Stapert note only demonstrates the unity of the Father’s critiques of pagan music, but he also documents their influence on Reformers such as Calvin. The Genevan reformer echoed the Father’s rejection of pagan music (195). More generally, Stapert notes that most people in most times and places have recognized the moral influence of music, in contrast to modern skepticism on this point:

One’s music Clement [of Alexandria] believed, is not merely a reflection of the kind of person one is; it is, to a certain extent involved in shaping a person. Clement and the church fathers were in general agreement on this point, and they were united with Plato and most of the thinkers of antiquity. For that matter, they are united with most people at all times and in all places—ancient and modern, East and West, primitive and literate, sophisticated and unsophisticated, civilized and uncivilized. Of course, there have always been skeptics too; but the biggest concentration of skeptics appears to belong to modern Western civilization. Modern Western skeptics have a strong inclination to dismiss the subject out of hand with absurdly reductionist rhetorical questions, such as, ‘How can a C-sharp make me evil?’ The answer, of course, is that C-sharp is not music. Nor is a scale or a chord or a rhythm or melodic motif. Music involves all of those things, but none of them is music, and no one ever claimed that those ingredients by themselves have an impact on a person’s character.

Calvin R. Stapert, A New Song for an Old World: Musical Thought in the Early Church (Eerdmans, 2007), 55-56.

An interesting observation from Calvin’s Stapert’s study of musical thought in the early church [see review here]:

I have quoted above James McKinnon’s characterization of their [the church fathers] polemic against it [some of the pagan music that surrounded them]: their response is characterized by ‘vehemence and uniformity.’ That uniformity is especially striking considering how different those writers were in other respects. Whether they were Greek-speaking or Latin-speaking, pre- or post-Constantine, conciliatory or antagonistic toward pagan learning, lifelong Christians or converts—whatever their background or personality, they agreed that Christians should distance themselves from some of the music of the surrounding culture.

Calvin R. Stapert, A New Song for an Old World: Musical Thought in the Early Church (Eerdmans, 2007), 131.

Books

Stephenson, Paul. Constantine: Roman Emperor, Christian Victor. New York: The Overlook Press, 2009.

Stephenson has produced a workmanlike biography of Constantine. It is consistently informative, if not always engaging. On the issue of Constantine’s conversion, Stephenson steers a middle course between Eusebius’s glowing portrait of the Christian emperor and those who argue it was an insincere political machination. Stephenson believes the evidence points to a sincere but gradual conversion. In other words, Constantine did sincerely convert, but he was emperor over a religiously diverse empire, and he had religious duties as emperor. Thus there is some ambiguity between 312 and 317. But the trajectory is that of a man with a deepening commitment to Christianity. Stephenson also discusses Constantine’s roles in the Donatist and Arian controversy. His view is that Constantine saw the doctrine differences as trivial, but he nonetheless demanded a unified Christian church. Thus he imposed unifying solutions on the church. This led the emperor who proclaimed toleration of all religions to persecute Christian heretics and schismatics. If there is any part of the book that church historians are likely to disagree with, it would be the section on the councils. Constantine’s role is placed in the foreground and the bishops’ roles are minimized. Nonetheless, Stephenson has produced a helpful biography of Constantine, and the bibliographical essays that conclude the work contain a wealth of information.

Letham, Robert. Through Western Eyes: Eastern Orthodoxy A Reformed Perspective. Mentor, 2007.

Letham’s book contains a great deal of useful material. He is also very evidently seeking to accurately represent the Eastern Orthodox position. Unfortunately, this often means that he fails to deliver on the subtitle’s promise of a Reformed perspective. This failure is not entire, but the book would have been stronger if it had less generic early church history up front and more room for a critique towards the end. As it stands Letham spends a great deal of space presenting the Orthodox views (e.g., on icons, Scripture and tradition, synergistic soteriology, etc.). He notes the Reformed views to the contrary (where applicable), but he does not develop them in any detail. Formally, Letham does raise the Reformed objections to Eastern Orthodoxy on these points, but the feel of the book is to diminish the differences.

McArthur, John and Richard Mayhue, eds. Christ’s Prophetic Plans: A Futuristic Premillennial Primer. Chicago: Moody, 2012.

