Exegesis and Theology

The Blog of Brian Collins

Leeman, How the Nations Rage

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Leeman, Jonathan. How the Nations Rage: Rethinking Faith and Politics in a Divided Age. Nashville: Nelson, 2018.

Leeman, a pastor and theologian with a degree in political science, is writing to help American Christians think biblically about politics. While he states up front that he is “not a political radical” or revolutionary, and while he values the political heritage that Americans have been bequeathed, he is concerned that American Christians often accept certain political principles because they are American without examining whether they are truly biblical.

Separation of Chruch and State?

For instance, many American Christians read Jesus’s words in Matthew 22:21, “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s” as if God’s things (“worship, faith, church, etc.”) belong in “the private domain” while the government’s things belong in the public domain. Leeman argues that Jesus’s words in Matthew 28 do not allow for this: “Jesus said he possesses all authority in heaven and on earth” (12). While Leeman affirms the separation of church and state (as two distinct institutions), he rejects “the separation of religion and politics.”

That is, Leeman rejects the old European model of Christendom in which church and state jointly ruled a nation. In Leeman’s view, this arrangement violated the unique spheres of authority that God gave church and state while bearing bad fruit (e.g., nominal Christianity, states that persecuted Christians in the name of Jesus).

But Leeman also rejects the model of John Locke and Thomas Jefferson in which the state rules over “outward things” and the church rules over personal, inward, religious matters. Leeman notes that people who hold such a view delude themselves into thinking that certain parts of life are not religious. For instance, the American values of “rights, equality, and freedom” may seem neutral. But when you ask: freedom to do what? rights to what? equality in what way? it becomes clear that religious viewpoints are smuggled in under these allegedly neutral terms. This, makes the fiction of a neutral public square damaging to the public good because it maintains a fiction.

Leeman explains:

When the non-Christian affirms his belief in the separation of church and state, he means separation of government from my church, not his own. He effectively says, ‘You can’t impose any of your beliefs and morals on me because they come from your church.’ Okay, but does that mean he cannot impose his idolatrous and non-Christian views on me? Ah, there’s the catch. He has no official church and no god with a name. And there’s no such thing as separation of idolatry and state. Too bad for me. Lucky for him. [41]

Thus the public square is not truly neutral: “What you really have is a square rigged against organized religion. Organized religions are kept out. Unnamed idols are let in” (34).

Leeman’s view is that the church and state should be largely separate institutions. God has given them two distinct jurisdictions. But all of life is religious. There is no neutrality.

What is at stake is found in the title of the book How the Nations Rage. While nations war among themselves, the greatest political rivalry is that of the nations conspiring against the Messiah. Leeman insightfully observes that “worship and rule belong together.” In a fallen world, rule is claimed by those who justify themselves as deserving the right to rule. Part of the challenge that Christians face is that the “politics of the new creation,” is currently present only in the church, which God by his Word and Spirit transforms hearts. And yet Christians are involved in the politics in this fallen world.

How Does the Bible Connect to Politics?

In order to navigate politics in a fallen world a right understanding of how the Bible relates to politics is needed. Leeman argues that “when it comes to thinking about politics, the Bible is less like a book of case law and more like a constitution. A constitution does not provide a country with the rules of daily life. It provides the rules for making the rules” (79). Leeman does not deny that the Bible makes some direct demands that should be translated into law. Law’s against murder come to mind. But in most cases, the Christian applying the Bible to the political realm is in need of wisdom. Leeman says that “wisdom is both the posture of fearing the Lord, as well as the skill of living in God’s created but fallen world in a way that yields justice, peace, and flourishing” (84; cf. Prov. 8:15-16). His point is that whereas there are some “straight-line issues” where the Bible can be directly applied (no murder means no abortion), most issues are “jagged line issues” where the Bible still applies, but not directly (e.g., health-care policy). Leeman argues that churches can bind people’s consciences on straight-line issues but should not do so with jagged line issues.

Why Do We Have Government?

Leeman then turns to the Bible’s teaching about the origin, purposes, and forms of government. He notes that the Bible’s view of the origin of government “sits uncomfortably with aspects of America’s liberal, democratic tradition.”

Our liberal, democratic tradition teaches that “governments derive their powers … ‘from the consent of the governed'” (101). This is the social contract view. On this view people lived in a pre-political state until they consented to form a government. Since the government provided a framework for life rather than something that regulated all of life, the formation of government created public aspects for everyone’s life while leaving a substantial portion of life private. The “source of the government’s moral authority … depends on our consent.” On this view, religion is considered a private matter, rather than a public one.

Leeman notes that the Bible’s view of government has no room for a “pre-political” state because everyone is “always under God’s rule.” When people form a social contract, they ought to do so under the rule of God since, according to the Bible “a government’s authority comes from God” (Rom. 13:1, 2, 4; John 19:11). “Our governments, after all, are simply a way of working out in time and space the rules that God has provided” (105).

Leeman’s discussion of the biblical purposes for government begins with Genesis 9. God requires “a reckoning for the life of man” in Genesis 9. From this, Leeman concludes that the first purpose of government is “To Render Judgment for the Sake of Justice.” Other biblical texts that support this purpose include 1 Kings 3:28; Proverbs 20:8; Romans 13:3-4. The second purpose of government also Leeman also derives initially from Genesis 9: “The authority that God gave to shed blood for blood (vv. 5-6) facilitates the larger enterprise of filling the earth and ruling over it (vv. 1 and 7)” (112). Thus the second purpose for government is “To Build Platforms of Peace, Order, and Flourishing.” See also Prov. 29:4; 16:12, 15; Joseph’s preparation for famine in Egypt and Mosaic regulations that provide for the poor. From 1 Timothy 2:1-4, Leeman discerns a third purpose for government: To Set the Stage for Redemption.” A good government “clears a way for the people of God to do their work of calling the nations to God.”

