Exegesis and Theology

The Blog of Brian Collins

Correcting Remaining Errors in Authorized

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I thought the funniest line in Mark Ward’s new book Authorized was his take on a common cliche found in the acknowledgments of many theological books:

All remaining errors—I’ve waited so long to say this—are of course the reviewers’ fault: they either missed the mistakes or failed to persuade me that I was wrong. (142)

Since my name occurs in the preceding list of reviewers, I think it only right to correct one of the errors that slipped through. 🙂

I’m pushing for “their” as a third person indefinite (not specifying singular or plural) pronoun—if that’s what the NOW corpus and other tools prove people are using. (72)

I would argue that since Bible translations are translations of an ancient document, we should preserve as much as possible in the receptor language forms of speech that reflect that of the ancient culture and avoid forms of speech, when possible, that obscure the ancient culture. I’m not arguing that the Bible should be made to sound archaic by using older forms of English. I’m arguing that the Bible should not read like a newspaper article. For instance, I’m reading the Aeneid right now. I’m reading a modern translation because I don’t want the additional barrier of working through older English to understand the text. But even in a modern translation, the Aeneid doesn’t sound like the newspaper. I think Mark agrees with this. See page 70.

I would apply this insight to the use of “their.” The Bible was written in a patriarchal society, and there is some value in recognizing that their use of pronouns reflected this aspect of their culture rather than trying to force our cultural sensibilities onto the text. At some point, the generic “his” may disappear from English usage, but at present, it is still in use. On such matters, I think Bible translations should trail the English vernacular.

Mark might respond by pointing out that this is why we have multiple translations. Mark makes a good case for using multiple Bible translations, and he argues that we should give up the quest to find the best translation. I agree with his point to a great degree. I benefit from using multiple translations, and if I were asked to name the best of those that I currently use I might tell you that I really like the ESV in 1 Peter, but not so much in 1 Corinthians, where I prefer the HCSB. I really enjoy reading the Psalms in the Lexham English Bible because it translates יהוה as Yahweh, but I don’t like its translation of Genesis 1:26-27. So I do get Mark’s point. And yet, there is a benefit to settling on a default translation that you primarily memorize from or for a church to select a translation that it will primarily use in its services. There are some versions that are more suitable for this role and others that should play a niche role. I would argue that versions that tend toward the more formal side of the translation scale are better suited for this role. I think Mark might agree with this since he noted at one point that more formal translations have a kind of logical priority over functional ones.

 

Review for Mark Ward’s Authorized

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The following is the Amazon review that I wrote for Mark Ward’s new book Authorized: The Use and Misuse of the King James Bible. I wrote it with a KJVO reader in mind with the hope that such a review might encourage him to pick up the book.

What role should the King James Version play in your life and in your church at present? This the question Mark Ward answers in Authorized. For those who use the King James Version as their primary or even only translation, this book is a must read. Though Mark holds argues against a King James Only position, he does so with respect. He wrote this book while developing personal friendships with leaders of King James Only churches and institutions, seeking their input and coming to understand their viewpoints better. Even if not persuaded to use a vernacular translation, Mark’s discussion of the challenges that readers of the KJV face today will be valuable. Awareness of the kinds of changes in the English language that impede understanding of Elizabethan English is especially important for those who make the KJV their primary or only translation. Three other features of Authorized should be noted. First, Mark avoids debates over textual criticism. Those who adhere to the KJV because they believe the Textus Receptus is the best text type get no argument from Mark (though that is not his position). They do get an exhortation to use or develop a translation from the TR that people today can readily understand. Second, Mark’s motivation for writing this book shines through: he loves the body of Christ, and he wants all Christians to be able to understand God’s Word. Third, this book is enjoyable to read. I had read a pre-publication version of this book, so when I sat down to write this review I didn’t plan to re-read the whole book. I was just going to glance through it to refresh my memory. But it was so engaging that I ended up re-reading the entire book in a single sitting.

Shepherd of Hermas and the Canon

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Steenberg, M. C. “Irenaeus on Scripture, Graphe, and the Status of Hermas,” St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 53, no. 1 (2009): 29-66.

In Against Heresies 4.20.2 Irenaeus identifies a quotation from Shepherd of Hermas as γραφη. Scholars have debated whether Irenaeus is referring to the quotation simply as a writing, as he does in some other instances, or as Scripture. Steenberg surveys all of the uses of γραφη in Against Heresies. He observes that Irenaeus does sometimes use γραφη to refer to a particular writing, but in those cases, there is some contextual marker that identifies which particular writing is being referred to. Irenaeus also uses γραφη frequently to refer to the Scriptures or to Scripture texts. Steenberg makes a persuasive case that this is the use of γραφη in AH 4.20.2 since the usage matches the other instances where Irenaeus refers to Scripture and since the quotation from Hermas is grouped with other Scripture quotations. Less convincing was the theory of Irenaeus’s view of the canon that Steenberg also developed in this article.

