is supposed to try to imitate.
  • "His perfect life means that he can be the perfect sacrifice" (50)—Wright is willing to grant the Bible does present Jesus as the sinless sacrifice and that his sinless life is part of this. He notes John 8:46 (cf. Mark 10:18); 2 Cor. 5:21; Hebrews 4:15; 7:26; 1 Peter 2:22; 1 John 3:5; Luke 23:14-15, 22, 31, 41, 47 (p. 50). Wright rejects, however, the Reformed teaching that Jesus fulfilled the Mosaic law and its teaching about Jesus’s active obedience (Romans 5:19) (p. 51). Overall, Wright concludes, "But, beyond these passages [noted above], the gospels show no interest whatever in making the link that much traditional teaching has employed. If that was what they were trying to say, you’d think they would have made it a bit clearer" (51). But Wright himself has assembled an impressive array of passages that make this point. He could add to this the Old Testament background that stands behind Mark 10:45, and he could factor in the significance of the temptation accounts which stand at the beginning of the Synoptic Gospels’ presentation of Jesus. This seems to be an important element that should play a role in whatever answer is given the question of the significance of Jesus’s ministry.
  • To provide us with stories "so we can identify with the characters in the story and find our own way by seeing what happened to them" (52)—Wright again acknowledges that this is a possible and legitimate use, but he doesn’t believe it is reason the Gospels were written.
  • "To demonstrate the divinity of Jesus" (and his humanity) (53)—Wright believes the Gospel writers would have affirmed Jesus these points, but he says even John who opens with this theme does not make it the major theme of his gospel. Rather, John, and all the gospels are "to tell us what this embodied God is now up to" (54). Wright’s affirmation is correct, but his denial is too sharp. My study of Mark has led me to conclude that demonstrating the deity of Jesus is a major theme of the Gospel from its opening verses.

Wright responds that the gospels are actually "trying to say that this is how God became king" (57). This is a good summary of the message of the four Gospels (and despite Wright’s rather annoying rhetoric of having discovered a lost theme that has been missing from the church until he wrote this book, this theme can be found in Herman Ridderbos’s The Coming of the Kingdom and in the writing of dispensationalists such as Craig Blaising).

In turning toward making a positive argument, Wright highlights four themes found in all the gospels. He thinks some of these themes are over-emphasized and some are under-emphasized. Getting these four themes correctly balanced is, in Wright’s view, essential to understanding the Gospel message about Jesus’s life. The themes are:

(1) "the story of Israel"—Wright laments that the Gospels have been read as the solution to the sin problem of Genesis 3, skipping over the story of Israel entirely, or looking at it as a "plan A" that went wrong with the gospel as a "plan B" that allows people to be saved by faith without having "to keep that silly old law" (84-85). In Wright’s view Jesus is "the climax of the story of Israel"; he is "Israel’s supreme representative" who finally does bring about God’s purposes for Israel (183). Wright’s emphasis on the importance of the story of Israel is commendable. Israel is the national focal point of the Old Testament for significant reasons, and the New Testament must not be cut loose from the Old. But Israel’s story is set within the larger human story that begins to go wrong in Genesis 3. Wright is wrong to minimize the Gospels as presenting the solution to the problem that begins there. Wright’s comments about not having to keep the "silly old law" are over the top. No serious scholar argues for that. Furthermore, he should not so lightly dismiss the plot of God giving Israel a law that the could not keep and then replacing that law covenant with a new covenant. That is the story that Deut. 28-30 plots explicitly from the beginning (and he ends up summarizing Israel’s story similarly less than a hundred pages later, compare 84-85 with 178-79).

(2) "the story of Jesus as the story of Israel’s God"—Wright thinks that the emphasis of Jesus as God has been overemphasized. In his view, it obscures the more subtle ways that that the Synoptics identify Jesus as Israel’s God. It is this that causes people to think John has a high Christology and the Synoptics have a low one. Wright has a point. Jesus is not a generic god incarnate. A tight connection to the Old Testament history and prophecies is important. Nonetheless, Wright seems to write as though conservatives, who have staunchly defended the deity and humanity of Christ in the gospels, and the liberals, who in his view misread the Gospels in different ways, are equivalently in error and in need of his setting things right. This is not fair or accurate.