This last purpose of government raises the issue of religious freedom. Leeman supports the view that governments should tolerate false worship because Scripture authorizes no government, except Old Testament Israel, to punish people for false worship. Leeman points out that this argument is not based on the freedom of the conscience (though that is a “fruit” of the argument) but on the authorization that God gives to government. Second, Leeman argues that “governments possess no authority to exercise the keys of the kingdom, and no ability to coerce true worship” (122).

With all this in view, what is the best form of government? Americans may be tempted to answer, “democracy.” But Leeman observes that a democracy only functions well when “the right kind of political culture must be in place.” He observes, “There must be a strong tradition of respecting the rule of law. Citizens must prize honesty and eschew bribes. They must trust one another to keep their contracts. They must know how to negotiate, persuade, compromise, and lose votes, yet still submit to the system. Apart from these kinds of public and private virtues, democracy has a much harder time working” (122). The Bible itself provides “no abstract ideal form of government.” Instead, a good government is any government that fulfills the three biblical purposes for government noted above.

The Chruch and Politcs

Leeman then turns from the role of the government to the role of the church. He emphatically denies the path of arguing that the church focuses on spiritual matters while the government focuses on political matters. Instead, he asserts, “Every week that a preacher stands up to preach he makes a political speech. He teaches the congregation “to observe all” that the King with all authority in heaven and on earth has commanded (Matt. 28:20)” (131-32). On the other hand, Leeman is skeptical of making the church into a lobbying organization. He notes that it is beyond the church’s mission and competency to formulate public policy. “Therefore, churches should ordinarily not seek to influence government policy directly. … It risks misidentifying Jesus’ name with human wisdom. It risks abusing the consciences of church members. And it risks undermining Christian freedom and unity” (145). He observes, “I have watched churches unite their names and therefore the name of Jesus to a Supreme Court nominee, to presidential candidates, and to legislation in Congress. And nearly every time I want to ask, ‘Are you sure? Do you really want to stake the reputation of Jesus and the gospel to that nominee or candidate or reform?'”(148).

Leeman acknowledges there are certain issues that are so clear that the church can speak directly to them. In fact, he notes that “churches can sin and prove faithless by not speaking up in matters of government policy when they should” (147). But the church has to be able to discern the difference between what it can bind consciences on and what a Christian, working in a sphere outside the church, might conclude as he brings policy expertise together with a biblically-shaped worldview.

The Christian and Politics

The limitations that Leeman places on the involvement of the church as an institution do not apply to general Christian involvement in politics. In fact, Leeman argues that disengagement from civic life is wrong, as is capitulation, “positively endorsing the world and its ways.” Leeman cautions, “Be leery of being too captivated by any political worldview” (181). Neither the right or the left provide the Christian with a biblical worldview. For the Christian to simply embrace the zeitgeist of either side or either party will result in conformity to the world in some areas of life. A third wrong path is to be worldly in the way the Christian acts politically. “There is a way of engaging that’s right on the substance but wrong on the strategy or tone” (164).

Leeman also notes various strategies for Christian engagement in the political realm. The first approach is to find some common ground in the way the argument is made. For instance, Leeman observes that when the Affordable Care Act required employers to provide insurance coverage that included abortion, Christians objected to this requirement (and prevailed in court) on religious freedom grounds. Leeman notes that he agrees with the religious freedom argument, but he observes: “Religious freedom isn’t the real issue. It’s a backup issue. The real issue, for a Christian, is murder. We don’t want the state to require us to fund something we believe is murder” (183). A second approach is to appeal to natural law. This was attempted in the debate over the redefinition of marriage. A third way of engagement Leeman calls the “sociologists approach.” For instance, a Christian defending policies that support two-parent homes or opposing policies that undermine two-parent homes could point to studies showing that children do better in two-parent homes.

Leeman does not object to Christians deploying any of these approaches when appropriate. But he does issue a warning about these ways of making a political argument. “All three lack the force of conviction because the very thing they are good at—finding common ground—affirms our modern intuitions that all authority and moral legitimacy rests in every individual’s consent. Unless I can be convinced something is true on my terms, it must not be true. And so you owe it to me to convince me on my terms. Ironically, the very attempt to persuade risks hardening people in the deeper certainty that they are right” (184).

This objection runs up against the way Americans tend to think about the public square. Leeman observes that John Rawls argued that “we are morally obligated to only bring arguments that everyone can understand on his or her own terms” (186). Leeman calls this view “a Trojan horse for small-g god idolatry.” Governments do not make laws only about matters for which there is consensus. When there is no consensus, on whose terms is the decision made. Leeman argues that it is better to observe that everyone’s god is attempting to set the terms of the debate. There is no religiously neutral public square or religiously neutral public argument.

Justice

Leeman’s final chapter addresses the issue of justice. The primary responsibility of government is to ensure justice, and Americans have a particular viewpoint on justice. “Together Jefferson’s Declaration and Lincoln’s Address present America’s mission statement on justice: we are a people dedicated to the principles of equality, freedom, and natural rights” (204).

Leeman is skeptical that this view of justice works. Just as there is no religiously neutral public argument, so there is no religiously neutral approach to justice: “Pick your God or gods; out will come your views on justice. Pick your conception of justice; out will come your views on equality, freedom, and rights” (206). Leeman’s point is that equality, freedom, and rights are themselves empty concepts that will be filled with different content depending on one’s worldview.

Leeman also challenges the more recent views of identity politics. He notes such approaches deny the Bible’s teaching about our “common humanity” and speak as if both truth and morality are social constructs of different groups. Instead of bringing about justice, identity politics, pits groups against each other so that they cannot even communicate with each other, much less work together as citizens. In contrast, Leeman says “The Christian path affirms both our common humanity and our created differences. It requires color-blindness with respect to our oneness in Adam and (if believers) in Christ (Gal. 3:28). It requires color-consciousness with respect to our different experiences, histories, and cultural traditions, as well as the unique ways different people can glorify God (1 Cor. 12:13–14; Rev. 7:9)” (221).

