In the last couple of posts I’ve interacted with Roy Beacham’s argument for a literal hermeneutic. I indicated that while I share Beacham’s concerns about approaches to Old Testament interpretation that re-interpret the text contrary to authorial intent, I think that the approach he advocates makes it difficult to understand numerous New Testament interpretations and fulfillments of Old Testament passages.

A few years back I raised a similar concern regarding Mark Snoeberger’s contribution to Covenantal and Dispensational Theologies: Four Views.

[Traditional dispensationalists] often begin by laying out their hermeneutic as if it is axiomatic and then insist that all passages conform to this hermeneutic without having first demonstrated the validity of their hermeneutic. Here Snoeberger explicitly affirms this approach. This approach violates the sufficiency of Scripture, since Scripture’s own self-interpretation should be the foundation for any biblical hermeneutic.

Interestingly, an article in the most recent volume of the Detroit Baptist Seminary Journal responds to the concern I raised. In “‘Received’ Laws of Language: The Existence, Ground, and Preliminary Identification of a Hermeneutically Disputed Notion” and an accompanying blog post, “The Sufficiency of Scripture and Transcendental Knowledge,” Snoeberger provides a substantial defense of his approach.

In the article, Snoeberger argues for the existence of natural laws. He further argues for a Van Tillian understanding of how these laws are “received.” Finally, he argues that natural laws are not restricted to matters of morality but that they encompass matters such as linguistics. I want to agree with Snoeberger on these matters.

In the blog post, rejects the sufficiency of Scripture critique by noting, “there must exist some tentative/provisional awareness, prior to reading the Bible, of certain basic hermeneutical a prioris. Otherwise, we would be caught in a paradox: we could not access the very Bible from which we learn how to read the Bible.”

I take the point. Further, I share his concern about the resurgence of pre-modern multi-sense interpretive approaches. Appeals to the Great Tradition to defend these interpretative models often undermine the sufficiency of Scripture.

Nonetheless, I have three reservations about Snoeberger’s argument. The first is practical, and the second two are theological.

First, while one can respond to the resurgence of pre-modern multi-sense interpretations by appealing to the received laws of language, I think it would be more fruitful to make the case that the apostles themselves did not adopt the allegorical approaches that became common in the patristic and medieval periods. This seems to me a more straightforward argument than appeals to the natural laws of linguistics. For an example of this kind of argument, see chapter 6 of my dissertation.

Second, while I affirm the reality of creational norms / natural laws, and while I think Christian’s should study creation (which includes the facility humans have in language) to discern these creational norms, all efforts to determine creational norms or natural laws need to be tested against Scripture. A key test would be to see how Scripture writers in both the Old and New Testament interpreted previous Scripture passages.

Third, while it is the case that “there must exist some tentative/provisional awareness, prior to reading the Bible, of certain basic hermeneutical a prioris,” a doctrine of biblical hermeneutics needs to be grounded in Scripture because of the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture. In other words, a doctrine of biblical hermeneutics needs to ground hermeneutical a prioris in the biblical text.

I should clarify that Snoeberger does in his contribution to the Four Views book and in other places seek to give an account of the New Testament’s use of the Old. For instance, in another recent post to the DBTS blog, Snoeberger argues that the New Testament often uses Old Testament language by way of analogy, metaphor, and corpus linguistics. In other words, the New Testament may be using Old Testament language without claiming to be interpreting those Old Testament texts. In particular, he claims this approach is better than seeing Old Testament types fulfilled by New Testament antitypes.

I grant the NT may well make use of the OT in the way Snoeberger describes, and I fully grant that many hymns and later Christian writings certainly do so. But I’m not convinced that analogy, metaphor, and corpus linguistics will account for all of the OT’s use of the NT.

In yesterday’s post I looked at Beacham’s chapter in defense of literal interpretation of the prophets. Despite being somewhat critical of the chapter, I should acknowledge my appreciation of Beacham’s scholarship. My engagement with it here due to the fact that I find myself challenged by his arguments and helpful to work through a response to them.

Beacham’s article commendably makes its case directly from Scripture. However, I would have appreciated some engagement with how the New Testament interprets Old Testament prophecy. In footnote 54 Beacham does give a hint of his approach.