(3) the "launching of God’s renewed people"—Wright laments the tendency in critical circles to read the gospels simply "as the projection of early Christian faith, reflecting the controversies and crises of the early church" (105). Wright doesn’t think it proper to say the Gospels are about "founding the church," since "there already was a ‘people of God.’" Nonetheless, Wright does think "the gospels are telling the story of the launching of God’s renewed people" (112). In other words, Jesus accomplished Israel’s vocation and enabled God’s plan to move forward in new ways. Wright’s critique of the old community-produced Gospels approach is on target. But the story he sees about "God’s renewed people" seems all too similar to what is often called replacement theology. To be sure, Wright takes pains to emphasize that he does not believe Israel has been "replaced" or "abandoned." He argues Israel has been "fulfilled" and "transformed." But in terms of position, rather than labels, Wright view is that of "replacement theology," which I believe to be a problematic position for a number of reasons (see Michael Vlach’s Has the Church Replaced Israel). (I’m inclined to treat opposing viewpoints according to the golden rule; for instance I can sympathize with the discomfort of some with the label "limited atonement" and am happy to use "particular redemption" as a more felicitous label; likewise, I’d be willing to use terms other than replacement theology or supersessionism if those who hold those positions had a term that they thought reflected their viewpoint more accurately. At present, however, I know of no alternate terminology.)

(4) the "clash of the kingdoms" of God and Caesar—Wright insists there is not mere a generic kingdom of God versus kingdom of the devil conflict in the gospels (and in the rest of the NT, for that matter), but a specific kingdom of God versus kingdom of Caesar conflict. I believe this is Wright’s weakest point. It seems to me that Scripture emphasizes the clash between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Satan. Often Caesar is aligned with Satan against God’s kingdom, but Caesar can also be called God’s servant. I think Wright has done too much reading between the lines on this score. Furthermore, Wright’s commendable tendency to ground Scripture in its historical context sometimes causes him to emphasize historical particularities when those are actually instances of broader, universal points. This appears in his handling of justification, and I think this is another instance of it.

When these four themes are rightly understood, it becomes evident, Wright says, that the Gospels are about "how God became king." But this raises the question of how Jesus’s message of kingdom proclamation and the cross integrate. Wright devotes part 3 of this book to answering that question. But before he delves into this topic, Wright takes a brief detour to argue against the Enlightenment idea that religion is a private matter about how individuals can be "spiritual." In order to understand how kingdom and cross fit together, Wright argues that the privatization of Enlightenment religion must be rejected. Christianity is a public religion that speaks to all of life rather than a private spirituality. Wright’s critique of the Enlightenment is right on target.

But the question remains: how do kingdom and cross come together? Wright says that Jesus climaxes the story of Israel by suffering as Israel’s representative. His suffering now means the story of Israel can move forward. But it is not just Israel, through its representative that suffers, but God himself who suffers. "God himself will come to the place of pain and horror, of suffering and even of death, so that somehow he can take it upon himself and thereby set up his new style theocracy at last" (196). Jesus’s suffering renewed God’s people, and they follow him by sharing in his suffering which "somehow has the more positive effect of carrying forward the redemptive effect of Jesus’s own death" (201). It is through their suffering that the church advances Jesus’s kingdom. Then end result is that through the cross the kingdom of Christ triumphs over the kingdom of Caesar. Wright’s primary weakness in this section is his dismissal of historic views of the atonement (a secondary weakness is his preterism). He speaks of "distortions that result when people construct an ‘atonement theology’ that bypasses the gospels" (196). But when he describes the atonement, he says, "God himself will come to the place of pain and horror, of suffering and even of death, so that somehow he can take it upon himself" (196, emphasis added). Throughout this section, the atonement is described with the vagueness of "somehow." This vagueness makes Wright’s attempt to connect kingdom and cross less than satisfying.

Wright closes by engaging with those who are part of the theological interpretation of Scripture project. He affirms their critique of historical critical scholarship, but he critiques their abandonment of history and their dependence on the creeds. He is not convinced that the creeds alone will guide believers to faithful interpretations of Scripture. Wright argues that the creeds need to continue to be refined by (historically grounded) approaches to Scripture. He does not want to abandon the creeds, but he does want to enrich them by expanding and recontextualizing (with Scripture) their phrases. This critique of theological interpretation does strike at a particular weakness among many theological interpreters. They should reckon with the arguments he makes here. However, Wright too often has precisely the opposite weaknesses: lack of familiarity with historical theology, a tendency to over-historicize Scripture, and a quickness to abandon traditional theology in favor of new perspectives.