Hill, C. E. “The Debate Over the Muratorian Fragment and the Development of the Canon,” Westminster Theological Journal 57, no. 2 (1995): 437-51.

This article reviews a book by Geoffrey Hahnemann which argues that the Muratorian Fragment should be dated in the fourth century rather than the late second/early third century, which is the traditional date. If the Muratorian Fragment is from the late second/early third century, it is the earliest known canon list, and its listing “has the same ‘core’ of writings which were later agreed upon by the whole church,” though there are some missing books and the Wisdom of Solomon is included. Hahnemann holds to a theory that claims the canon was not established until the fourth century. The early dating of the Muratorian Fragment is an obstacle to Hahnemann’s theory and motivates his attempt to re-date it. Hill effectively demonstrates the numerous problems with Hahnemann’s arguments.

I read the article because the Muratorian Fragment speaks to the canonicity of the Shepherd of Hermas:, not that it was “written very recently in our times in the city of Rome by Hermas, while his brother, Bishop Pius, sat in the chair of the Church of Rome [139–154 AD]. And therefore it also ought to be read; but it cannot be made public in the Church to the people, nor placed among the prophets, as their number is complete, nor among the apostles to the end of time.” Hill observes: “Irenaeus’ use of the Shepherd forms an entirely plausible setting for the Fragment’s specification that it should be read but cannot be classed with the Scriptures and read in public worship” (439). Hill also notes, “Tertullian tells us that the Shepherd’s standing had at least by the second decade of the third century been considered by several councils, with unanimously negative results…. That these councils declared Hermas not only to be apocryphal but “false” may indicate an indictment as false prophecy, or the reputation of a claim made for the identity of its author” (439-40). (This is relevant to Hill’s argument because the Muratorian Fragment’s claim that Hermas was written “very recently” at the time of a second-century bishop of Rome is a clear obstacle to Hahnemann’s re-dating.)

Thomas Watson’s Body of Divinity

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Watson, Thomas. A body of Divinity. 1692; Reprinted, Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 1965.

This book is the first part of Thomas Watson’s A Practical Body of Divinity, reprinted in three volumes by Banner of Truth. Watson takes questions and answers from the Westminster Shorter Catechism and expounds them. The sermonic and exhortatory nature of this book makes it useful for personal or family worship, but the content is profound enough to be referenced along with other systematic theologies. For instance, I find Watson’s discussion of what it means to glorify God unrivaled.

Review of James Dolezal, All that Is in God: Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Classical Christian Theism

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Dolezal, James E. All that Is in God: Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Classical Christian Theism. Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2017.

Key Issues and Persons

Dolezal identifies his purpose at the outset: “The chief problem I address in this work is the abandonment of God’s simplicity and of the infinite pure actuality of His being” (loc. 117). Later he says, “The underlying and inviolable conviction is that God does not derive any aspect of His being from outside Himself and is not in any way caused to be” (loc. 182). In contrast to his own view are those he labels “theistic mutualists.” Of them he says, “This ontological openness to being changed by creatures, whether initiated by God or by creatures themselves, is the common denominator of all forms of theistic mutaliusm. Thesitic mutualists may disagree among themselves on precisely how much process and development to allow in God or even over what the ultimate source or cause of such development might be. But all hold to a divine ontology that allows for God to acquire and shed actuality of being” (loc 216).*

Dolezal’s list of theistic mutualists is a who’s who of evangelical scholars: J. Oliver Buswell, D. A. Carson, William Lane Craig, R. L. Dabney, John Feinberg, John Frame, Charles Hodge, Ronald Nash, Donald Macleod, J. P, Moreland, K. Scott Oliphint, J. I. Packer, Alvin Plantinga, Robert Reymond, Kevin Vanhoozer, Bruce Ware, Nicholas Wolterstorff. But Dolezal holds that on his side are Thomas Aquinas, Francis Turretin, John Owen, Herman Bavinck, and the Reformed confessions.

For Dolezal the stakes of this debate are high. He quotes favorably Eastern Orthodox theologian David Bentley Hart that any god other than that of classical theism “can never be more than an idol: a god, but not God; a theos, but not to Theos; a being, not Being in its transcendent fullness.” Dolezal himself goes on to say, “The reason for these strong objections to mutualist understandings of God is that such a God is inevitably mutable and finite and as such is unworthy of worship” (loc. 256). Though Dolezal at times softens his rhetoric, indicating that he thinks that some of the men above know not what they teach, the charge is still serious. It amounts to a charge of heresy, and for the Reformed men, at least, an abandonment of their confessions.

Theological Methodology: Scripture and Confessions

At the root of the division that Dolezal outlines is a methodological debate within evangelicalism between exegetically-focused theologians and historically-focused theologians. On the one side are the exegetically-oriented theologians who wish to tie their theological conclusions tightly with exegesis. On the other side are the historically-oriented theologians who make much of how the creeds and confessions were understood in the past.