He argues that “Joel 2 … is applied argumentatively by Peter in his sermon recorded in Acts 2.” He further claims that this application “in no way necessitates or even suggests their actual fulfillment (59, n. 54). He is especially concerned that this prophecy not be “assign[ed] … to a different time, place, people, or outcome in contradistinction to those originally stated” (59, n. 54). Given this statement, and Beacham’s article, “Joel 2, Eschatology of” in the Dictionary of Premillennial Theology, I take him to locate the events of Joel 2:18-27 to latter part of the Tribulation and beginning of the Millennium.

Beacham does not understand the “afterward” in Joel 2:28 to refer to the immediately preceding verses “because those blessings are framed in terms of unending time” (“Joel 2,” 217). Rather, he relates the “afterward” to Joel 2:11. These are events that I’ll happen after “great and very awesome” day of Yhwh. On this reading, Joel 2:12-27 “constitute a digression that bisects the first and last sections of the chapter” (“Joel 2,” 217-18).

This interpretation, however, creates a tension with Peter’s statement, “But this is what was uttered through the prophet Joel” (Acts 2:16). Beacham’s interpretation of Joel 2 precludes a fulfillment in Peter’s day, but it is difficult to read Peter’s “This is what was uttered through the prophet Joel” as anything other than a statement of fulfillment. Peter did not say, “This is like what Joel uttered” or “this is analogous to what Joel uttered.” He said, “this is what was uttered through the prophet Joel” (emphasis added).

Another reading of the Joel prophecy allows for a more harmonious understanding of Joel 2 and Acts 2. If 2:18-27 is read as telescoping together the restoration of the land after the locust plague recounted in chapter 1 as well as the restoration after the final day of Yhwh judgment from the first part of chapter 2, the “afterward” in verse 28 could take place anytime after the original restoration. Beacham himself provides a rationale for not tying the “afterward” to the ultimate restoration—it is never ending. The rationale for this telescoping in 2:18-27 would be that Joel 1 relates to a historic locust judgment in Joel’s day while Joel 2:1-11, as I understand it, predicts and eschatological judgment that will be fulfilled during the final Day of Yhwh. Thus the restoration section that follows telescopes both the historical and eschatological restorations.

This reading allows for a literal reading of Peter’s “But this is what was uttered through the prophet Joel” and a literal reading of Joel. Peter replaced Joel’s “And it shall come to pass afterward” with “And in the last days it shall be.” As the New Testament elsewhere emphasized the last days began with the ascension of Christ. The events recounted in Acts 2:17-18 occurred in Acts just as prophesied at the beginning of these last days. The events in verses 19-20 will occur at the end of the last days. Peter, of course, did not know that this would be over 2,000 years later. Verse 21 is God’s call to people all through this time.

Central Baptist Theological Seminary just published Dispensationalism Revisited: A Twenty-First Century Restatement. This book is a Festschrift for Charles Hauser, Jr. that is comprised of chapters by his former colleagues and students. The first three chapters focus on the classic sine qua nons of dispensationalism. This chapter by Roy Beacham defends literal interpretation as a sine qua non of dispensationalism.

Beacham’s thesis is that dispensationalists are correct to insist that “God intended all prophetic foretelling in Scripture to be understood literally and only literally” (32; cf. 36). He clarifies that literal interpretation does not negate “figures of speech” or “exaggerated” language, but he is not inclined to abandon the term (32, n. 1). Beacham’s method in this chapter is to demonstrate that what God says in Scripture about the genre of predictive prophecy requires such prophecy “to be literally and only literally understood, interpreted, and fulfilled” (33). He further clarifies that the involves rejecting “any form of other-than-literal, less-than-literal, or more-than-literal interpretation of prophetic predictions” (37).

Beacham makes his case by examining what Scripture says about the “purpose, ground, nature, function, and test of divinely appointed predicative prophecy” (37).

Beacham argues that the purpose of predictive prophecy is “apologetic”—it is designed to demonstrate that only God is the true God. In support of this thesis he cites Isaiah 41:21-24, 26; 42:8-9; 44:6-8; 45:18, 20-21; 48:3-5. From these texts Beacham concludes, “Any hermeneutical viewpoint that espouses any form of other-than-, less-than-, or more-than-literal fulfillment of God’s foretelling negates the declare purpose and evidentiary worth of this genre” (41). I see how this arguement counters “other-than” and “less-than” fulfillments, but I’m not sure it holds for “more-than.” If everything God predicted happened exactly as God said it would, but more happened in addition to what God predicted, how does the “more-than” negate this purpose for the prophecy? In fact, given the fact that no prophecy is exhausive, how does one escape “more-than” fulfillments.