Blaising, Craig A. and Darrell L. Bock. Progressive Dispensationalism. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993.

The most helpful chapter in this book was Blaising’s chapter on the history of Dispensationalism. As a freshman I recall being confused by Ryrie’s insistence on literal interpretation when Scofield obviously did not always follow that method. Blaising cleared up that confusion by documenting, among other things, changes in dispensational hermeneutics. Bock’s chapters on hermeneutics and Blaising’s closing practical chapter were mildly helpful. The core of the book on the covenants and the kingdom contained helpful material.

Kauflin, Bob. Worship Matters: Leading Others to Encounter the Greatness of God. Wheaton: Crossway, 2008.

The heart of the book unpacks Kauflin’s thesis concerning the task of a worship leader: "A faithful worship leader magnifies the greatness of God in Jesus Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit skillfully combining God’s Word with music thereby motivating the gathered church to proclaim the gospel, to cherish God’s presence, and to live for God’s glory." This is an excellent statement that would serve well in any good church music ministry. Overall, Kauflin does a good job in expounding each aspect of this thesis.

Other positives abound in the book. Kauflin has a high view of the Scriptures and of the importance of sound doctrine in Christian worship. He rightly includes preaching as part of worship; he does not limit worship to the musical part of the service alone. He wants musicians to be proficient but not to show off. Music ministry should not be emotionally manipulative. Their proficiency should undergird the worship; it should not contribute to a concert mentality. He calls on worship leaders and band members to avoid sensuality in both their dress and "vocal inflections" (48).

Even in the section on musical styles Kauflin rightly argues that the "music should serve the lyrics" (100). But he is weakest in his arguments in favor of using all styles of music in worship. His primarily argument is that the unity of the church should be centered on the gospel and not on musical styles. He grounds this unity in diversity in the nature of God: "Musical diversity reflects the varying aspects of God’s nature. He is transcendent and immanent. He splits mountains and clothes the lilies. We worship him as our Creator and Redeemer, King and Father. How can anyone think that a single kind of music could adequately express the fullness of God’s glory?" (104). Kauflin has stated a number of truths. But it does not follow that every musical style glorifies God. Al Wolters argues that fundamental to a Christian worldview is that all of God’s creation is essentially good, that the Fall affects every aspect of God’s good creation, and that redemption will extend as far as the Fall. It is the middle point that Kauflin is not reckoning with. It is true that various cultures have differing styles of music that may and even should be used. But it does not follow that all styles in every culture are acceptable. To assert this would be to assert that the Fall has affected every aspect of creation except musical styles. Finally, it is strange to assert that musical diversity should be employed to demonstrate the unity of the church when, in practice, introducing pop music into the church has been divisive for many congregations. Our unity is in the gospel and not in musical styles, but insofar as musical styles connect to our sanctification, they impinge on the gospel. Thus those who resist bringing Fall-distorted styles into the church are right in their resistance and those who introduce them bring division to the church that is, by their own standard, unnecessary.

The penultimate section of Worship Matters deals with tensions (e.g., between emphasizing God’s immanence and his transcendence). Overall Kauflin does a good job of handling these tensions. A few times, however, his balancing seemed less thoughtful than it ought to have been. For instance, on inward and outward worship, Kauflin says that clapping, and other outward expressions of worship, must not be ignored in modern American worship because they appear in Scripture. But he fails to ask important questions that are necessary for careful application. For instance, what was the clapping? Was it applause? Was it to keep rhythm, as is still the practice in some cultures? Was it something else or some of both? Without asking these questions, one may assume that applauding a musical performance is more in keeping with Scripture than not applauding special music–but the assumption would be ill-considered. But for the most part Kauflin’s handling of tensions is well done. He recognizes that in some of these pairings, one element is more important than the other. For instance, in dealing with whether worship service should be targeted to believers or unbelievers, Kauflin rightly says, "Let’s not ignore non-Christians when we gather to worship God. But let’s not allow them to dictate our direction, methods, and values either. Those have all been determined and modeled by the risen Savior" (204).