Evaluation

Good books on Christians and politics are difficult to find. Often Christians are tempted to baptize current political philosophies (whether from the left or right) rather than testing these philosophies against Scripture. Leeman does an admirable job of letting the Bible challenge our customary ways of thinking. This is probably the best brief book on politics that I’ve read.

Johannes Althusius’s Politica and the idea of Federalism

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Althusius, Joannes. Politica: An Abridged Translation of Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples. Edited and translated by Frederick S. Carney. Foreword by Daniel J. Elzazar. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995.

This is an early treatise of political theology from a Christian perspective by a 16th/17th century Reformed thinker. He was a colleague of Caspar Olevianus, coauthor of the Heidelberg Catechism (1563). He was an intellectual opponent to the still famous Hugo Grotius.

In defending the rights of cities and guilds, etc. against a push toward a unitary state, Althusius developed the idea of federalism. The term “federal” is related to the Latin word for covenant. For Althusius, a federal form of government is one in which the government is in covenant with the people and in which different levels of government are in covenant arrangements with each other.

The introduction to this particular translation (available for free from the Liberty Fund website) is helpful. Here’s a sample:

The first grand federalist design, as Althusius himself was careful to acknowledge, was that of the Bible, most particularly the Hebrew Scriptures or Old Testament. For him, it also was the best—the ideal polity based on right principles. Biblical thought is federal (from the Latin foedus, covenant) from first to last—from God’s covenant with Noah establishing the biblical equivalent of what philosophers were later to term natural law (Genesis, chapter 9) to the Jews’ reaffirmation of the Sinai covenant under the leadership of Ezra and Nehemiah, thereby adopting the Torah as the constitution of their second commonwealth (Ezra, chapter 10; Nehemiah, chapter 8). The covenant motif is central to the biblical world view, the basis of all relationships, the mechanism for defining and allocating authority, and the foundation of the biblical political teaching.

The biblical grand design for humankind is federal in three ways. First, it is based upon a network of covenants beginning with those between God and human beings, which weave the web of human, especially political, relationships in a federal way—through pact, association, and consent. In the sixteenth century, this world view was recreated by the Reformed wing of Protestantism as the federal theology from which Althusius, the Huguenots, the Scottish covenanters, and the English and American Puritans developed political theories and principles of constitutional design.

Second, the classic biblical commonwealth was a fully articulated federation of tribes instituted and reaffirmed by covenant to function under a common constitution and laws. Any and all constitutional changes in the Israelite polity were introduced through covenanting. Even after the introduction of the monarchy, the federal element was maintained until most of the tribal structures were destroyed by external forces. The biblical vision of the restored commonwealth in the messianic era envisages the reconstitution of the tribal federation. Most of the American Puritans and many Americans of the Revolutionary era, among others, were inspired by the biblical polity to seek federal arrangements for their polities.

Third, the biblical vision for the “end of days’ ’ —the messianic era—sees not only a restoration of Israel’s tribal system but what is, for all intents and purposes, a world confederation or league of nations, each preserving its own integrity while accepting a common Divine covenant and constitutional order. This order will establish appropriate covenantal relationships for the entire world. …

In some respects, all subsequent federalist grand designs until … the mid-nineteenth century are derived from or somehow related to that scriptural precedent. …

Althusius’ grand design is developed out of a series of building blocks or self-governing cells from the smallest, most intimate connections to the universal commonwealth, each of which is internally organized and linked to the others by some form of consensual relationship. Each is oriented toward some higher degree of human harmony to be attained in the fullness of time….

…In the struggle over the direction of European state-building in the seventeenth century, the Althusian view, which called for the building of states on federal principles … lost out to the view of Jean Bodin and the statists who called for the establishment of … centralized states where all powers were lodged in a divinely ordained king at the top of the power pyramid or in a sovereign center. While Althusian thought had its exponents until the latter part of the century, after that it disappeared from the mainstream of political philosophy. It remained for the Americans to invent modern federalism on the basis of individualism and thus reintroduce the idea of the state as a political association rather than a reified entity, an artifact that is assumed to have an existence independent of the people who constitute it.”

Daniel J. Elazar, “Althusius’ Grand Design for a Federal Commonwealth,” in Joannes Althusius, Politica: An Abridged Translation of Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples, ed. and trans. by Frederick S. Carney (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), 23-25.

More on Littlejohn and Two Kingdoms Theology

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A friend emailed after I posted my review of Bradford Littlejohn’s book on the two kingdoms asking for more specifics. The following is a slightly edited version of my reply to him:

In my review I flagged the big historical contribution. Littlejohn shows clearly that the two kingdoms division was not between institutional church and institutional state, as R2K/W2K folks like Van Drunen (DVD) say. I think Littlejohn showed this conclusively, and historically this is important because DVD wants to use R2K to enforce a kind of separation of church and state, or as Littlejohn puts it, “the religious neutrality of modern liberal politics.” Historically, that’s hard to see in Luther and Calvin, and Littlejohn shows why. Their two kingdoms are different from those of R2K.

Littlejohn argues that the Reformers’ 2K doctrine is not about dividing the life into two distinct spheres but are different ways to look at all of life. So, Luther argues that “inwardly, before God, the Christian is not subject to the mediation of any human authority, or conscience-bound by its commands” (Littlejohn’s summary, p. 16). But because of love for neighbor, the Christian does outwardly submit to human rulers. I’ve read the treatises Luther wrote on this subject, and I’d say Littlejohn’s summary is accurate. But I’m not convinced that Luther is right! So I still find myself at variance from a 2K approach. Calvin is, I think, better in his formulations than Luther, though he like Luther is using the formulation to defend Christian liberty. (And here Littlejohn makes a helpful clarification: “not Christian liberty in the sense we often mean it today—the freedom of individual believers to act as they wish in matters where Scripture is silent—but is fundamentally soteriological, the proclamation of the freedom of the believer’s conscience from the bondage of external works” (p. 26). As Calvin develops it, he is not saying that “human authorities cannot prescribe outward conduct for believers in matters indifferent,” because that would do away with all government (p. 27). But he means that the conscience cannot be bound.) So government and church alike can make laws concerning church order or about things indifferent, but neither state nor church can say about such things: “this you must do to be right with God.”