Beacham argues that the ground of predictive prophecy is “God’s immutable person and efficacious speech” (42). Isaiah 45:18-19; 45:22-25 are cited since these are passages in which God swears by himself to perform what he has stated. He also appeals to Isaiah 44-48, noting that since the prophecy regarding Cyrus was fulfilled as stated God’s words about the nation Israel in this passage will also be fulfilled as stated. He concludes, “The prophecy itself gives neither the original hearers nor the ensuing readers any indication that God intended some of these sworn forecasts to be fulfilled exactly as stated, while others he intended to signify, typologize, expand, and/or spiritualize” (48). Once again, “expand” strikes me as an outlier in this list. How does expanding on a predictive prophecy undermine the fulfillment of what was predicted? In fact, what is progressive revelation but an expansion upon previous revelation. For instance, is not every subsequent revelation about the Messiah’s redemptive work an expansion of Genesis 3:15?

Beacham’s concern about expansion is detailed in note 32: “The argument seems almost ubiquitous among partial nonliteralists and  complementary heremeneuticians that people should be thankful and that God should be admired if he produces a ‘more expansive’ fulfillment than those that he originally swore. According to this innovative hermeneutical theory, God can do more than he promised, he just can’t do less…. In any case, the outworking of expanded nonliteral fulfillment usually does not result, formulaically, in the equation, ‘God promises to do x but instead he does x+,’ (something more than x). Rather, it results in the equation ‘God promises to do x but instead he does y, which, in their view is ≻ x (something greater than x). In reality, however, y us not x at all. It seems more theologically sound to assert, in every case, that if God swears on his own person and nature to do x, then God will in fact do x, nothing more and nothing less. Any other outcome, expanded or diminished, would call into question the efficacy of hiw words, not to mention the integrity of his person. No outcome can be ‘better’ than the exacting accomplishment of God’s self-sworn pronouncements all the time” (51, n. 32). I agree with Beacham that if x+ in reality means y instead of x, there is a problem. But that doesn’t really describe an “expansion” of the promises; it describes replacement under the lablel of expansion. Thus, I do not see who this argument negates expansion in principle as Beacham goes on to do. In fact, I am again left to wonder how expansion can be eliminated without predictive prophecy being exhasutive. For instance, is it not an expansion that the prophecies regarding Christ are divided into a first coming and a second coming?

Next Beacham argues that the nature of “predictive prophecy was univocal” (51). He argues that “there is no divergence of meaning between the human authors and the divine author” (52). He roots this in Deuteronomy 18:15-22, from which he concludes that “the human prophet served as no more than a mouthpiece” (55). (It is important to recognize that Beacham is here speaking specifically of prophecy.) Thus, “The prophet may have fully understood the prediction that he announced on behalf of God (1 Kgs 22:17, see 22:28) or the prophet may have found the forecast utterly perplexing (Dan 7:15-16), but neither case affected the prophecy’s meaning or intent whatever. If a true prophecy consisted of God’s words alone, and it did, then that true prophecy bore God’s meaning alone” (55). I’m not sure that this arguement advances the thesis. Those who wish to find a fuller sense find it God’s meaning. So negating the human meaning to focus on the divine meaning doesn’t really address this challenge. 

I would agree that there can be no contradiction between the divine and human authors of Scripture in terms of meaning, but as I’ve written elsewhere, “God, who knows all things, knows the whole scope of what he will reveal in Scripture along with all of the potentially correct applications. The human author is limited in what he can intend” (Scripture, Hermeneutics, and Theology, 211-12). For instance, Moses recorded the redemptive promise of Genesis 3:15. But did he understand all that God intended in that promise? Did he understand even what New Testament believers understand to day in reading that text? I am doubtful even though I also think that Old Testament believers understood more than scholars often give them credit for. Moses and God did not intend differenet things in Gensis 3:15 but God certainly intended things beyond what Moses could have known.

Beacham is also critical canonical interpretation. He is right to be concerned about appeals to canonical interpretation that negate promises like the land promises to Israel. But canonical interpretation seems to simply be the way that texts are read. If a person is reading a series of novels and one character seems ambiguous or evil in earlier volumes while a later volume reveals him to have been a secret agent working for the good side, that later information will necessarily reshape how those earlier scenes are understood. Likewise, when the seed promise of Genesis 3:15 is read in light of all the progressive revelation that develops that promise, a richer understanding of that promise is had by readers of Genesis 3. The abuse of canonical readings does not negate its proper, even inevitable, use.