An exegetically-focused theology that is historically uninformed can end up in serious error. The theologian may not recognize that his formulations have already been tried and found wanting because they carry theological implications not consistent with the rest of Scripture. If an exegetically-oriented theologian is departing from confessional tradition, he should do so hesitantly and having interacted carefully with the opposing arguments. On the other hand, it is not sufficient for the historically-oriented theologian to reject new formulations from an exegetically-oriented theologian simply because great theologians of the past, or even church confessions, take a different position. The historically-oriented theologians must demonstrate the exegetical feasibility of their position.

Herman Bavinck outlines a proper theological methodology in volume one of his Reformed Dogmatics. He observes, “A good dogmatic method…needs to take account of all three factors, Scripture, church, and Christian consciousness (1:84). But these three factors are not equal. Bavinck grants, “In every branch of learning, the practitioner begins by living from the tradition. He always gains his first acquaintance of the field from an authority…. It is no different for the dogmatician.” Though this is true “pedagogically,” Bavinck  concludes, “Scripture is the sole foundation (principium unicum) of church and theology. In the case of conflict between them, the possibility of which can never be denied on a Reformational view, church and confession must yield to Scripture. Not the church but Scripture is self-authenticating (αὐτοπιστος), the judge of controversies (iudex controversiarum), and its own interpreter (sui ipsius interpres). Nothing may be put on a level with Scripture. Chruch, confession, tradition—all must be ordered and adjusted by it and submit themselves to it…. The confession deserves credence only because and insofar as it agrees with Scripture and, as the fallible work of human hands, remains open to revision and examination by the standard of Scripture” (1:86). As the remainder of Bavinck’s Dogmatics reveals, Bavinck is by no means dismissive of historical theology or the creeds and confessions. But he also attempts to ground his theological exegetically. He begins with exegetical work, moves to history and philosophy, and concludes with his theological formulation.

Though Dolezal claims to be defending the Reformed confessions his methodology is not aligned with the Reformed methodology outlined by Bavinck. A comparison between Dolezal’s treatment of immutability and Bavinck’s demonstrates this. Commendably, Dolezal does begin his discussion of immutability with a discussion of Scripture. However, it is not clear that the Scripture passages he cites actually prove what he seeks to prove. For instance, does Malachi 3:6 really prove that God is pure actuality: “For I the LORD do not change; therefore you, O children of Jacob, are not consumed”? In addition, Dolezal does not deal with the passages that seem to indicate that God does change. Instead, he notes that that Bible speaks of God’s body parts, or his moving through space, and of his changing his mind. He notes that these are anthropomorphic passages and asserts that “when the Bible speaks of God as experiencing changes of relation, affection, or agency” these texts should be understood in the same way. There is no exegetical engagement with why some understand a reference to God’s nostrils as anthropomorphic but cannot understand a reference to God’s anger as anthropopathic (Psalm 17:7-8).

Bavinck, on the other hand, observes the variety of passages that would seem to count against immutability as well as the different ways in which the Bible teaches that God does not change (e.g., with regard to “existence and being” but also with regard to “thought and will” and “plans and decisions”). When Bavinck, after surveying the history of the doctrine and its philosophical implications, formulates the doctrine, he takes all of the biblical data into account. He affirms that God is immutable in “essence,” “knowledge,” and “will.” He also holds that scriptural language about God changing is anthropomorphic. But he also observes, “This immutability, however, should not be confused with monotonous sameness or rigid immobility. Scripture itself leads us in describing God in the most manifold relations to all his creatures. While immutable in himself, he nevertheless, as it were, lives the life of his creatures and participates in all their changing states.” Nonetheless, Scripture, Bavinck avers, “prohibits us from positing any change in God himself” (2:153-59).

Because Bavinck dealt with the full range of Scripture, I found his account of immutability more satisfying than Dolezal’s even though they allegedly hold to the same position. In Dolezal there was a great deal of emphasis on the implications of God being pure actuality without Bavinck’s qualification that this cannot mean that God exists in a “rigid immobility” that prevents his “manifold relations to all his creatures.”