As he goes on with the historical survey Littlejohn turns to Hooker’s response to the Puritan objection to various ceremonies and forms being imposed on them. Littlejohn likes Hooker, so here’s where my sympathies diverge from Littlejohn. Littlejohn sees Hooker make use of the 2K distinction of Luther and Calvin to oppose Puritanism. Littlejohn summarizes: “We can now see why Hooker’s Lawes represents such an important contribution to Protestant two-kingdoms theology, even if we might resist the conclusions Hooker himself draws for religious uniformity and royal supremacy. However oppressive these might seem to us today, they were, at least as understood and defended by Hooker, much less so than the Puritan legalism he opposed, which brooked no opposition and left no room for discretion in the outward ordering of the Christian community. Hooker deserves credit for freeing Christian consciences from the tyranny of Scripture conceived as an exhaustive law-book, desacralizing human authority in both church and state, and resisting the Puritan tendency to immanentize Christ’s eschatological rule in the visible church. In all this he both re-affirmed the core agenda of Luther’s reform, but he also clarified and filled out Luther’s sometimes paradoxical formulations by spelling out how it was that the visible church had a foot in both kingdoms, so to speak.” I’m not convinced that that Hooker stood in the breach against those bad Puritan legalists. I rather think that the Puritans were correct about their church worship concerns. So I remained unconvinced of the benefits of 2K.

As to the chapters on practical implications in the spheres of church, state, market, etc., I’m of two minds. I liked a number of conclusions he reached and disagreed with others. But I think I can get to the applications that I found insightful apart from 2K theology.

J. Porter Harlow on How Should We Treat Detainees?

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Harlow, J. Porter. How Should We Treat Detainees? An Examination of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” under the Light of Scripture and the Just War Tradition.  P&R, 2016.

Harlow, who served as an attorney in the Marine Corps and as an associate professor at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s School, wrote this book as a thesis for an M.A.R. degree from RTS.

He opens the dissertation with an account of how his views began to change on this subject. While teaching at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s School he invited Marine Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Couch to address the class. He described Couch as “a prosecutor’s prosecutor, a strong advocate for the Government who I did not believe had ever served as a defense counsel” and as “as self-described Republican and evangelical Christian” (xvii-xviii). In this lecture Couch explained why he had refused to prosecute an al-Qaeda terrorist because his “confessions had been obtained by the U.S. Government as the result of torture” (xvii). Couch found this not only unlawful (and thus evidence “inadmissiable in a court”) but he also registered his moral objections. This prompted Harlow, an evangelical Christian, to begin to rethink his position on torture and to investigate the nature of the enhanced interrogation techniques that had been used for a time by the U.S. government.

In this work he reviews the biblical argumentation for just war theory and then applies his findings to the enhanced interrogation techniques employed early on in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He concludes that these techniques, especially when combined are torture and violate the principles of discrimination (in which only combatants are to be targeted in war) and proportionality (principles that he earlier grounded in Scripture).

One of most interesting discussions in the book has to do with the ticking time bomb scenario. It is in connection with this scenario in particular that some evangelicals have sanctioned torture. Harlow finds this fundamentally problematic because it sets aside a deontological approach to ethics (something is right or wrong because it conforms to or violates the law of God) for a utilitarian ethic (something is right or wrong depending on the potential outcome). He concludes: “Ticking time bomb scenarios have been criticized as intellectual frauds because they (1) provide for unrealistic certainty in the factual circumstances, (2) limit the leader’s options so as to only consider whether to torture or not to torture, and (3) mis-frame the entire debate over detainee treatment by developing principles based upon the most exceptional circumstances and then applying those principles to detainee treatment in general circumstances” (90).

Harlow concludes that evangelicals have not applied the Scripture to this issue with the same rigor and concern that they have to issues like abortion. Instead they have often been overly influenced by their political affiliations. He calls for evangelicals to test treatment of detainees by Scripture and to allow Scripture to shape their approach to public policy in this area.

The Danger of Political Worldliness

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Yesterday Rod Dreher posted a piece, noting, “You can’t build a movement on the rage and unreason of radio talkers and expect that the weaponized grievance will stay pointed at liberals only.” This has long been a concern of mine for biblical reasons. As we say in our book, Biblical Worldview: Creation, Fall, Redemption:

Christians are sometimes in danger of becoming so accustomed to the status quo that they fail to realize that the way things work is worldly in the negative biblical sense. Worldliness isn’t limited to entertainment or dress. Worldliness can be found in every aspect of life, including political activities. It is possible for worldliness to be present in political discourse–even the political discourse of people who are right about the issues.

Paul admonished Christians to render to Nero the honor that God said he was due (Rom. 13:7), and Paul himself determined to render the biblically required honor to a corrupt high priest (Acts 23:4-5). So today Christian citizens ought to render the honor their leaders are owed by virtue of their office.

Honoring leaders doesn’t mean they’re above critique, even searching critique. If they’re acting unlawfully (by God’s law or just human laws), then the Christian, like John the Baptist, can forthrightly state this even if it results in being jailed. But Christians should be able to deliver these critiques in a way that still renders due honor.

Even if the political opponent could be considered an enemy in the fullest sense of the term, Christians are to love their enemies. This means that the Christian should treat his political opponents with kindness (1 Cor. 13:4). He shouldn’t rejoice when political opponents are caught in wrongdoing (13:6). Believers shouldn’t be arrogant or rude when dealing with poltiical opponents (13:4-5). Nor should they be irritable or resentful when their opponents win (13:5). The Christian shouldn’t believe every negative assertion made against his opponents, nor should he dismiss negative reports about his own side. The Christian should be scupuous about being fair and truthful to all parties.

