Exegesis and Theology

The Blog of Brian Collins

Martin Luther’s Bondage of the Will

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Luther, Martin. Career of the Reformer III. In Luther’s Works. Volume 33. Edited by Helmutt Lehmann and Philip S. Watson. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999. [Bondage of the Will]

The Bondage of the Will is essential reading. Luther believed that Erasmus, to whom he is responding, reached the heart of the Reformation in his critique. It is important to recognize that by bondage of the will Luther does not mean that people do not do what they please. Rather, he means that the will is so bound by sin that people will not choose to come to God apart from the working of God upon their hearts. Luther’s argumentation is both theological and exegetical.

Warfield on Darwin and Evolutionary Science

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Warfield, Benjamin B. “Darwin’s Arguments against Christianity and against Religion.” In Benjamin B. Warfield: Selected Shorter Writings. Volume 2. Edited by John E. Meeter. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1973.

Warfield opens this article by noting that numbers of scientific thinkers had abandoned religion. Here he examines Darwin’s autobiography to understand why. Darwin observes that he rejected Christianity when he could not harmonize Genesis with his theory of Evolution. In addition, Darwin said he could find no irrefutable proof for the veracity of the rest of Scripture. In his discussion of this last point, Warfield observes, “Nothing short of a miracle would then have convinced him, and nothing short of a miracle could have convinced him of a miracle. Surely a man in such a state of mind would be refused as a juror in any case.”

Darwin later rejected theism on the grounds that the argument of design falls to natural selection, the argument of the good order of the world falls in the face of suffering, the argument that most people in the world throughout history have been inwardly convinced of a god is unreliable (Darwin observed he once had such feelings and lost them). Darwin granted that the argument that the universe could not arise by chance had some weight with him. But then he thought, “Can the mind of a man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions.” Warfield observes, “Thus the last and strongest theistic proof fails, not because of any lack in its stringent validity to the human mind, but because so brute-bred a mind as man’s is no judge of the validity of the proof.”

Warfield concludes that Darwin’s “absorption in a single line of investigation and inference had so atrophied his mind in other directions that he had ceased to be a trustworthy judge of evidence. Whatever may be true in other cases, in this case the defection of a scientific man from religion was distinctly due to an atrophy of mental qualities by which he was unfitted for the estimation of any other kind of evidence than that derived from the scalpel and the laboratory, and no longer could feel the force of the ineradicable convictions which are as ‘much a part of man as his stomach or his heart.'”

Of course, the deep question is whether this was due merely to an atrophy that came about by working in a single direction of whether this is an example of “suppressing the truth” (Rom. 1).

Warfield, B. B. “On the Antiquity and the Unity of the Human Race,” The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield, 9:235-58.

The thesis of this article is that the age of humanity has no theological significance whereas the unity of mankind is highly significant to theology.

As to the former, Warfield argues that science and Scripture are not as much at odds as was often supposed. For one, the evolutionary scientists shortened their estimates of the age of mankind. On the other hand, Warfield argues that the genealogies prior to Abraham were not meant to provide chronological data. That that was not their purpose may be agreed on. That they don’t actually provide this data is another matter. Warfield’s assertion that they do not seemed superficial and not up to his usual work. He doesn’t satisfactorily account for the details of the text, such as the fact that Genesis 5 provides the length of time that a person lived until he fathered the next person in the genealogy.

More enduring is Warfield’s argument for the theological necessity of a unitary human race descended from Adam. The unity of the human race is still granted by evolutionists, but the descent from Adam is denied by may theistic evolutionists, leading them to revise key doctrines. Here Warfield’s insistence on the theological necessity of a unified human race descended from Adam remains relevant and necessary.