Theological Methodology: The Role of Philosophy

Dolezal’s largely philosophical approach is not a minor aspect of his methodology. In his discussion of simplicity Dolezal says,

The medieval scholastic theologians, as well as the seventeenth-century Protestant scholastics who followed them, had articulated the doctrine of simplicity in terms of an elaborate scheme of denials in which the four causes known through Aristotelian metaphysics (final, formal, efficient, and material) were carefully denied of God. But one would need to presuppose the basic accuracy of Aristotelian metaphysics (or at least that version of it as modified by Aquinas and others) for such elaborate denials to continue to make sense. After Hume and Kant’s attack on the perennial Aristotelian philosophy, many a Christian theologian opted to abandon, rather than defend, the metaphysical structure (regarding being, becoming, and causation) in terms of which simplicity had been so meticulously developed. Indeed, many Christian theologians and ministers retreated from the field of metaphysics altogether and retrenched themselves in their Bibles, assuming that the Bible’s teaching could be successfully preserved without committing oneself to a particular understanding of being. [loc 1390-98]

This may be one of the most important methodological statements in Dolezal’s book. It states that Dolezal believes that Aristotelian metaphysics are essential to formulating an orthodox doctrine of God.** This is a massive claim, and it would commit Dolezal, one would think, to demonstrating that the Scripture itself requires, or at least implies, an Aristotelian metaphysic. Failing this, I think Dolezal’s insistence on an Aristotelian metaphysic violates the Reformation principle of the sufficiency of Scripture.

Timothy Ward observes the doctrine of Scripture’s sufficiency has two aspects: “‘Material sufficiency’ asserts that Scripture contains everything necessary to be known and responded to for salvation and faithful discipleship…. ‘Formal sufficiency’ claims that Scripture as the word of God ought not ultimately to be subject to any external authority of the church or a Spirit-filled individual, and so is significantly ‘self-interpreting'” (“Scripture, Sufficiency of,” DTIB, 730). Though Ward does not mention the external authority of a philosophical system, such an authority would contradict the formal sufficiency of Scripture.

Leinsle, in his Introduction to Scholastic Theology, observes that this was precisely the issue that faced the medieval church with the recovery of Aristotle: “The old formula that philosophy is the ancilla [handmaid] of theology presupposed a philosophy restricted to instrumental disciplines. Could this formula still be applied to an independent, comprehensive pagan interpretation of the world, as found in Aristotle’s works, or did scholars have to redefine the relationship [between theology and philosophy” (134, brackets supplied by the translator). Whether Thomas managed to keep philosophy in its ancillary position or not remains a debate until the present day. However that historical debate is solved, Dolezal’s insistence that theologians must accept an Aristotelian metaphysic makes Aristotle no longer an ancilla but a lord over theology, violating the sufficiency of Scripture. Once again in defending what he understands to be the classic Reformed doctrine of God, it seems that Dolezal has departed from the theological method of the Reformation and Post-Reformation.

A practical problem that flows from this problematic methodology is Dolezal’s tendency to come to conclusions on the basis of what logically must be despite Scripture statements to the contrary. For instance, noting agreement that God does not possess nostrils (having no body) or move through space (being omnipresent), Dolezal argues that references to God’s anger or mercy should be understood as anthropopathisms: “God alters the revelation of Himself without altering Himself ontologically. He unchangingly wills change in His ad extra dealings with creatures without willing or experiencing a corresponding change of agency in His own intrinsic actuality. The proper locus of all change is in the revelation of God … and in the effects of His sovereign administration.”*** But does this mean, as some have said, that a Christian is not someone who was formerly under God’s wrath but is now under God’s grace, being, instead, someone who moved to a knowledge of always being under God’s grace? Or is Dolezal saying that when the Scripture speaks of God’s anger that it is not speaking of any affections in God but only of his ad extra acts of punishment? If so, logic seems to be running roughshod over revelation. I would want to affirm immutability and to affirm the move from wrath to grace. And while recognizing that God is impassible, I would not want to deny the affections of love, anger, jealousy, compassion, etc. to God. While recognizing that our language with reference to God is analogical rather than univocal, I want to guard against taking the Scripture’s language about God to be equivocal. This, I think, Dolezal was sometimes in danger of doing. It cannot be that Scripture gives us inadequate and misleading ways of speaking about God that can only be fixed when translated into a philosophical mode of speaking. This is not to deny the theology the role of synthesizing revelation about God; it is to insist that God’s revelation of himself take priority over our deductions of what must be.

A final problem to note with this philosophically-oriented approach is Dolezal’s failure to address problems that his position might logically lead to. For instance, when he claims that relative attributes in God are not ontologically relative, does he make creation necessary? If not, why not? If he is going to critique those who wish to affirm classical theism but who also wish to account for Scripture statements regarding God’s affections or other relations that he has with people for their logical consequences, does he not also have to deal with logical consequences as well? And if the answer at some point is that these things are mysterious (as indeed they are!) why does he draw the line of mystery where he does?

Theological Methodology: Categorizing Classical Theists and Theistic Mutalists

A final methodological problem has to do with Dolezal’s classification of people into the two categories of classical theist and theistic mutalist. There are great differences between those Dolezal groups in the theistic mutualist category. For instance, William Lane Craig does not hold to God’s timelessness and, according to Dolezal, holds to “a form of social trinitarianism.” This puts him at some distance from, say, J. I. Packer. Dolezal, in his discussions of individuals, is clear about these differences. However, in his evaluations they are all lumped back together as theistic mutualists.