Biblical Worldview: Creation, Fall, Redemption, Teacher’s Edition, 275.

Later we note:

Within the context of government, Paul tells Christians to ‘speak evil of no one, to avoid quarrelling, to be gentle, and to show perfect courtesy toward all people’ (Titus 3:2).

This sounds unrealistic. Is Paul really saying that a Christian can’t say anything negative about a political opponent? Can he not argue with his policies or expose his corruption? That isn’t what Paul means when he says, ‘Speak evil of no one,’ but he’s still saying something that serves as a sharp critique of American political practice. The Greek word that underlies ‘speak evil’ is the verb from which we get the word blaspheme. Paul is prohibiting angry or abusive speech, insults, slander, and defamation.

Biblical Worldview: Creation, Fall, Redemption, Teacher’s Edition, 281.

I’ve wondered more than once this election season about the potential that our electoral choices in November might reflect a judgment of God. If it is a judgment, we might do well to consider that it may be a judgment upon us for our own sins and not only for the sins of others.

Review of Greg Forster’s Book on Regaining Christian Cultural Influence

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Forster, Greg. Joy for the World: How Christianity Lost Its Cultural Influence and Can Begin Rebuilding It. Wheaton: Crossway, 2014.

Several of Greg Forster’s previous books, Starting with Locke and The Contested Public Square, have been among the best I’ve read on the topic of government and Christianity’s relation to government. In my opinion Joy for the World does not rise to the level of The Contested Public Square , but it is still well worth reading. It is targeted to a broader audience, but it is seeking to answer the “where do we go from here?” question that remained unanswered by The Contested Public Square.

Forster thinks that if Christians are going to rebuild their influence in American society, they need to have an understanding of Christianity’s role in America and of the nature of society. These two issues are the focus of part one of Joy for the World. Forster believes that Christians tell themselves faulty stories about their past influence. These faulty stories have led to faulty strategies, which have led to the loss of Christian influence.

Forster summarizes three faulty stories. There is the “Christian founding” story. In this story, the United States was founded as “a new model of society more in line with Christian teaching than any before.” Sadly, the Christian foundations of the nation were undermined in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through unbelieving science and philosophy. As a result secularism threatens Christian America. The second story is the “secular founding” story, which places anti-Christian Enlightenment ideals at the center of the American founding and Christianity at the margins. According to this view ideas opposed to Christianity were “dressed up in a cloak of theological language” to gain the support of American Christians. Now, however, opposition to Christianity no longer needs to be cloaked. This is good because Christians are no longer deceived by American civil religion, but it is bad because of increased hostility to Christianity. The third story is the “it doesn’t matter” story. In this account, the role of the church is evangelism. The church is not going to try to influence the culture; rather, the church will seek to harness the culture to spread the gospel.

Forster raises concerns about all three of these stories. He is concerned that the “it doesn’t matter” approach will lead the church to conform to the culture  in the false hope that cultural conformity will increase evangelistic opportunity. He thinks the other two stories both get somethings right: the reality that both Christian and Enlightenment ideas influenced the American founding. But both stories also get some things quite wrong. The “Christian founding” story does not fully account for the rationalism of the leading founders. The “secular founding” story does not account for the Christian influence on the founder’s view of man as both dignified and fallen. Forster argues that this is a Christian idea that preserved the United States from the disasters experienced by political systems built only on Enlightenment principles. Forster’s takeaway: “The American social order was never either clearly pro-Christian or clearly anti-Christian. Ross Douthat has described America as a civilization driven not by Christian orthodoxy nor by heresy, but by a perpetual social tension between the two.” Forster holds that the reason for this tension lies in the departure of Americans from a state church system to one which allows for freedom of religion. Forster praises freedom of religion, but he also notes some complications that arise. Such a system “does not enforce religion, but it requires religion” so that the society can cohere through shared moral foundations.

These shared moral foundations were provided by a general Protestant consensus throughout the nineteenth century, but by the 1920s it was clear that, from the infection of  modernism within the churches, that “Protestant consensus” no longer existed because no consensus existed among Protestant churches any longer. As the unraveling of the nation’s moral consensus became apparent, evangelicals attempted to stem the tide. Forster holds that evangelicals did much good in slowing, or in some cases halting, “the rising tide of moral disorder.” However, some of the strategies employed, though enjoying short-term success, have harmed longer-term efforts. Forster ties the faulty strategies to the faulty stories of American history. Those who believed the first story tried to gain for evangelicalism the place of Protestant moral consensus around which the nation should cohere. Forster notes, “Evangelicalism could rightly claim to be the doctrinal heir of the historic Protestant churches, but it had no standing to claim their cultural or historical place.” In trying to reclaim that place, they bred resentment among Americans who thought that evangelicals were attempting to impose an illegitimate conquest on the nation. Christians who believed the second story, Forster says, withdrew culturally. Forster critiques this approach, noting that if Christianity has no place in the culture evangelism becomes more difficult because people end up thinking in categories quite outside those necessary for understanding the Christian message. Forster fears that the failures of these two approaches have led to a rise in a “cultural accommodation” approach for many evangelical churches. Forster wants to maintain Christian distinctiveness, robust evangelism, and cultural influence. On this latter point, he says, “We can’t force a religious society upon our neighbors; we must persuade them to want a religious society. People who don’t share our beliefs and our churches must nonetheless have their own intrinsic reasons to view our beliefs and churches as socially beneficial.”