One could adapt Warfield’s thesis to the present debates and say that the age of the earth has no theological significance whereas the unity of the mankind is highly significant to theology. This sounds persuasive in the abstract, but when one asks what was happening in the long ages before the creation of Adam and Eve, the answer typically entails death, suffering, and natural evil. As I’ve noted elsewhere:

The problem of death and suffering before the Fall is far more serious than most theologians seem to realize. The conflict between evolution and Scripture is often seen as the chief apologetic challenge of the present time. But the chief philosophical challenge to Christianity is the problem of evil, and attempts to harmonize Scripture with evolutionary theory make defending Christianity against this challenge difficult if not impossible. The problem of evil has become more pointed as scientists learn more about certain animals’ sentience, capacity to experience pain, abilities to remember, and so forth. This has led many to conclude that animal suffering and death is a great evil. On this point the Bible is in agreement with modern science and philosophy. The Bible evidences concern for the wellbeing of animals (Prov. 12:10). The suffering of the non-human world is described as a condition of bondage, groaning, and pain as a result of sin (Rom. 8:20; Gen. 3:17-19). The earth awaits redemption (Rom. 8:23), and included in that redemption is the end of animal suffering and pain (Isa. 11:6-9; 65:25).

Traditionally, Christians have defended against the problem of animal suffering and death by pointing to the Bible’s teaching that it is a result of the Fall (Rom. 5:12; 8:20). In seeking to defend Christianity against those who say it is scientifically ill-informed, Christians who seek to harmonize the Bible and evolution have removed the biblical explanation of the problem of evil in the animal world.

I would therefore argue that both the age of the earth (not in the abstract, but given the theological implications that attend an old earth) and the unity of mankind are highly significant to maintaining orthodox theology.

Related Posts:

Accommodating Evolution and the Problem of Evil

Review of Article on the Problem of Evil and Animal Death

Warfield on Shorter Catechism One: To Glorify God and Enjoy Him Forever

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WARFIELD-Benjamin-B.-IpsenWarfield, Benjamin B. “The First Question of the Westminster ‘Shorter Catechism.'” In The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield. Volume 6. 1932; Reprinted, Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003.

The first question of the Westminster Shorter Catechism is perhaps the most famous of all catechism questions: “Q. What is the chief end of man. A. The chief end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever.” This is an excellent article tracing the origins of this question through earlier catechisms and theologies. It also contains a helpful discussion about the “enjoy” part of the answer.

For instance:

 For justice is not done that conception if we say merely that man’s chief end is to glorify God. That certainly: and certainly that first. But according to the Reformed conception man exists not merely that God may be glorified in him, but that he may delight in this glorious God. It does justice to the subjective as well as to the objective side of the case. The Reformed conception is not fully or fairly stated if it be so stated that it may seem to be satisfied with conceiving man merely as the object on which God manifests His glory—possibly even the passive object in and through which the Divine glory is secured. It conceives man also as the subject in which the gloriousness of God is perceived and delighted in. No man is truly Reformed in his thought, then, unless he conceives of man not merely as destined to be the instrument of the Divine glory, but also as destined to reflect the glory of God in his own consciousness, to exult in God: nay, unless he himself delights in God as the all-glorious One.

Read the great Reformed divines. The note of their work is exultation in God. How Calvin, for example, gloried and delighted in God! Every page rings with this note, the note of personal joy in the Almighty, known to be, not the all-wise merely, but the all-loving too. Take, for example, such a passage as the exposition of what true and undefiled religion is, which closes the second chapter of the First Book of the Institutes. [pp. 396-97]

Miroslav Volf on Human Flourishing

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Volf, Miroslav. “Human Flourishing.” In Renewing the Evangelical Mission, ed. Richard Lints. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013.

In this essay Miroslav Volf provides a brief and broad historical survey of views of human flourishing accompanied with evaluation and a proposal. Volf’s survey begins with Augustine, for whom human flourishing was found in love for God and neighbor. With the Enlightenment God dropped away, but love for neighbor remained a part of the conception of human flourishing. “The central pillar of its vision of the good life was a universal beneficence transcending all boundaries of tribe or nation and extending to all human beings” (16). In late 20th century, however, human flourishing came to be understood simply in terms of “experiential satisfaction.” Volf concludes: “ours is a culture of managed pursuit of pleasure, not a culture of sustained endeavor to lead the good life” (15).