On the other hand, there are significant differences among classical theists that are not raised. As noted above, some classical theists seem to argue that a Christian has not moved from wrath to grace but that he has moved to a knowledge that he is under God’s grace. Other classical theists seem to argue that there is a move from wrath to grace, but that that move happens in us rather than in God. Our position as sinner placed us in a wrath relationship to God and at salvation we moved into a grace relationship with God. God didn’t change; our relationship to God changed. I would find the latter position acceptable but the former completely unacceptable, that is unbiblical.

Conclusion

I would not recommend this book as the way forward in the debates about theology proper. Its incendiary charge of idolatry and its problematic methodology renders it an unfit guide. More particularly, Dolezal’s philosophical/speculative approach tends towards saying that what God has revealed cannot really be so because it conflicts with certain philosophical deductions.

My theological method gives weight, though not an authoritative weight, to historical theology and confessions. So I am open to the idea that theology from Hodge to Vanhoozer has taken a wrong turn in theology proper. But that wrong turn and the alternative need to be demonstrated and established on the basis of sound exegesis. Elements of theology proper that are deduced from good and necessary consequence must be good and necessary consequences that flow from rightly exegeted Scripture. As a way forward I would recommend reading the primary sources: Aquinas, Turretin, Owen, Bavinck, Hodge, Oliphint, Horton, Vanhoozer, and Frame. Evaluate their positions according to a methodology that gives due weight to tradition as an ancilla to theology but which retains Scripture as the foundation for theology.

Endnotes

*Not all whom Dolezal places in the category of theistic mutalist would agree with this description of their position. Dolezal, however, maintains that these theistic mutalists misunderstand their own position because they misunderstand the nature of being: “Part of the reason many evangelical theistic mutalists do not recognize that they have already adopted a form of ontological becoming in God is because they have lost sight of what ‘being’ means. They mistakenly assume that ‘being’ indicates merely ‘nature’ or ‘essence.’ Rather it denotes any actuality or ‘is-ness’ whatsoever, that is, any participation in the act of existing (in esse, or ‘to be’)” (loc. 272).

**Dolezal’s insistence that the Bible must be understood through the lens of an Aristotelian metaphysic helps explain the previous endnote. Dolezal describes those he identifies as theistic mutalists in terms that not all would accept on the grounds that they don’t understand “what ‘being’ means.” What he means by this is: they don’t accept an Aristotelian view of being.

***It is worth noting that there is some incongruence in arguing for anthropopathism on the grounds that everybody acknowledges anthropomorphism. In the first place, many of the anthropomorphisms used of God are idiomatic expressions. For instance, Jeremiah 48:25 says “The horn of Moab is cut off, and his arm is broken, declares the LORD.” Clearly, “arm” is idiomatic for strength or power, and we should expect, when we read God say in Isaiah, “Was my arm too short to deliver you?” (Isa. 50:2) the idiom to also refer to power. So when Numbers 32:10 says that Yhwh “was hot in the nostrils” this is clearly not an statement regarding God’s body; it is an idiom regarding anger. This the translation: “And the Lord’s anger was kindled on that day.” But, having rendered the Hebrew idiom into an English idiom are we now required to argue that God’s anger cannot be kindled because God is immutable and impassible? Can we not affirm immutability, impassibility and that it is proper to ascribe the affection of anger to God?

Edited 3/26/2020

Tim Miller on the Relation between Union with Christ, Justification, and Sanctification

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Miller, Timothy. “The Debate Over the Ordo Salutis in American Reformed Theology,” Detroit Baptist Seminary Journal 18 (2013): 41-66.

In this piece Tim examines the different ways in which union with Christ, justification, and sanctification are related to one another by individuals connected with either Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia (Gaffin, Tipton, Garcia, Evans) or Westminster Seminary California (Clark, Fesko, Horton, VanDrunen, and Godfrey). In unpacking this debate Miller first examines the Lutheran ordo salutis since some accuse those on the Westminster Seminary California (WSC) side of adopting a Lutheran ordo. Lutheran theologians have rejected the idea that union with Christ is the unifying soteriological category and that soteriological benefits flow from union. Instead, Lutherans have all soteriological benefits, including union with Christ, flow from justification.

Miller then turns to the WSC ordo. First, those aligned with WSC argue that Lutherans and the Reformed share the same conception of justification. Second, they affirm that all other soteriological benefits flow from justification. This does not mean that theologians, such as Michael Horton, wish to deny that the other soteriological benefits are all connected to union with Christ. But “he also believes that within the unfolding drama of human history, justification is the source of the other soteric benefits” (48). This position raises the issue of how justification and sanctification relate to each other as “distinct–yet-inseparable.” Third, and as a result of the first two points, union with Christ is distinguished into a forensic union and a renovative union. This is not a claim that there are two unions but that the one union has two aspects.