Forster then turns to the nature of society. He finds in the creation of Adam and Eve the twin truths of “the intrinsic dignity of every individual and the social nature of humanity.” The Bible thus establishes the reality that humans live in society. It does not, however, prescribe particular societal forms.  In fact, Forster says, God “wants not just people from every tongue, tribe, and nation, but people of every tongue, tribe, and nation.” Christians can and should live within their cultures as people of those cultures. And yet, because of the Fall and its effects on all cultures, the Christian cannot simply conform to any culture. One area of American culture that Forster indicates needs to be challenged is “individualism.” He praises individualism over against collectivism, but he also notes that the idolization of the “sovereign self” lies at the bottom defenses of abortion, divorce, modern sexuality, and even distortions of the work ethic. Forster observes, “One of the great dangers of our time is the illusion that moral obligations are somehow weaker if they’re not chosen. . . . The whole point about obligations is that you have to do things that aren’t intrinsically attractive to you. You have to discipline yourself for actions that cut against your desires.” Forster’s bottom line is that Christians influence society precisely by living as people in society and allowing a Christian view of society leaven whatever sphere of influence they have.

The next two parts of the book examine how the church can and should influence the culture. Part two looks at the role of the institutional church and part three looks at the role of the church as an organism. Forster makes the institution/organism distinction to protect the mission and distinctiveness of the church as institution while still promoting the involvement of Christians as Christians in society. Forster models his discussion of the institutional church on the “threefold office of Christ—Prophet, Priest, and King.” He argues that each of these three offices represent an emphasis that the church needs. The office of the prophet relates to “doctrine,” the office of priest to “devotion,” and the office of king to “stewardship.” In the chapter on doctrine, Forster argues that belief in the Bible’s inerrancy and authority is absolutely foundational. On this foundation preaching that teaches in detail what the text of Scripture actually says is absolutely necessary. Expositional preaching is not enough however, for the pastor must show the congregation how the text of Scripture applies to their daily lives. In his chapter on devotion Forster makes the case that doctrine is not enough. The goal of Christianity is not to produce people who think rightly and act morally. The goal of Christianity is to liberate people from sin so that they become transformed worshippers of God. This kind of community should stand out as a beacon in the world. In the chapter on stewardship Forster argues that the Christian doctrine of sanctification means that the transformation in the heart must work out in the transformation of the life. The institutional church plays an important role in discipling the people of God. Forster argues that this discipleship ought not focus only on the life of the individual as individual. Since we live in community and work in various vocations, discipleship should extend to these areas as well.

In the final part of the book, Forster looks at the organic church: Christian life in the civilizational spheres. Forster begins with some insightful thoughts about social structures. He notes, in the first place, that these structures are not infinitely malleable. In order to work they must be rooted in our natures and in the way God designed the world to work. On the other hand social structures are not static. Humans can change, improve, or disrupt them. With this foundation in place Forster looks at the following topics: “Sex and Family,” “Work and the Economy,” and “Citizenship and Community.”

Forster begins with sex and family because of their importance: “The most basic building blocks of society—above all, family, but much else as well—arise from our sexual desires. Because our sexual desires affect us so profoundly, their disorderliness is all the more destructive. . . . So it makes sense that sex is a key issue for public witness. If Christianity doesn’t have something to say about sex and family in contemporary America, Christianity doesn’t really have much to say about contemporary America, period.” Forster’s main point is that sexual desires are not merely bodily needs. Spiritual realities underlie these desires, and the sins regarding sexuality are pointers to deeper spiritual problems. Positively, “marriage is a structure designed to recognize that sex creates [a permanent metaphysical] union and to manage its consequences.” This is why “marriage breaks down when we treat it merely as a vehicle for romantic love, or even childrearing.” Forster then moves on for a probing discussion of the importance of the family to the health of a society.

In his chapter on work and the economy Forster argues that work is dignified when it enables people to “make the world a better place.” When we recognize that our work is about relationships with other people, then we can work to serve others. This means that there are certain kinds of work that we might not think of as unchristian, but which in reality are. For instance: “I once heard an ethics professor challenge the little vending machines that stores and restaurants keep in front, selling worthless trinkets for fifty cents or a dollar apiece. The trinkets won’t entertain the kids who buy them for long; the machines are really just there to prompt kids to demand their parents buy them something. In effect, the machines are there to create discord in families so the owners of the vending machines can blackmail parents.” On the other hand, Forster argues that there are many kinds of work that are looked down upon, but which actually are dignified because they are essential to making the world a better place. Forster also discusses matters like the goodness of making high quality products and the goodness of making “good enough” products that raise the standard of living of the poor. In discussing the economy, he looks at American labor law, at the role of markets, and at the regulation of markets.

The final chapter has to do with Christian involvement in politics. Here Forster argues for several distinctions. He makes the case that not all of life should be political life. There should be certain areas of life where we function as neighbors and in which politics is not used to enforce neighborliness. He is concerned that the politicization of everything will damage other important institutions in society. Forster also wants to distinguish between “theological justice” and “natural justice.” The former Christians should seek to further by persuasion. The latter should be something that Christians should press for politically. Forster’s hope is that this approach will allow for moral consensus that won’t be perceived as imposing Christianity on our neighbors.

In his conclusion, Forster examines the virtue of prudence. He exhorts his readers to discern not only where they want to go but what they can plausibly do to get there. They may want to go from A to Z, but they can only plausibly get their neighbors to come with them to G. So, Forster says, let’s try to bring them to G. Some radical cultural changes seem to happen overnight, but, Forster observes, these changes were actually the result of many small steps over a long period. Forster thinks Christians can learn from this.

Forster’s book has many strengths. Too many books on Christians in the public square neglect the role of the institutional church. Forster gives it a full third of the book. Others might assume that the institutional church should play an active role in political and societal issues, but Forster rightly recognizes that the institutional church has its own distinct mission. Another strength is Forster’s grasp of American religious history as his discernment regarding the stories that American Christians tell themselves about that history. Finally, I found Forster’s mediations of the sexual relations, marriage, work, and the economy full of insight.