To make his approach work, Beacham draws a stark line between meaning and  “implications and applications” (59). But it is not clear that the line between these is stark. E. D. Hirsh wrestled with this problem. At one point he said, “‘There is no magic land of meaning outside human consciousness.’ But Hirsch realized that humans often intend their meaning to be true in situations of which they presently have no knowledge (the distant future, for instance). Thus Hirsch was willing to broaden his statement so that principles from the original statement may be applied to new situations without violating authorial intention. But, he notes, his original statement ‘would be true if, godlike, we could oversee the whole of human consciousness, past, present, and future.'” This leads me to conclude, “One of the difficulties, where to draw the line between meaning and significance, is greatly mitigated if the Author intends all possible right applications from the beginning” (Scripture, Hermeneutics, and Theology, 210-11, citing E. D. Hirsch, Jr., “Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted,” Critical Inquiry 11, no. 2 (Dec. 1984), 202, 204).

Next, Beacham appeals to “the function of predictive prophecy” according to Deuteronomy 18:19. On the basis that the prophets were to be obeyed, he concludes that “all that they foretold, was both comprehendible and practicable by the ordinary person…. There could be no vast passing of time until the ultimate true meaning of God’s words to Israel could acquire their final significance through canonical reinterpretation and/or typological fulfillment” (61, emphasis added). I understand Beacham’s concern, expressed in footnotes 56-57, regarding interpreters who conclude that God will not do exactly as he predicted through the prophets but might actually do something other than the prophets said. I share that concern. But I’m not confident that Deuteronomy 18:19 is saying that that everything the prophet said was comprehended by the original audience. I’m not even sure that Beacham truly wants to press the point that far, since he acknowledged earlier that the prophets didn’t fully understand all that they were saying all that they were given to say. Nor do I want to diminish what the Old Testament saints could understand. I think they often understood more than modern scholars given them credit. Nevertheless, to turn again to Genesis 3:15, surely the understanding of the ultimate true meaning of God’s words has grown as God progressively revealed more about his redemptive plan in Christ. Doubtless Christians understand the meaning of Genesis 3:15 better than Adam or Moses. Or, to give another example, the Old Testament revealed much about the gospel going to the Gentiles and about Israel’s role in God’s plan in connection to this mission to the Gentiles. Surely Old Testament texts about the gospel coming to the Gentiles should be read in light of Acts and the Epistles.

Finally Beacham argues that the “test of predicative prophecy” supports his view (63, emphasis added). Deuteronomy 18:21-22; Jeremiah 28:7-9; Ezekiel 33:30-33 all affirm that the test of a true prophet is that his predictions come true. Beacham observes, “No caveat existed in God’s declared test of genuine prophecy to allow for spiritualized, typified, multi-intentioned, expanded, or canonically resignified fulfillments” (64). Once again, I would agree that interpretations in which the fulfillment of Old Testament texts are replaced with spiritual interpretations or resignified are condemned by these texts. Allegorical interpretation was something the pagans had to do to make sense of their sacred texts. It was not a method that Christians needed to or should have resorted to. But I remain puzzled about the inclusion of “multi-intentioned” and “expanded” in the list. If there are texts in which God says, “I will do X for believing Israel,” and he does X for believing Israel while also revealing later that he always intended to do the equivalent for believing Gentiles as well, how does that fall afoul of the above passages?

While the texts that Beacham adduces do rule out the spiritualizing approaches that were popular in previous centuries and some of the approaches today that reinterpret Old Testament texts, I do not think that the texts he cited contradict a complementary hermeneutic or interpretations in which the Old Testament texts retain their integrity while progressive revelation clarifies or extends the these OT texts.

In sum, while I share Beacham’s concerns about approaches to Old Testament interprertation that re-interpret the text contrary to authorial intent or which posit a “reality shift” (to borrow terminology from Craig Blaising) between the Old and New Testaments, I think that the approach he advocates makes it difficult to understand numerous New Testament interpretations and fulfillments of Old Testament passages. I want to interpret the Old Testament literally. I also want to interpret the New Testament’s use of the Old Testament literally.