How should those who disagree with Kauflin’s approach to musical style view this book? First, most of the book is not about musical style. Furthermore, Kauflin does seek to ground what he writes in Scripture. So much of this book is quite helpful. Second, we should be willing to be self-critical regarding our music. Traditional is not a sufficient standard for a church’s music ministry. Kauflin is careful enough with the content of the music in the worship services he leads that it is possible that the content of his worship music may be more substantial than the gospel songs that many musical conservatives employ. This could lead to an uncomfortable situation in which some people feel as though they must choose between a worship service of theologically rich but stylistically objectionable music or a service of theologically shallow but stylistically traditional music. Those of us who object to contemporary worship music should must ensure that this is not a choice that people feel themselves faced with. Third, the section on musical styles should be recognized as one of the weakest parts of the book. The attempted Scriptural argumentation is thin and theologically flawed. In sum, this book is overall quite helpful while being flawed in a few significant areas.

Hugo, Victor. Les Miserables. Translated by Charles Wilbour. 1862; Repr., Modern Library, 1992.

Articles

Philips, Robin. "Scripture in the Age of Google: The Digital Bible and How We Can Read It," Touchstone (July/August 2012): 40-44.

Argues that the medium by which we read affects the way in which we read. He notes that writing without word separations led to oral rather than silent reading (though I understand this is now debated). Until producing and disseminating text became affordable (the printing press being one but not the only factor), people would read a few texts, but they would read them deeply and repeatedly. Later, when newspapers and periodicals came into being, people read widely and less deeply. The internet continues this trend. With hyperlinks and other distractions, digital reading is not conducive to concentration in reading. I think Philips is right to consider the influence of the medium on the way we read. However, I’m not convinced by all the applications he drew. I was able to read a scan of his article on my iPad without loosing my concentration. I will, however, probably not read his periodical article more than once.

Wood, Gordon S. "Is There a ‘James Madison’ Problem." In Liberty and American Experience in the Eighteenth Century. Edited by David Womersley. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006.

Wood argues against attempts to say there were two Madisons: the Federalist Madison of the 1780s and the Republican Madison of the Federalist 1790s. He also argues against Banning’s proposal unifies Madison at the expense of his nationalism in the 1780s. Instead Wood argues that Madison in the 1780s saw the dangers of democracy leading up to the constitutional convention. He wanted a strong national government to serve as a disinterested umpire between the conflicting interests in the states. This goal lies behind his advocacy of a strong national government. However, he never wanted a strong European-style military state. When he saw that was the government that Hamilton was seeking to create, Madison staunchly opposed him. Wood proposes that Madison’s vision of government remained consistent, though the opponents he faced in these differing decades resulted in differing responses.

Goldingay, John. "How Should We Think about Same-Sex Relationships?" In Key Questions about Christian Faith: Old Testament Answers. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010.

Goldingay, an Episcopalian OT scholar, though this issue by looking at First Testament (his term for Old Testament) and New Testament teaching on the matter and then at the present cultural context. He notes that if the stories of Noah and Ham and the stories of Sodom are rejected as not being analogous to same-sex marriage (because of the rape elements), so also Ruth and Naomi or David and Jonathan cannot be appealed to as analogous same-sex relationships since there is no physical relationship in these cases. Goldingay also discusses Lev. 18:22 and 20:13. He grants that these prohibitions are tied in with prohibitions that no longer directly apply to Christians. In their First Testament context however, Israel is prohibited from things that don’t "fit into creation" (with some animals serving as examples of this). Goldingay notes that "Humanity should fit into creation. Homosexual acts do not do that" (321). He does not wish to place the weight of his argument on these passages, however. He places much more weight on the First Testament’s vision of what marriage should be. He notes that our culture assumes that marriage is all about romance and choice. But while the First Testament gives romance its place, it is a subordinate place. Goldingay says, "In Genesis, God instituted the sexual relationship as a means of implementing the divine purpose to subdue the earth and serve the garden. To that end this relationship involves a mutual commitment to forming a new context in which children may be born, nurtured, and taught the faith and may share in the work" (321).