The book has some weaknesses as well. I’m not yet convinced that the three offices of Christ really serve as a model for church life, though I am starting to see this idea in several places (due, I think, to the influence of Tim Keller). This is a minor complaint, however, because what Forster actually discusses in those chapters are the roles of doctrine, devotion, and sanctification. The cheif weakness of the book, in my view, is Forster’s reliance on John Locke’s politics of moral consensus. At the conclusion of his The Contested Public Square Forster wrote:

All paths now lead to danger. If we wish to preserve religious freedom, we must somehow find a way to build social consensus around the moral laws that politics requires without going back to dependence upon a shared religion. Locke’s confidence that this would happen simply on its own has proved to be misplaced. Tocqueville gave us what is probably the most penetrating analysis of the problem, and in the end he did not even pretend to offer a clear solution. To the contrary, he warned us that all of the tools available for preserving the moral foundations of democracy can easily become subverted and end up undermining those foundations instead. All of the great defenders of religious freedom since Tocqueville have joined him in confessing that its preservation in the face of this challenge is uncertain. But what is the alternative. Even if we were inclined to declare the experiment in religious freedom a failure, how would that help us? Attempting to restore a shared community religion as the basis of government policy would only deepen our divisions and exacerbate our conflicts. And if the entanglements of worldly and otherworldly powers caused unthinkable slaughter between Protestants and Catholics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, what would it do now, when our societies are even more radically divided over religion? I do not know the answer to this crisis.

Perhaps the best answer is the one given in Joy for the World: live the Christian life joyfully before your neighbors and attempt to strengthen their acceptance of natural law. I certainly agree that Christians should act prudently and seek to advance righteousness in their limited sphere as they are able. Nonetheless, I remain doubtful that the kind of moral consensus that was possible in Locke’s day is possible today without the pervasive Christian influence on thought and culture that existed then.

Political Virtues: Humility and Respect

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In BJU Press’s Biblical Worldview: Creation, Fall, Redemption we aslo gave attention to the virtues of humility and respect. Here is a selection from an inital draft that was later reduced due to space constraints:

Repeatedly Scripture urges Christians to engage those who oppose them with respect. Consider Titus 3:1-3. In the context of submission to governmental authority, Paul describes how Christians should conduct themselves: Christians should not slander, defame, or verbally abuse anyone, especially a person in a role of authority. When Paul was on trial and the high priest ordered Paul to be struck illegally, Paul shot back: “God is going to strike you, you whitewashed wall.” Paul pointed out the hypocrisy of those who were judging him according to the law breaking that law in their very proceedings. But when it was pointed out to Paul that the person he spoke against was the high priest, Paul retracted his statement and confessed he was wrong since the law said, “You shall not speak evil of a ruler of your people” (Acts. 23:2-5; cf. Ex. 22:28). Rather than quarreling with opponents, the Christian should be known as gracious, considerate, and peaceable. Paul bases his instruction on the fact that Christians were no different than the sinners who rule over them and live around them. Christians are saved by grace, not by any merit of their own. Thus Christians should be gracious, not abusive toward others.

If Christians participated in political life with these virtues, they would stand out as distinctively Christian. Sadly, too often Christians speak with the same harshness, quarrelsomeness, and sometimes even untruthfulness about their political opponents as the lost world. Such things ought not be so (Jam. 3:10). Even under a ruler such as Nero, who had starkly unchristian policies, Peter says, “Honor the emperor” (1 Pet. 2:17).

I fear that too often we are more shaped by talk show or TV personalities than we are by Scripture in these matters. Not only does this harm conservativism politically, as Mona Charen points out in an excellent article in National Review, but, more importantly we are conformed to the world in an area of public witness and we may be unaware of our worldliness and the damage it does to the cause of Christ.

This is by no means a call for Christians to disengage from the political area or to be less bold in such engagement. It is a call for strength of conviction to be clothed with humility and respect.

The Political Virtues: Prudence and Boldness

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In BJU Press’s Biblical Worldview: Creation, Fall, Redemption we gave some attention to the political virtues of prudence and boldness (p. 280).

Prudence means understanding your situation, seeing what good can be accomplished in it, knowing what options are both morally legitimate and likely successful—and then pursuing the wisest goal in the wisest way. Prudence is a key virtue for Christians involved in politics (Prov. 8:12–16). The Bible does not provide specific revelation about how to frame laws, manage campaigns, or even who to vote for in a presidential election. But the Bible was written to help Christians live wisely in every aspect of their lives. Prudence is knowing the best way to get from here to wherever you ought to be. For example, Christians and radical feminists fundamentally disagree about the structure of the family and the roles of men and women in society. But they both see pornography as degrading, and both oppose domestic abuse of women. A politically prudent Christian can reach across the aisle and cooperate with someone who wants the same biblical things even if their motivations are ultimately different.

Of course, some fundamental disagreements will always remain. Cooperation is sometimes impossible. On these matters the Christian should state the Christian position boldly, but not brashly.

Another example of political prudence can be seen in the abortion debate. Ideally, the Christian would see a constitutional ammendment passed that would see the life of the unborn protected in the nation without exceptions. But such an ammendment is a political impossibility. The prudent Christian, however, sees that abortion can be constrained and limited though more limited laws that Congress and state legislatures pass. If a pro-life politician agrees to a law that will prevent or hinder him from reaching the goal of ending abortion in the United States, that would be compromise. But he he is pressing for laws that move toward the goal even if they don’t reach it, that is political prudence.

This kind of prudence is not a weak-kneed approach to politics, even if it avoids making Quoxitic stands. It typically requires a great deal of foresight and boldness if it is going to be successful.

Christian Political Involvement

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This last year I had the privlege of contributing a section on the Christian’s involement in politics in BJU Press’s new textbook, Biblical Worldview: Creation, Fall, Redemption. We looked at the Christian’s political responsibility under these headings:

Praying for All People

Pressing for God’s Will to Be Done

Preserve the Good, Reform the Evil

Develop Christian Political Virtues: Prudence, Boldness, Humility, and Respect

In the first draft of this chapter I wrote what follows about prayer (the published text was cut due to space constraints and improved by fellow authors and editors; I present the initial draft here because it is fuller and blogs don’t have space constraints):

When God sent the Israelites into exile, they were a conquered, politically powerless people. They were scattered form their homeland for the purpose of breaking their political power. And yet they are told to pray for the city to which they would be sent. (Jer. 29:7). Prayer was still possible. Likewise, the Christians in first century Rome did not have any political power. Many Christians were slaves. But Paul makes prayer for those in authority a duty for all Christians (1 Tim. 2:1-4).