As with most books of collected essays the quality varies by the contributor. The best essays in this volume are the three by Michael Vlach that deal with the topics of Dispensationalism and Israel. Mirroring his work in Dispensationalism: Essential Beliefs and Common Myths, Vlach defines Dispensationalism and clarifies misunderstandings. He demonstrates that Dispensationalism does not demand a particular soteriology (Calvinist or Arminian, progressive sanctification or Keswick, etc.). It certainly does not teach two ways of salvation, and it is not antinomian (though it does not hold that the Mosaic code directly applies to the believer). He defines Dispensationalism in terms of "six essential beliefs." First, the NT does not reinterpret the OT in such a way that the OT authorial intent is canceled out. Second, Israel is not a type of the church. Third, "Israel and the church are distinct, thus the church cannot be identified as the new or true Israel" (29). Fourth, the salvific unity of Jew and Gentile does not remove a future national purpose of Israel. Fifth, Dispensationalists believe in the future salvation, national restoration of Israel during the Millennium. Sixth, Dispensationalists affirm that "seed of Abraham" has multiple senses. It can refer to national descent or to Gentiles connected to Abraham in Christ. In defining Dispensationalism, Vlach is also careful to correct Dispensational errors in self-definition. For instance, Ryrie asserted that the glory of God as God’s purpose in the world was a Dispensational distinctive. Vlach notes that it would be better to say that Dispensationalists have a greater tendency to understand God’s purposes in a holistic manner that incorporates "social, economic, and political issues" in God’s plan for glorifying himself along with soteriological and spiritual issues (21-22). He also highlights the problem of Dispensationalists defining themselves in terms of consistently literal hermeneutics. He quotes Feinberg, "The difference is not literalism v. non-literalism, but different understandings of what constitutes literal hermeneutics" (22). Vlach is correct that the hermeneutical discussion must go deeper to wrestle with the reasons for different approaches to prophetic material. Vlach’s essays on dispensationalism along with his essay arguing for the future restoration of Israel are highly recommended.

Church historians of many different persuasions have long recognized the earliest Christians were premillennial in orientation. Nathan Busenitz’s essay helpfully provides for lay readers the quotations from the church fathers that underlie this consensus. He also provides a historical argument for why Amillennialism became the dominant view in the church from Augustine through the middle ages and beyond.

Matthew Waymeyer presents a standard defense of the premillennial reading of Revelation 20. He argues from Scripture passages about Satan’s current activity for the impossibility that Satan is currently bound and unable to deceive the nations. He argues against the idea that the first resurrection in Revelation 20 refers to regeneration. He argues in favor of a 1,000 year millennium. And he argues in favor of a chronological reading of Revelation 19 and 20.

John MacArthur contributed three essays to this volume, including a version of his controversial address about why Calvinists should be Premillennialists. His other essays address the timing of the last things. He opposes both preterism and date-setting, but he affirms the general dispensational sequence. In another essay he argues that no New Testament passage precludes the premillinnial position.

Richard Mayhue’s contributions were the weakest. At several points his chapters read like speaking notes in which greater explanation would have been provided in the course of the lecture. These parts were written in a bullet point fashion that succinctly stated his position, but he needed to provide greater development and argumentation for his assertions. MacArthur and Mayhue also repeatedly make the error of appealing to literal interpretation as if it settled the debate. This was especially disappointing because Vlach demonstrated this line of argumentation to be erroneous in the book’s first chapter.

This book is for a lay reader who wishes to have a basic orientation to dispensational premillennialism (the authors have coined the term futuristic premillennailism, which is an odd choice since historic premillennialists also believe that the millennium is future). Those who wish to dig deeper into this perspective of eschatology would want to track down the sources listed in the endnotes.

Figes, Orlando. The Crimean War: A History. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010.

Figes does an excellent job not only recounting the war but also describing its causes (especially the religious dimensions) and its effects.

Murray, Iain H. David Martyn Lloyd-Jones: The Fight of Faith 1939-1981. Banner of Truth, 1990.

An 800 page biography that covers forty years of a man’s life cannot be reduced to a theme or two. Nonetheless two themes especially struck me as I read Murray’s sympathetic, yet not uncritical, biography of David Martyn Lloyd-Jones.

The first was the importance that Lloyd-Jones placed on preaching. I found myself encouraged to value to a greater extent the preaching that I hear each week. Lloyd-Jones’s thoughts on the new technology of cassette tapes are also worthy of consideration. Though he permitted his sermons to be taped, he did register a concern that sermons played in the background as people do other things may lead to a devaluing of the Word preached. Furthermore, such preserved preaching cannot replace the gathered church listening to a sermon.

The second theme that pushed itself to the fore was Lloyd-Jones’s concern for true church unity. He believed that the false unity of the ecumenical movement made it necessary for evangelicals to develop a theology of true Christian unity. Sadly, the true unity was shattered by those evangelicals who insisted on participating in the ecumenical movement and thus broke ties with Christians who could not give Christian recognition to unbelievers nor work with unbelievers on Christian endeavors. While Lloyd-Jones was doubtless correct in his general stance, he did fail to clearly articulate his alternative. He seemed to desire some form of visible, organizational unity that was neither a new denomination nor merely a parachurch organization.