The problem, Volf explains, with making pleasure or “experiential satisfaction” at the heart of human flourishing is that humans are never satisfied. Even when they achieve what they want, there is more to want. “Our striving can therefore find proper rest only when we find joy in something infinite” (19).

Another problem with equating human flourishing and pleasure is the disconnect between creation and human flourshing that emerges. Volf observes, “Satisfaction is a form of experience, and experiences are generally deemed to be matters of individual preference. Everyone is the best judge of their own experience of satisfaction” (25). He argues that in contrast to this approach most religions and philosophies have argued that human flourishing is tied to the nature of reality. Though Volf does not provides exegetical argumentation for this being the correct position, I would argue that the exegetical foundation is present in Proverbs 8’s teaching that God built wisdom/law into the structure of creation and in Psalm 1’s teaching that wisdom is to live in accordance with this law with flourishing as the result.

In enunciating what this fit between reality and flourishing is, Volf returns to Augustine and summarizes his position in four points: “First, he believed that God is not an impersonal Reason dispersed throughout the world, but a ‘person’ who loves and can be loved in return. Second, to be human is to love; we can choose what to love but not whether to love. Third, we live well when we love both God and neighbor, aligning ourselves with the God who loves. Fourth, we will flourish and be truly happy when we discover joy in loving the infinite God and our neighbors in God” (27-28). Again, though Volf does not bring it out, there is a connection with Psalm 1. It is in meditating on (and then living out) the law of God (which can be summarized in loving God and others) that humans flourish.

Creation and Social Structures

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Greg Forster has some helpful comments on how social structures are rooted in Creation while also being shaped by human action. This means that social structures are rooted in the creational order but human action can twist them in accord with the Fall or press them back toward something that conforms to God’s law.

We must avoid two errors when thinking about social structures. The first error is thinking of them as arbitrary constructs of individual human decisions. This implies that there are no limits on how social structures can be changed. We raise children in families now, but if we all decided to live differently, we could just as easily create massive nurseries and drop off all our babies there at birth. We have an economy based on ownership and exchange now, but if we all decided to live differently, we could just as easily redistribute all property to the people we think should have it, or abolish property and live communally. This is the error I described earlier as naiveté about the social nature of human beings. . . . Admittedly, there is something mysterious about this. It certainly seems like social structures ought to be infinitely changeable if they are only the result of human action. But in fact, they make no sense to us if they’re arbitrary. If we can rearrange parenthood or ownership at will just by deciding to do so, then really there is no such thing as parenthood or ownership. The reason is simple: social relationships are embedded permanently in our nature as human beings. They’re like reason and morality, which are also embedded in our nature. You can’t think logically unless you first assume, without argument, that logic is valid. You can’t think morally unless you first assume, without argument, that there is such a thing as right and wrong. Similarly, you can’t think socially unless you first assume, without argument, that social systems are real and not arbitrary. The other error to avoid is treating social structures as though they were not a result of human action at all. This implies they can’t be changed, that they’re mechanical forces that stand outside our world. They control us, but we have no power to control them. I’ve already hinted at this error, when I commented that there’s no magical force outside human will that makes people live this way.

Greg Forster, Joy for the World: How Christianity Lost Its Cultural Influence and Can Begin Rebuilding It (Crossway, 2014), 178-80.

Culture and Creation

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Culture is what we make of creation. Literally we take the stuff of creation and shape artifacts and institutions. We build things from stone and steel. We make art by arranging colors and textures, sounds and words. And our social institutions are shaped by taking into consideration the nature of human nature. Figuratively, we make something of creation—we project an appraisal in our cultural forms of the kind of world that God has made and the kind of creatures he’s made us to be. Cultural disorders often come from inadequate or false readings of creation. Many people today deny the very existence of a given human nature, arguing that cultural institutions are simply social constructions, arbitrary and freely chosen patterns guided only by human willing.