The content of these two prayers is significant. In Jeremiah the people are to pray for the welfare of the foreign city to which they were exiled. Israel may have been tempted to view the Babylonians simply as the enemy. They may have been tempted pray curses down on these enemies. But God says his people’s welfare will be found in the welfare of the people they live among. Though Christians are not exiles under God’s judgment, they are still exiles and sojourners in this present evil age awaiting the return of their King (1 Peter 1:1). They may face persecution, if only the credulous mocking that comes when Christians resist the debauchery around them (1 Peter 2:11-12; 4:4). Nonetheless, Christians should view the unbelievers around them not as enemies, but as neighbors. They should pray for their welfare.

Paul urges that Christians pray for all people, but he calls out kings and other authorities for special attention. In particular, Paul says that Christians should pray that rulers would rule in such a way that Christians can lead “peaceful and quiet” lives. This may be a way of praying that governments would live up to their obligations as laid out in Romans 13:1-7 and 1 Peter 2:13-17. Rulers who are a terror to bad conduct but a blessing to good conduct will lead to peaceful and quiet lives for all, including Christians. But this prayer goes beyond praying just that government would fulfill its responsibilities. Paul is praying that the government will permit Christian’s to fulfill theirs. He prays that Christians might live lives of eusebia, which means a life lived in the fear of God, a life that seeks to please God in every aspect of life. He also prays that Christians would be able to live “dignified” lives. A dignified person is not flippant about life; he knows that every moment is lived before God. Life may be enjoyed but it should be enjoyed with due recognition of the duty to live always before God and a watching world. Finally, Paul indicates that Christians pray for everyone because God desires everyone to be saved. This means that Christians should pray for the salvation of those in government.

Paul’s example here of praying the government would fulfill its God-given duties reveals that Christians can pray that their leaders would be enabled by God to promote justice in all that they do. Christians should pray that governments will defend those who are deprived of justice from their oppressors (Ps. 72). Christians should also pray that their leaders would be just, righteous, morally self-controlled, and aware that they will give an account before God for their actions (Acts 24:25).

Jesus’s model prayer instructs us to pray that the Father’s will be done “on earth as it is in heaven.” This would include God’s will about the matters of state (Matt. 6:10).

Finally, Christians should pray for the soon return of Jesus from heaven to establish his righteous rule on earth forevermore (Matt. 6:10).

Thinking about Democracy

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For most Americans that democracy is good is a given. This was not always so. Mark Noll observes:

Republican themes have been so widely embraced by both religious and nonreligious Americans that it is now difficult to understand why defenders of traditional religion once looked with such suspicion on civic humanist, commonwealth, Real Whig, and country convictions. Yet such suspicion was in fact the norm until the unusual convergence of republicanism and Christianity in the American founding.

Traditional Christian complaints were recited for several centuries as a common litany: Republican instincts prized human self-sufficiency more highly than dependence on God. They demeaned the life to come by focusing without reservation on this-worldly existence. They defined the human good in terms of public usefulness instead of divine approval. Both Protestants and Catholics, in addition, regularly noted the persistent correlation of republican political convictions and heterodox theological opinions. This discourse of virtue, vice, liberty, and tyranny seemed always to be associated with the rejection of innate human sinfulness, with views on human salvation that dispensed with the substitutionary work of Christ, with opinions about Jesus treating him as no more than an unusual human being, and, in the most extreme cases, with arguments denying the existence of God altogether.

Mark Noll, America’s God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 57-58.

Through friendlier to democracy that Christians in earlier generations David Koyzis warns against democracy as an ideology. When Koyzis issues this warning, he is not claiming that democratic elements in a government are a problem. To the contrary, democracy as an element of a governmental system seems appropriate given that God has given all humans the responsibility of ruling over the earth (Gen. 1:26-28).

But sometimes political figures speak as if the spread of democracy would bring salvation, or at least stability and freedom, to the world. This kind of thinking, Koyzis says, is idolatrous. In addition it neglects the reality that unchecked democracy has significant flaws: “Democracy, in short, can endanger politics by attempting to impose a single majoritarian interest on a diverse and pluriform political community” (Kindle loc 1592). It is true that modern democracies often have checks and balances built in, but Koyzis notes that “democratic checks on political power are insufficient to prevent a totalitarian expansion of that power, especially if there are no countervailing checks on democracy itself” (Kindle loc 1711). The American founders instituted a number of these checks on democracy, from the election of senators by legislatures and of the president by the electoral college to the appointment of Supreme Court justices for life. Yet these checks have been eroded or are now regularly challenged on the grounds that they are undemocratic.

Koyzis notes a “second way in which democracy can become totalitarian: by attempting to extend the democratic principle throughout the entire political system and even into the whole of life, including an array of spheres where for various reasons it is simply not appropriate. Here democracy becomes not simply a form of government, but a way of life with definite idolatrous religious roots” (Kindle loc 1718). Examples of this noted by Koyzis include running families, churches, and schools as if they were democracies. Sometimes people presume that all of society and culture should be democratic in nature.

C. S. Lewis also identified this extension of democracy as a problem: “When equality is treated . . . as an ideal we begin to breed that stunted and envious sort of mind which hates all superiority. That mind is the special disease of democracy, as cruelty and servility are the special diseases of privileged societies” (“Equality,” in Present Concerns, Kindle loc 147).

The privilege to participate in the governing process should be valued by all Americans, but we must be alert to the dangers of democracy as well as to its blessings.