In turning to the New Testament, Goldingay notes that we find confirmation that same-sex relationships are not in the same category as food laws or clothing laws. This is evident in 1 Corinthians 6:9-11 and 1 Timothy 1:10. Romans 1:24-27 continues to indicate that same-sex relationships go against nature, which means it is contrary to the way God made human bodies and the creational purposes for which he made sexuality. Goldingay recognizes that there is another way in which our culture speaks of same-sex attraction as natural for those who have them. Goldingay counters, "But then, for a heterosexual person, heterosexual relations are natural, but we do not reckon that this means we can simply do what comes naturally irrespective of moral considerations" (323). It is important to note that Goldingay also warns that much heterosexual sexual activity also falls outside of God’s creational purposes. He suggests as possibilities: adultery, polygamy, incest, prostitution, divorce, remarriage, masturbation, living together before or without marriage, and the deliberate lifelong avoidance of conception" (323).

Goldingay was much more fuzzy on the place that those in same-sex relationships or with same-sex attractions should have within the church. He clearly things that overseers and deacons should be held to a higher standard in this matter (1 Tim. 3:2, 12). He does not think he ought to leave the Episcopal Church over the issue. His primary counsel is to show love to those with same-sex attractions while maintaining that they have not made "an equally-valid lifestyle choice."

This raises the justice issue. Goldingay notes, "The freedom of people of differnet races to marry is a justice issue on the basis of a certain understanding of humanity. Same-sex marriage is a justice issue only if one first presupposes that marriage does not integrally involve two people of the opposite sex" (325). Goldingay also notes that our cultural understanding of justice differs from the biblical understanding. We tend to equate equality and justice whereas the Bible indicates that justice is acting "in a way that does right by the people to whom one has commitments, and in in particular that implements a concern for the needy."

Goldingay, John. "What Is the People of God? (A Narrative Answer)." In Key Questions about Christian Faith: Old Testament Answers. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010.

Goldingay outlines his narrative answer in the opening pages of this essay: "These epochs [in Israel’s history] brings a change in the mode of being of god’s people. It begins as a family (mishpakhah), one of the families of the sons of Shem (Gen 10:31-32), The fulfillment of God’s promise makes it more than a family, a people (‘am; e.g., Exod 1:9; 3:7), and indeed a nation (goy) alongside other nations, a political entity (e.g., gen 12:2; Judg 2:20). The monarchy turns it into a state, a kingdom (mamlakah and // related words; e.g., 1 Sam 24:20; 1 Chr 28:5). The exile reduces it to a remnant (she’erit and other expressions; e.g., Jer 42:2; Ezek 5:10). It is restored, to its land and to its relationship with Yahweh, as something more like a religious community (qahal; e.g., Ezra 2:64; Neh 13:1)" (76-77). The rest of the essay unpacks these categories and discusses their present day relevance. Goldingay does not find them universally relevant to the church, since they are historically conditioned.

Goldingay, John. "What Is Israel’s Place in God’s Purpose?" In Key Questions about Christian Faith: Old Testament Answers. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010.

Goldingay answers this question with "four polemical theses": (1) "The Jewish people is still God’s people but is destined to come to recognize Jesus (190); (2) "The Jewish people still has a claim to a homeland in Palestine" (196); (3) "Commitment to the Jewish people does not imply commitment to the state of Israel (202); (4) "Israel’s destiny is secure, but its present is dependent on its decisions (206).

Under the first thesis Goldingay argues that God still has a place for Israel as a distinct people. He finds Romans 9-11 clear on this point. He nowhere finds the New Testament affirming that the church has become the New Israel (he understands Gal. 6:16 as Paul "seeking god’s mercy on Israel as well as on believers in Christ; p. 192, n. 7). He also reject two covenant theology, in which Israel relates to God apart from Christ.

Goldingay argues in the second thesis that the New Testament does not say the land promise was fulfilled in Jesus or that it was a symbol that has now been supplanted. He takes the New Testament’s silence on this issue to mean that the promise still stands.

Goldingay argues in the explication of his third thesis that the first two theses do not imply that the State of Israel is the fulfillment of God’s promises. He does not believe that the land promise necessarily includes a state, for Abraham did not live in the land in a state, nor did the returned exiles. He notes further, that God recognized the rights of previous inhabitants to the land in Abraham’s day. Israel had to wait four centuries before God gave the land to them because it would not have been right to drive out the other inhabitants until their iniquity was full. Finally, Goldingay says that Israel was supposed to be a blessing to the nations, and Israel is not now a blessing to the Palestinian people. Goldingay recognizes that Israel has a legal right to the land, and he also grants that Israel’s expansion came though defensive wars. But it seems that he would prefer a combined state of Jewish and Palestinian peoples living together peacefully than even a two-state solution.