All in all, Murray has written a thought-provoking biography that remains timely. Highly recommended.

Stapert, Calvin R. A New Song for an Old World: Musical Thought in the Early Church. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007.

Historical theology provides a great service to the church, especially when applied to matters that are fiercely debated among God’s people today. C. S. Lewis, in his famous celebration of old books, observes that the errors of older writers "are not the same mistakes. They will not flatter us in the errors we are already committing." Calvin Stapert’s, A New Song for an Old World, provides this service to the present-day debate over church music. By ushering them into the old world, Stapert hopes to give readers a fuller perspective on their own.

Stapert begins by extending Lewis’s argument. He first provides a more theological reason for understanding the thought of earlier Christians: obedience to the command to honor one’s father and mother—applied here by extension to our spiritual forebears—of necessity involves understanding what these spiritual parents thought. In addition to this (and here Stapert gives some specificity to Lewis’s practical observation), the Enlightenment has so influenced Christian thought on music that a pre-Enlightenment perspective on music becomes important for Christians. Stapert’s point is not that all post-Enlightenment music or thought on music is problematic. His point is Lewis’s: Christians will find it more difficult to evaluate post-Enlightenment music and thought without knowing the earlier views.

The body of the book begins with a survey of New Testament musical teaching and example. Stapert highlights two major themes in biblical song: rejoicing and triumph balanced by sorrowful cries for mercy. He also distinguishes biblical song from pagan songs which were used to summon divine beings. Christian songs call upon God, but they have no magical power. New Testament songs also have two audiences: God and other believers. Finally, Stapert notes that the emphasis on the unity that characterized New Testament and early church practice of teaching and singing. Singing together with one voice made audible the unity of the church.

The core of the book surveys early church thought on church music from the second through the fifth centuries. A survey of the second and early third centuries is followed by more detailed studies of Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian. This pattern is repeated with a survey of the late third through fifth centuries once again followed by two more detailed studies: Ambrose and Chrysostom. Two chapters then summarize the findings. Positively, the fathers urged their people to sing songs and hymns to familiarize them with sound doctrine and to guard them against heresy, to calm negative passions to raise their affections toward God, and to praise the Creator and Savior. Negatively, the fathers polemicized against pagan music. They did not target all music of unbelievers; they "aimed no polemic at the nobler art music or the folk music of their day" (145). Their critiques were "aimed at a few well defined targets: the music of the popular public spectacles, the music associated with voluptuous banqueting, the music associated with pagan weddings, and the music of pagan religious rites and festivities" (145). They described the music they rejected as "licentious, voluptuous, frenzied, frantic, inebriating, titillating, scurrilous, turbulent, immodest, and meretricious" (54, here describing Clement of Alexandria’s writings). They were concerned that his music would deform a person’s character and would arouse deformed passions that were governed by neither reason nor love (55, 86-90). Interestingly, this view of music remained constant despite the variety of views about pagan culture. The critique of pagan music existed in both Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian.

Stapert concludes the body of the work with a chapter on Augustine and inordinate loves. Augustine warns that beautiful sacred music can be dangerous because it draws the mind from God to the music itself. This is a sin, not because such music is not to be loved, but because no earthly thing is to be loved for its own sake. All earthly goods are to be loved as vehicles to love God. Stapert shares the concerns of those who wish to guard against an asceticism which shirks from taking delight in God’s good creation, but he also thinks that Augustine’s discussion of ordering loves contains important insights from which modern readers will especially benefit.

Though Stapert’s work is primarily historical, he does not write for mere antiquarian interest. He believes the contemporary church needs to recover the musical insight of the early church. His concluding chapter, a postlude he calls it, asks what the early church can teach the present-day church. Positively, Stapert hopes for four things: (1) a recovery of the centrality of the psalms in worship, (2) the incorporation of the best patristic hymn texts in our worship, (3) contemporary hymns modeled on ancient hymns—"texts that address God communally in language that is simple yet dignified, poetically excellent, and redolent with scriptural vocabulary, stories, sentiments, and imagery" (194), (4) a recovery of psalm and hymn singing as a part of the Christian’s daily life. Negatively, Stapert hopes that modern Christians will follow the church fathers in rejecting pagan music. He especially hopes the father’s reasoning about music will puncture three modern myths: (1) "It’s just a song"—and therefore no ethical concerns should be raised, (2) music is a creation of God and therefore no ethical criticism may be mounted, and (3) "if we wish to see the church grow, we must adopt the music of the ambient culture" (199).

A New Song in an Old World is a work of scholarship aimed at serving the church. It deserves a wide reading in the hope that it would make a small contribution toward Christians singing together with one voice that makes audible the unity of the church in Christ by the Spirit.