Having outlined the WSC ordo Miller then outlines the ordo associated with Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia (WTS). In contrast to WSC, those aligned with WTS distinguish Lutheran and Calvin’s conceptions of justification in that Calvin affirmed that “so long as we are without Christ and separated from him, nothing which he suffered and did for the salvation of the human race is of the least benefit to us” (Institutes 3.1.1). (On this point Calvin is said to differ from late Reformed federal theology.) Justification therefore flows from a union with Christ that is obtained by faith. From union with Christ flow the double benefits of justification and sanctification. These two benefits are inseparable as they both come from union with Christ, but they are also distinct. Finally, instead of distinguishing between forensic and renovative aspects of union, those associated with WTS seek to relate the historia salutis with the ordo salutis. Miller summarizes this in four points: “First, the historical bodily resurrection of Jesus includes within it His adoption, justification, and sanctification (57-58). Second, “believers are united with Christ into His life history—His death, burial, and resurrection” (59). Third, “the redeemed share with Christ all of His soteric benefits in union with His person and work” (60). Fourth, “because Christ contains in Himself all the soteric benefits, union with Him provides all benefits simultaneously, distinctly, and inseparably” (61).

Having outlined the debate Miller probes the significance of the two positions. First, if the WTS position is correct, the Roman Catholic objection that Protestantism leads to “immoral living” is answered. Sanctification is inseparable (though district) from justification as a benefit of union with Christ. Second, the WTS position more clearly guards the forensic nature of justification by not having sanctification flow from justification. Third, the WTS ordo emphasizes the centrality of Christ rather than subsuming Christ as one benefit among others within the ordo.

As should be clear, Miller favors the WTS view. Unreflected in this summary, but present in the article, are the exegetical arguments that lead Miller to favor the WTS viewpoint. I found this to be a clear and compelling article and recommend it to all interested in this issue.

Ryan McGraw Reviews Systematic Theologies by Michael Horton and John Frame

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McGraw, Ryan M. “Shifting Paradigms in Reformed Systematic Theology: A Review Article of Michael Horton’s The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way,” Puritan Reformed Journal 5, no. 2 (July 2013): 245-59.

McGraw praises Horton for writing an orthodox, well-organized, systematic theology that addresses contemporary challenges. However, McGraw critiques Horton for adopting new paradigms in three areas.

First, Horton weaves speech-act theory throughout his treatment of theology, connecting the Father with locution, the Son with illocution, and the Spirit with perlocution. McGraw observes, “The advantage to this theory is that it involves all three persons of the Godhead simultaneously and distinctly; the disadvantage is that it makes everything that God does a speech-act or declaration” (248). One infelicitous effect noted by McGraw is the tendency to subsume all of soteriology under the forensic declaration of justification. He is also concerned that it “adopts too many aspects of a post-modern metaphysic and epistemology” (249).

Second, Horton also makes use of the essence/energies distinction common in Eastern Orthodox Trinitarian theology. While Horton sees a convergence with Reformed theology and Eastern Orthodox theology at this point, McGraw does not. He argues that this distinction leads to viewing God as “unknowable” rather than “incomprehensible.” He also thinks that “this distinction threatens to shift soteriology from solving an ethical problem to addressing an ontological one.” Horton clearly does not want to embrace the latter and probably would not want to embrace the former, but McGraw thinks the essence/energies distinction pushes him in those directions.

Third, McGraw critiques Horton for viewing the entire ordo salutis through the lens of justification. By making justification, rather than union with Christ, the central reality of soteriology from which the other benefits flow, all of soteriology, even regeneration, become forensic. This approach also leads Horton to minimize the accomplished/application distinction and opens the door (though Horton does not proceed through it) to antinomianism.

I found McGraw’s review helpful to keep in mind as I use Horton’s The Christian Faith and as I work through his more detailed four book set theology.

McGraw, Ryan. “Toward a Biblical, Catholic, and Reformed Theology: An Assessment of John Frame’s Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief.” Puritan Reformed Journal 8, no. 2 (2016): 197-240.

McGraw’s assessment of Frame’s Systematic Theology can be summarized in a paragraph at the beginning of his review:

“His theology is simultaneously brilliant, innovative, and eccentric. Its primary strengths are the clarity of his arguments, his extensive use of Scripture, and his ability to interact critically with unbelief. The primary weakness of his theology lies in its lack of connection to historic Reformed theology. This is a problem because the absence of historical theology will almost always result in detachment from the confession of the church and an interpretation of the Bible that detracts from rather than promotes church unity. [198]

Despite general positive comments here and at the end of the review, McGraw’s treatment is otherwise entirely negative. He first faults Frame for focusing on the doctrines of God, the knowledge of God, and Scripture to the comparative neglect of Christology, soteriology, and ecclesiology. This is true enough, but as it reflects the emphasis in Frame’s teaching and writing ministry, it seems hard to fault him on this point. I don’t have the impression that Frame was attempting to write a standard classroom textbook.