In his fourth thesis Goldingay argues that the State of Israel is not guaranteed the land by God. Though God’s promises stand, neither God nor the church can accept uncritically the actions of Israel. Sometimes words of judgment need to be spoken and not words of comfort alone. He concludes with an appeal for peace for Jerusalem for both Jew and Arab.

Goldingay, John. "Is Election Fair?" In Key Questions about Christian Faith: Old Testament Answers. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010.

Goldingay asks this question in light of the conquest of Canaan. His ability to answer this question is marred by a willingness to evaluate God’s actions by a standard other than Scripture. He does not help himself by leaving the historicity of Joshua an open question.

Hamilton, James M. "Was Joseph a Type of the Messiah? Tracing the Typological Identification between Joseph, David, and Jesus," Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 12.4 (2008): 52-77.

Hamilton, Jr. James M. "The Typology of David’s Rise to Power: Messianic Patterns in the Book of Samuel," Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 16.2 (2012): 4-25.

In the final footnote for the article on Joseph, Hamilton thanks Peter Gentry and Stephen Wellum "for insisting on textual warrant for typological interpretations." My sense was that this was too often missing in these articles. I recall a reviewer of Peter Leithart’s commentary on Kings saying it was worth working through all the implausible typological connections for the 1/3 which were right. I have the same sense with these two articles by Hamilton.

Poythress, Vern S. "Gender Neutral Issues in the New International Version of 2011," Westminster Theological Journal 73 (2011): 79-96.

After noting improvements in the NIV 2011 over the TNIV, Poythress documents verses in which he thinks gender neutral translations have obscured the text. Poythress also offers an evaluation of the Collins report on gender neutral language and potential problems in the statistical analysis which was done.

Warfield, Benjamin Breckinridge. "Jesus’ Mission According to His Own Testimony." In The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield. 2:255-324. 1932; Reprinted, Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003.

Warfield begins this three-part article by critiquing a similar project by Harnack that proceeded on critical grounds. In the second part of the article Warfiled expounds a series of passages in which Jesus says why he came to earth (these passages and their synoptic parallels):

Mark 1:38—He said to them, “Let us go somewhere else to the towns nearby, so that I may preach there also; for that is what I came for.” (NASB); cf. Lk. 4:43.

Matthew 5:17-18—"Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. 18 For truly, I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the Law until all is accomplished."

Matthew 9:12-13—But when he heard it, he said, “Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick. 13 Go and learn what this means, ‘I desire mercy, and not sacrifice.’ For I came not to call the righteous, but sinners.”

Luke 12:49-53—“I came to cast fire on the earth, and would that it were already kindled! 50 I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how great is my distress until it is accomplished! 51 Do you think that I have come to give peace on earth? No, I tell you, but rather division. 52 For from now on in one house there will be five divided, three against two and two against three. 53 They will be divided, father against son and son against father, mother against daughter and daughter against mother, mother-in-law against her daughter-in-law and daughter-in-law against mother-in-law.”

Matthew 10:34-36—“Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. 35 For I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. 36 And a person’s enemies will be those of his own household.

Luke 19:10—For the Son of Man came to seek and to save the lost.”

Matthew 20:28—even as the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many.”

When put together, it is clear that Jesus came to preach of the kingdom that arrived in his person, to fulfill the law, and to rescue sinners from their sin so they can be a new called out people opposed by the world, and that he achieves this through his sacrificial death.

In the third part of this article, Warfield draws some broader theological conclusions. He notes first that Jesus had a clear messianic consciousness. Second, he notes that the "I have come" passages imply pre-existence.