Articles

Marsden, George M. "Perry Miller’s Rehabilitation of the Puritans: A Critique." In Reckoning With the Past: Historical Essays on American Evangelicalism from the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals. Edited by D.G. Hart. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995.

Marsden gladly grants that Miller’s main thesis—that the Puritans were rational humanists concerned with the intellect (though not to the exclusion of piety)—stands. But Marsden argues that Miller minimizes aspects of Puritanism that moderns may find "unattractive," namely, "Puritan biblicism, doctrinal formulations, emphasis on the place of Christ, and their Calvinism" (26). Minimizing these aspects of Puritanism, Marsden argues, causes Miller to distort his treatment of the Puritan view of the covenant. He treats their covenant theology as a softening of Calvinism (Marsden maintains that Miller rehabilitated the Puritans but consistently embraced caricatures of Calvin’s thought) and to misunderstand the careful distinctions between the covenants of works and grace in Puritan thought.

Stout, Harry S. "Word and Order in Colonial New England." In Reckoning With the Past: Historical Essays on American Evangelicalism from the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals. Edited by D.G. Hart. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995.

Stout argues that the Puritans, especially those in New England, shifted from the Geneva Bible to the KJV because the notes of the former presented the Old Testament in personal, spiritualized terms whereas by the time of New England’s settlement, the Puritans had a more developed covenant theology that made room for national covenants modeled on those with Israel. This led to a more literal, historical reading of the Old Testament since Israel was now needed as a model for the political functioning of the Puritan government. Stout’s essay includes a good thumbnail history of the Geneva Bible.

Svigel, Michael J. “The Apocalypse of John and the Rapture of the Church: A Reevaluation.” Trinity Journal 22, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 23-74.

Micahel Svigel surveys attempts to locate the rapture in the book of Revelation. He rejects Rev. 3:10; 4:1-2; 4:4; 5:9-10; 7:9-17; 11:11-19; 14:14-20; 19:11-20:6. He then argues that Revelation 12:5 is the sole passage in Revelation that presents the rapture of the church. Svigel understands the woman in Revelation 12 to be the elect remnant of Israel (with a possible secondary application to Mary), the dragon to be Satan and, corporately, the nations throughout history who have opposed God’s people, and the male child to be Jesus Christ and his corporate body, the church. He identifies the catching up of the child to God and his throne as the rapture. Svigel does not deal explicitly with the timing of the rapture in this article, though his discussion of 19:11-20:6 does preclude a post-tribulation rapture.

Svigel’s arguments against locating the rapture in other places in Revelation were convincing, except in the case of Revelation 3:10. He concedes more than necessary to contrary positions. Svigel himself seems to think that this passage is at least a cooborative passage. His argument against the post-tribulational Rapture in 19:11-20:6 is strong. The main argument of the paper, that Revelation 12:5 presents the rapture of the church, is forcefully made and interesting.

Arguments against a Post-Tribulational Rapture in Rev. 19:11-20:6: After noting that the rapture is not mentioned in this passage (not a decisive factor), Svigel notes that if one grants the premillennial contention that Revelation19:11-20:6 is chronological and sequential, the post-tribulational position has to wrestle with the occurrence of the resurrection(/Rapture?) at a time after the Second Coming and defeat of God’s enemies (Rev. 20:4). This does not easily harmonize with 1 Thess. 4:16-17 and 1 Corinthians 15:52 which "make the descent of Christ, the trumpet, and the resurrection/Rapture all simultaneous events" (50-51). In addition, those coming with Christ in 19:14 are resurrected saints (contra Ladd, who sees them as angelic hosts; see Svigel, 51 for arguments). Thus saints must have been raptured/resurrected before the return of Christ. Finally, the antecedent to the third person plural in "and I saw thrones, and they sat on them" (2:4, NKJV, cf. NASB) is best understood to be Christ and the saints who came with him. This means those resurrected in 20:4 are best understood as saints who died during the tribulation. There is thus a distinction between already raptured/resurrected saints who return to earth with Christ and saints who died during the tribulation and are resurrected afterwards.

Warfield, Benjamin B. “Hosea VI.7: Adam or Man?” In Selected Shorter Writings, edited by John E. Meeter, 1:116-29. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1970.

In this article Warfield surveys the translational and interpretive positions taken on this text from the the LXX and Targums to the critics of his own day.

He notes that the ancient translations and interpreters were divided over translating the word in question as a common noun or a proper noun down through to the time of the Reformation. The emergence of federal or covenant theology inclined federal theologians toward the translation "like Adam." But, Warfield notes, most were fair in recognizing the translational difficulties and did not rest their entire theology on this one verse. It served them in a more confirmatory role than in a foundational role.