McGraw also critiques Frame for building his theology around the concept of Lordship. He thinks that organizing theology around the attributes of Lordship, defined as authority, control, and presence, undermines the doctrine of simplicity by singling out some attributes at the expense of others. He also observes that in the Bible Yhwh refers to God in his totality rather than just to his lordship. Finally, Lordship is a relative attribute, one that has to do with God’s relationship to his people rather than to God himself. Regarding the first of these critiques, while I’ve not found the control, authority, presence triad as useful as some of Frame’s other triads, I don’t think Frame’s point is ontological. It is a heuristic device. The third point may have some merit, but as the Bible itself focuses on revealing God in relation to his people, I wouldn’t make too much of this point. The second point is valid. I have long thought that Frame’s move from Yhwh to the title of “Lord” was exegetically untenable and theologically thin.

Related to this critique is a critique of Frame’s multiperspectivalism. McGraw seems to think that Frame’s normative, situational, and existential perspectives remove Scripture from its place of ultimate authority, but this is clearly a misreading of Frame which he addresses in his Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (I don’t know if he addresses it in his ST as I’ve not read Frame’s ST).

McGraw also dings Frame for defining theology as “the application of Scripture, by persons, to every area of life.” McGraw says that historically the Reformed affirmed “that theology was both theoretical and practical.” He does not think Frame’s definition captures this. But Frame’s definition is not much different from Ames who, according to McGraw, “famously defined theology as the doctrine of living to God.” McGraw could also have mentioned William Perkins’s definition: “the science of living blessedly forever.” Frame is not substantially different from these historic definitions, and he does not deny the theoretical side of theology. So it is difficult to see the nit that is being picked here.

McGraw next faults Frame for holding to a covenant of creation district from the covenant of works and for over-reliance on studies of ANE covenants in framing his doctrine of the covenants. I’m with McGraw on these criticisms.

Finally, McGraw critiques Frame for a methodology that is “something close to biblicism.” The value of these critiques vary. The knock against triperspectivalism because “this construction does not arise from simple and straightforward exegesis” misses Frame’s own point about his methodology. It seeks to hold Frame to a standard he hasn’t set for himself. As the standard is neither Frame’s nor McGraw’s own, the critique seems unnecessary. The critique that Frame fails to engage with historical theology is valid. I’ve long thought that this is Frame’s greatest weakness. The objection that Frame does not hold strictly to creeds or confessions is more difficult. Creeds and confessions are important but they are not infallible. If I am disturbed by Frame’s lack of engagement with historical theology (and I am), I am also concerned about those who want to settle theological debates by appealing to creeds or historical theology without also making the exegetical case for their position.

In general this was a helpful review, but I think McGraw would have enhanced the force of his best critiques if he had replaced his weakest critiques with measured praise of specific aspects of Frame’s work.

 

Naselli, No Quick Fix

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Naselli, Andrew David. No Quick Fix: Where Higher Life Theology Came From, What It Is, and Why It’s Harmful. Bellingham, WA: Lexham, 2017.

This book, a popularization of Andy’s first dissertation, does just what its subtitle says it does. It gives a history of higher life theology, describes what it is, and provides ten reasons for rejecting it. An appendix provides resources that make a positive contribution to understanding and applying the doctrine of sanctification.

The book is brief, the writing is clear, the theology it espoused is sound. At times Andy provides exegetical treatments of key passages (e.g., Ephesians 5:18). These were often so good that I dropped them into my notebooks on those passages. Highly recommended.

Naselli and Gons, “An Examination of Three Recent Philosophical Arguments against Hierarchy in the Immanent Trinity.”

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Naselli, Andrew David and Philip R. Gons, “An Examination of Three Recent Philosophical Arguments against Hierarchy in the Immanent Trinity.” In One God in Three Persons. Edited by Bruce A. Ware and John Starke. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2015.

Naselli and Gons defend Eternal Functional Subordination (EFS), defined as “the Son is eternally and necessarily subordinate to the Father, not in terms of his deity, but in his role in relationship to the Father” (197), against three philosophical arguments brought against it in favor of Eternal Functional Equality (EFE), defined as “the Father and Son are completely equal in all noncontingent ways: all subordination is voluntary, arbitrary, and temporary” (197).

The first EFE argument essentially says that if the Son has the property of being necessarily and eternally submissive to the Father, then the Son is not homoousios with the Father because he has a property that the Father does not have. Naselli and Gons reply that this argument only works by equivocating on the term “essential.” Furthermore, if deployed consistently, the argument would deny the eternal generation of the Son because it would deny that the Son can have the property of being necessarily and eternally generate.