Zaspel, Fred G. The Theology of B. B. Warfield: A Systematic Summary. Wheaton: Crossway, 2010. [Read sections on historical context, apologetics, prolegomena, and bibliology, pp. 15-175]

Zaspel does an excellent job of comprehensively systematizing and summarizing Warfield’s thought. This volume is valuable as a reference work for those who are interested in tracking down what Warfield wrote on various topics and where he wrote it. But Zaspel’s summaries are valuable in their own right. I remain unconvinced of Warfield’s apologetic approach, in which he finds it necessary to establish Scripture as authoritative prior to any theologizing. But his doctrine of Scripture itself is masterful. It fully takes into account the complexity of Scripture’s teaching regarding itself as a divine and human book. Peter Enns, Kenton Sparks, and others who challenge the doctrine of inerrancy need to more fully reckon with Warfield’s arguments for their dismissal of the historic doctrine of Scripture to have credibility.

Johnson, Luke Timothy. The First and Second Letters to Timothy. Anchor Bible. Edited by David Noel Freedman. New York: Doubleday, 2001. [Read introductions and commentary on 1 Timothy 1-3]

Johnson is a critical scholar who is unconvinced of the arguments against Pauline authorship of the letters to Timothy and Titus. His critique of the reigning critical view and his arguments for Pauline authorship are careful and insightful. His critical proclivities emerge however in his comments about the role of women in the church.

Van Til on the Relation between Metaphysics and Epistemology

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It is just as important to have a Christian theory of knowledge as it is to have a Christian theory of being. One cannot well have the one without at the same time also having the other. Modern thought is largely preoccupied with the theory of knowledge. As Christians we shall therefore find it necessary to set the Christian theory of knowledge over against the modern form of the non-Christian theory of knowledge. Even so we shall have to make it plain that our theory of knowledge is what it is because our theory of being is what it is. As Christians we cannot ask how we know without at the same time asking what we know.

. . . . . . . . . .

If the being of God is what, on the basis of Scripture testimony, we have found it to be, it follows that our knowledge will be true knowledge only to the extent that it corresponds to his knowledge. To say that we do not need to ask about the nature of reality when we ask about the nature of knowledge is not to be neutral but is in effect to exclude the Christian answer to the question of knowledge.

That Singer [a University of PA philosophy prof.] has in effect excluded from the outset the Christian answer to the question of knowledge appears from the fact that in his search for an answer to this question he affirms that we must go to as many as possible of those reputed to have knowledge (p. 5). The notion of going to One whose opinion may be more valuable than the opinion of others is not even considered. In paradise, Eve went to as many as possible of those who were reputed to have knowledge. God and Satan both had a reputation for knowledge. Apparently God did not think well of Satan’s knowledge and Satan did not think well of God’s knowledge, but each thought well of his own knowledge. So Eve had to weigh these reputations. It was for her a question as to, How do we know?

The problem that Eve faced was a difficult one. God told her that she would surely die if she ate of the forbidden tree. Numerically there was only one in favor of one  and only one in favor of the opposite point of view. Thus she could not settle this matter of reputation by numbers. She herself had to decide this matter of reputation by a motion and a vote. God claimed that he was the Creator. He claimed that his being was ultimate while Satan’s being was created and therefore dependent on God’s being. Satan said in effect that she should pay no attention to this problem of being. He told her that she should decide the question, How do we know? without asking the questions, What do we know? He said she should be neutral with respect to his interpretation and God’s interpretation of what would take place if she ate of the forbidden tree. Eve did ignore the question of being in answering the question of knowledge. She said she would gather the opinions of as many as she could find with a reputation for having knowledge and then give the various view presented a fair hearing.

We should observe that in doing what she did Eve did not really avoid the question of What do we know? She gave by implication a very definite answer to that question. She made a negation with respect to God’s being. She denied God’s being as ultimate being. She affirmed therewith in effect that all being is essentially on one level?

At the same time she also gave a very definite answer to the question How do we know? She said we know independently of God. She said that God’s authority was to be tested by herself. Thus she came to take the place of ultimate authority. She was no doubt going to test God’s authority by experience and reflection upon experience. Yet it would be she, herself, who should be the final authority.

Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 4th ed, 55-58.

Van Til on Theism

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“It is  . . . no easier for sinners to accept God’s revelation in nature than to accept God’s revelation in Scripture. They are no more ready of themselves to do the one than to do the other. From the point of view of the sinner, theism is as objectionable as Christianity–theism that is worthy of the name is Christian theism. Christ said that no man can come to the Father but by him. No one can become a theist unless he becomes a Christian. Any god that is not the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is not God but an idol.”

Christian Apologetics, 2nd ed., 79.