The modern critics, satisfied with neither the common noun nor personal name options propose various emendations. Michaelis conjecturally emended the word to read "Edom" and interpreted the sense as Edom’s abandonment of the Abrahamic covenant. Others suggested that "Adam" refers to the city mentioned in Joshua 3:16 and that this city Adam was the location of the events of Numbers 25. Others suggest emending the text from ke’ādhām to bā’adāmah, that is, to "in the land," meaning in Judah. In favor of this view is the word "there" in the second half of the verse.

Though Warfield finds the place name proposition attractive because of the presence of "there" in the second half of the verse, he does not see how it can be adopted as the text now stands. It is true that an emendation from a כ to a ב (letters easily confused) would solve the problem, but there is no evidence of such a corruption in any of the manuscripts or versions. Warfield therefore proposes that the principle of allowing the more difficult reading to stand tells against emending the text. Warfield is also suspicious that the push to emend the text stems from the bias of the modern interpreters: "Speaking broadly, these critics are agreed that an allusion to Adam’s sin in Hosea would be too unexpected to be admitted. . . . The very name Adam we are told occurs very seldom in the Old Testament, and only in certain later strata of its formation: his sin is not emphasized and the sinfulness of man is not traced back to it; least of all is the transaction between God and Adam in the Old Testament called, or thought of, as a covenant" (125). Warfield notes the modern critics are biased against understanding the term as Adam, but though they wish another interpretation, they are not satisfied by taking the disputed term as a common noun. Hence the other expedients such as emendation.

Since Warfield, is not satisfied with the arguments for emendation, and since taking the noun as a common noun has not gained wide consent, this pushes Warfield toward accepting it as the personal name Adam. He is confirmed in this position upon further examination of the common noun reading. He notes that "the translation, ‘They have transgressed as if a man’s covenant’ may be pronounced at once impossible, because forcing a construction upon the Hebrew which it cannot fairly be made to bear. But on the other hand the translation, ‘they have like men transgressed the covenant’ remains vapid and meaningless until a sense beyond the suggestion of the words themselves is forced upon it." That is they must be "mere men, as opposed to God, or as common men as opposed to the noble . . . or as heathen as opposed to the Israelites—to none of which does it seem naturally to lend itself here" (127). In the end the rendering "like Adam" does not face the exegetical difficulties of the other renderings. "Any difficulties that may be brought against it, indeed, are imported from without the clause itself. In itself the rendering is wholly natural" (128).

Warfield, Benjamin B. “Jesus Christ the Propitiation for the Whole World.” In Selected Shorter Writings, edited by John E. Meeter, 1:167-77. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1970.

Warfield surveys various interpretive options for 1 John 2:2. He rejects standard theories such as world stands for Christians scattered throughout the world (on the grounds that John is already speaking so generally that the "our" already encompasses all Christians) or that Christ is the propitiation for all men but not the advocate of all men (on the grounds that it empties "the conception of propitiation of its properly expiatory content"). Warfield suggests that John is emphasizing the universal nature of Jesus’s saving work. He has come to save the entire world, which does not mean that every individual will be saved, but it does give in broad terms the scope of his saving activity. Perhaps. But at least one of Warfield’s critiques is deserving of critique. Like John Owen Warfield makes the argument that the sin of rejecting Christ is propitiated by Jesus as well as every other sin, so a general atonement tends toward universalism (172). This is based on the assertion that "the propitiation . . . not merely lays a foundation for a saving operation, to follow or not follow as circumstances may determine. It itself saves" (174). But this conflates the accomplishment and the application of the propitiation, and that causes theological problems, for it would mean that the elect ceased to be under the wrath of God at the time of the crucifixion (contrary to Ephesians 2). It is best, therefore, to keep the accomplishment of propitiation and its application to individuals separate.

Warfield, Benjamin B. “True Church Unity: What It Is.” In Selected Shorter Writings, edited by John E. Meeter, 1:299-307. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1970.

Warfield believes that the unity of the church is visible. But it does not exist in a single universal church government since such a government did not exist in the time of the New Testament. Nor is it "grounded in uniformity of organization, forms of worship, or even details of faith." Warfield detects legitimate variation on these elements in the New Testament church. Nor is it grounded in apostolic origin, for the New Testament does not evince any care of who founded the churches or Rome or Alexandria or Antioch. "In a word, the unity of the apostolic churches was grounded on the only thing they had in common—their common Christianity. Its bond was the common reception of the Holy Spirit, which exhibited itself in one calling, one faith, one baptism" (302). Thus Christians should not seek unity by attempting to include all Christians in one organization, or with a single form of government or worship, or through attempting to establish some apostolic succession. "Least of all, are we to seek unity by surrendering all public or organized testimony to all truth except that minimum which—just because it is the minimum, less than which no man can believe and be a Christian—all Christians of all names can unite in confessing" (305). Rather, "If we are to find the unity for which our Master prayed, we are to seek it in our common relation as Christians to our common head . . . as mediated by our common possession of one Spirit" (305). In practical terms Warfield says this means recognizing as Christian all gospel-proclaiming denominations, a firm commitment to God’s truth as that which all his people should confess, cooperation in good works with brothers in Christ, and formal means of working together as denominations for the pursuance of common ends "so far as such federation involves no sacrifice of principle or testimony" (307).