Ken Myers, Mars Hill Audio Journal 78 (Jan/Feb 2006): 00:08-00:57

N. T. Wright and Resurrection in the Old Testament

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Though appreciating a great deal of Wright’s argumentation in Resurrection and the Son of God, I did interact critically with him in my dissertation regarding his views on resurrection in the Old Tetament.

I quote Wright’s summary of the typical reconstructon of the development of resurrection beleif in Israel:

Surveys and studies of ancient Israelite beliefs about life after death have thus tended to plot three distinct types of phases. In the early period, there was little or no hope for a life of joy or bliss after death: Sheol swallowed up dead, kept them in gloomy darkness, and never let them out again. At some point (nobody knows when; dating of developments in such matters is notoriously difficult) some pious Israelites came to regard the love and power of YHWH as so strong that the relationship they enjoyed with him in the present could not be broken even by death. Then, again at an uncertain point, a quite new idea came forth: the dead would be raised. [RSG, 86]

Wright is willing to accept this position as “broadly accurate,” though he will adjust it to fit his unique emphasis on the exile of Israel (RSG, 86, 121-24).

In contrast, I would argue that the early parts of the Old Testament affirm the resurrection. For instance, Job claims that in the future, when his Redeemer stands on the earth (which will occur after the decomposition of his body), he will see God himself in his flesh (Job 19:25-27).

Wright says on this passage, “The passage in Job often thought to be an exception to this rule [that in Job there is no concept of life after death] is almost certainly not.” In Wright’s view, Job 19:25-27 is full of translational difficulties. Since other, clearer, passages in Job deny life after death, Wright finds it unlikely that this difficult passage should be understood differently (RSG 97-98).

But these other passages are not as clear as Wright supposes. Job 7:7-10 does say that once a man dies he never returns to “his house” or “his place.” But this is a true statement even for those who believe in resurrection. Resurrection occurs at the end of the age, and people do not return in this age to their own houses and places (Thomas Aquinas, The Literal Exposition of Job , trans. Anthony Damico [Atlanta: Scholars, 1989], 148-50).

Likewise Job 14:1-2, 7-14 applies only to this present world. A time limit is placed on the period in which people will not rise: “Till the heavens are no more he will not awake or be roused out of his sleep” (14:12). But after God’s wrath is past, Job desires to be remembered (14:13). Wright also prejudices his readers by cutting off the quotation in verse 14 with the question and providing “no” as the answer, whereas Job continues in verse 14 with a hope of his “renewal.” Even if the question of 14:14a should be answered, “no,” the remainder of the verse reveals that the “no” is not a denial of the resurrection (Aquinas, 228; Andersen, Job, TOTC, 169-70, 172-73; Talbert, Beyond Suffering, 111, 317-18, n. 66-67).

Thus Wright’s first example does not prove the absence of resurrection, and his second example actually points toward belief in resurrection. The way is therefore cleared for a look at Job 19:25-27 itself.

Wright says that nobody can really know whether the key word in 19:26 should be translated “in my flesh” or “without my flesh” (RSG, 98). But Job insists that his very own eyes will see his Redeemer (19:27), and eyes presuppose a body (Talbert, 121, 324, n. 51, 52, 57; Andersen, 193-94). Though not every phrase of Job 19:25-27 is entirely clear, the translation that affirms bodily resurrection is, on balance, the most likely.

I would also argue that the promises of God to Abraham also imply a resurrection. God had told Abraham, “I will give to you and to your offspring after you the land of your sojournings, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession” (Genesis 17:8). But Abraham never received this promise during his lifetime (Heb. 11:13). It is this truth that lies behind Jesus’s affirmation that Exodus 3:6 teaches the resurrection (Matt. 22:23-33 || Mark 12:18-27 || Luke 20:27-40). God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob because he has covenanted with them, and in the Exodus he is fulfilling some of the covenant promises made to them (Ex. 2:24-25). He is not the God of the dead but of the living, because the patriarchs must be raised one day for the promises to them to be fulfilled.
Wright correctly concludes that this passage is not only about the patriarchs in the intermediate state but that it also deals with their future bodily resurrection (RSG, 423-36). Given what Hebrews 11 says about what Abraham beleived, concerning these promises, I think we must conclude that Abraham beleived in resurrection.