The second EFE argument says that EFS entails that the Father could not have become incarnate, which denies omnipotence to the Father. Naselli and Gons reply that no proponent of EFS assert that “it is not even theoretically possible for the Father or the Spirit to be united to a human nature” (207). Rather, they distinguish between what is “possible” and what is “fitting.” Because it is fitting for the Son, and not the Father and the Spirit, to become incarnate, it is not possible given the wisdom of God and the world he created for the Father or Spirit to become incarnate (possible as used here is not connected with the issue of omnipotence).

The third EFE argument is that if passages about the Father sending the Son point to EFS of the Son to the Father, then the Son is eternally submissive to the Spirit as well because sent by him (Matt. 4:1; Mark 1:12; Luke 4:1). Naselli and Gons reply that these sendings are different. The Spirit sends the incarnate Jesus to the wilderness which is qualitatively different from the Father sending the pre-incarnate Son into the world.

Though this article does not resolve the controversy or demonstrate that EFS is true, it does clearly refute three poor EFE arguments made against EFS.

Swain and Allen on the Obedience of the Eternal Son

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Swain, Scott and Michael Allen. “The Obedience of the Eternal Son,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 15, no. 2 (April 2013): 114-34.

Swain and Allen observe that in the last century numbers of theologians have argued that obedience is part of the Son’s proper work eternally in the external works of the Trinity. This observation includes not only evangelical theologians such as Grudem and Ware but also theologians such as Barth and von Balthasar.

Worryingly for Swain and Allen, “Affirming the obedience of the only-begotten Son has in many cases entailed significant revisions to classical trinitarian metaphysics” (115). They list as examples: “historicizing of the doctrine of God,” “metaphysics of trinitarian kenosis,” “replacing eternal generation with obedience as the Son’s distinguishing personal property,” and “social trinitarianism, which affirms three centers of self-consciousness and willing within the triune God.”

Swain and Allen wish to affirm “the claim that obedience constitutes the proper form of the Son’s divine work in the economy of salvation.” They wish to avoid adjusting “traditional trinitarian metaphysics” (116).

They therefore argue that rather than working from economy back to essence, one should work from essence toward economy: “mode of acting follows mode of being.” With this approach, “the Son’s obedience to the Father in the economy of salvation” is “the economic extension of his eternal generation.” It “constitutes the proper filial mode whereby he executes the Trinity’s undivided work of salvation” (117). The wording here seems significantly precise. The obedience of the Son is something economic, not essential. The work of salvation in which the Son is obedient to the Father is “the Trinity’s undivided work” (that is, there is single will in the Triune God). But the economy works out the way it does because it is grounded in an ontology in which the Father eternally generates the Son.

In the third section of their essay, Swain and Allen seek to ground their theology exegetically in John 1 and 5. Drawing on the exegesis of Thomas Aquinas, they argue that saying the Word is the one through whom the world is created is not an assertion that the Word is the instrument through which the Father created but is instead an assertion that “the Word performs the common trinitarian work of creation in a manner consistent with his distinctive mode of being” (122). This leads to the following thesis: “As the Son’s proper mode of being God consists in the pure relation wherein he receives his being from the Father, so the Son’s proper mode of acting as God consists in the pure relation wherein he receives his actions from the Father” (123-24).

The more significant passage for this argument seems to be John 5:19-30. Swain and Allen see two claims that emerge from this passage: “The first claim is that Jesus does nothing on his own initiative, but only what he sees the Father doing. The second claim is that Jesus, in following his Father’s lead, does everything that his Father does” (124). Swain and Allen assert that the first claim implies that the Son is inferior to the Father and the second claim entails that he is equal with the Father. Not only are “these seemingly contradictory claims” made “within the same context,” but “John 5:19 insists that the former claim is the basis for the latter claim” (124). The theological conclusion drawn: “the obedience of the Son to the Father who sends him constitutes the Son’s opus proprium within the undivided opera Trinitatis ad extra” (126).

In part four of this essay Swain and Allen respond to three questions that their argument has raised. First, does the obedience of the eternal Son imply two wills in the Godhead? Second, does obedience suggest a lack of omnipotence? Third, “does not all this smack too much of a ‘substance ontology'” (131)? In answer to the first question, Swain and Allen assert that “the Son’s obedience to the Father in the work of salvation is not indicative of a second will alongside that of the Father but of the proper mode whereby Jesus shares the Father’s will as the only-begotten Son of the Father” (127). In answer to the second question they assert, “The eternal Son exists receptively as one whose self-existence (autotheos) and almightiness are granted to him by the Father” (128). They key exegetical support for these two answers is found in John 10:17-18. In answer to the third question, they appeal to John 1, which they say “distinguishes the being of the Word…(1:1-2, 18)…from the becoming that characterizes the economy of creation and redemption (1:3, 6, 10, 14, 17…)” (131).

The ultimate conclusion: “the external works of the Trinity are indivisible (opera ad extra trinitatis indivisa sunt), though they are performed by all the persons in their own person-specific, ‘proper’ ways” (133).