Saucy, Robert L. "Israel and the Church: A Case for Discontinuity." In Continuity and Discontinuity: Perspectives on the Relationship Between the Old and New Testaments. Edited by John S. Feinberg. Westchester, IL: Crossway, 1988.

Saucy’s article is more nuanced that Woudstra’s counterpoint essay in the same volume. Despite the chapter title, Saucy argues for both continuity and discontinuity in the relationship of Israel and the church. Continuity exists in the fact that both the Israel and the church are called the people of God. Furthermore, many of the images for Israel are carried over to the church. Nonetheless, the church and Israel are distinct entities. Israel is a national entity, and it retains this significance in the New Testament notwithstanding a few debated passages (Gal 6:16; Rom. 9:6). Saucy presents abbreviated but compelling arguments against understanding these passages or the application of Israel symbols on the church to communicate the replacement of Israel with the church. Saucy further argues that Israel will maintain its role of mediating revelation and furthering God’s plan of salvation in the future.

VanDrunen, David. "A System of Theology? The Centrality of Covenant for Westminster Systematics." In The Pattern Of Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology At The Westminster Seminaries. Edited by David VanDrunen. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2004.

VanDrunen surveys the approach to systematic theology at the Westminster seminaries in light of Otto Weber’s criterion that a true system of theology should have a central "principle" that "contains potentially the one and total content which is ten explain in greater detail in the systematic exposition" (199). VanDrunen finds Westminster systematics to be heavy on exegesis and to lack a central principle around which the synthesis of systematic theology should take place. While affirming the need for exegetical grounding, VanDrunen argues that covenant can serve as the unifying central principle of a Westminster systematic theology. He then sketches out how the covenant can center prolegomena, theology proper, anthropology, Christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and ethics. If systematic theology must have a central dogma, the covenant concept is certainly a contender. But VanDrunen fails to establish why Weber’s criterion is correct. This is especially important in light of Richard Muller’s expose of neo-orthodox attempts to impose central dogma’s on Lutheran and Reformed Orthodox theologies where none existed. If the Protestant Orthodox did not conceive of theology in terms of central dogmas, what is the compelling reason for Westminster theologians to begin now?

Warfield, Benjamin B. “The Resurrection of Christ a Historical Fact.” In Selected Shorter Writings, edited by John E. Meeter, 1:116-29. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1970.

Warfield mounts an apologetic for the resurrection by arguing that even if the Christian limits himself to the Pauline epistles granted by the critics to be authentic, testimony to the resurrection can be shown to be early and widespread.

Monson, John M. “Enter Joshua: The ‘Mother of Current Debates’ in Biblical Archaeology.” In Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith?: A Critical Appraisal of Modern and Postmodern Approaches to Scripture. Edited by James K. Hoffmeier and Dennis R. Magary. Wheaton: Crossway, 2012.

Well over a century ago scholars like C. H. Toy, scholars who began their careers in conservative schools, began to doubt the scientific and historical accuracy of Scripture. They took Genesis to be an accommodation to prescientific man. They adopted critical methods for understanding the composition the Old Testament books, casting doubt on the historical veracity of the Old Testament materials. And they argued that the New Testament authors adopted rabbinic methods of interpretation that caused them to misinterpret Old Testament texts as they applied them to Jesus as Messiah. Men like Toy professed personal piety, and they insisted on their belief in the basic message of Scripture. Nonetheless, they argued that Christian scholarship must adapt itself to the intellectual realities of their time. Their deviations form orthodoxy set off the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy. Now, these many decades later, Peter Enns and Kenton Sparks are replaying the controversy. Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith? is a response to the claims of Enns and Sparks that evangelicals must finally capitulate to the modernists.