Several Davidic Psalms also imply resurrection: 11:7; 16:8-11; 17:15; 23:6; 139:18. And yet a number of Psalms speak in a way that would seem to deny resurrection (Psalm 6:5; 30:9; 88:3-7, 10-12; 115:17; cf. 2 Samuel 14:14). Their presence together in the Psalter, along with the ascription of Davidic authorship to passages in both categories, argues that passages that seem to deny life after death should be harmonized with passages that affirm the afterlife and resurrection.

Hosea 13:14 is a borderline passage. In affirmation of ressurrection, see the NIV and HCSB. For an alternative approach, see NASB and ESV. On this passage Wright attempts to divorce later inspired interpretation of this passage from the original author’s intention (RSG, 118-19). I don’t find this an acceptable approach.

Isaiah clearly promises, “Your dead shall live; their bodies shall rise. You who dwell in the dust, awake and sing for joy! For your dew is a dew of light, and the earth will give birth to the dead” (Isa. 26:19).Isaiah’s affirmation of resurrection here is doubted by few, though Wright seems to indicate that many (not including him) wish to date the passage late simply because it affirms bodily resurrection (RSG, 116).  Daniel 12:2-3 is almost universally acknowledged to teach bodily resurrection (RSG, 110).

Given this evidence from the Old Testament, I would argue that bodily resurrectionis affirmed throughout the entire Old Testament, from patriarchs (or earlier) to prophets.

This material is adapted from my dissertation, available here for purchase as a paperback or for free download as a PDF.

Was Edwards an Intellectualist, Voluntarist, or Concurrentist

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Waddington, Jeffrey C. “Which Comes First, The Intellect or the Will? Alvin Plantinga and Jonathan Edwards on a Perennial Question,” The Confessional Presbyterian 11 (2015): 121-28, 252-53.

Alvin Plantinga, in Warranted Christian Belief, proposes a concurrentist model of the relation between the intellect and the will while identifying the position of Jonathan Edwards as intellectualist, or giving priority to the intellect. Waddington argues that Edwards’s position was closer to Plantinga’s than Plantinga realized.CPJ-11-FrontCover-forCB

In the course of the article Waddington helpfully classifies various positions on the relation of the intellect and will. The first noted is “absolute intellectualism,” a position associated with Thomas Aquinas. On this view “the will is considered blind, and is seen as a slave of sorts to the intellect.” A second position is “functional intellectualism.” In this view the intellect is primary because it presents the will with the “object to which it is either attracted or repulsed.” But ontologically the will and intellect are equals. Waddington notes this view is akin to the Trinity in which each of the persons are ontologically equal while a functional order among the members exists. A key difference between these two positions is that the sin has only affected the intellect in the first, since the will is a slave to the intellect. But on the second view, both intellect and will are affected by sin and in need of regeneration. A third position is “scholastic voluntarism.” On this view the will takes such priority that it is “self-determining.” A fourth position is “Augustinian voluntarism.” In this view, the will is the orientation of the person toward or away from God. This orientation his primacy over the intellect. Finally, there is the concurrentist position is which there is no primacy of intellect or will over the other.

Though Plantinga identified Edwards as an intellectualist, Edwards scholars such as Norman Fiering and Allen Guelzo have identified Edwards as an Augustinian voluntarist. Waddington notes that this is a valid option, and the view that he had held. However, he now recognizes the legitimacy of functional intellectualism to  describe Edwards. Both categories seem to fit elements of Edwards work. In the end, however, Waddington now thinks that Edwards fits best into the concurrentist position