John Monson’s article addresses the historicity of Joshua. In the face of those who claim that no archaeological evidence for any kind of invasion from Israel exists, Monson argues that a closer reading of the Scripture text reveals that the conquest of Canaan was a more modest affair than the Albright school made it out to be (e.g., the text only claims that the Israelites burned three cities in the course of the conquest). When this is taken into account, the archaeology does fit with kind of conquest presented in Scripture. Monson uses Ai as a case study for showing how archaeology and a close reading of the text work together. Whether Monson’s reconstruction is the correct one (he footnotes an alternative solution by Bryant Wood; see his Rice lectures at DBTS), he does demonstrate at least one plausible interpretation of both the textual and archaeological evidence.

Ferguson, Sinclair B. “Christus Victor Et Propitiator: The Death of Christ, Substitute and Conqueror.” In For the Fame of God’s Name: Essays in Honor of John Piper, 171-189. Wheaton: Crossway, 2010.

Oftentimes the Christus Victor atonement theme and the propitiatory nature of Christ’s atonement are set against each other. Ferguson notes that within the Reformed tradition, the debate between Anselm and Abelard set the parameters of the theological discussion, that Puritan theology tended to focus on the Christian’s battle and triumph over Satan rather than Christ’s, and that those in the Reformed tradition recognized the problems with the patristic explanation of how Christ conquered the devil. More recently evangelicals have recognized the problematic denial of a satisfaction view of the atonement in Aulen’s Christus Victor. Nonetheless, Ferguson argues that Christ’s victory over Satan remains an important aspect of the atonement. He traces this theme through the gospels and epistles to demonstrate not only that Christ’s victory over Satan is present in Scripture but also that his propitiatory sacrifice is the means by which Christ triumphs over Satan. When Christ stands in the place of the sinner, satisfies the wrath of God, and frees him from death and the power of sin, he frees him from the dominion of Satan and triumphs over him. Chistus Victor is not an alternative to penal substitutionary atonement, for penal substitutionary atonement is the mechanism of the victory.

VanGemeren, Willem A., and Jason Stanghelle. “A Critical-Realistic Reading of the Psalm Titles: Authenticity, Inspiration, and Evangelicals.” In Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith?: A Critical Appraisal of Modern and Postmodern Approaches to Scripture. Edited by James K. Hoffmeier and Dennis R. Magary. Wheaton: Crossway, 2012.

The authors begin with a survey of evangelical scholarship on the issue of Psalm titles. Most evangelicals have not attempted to argue that the Psalm titles are inspired, though several have argued for their general reliability and even an early affixation to the Psalms. The authors then note that the real problem with the Psalm titles is the variation (and occasional contradiction) found between the Masoretic text, Qumran texts, and the Septuagint. This is followed by a very brief discussion of the canon which serves to emphasize that canonical books developed in a historical process, and that they sometimes existed in different editions (here the differences between the Hebrew and the Greek versions of Jeremiah are appealed to). Thus the titles to the Psalms may be canonical even if they were added to the book at a later date. In the end, they conclude "the titles are authentic, not because the titles are original or because the psalms were written by David, but because of their relationship to the Davidic vox. . . . Like the voice of Jesus in the Gospels and that of Moses in the Pentateuch, we hear the voice of David in the Psalter. The titles are authentic in the sense that they were part of a historical process of editing that led to its final canonical shape. As such they have great authority in helping us to interpret the Psalter, and they form the canonical function pointing us back to the Davidic persona within the Psalter" (300).

This essay contains a number of weaknesses. Foremost is a failure to set out a theology of canonicity to serve as a check on the thesis they are proposing. There is no doubt that the books of Psalms and Proverbs developed over time in ways that Galatians certainly did not. But what are the theological limits to this development? How do doctrines such as inspiration relate to the development of canonical books? Earlier in the book Graham Cole warns against "historyless" systematic theology, but there is also the danger of an atheological approach to historical matters. Second, how closely connected is the vox of David connected to the verba of David. It is one thing to say that the verba of Jesus, spoken in Aramaic, is rendered in Greek and summarized so that the Sermon on the Mount is not a verbatim record such as would have been recorded by a stenographer but a sometimes periphrastic summary of what Jesus said. It is another thing to say that Jesus never preached the Sermon on the Mount but that it preserves his "voice," it resonates with the kinds of things that he said. An evangelical view of the vox of Jesus would, it seems, need to operate with the first view. But with written material, such as the Psalms references to the vox of David would seem to fall into the latter paradigm (it would seem odd to argue that a late writer paraphrased David’s poetry into a new poem). This raises a third question, do the authors understand ledawid to indicate authorship or not? If yes, their view would seem to raise theological problems, if no, there seems little theological problems. Finally, the authors should have done a more thorough job of stating why they feel driven to deny Davidic verba for many of the Psalms and argue for a Davidic vox that points toward a Davidic "persona." The variations in the manuscript traditions are obviously a key factor. But why do they drive the authors to this solution? In the end this essay lacked the necessary argumentation to demonstrate that the proposed solution was both historically necessary and theologically acceptable.

Millard, Alan R. “Daniel in Babylon: An Accurate Record?” In Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith?: A Critical Appraisal of Modern and Postmodern Approaches to Scripture, 263-80. Wheaton: Crossway, 2012.

In this essay, Alan Millard helpfully summarizes alleged problems with Daniel’s historicity and proposed solutions.

Date of the Exile: On an initial reading the date Daniel gives for the exile in 1:1 is too early. But by understanding different ways of calculating years provides a way of harmonizing Daniel’s chronology with secular chronology.

Nebuchadnezzar’s Madness: Millard notes that a records of Nebuchadnezzar’s life in the non-biblical records provides space in which Nebuchadnezzar’s madness may have occurred. He also provides precedent for mentally deranged monarchs retaining their thrones.

Use of Chaldean to refer to a class of people: Millard argues that there is a possible parallel situation with the term Magi, which designated a Median tribe as well as a class of people. He further notes that Chaldean was not used as an ethnic term in contemporary non-Biblical records. So there is no textual basis for claiming the term could have only been used in one way during the time of Daniel.

Belshazzar: Some claim that it is inappropriate to identify him as a king, but Millard demonstrates that term was used of lesser rulers at that time. Second, some argue that it is inappropriate to identify Belshazzar as Nebuchadnezzar’s son since he was not related to Nebuchadnezzar. Millard notes that the evidence is not full enough to rule out the relation.

Darius the Mede: Daniel identifies him as the conquer of Babylon while historically it is clear that Cyrus conquered Babylon. Millard interprets Daniel 6:28 as equating Darius the Mede and Cyrus the Persian (cf. 1 Chron. 5:26).

Satraps: Herodotus says Darius I created twenty of these whereas Daniel says Darius the Mede/Cyrus created 120 of them. Millard says the term may be flexible enough to indicate different administrative divisions.

Language: Driver had argued that the use of Greek words and Aramaic pointed toward a date of authorship after the conquest of Alexander the Great. Millard notes subsequent discoveries have demonstrated that such a conclusion from the language is not necessary.

Overall, Millard demonstrates that the evangelical claims for Daniel’s accuracy need not give way to critical reconstructions as Sparks claims.

Schultz, Richard. “Isaiah, Isaiahs, and Current Scholarship.” In Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith?: A Critical Appraisal of Modern and Postmodern Approaches to Scripture. Edited by James K. Hoffmeier and Dennis R. Magary. Wheaton: Crossway, 2012.

A certain segment of ostensibly evangelical authors are adopting an increasingly harsh tone toward evangelicals who resist the conclusions of modernist scholars. Kenton Sparks claims that conservative evangelicals maintain their position for the following reasons: "theological immaturity, an overly pastoral focus, a ‘desire to sell books to conservative readers,’ a self-protective impulse (i.e., seeking to retain their teaching posts at conservative institutions), and poor training and a general lack of knowledge regarding contemporary critical scholarship," (260, n. 80, summarizing Sparks, God’s Word in Human Words, 167-68). Evidently Sparks finds it impossible to believe that any well-educated scholar would continue to believe Scripture’s self-testimony and historically orthodox doctrine when it conflicts with whatever happens to be the current critical (and typically unbelieving) scholarly consensus.

In this essay Richard Schultz defends the integrity of Isaiah from attacks by Sparks in his God’s Word in Human Words and by John Halsey Wood in an article critiquing O. T. Allis’s defense of Isaiah’s unity. Wood argues that since Allis allowed that Moses used sources in constructing the Pentateuch and allowed for post-Mosaic updating, it was inconsistent for him to adhere to a unified Isaiah. Wood thinks that Allis is wrongly motivated by a desire to maintain the predictive quality Isaiah. He further thinks that while prophets were able to predict the future there is no compelling reason to affirm that they actually did so. Wood also critiques Allis’s messianic reading of Isaiah 53. He says that since Allis acknowledged that Deuteronomy 18 envisioned a succession of prophets culminating in a Messiah, he should be willing to concede the same for Isaiah 53. Sparks objects to the unity of Isaiah on the grounds that the earlier part of the book is addressing those in Judah threatened by Assyria whereas the latter part of the book is addressed to the Babylonian exiles in the next century. He also finds it hard to believe that detailed prophecies would have been given to people who lived so long after the prophecies were given. He thinks the prophecies in Isaiah were genuine prophecies, but he argues they were delivered at a much closer time period to the events that they address. Next, Sparks notes Isaiah is named 16x in chapters 1-39 whereas he is not named at all in the latter half of the book. In addition, he argues that Jeremiah’s silence regarding Isaiah’s prophecies demonstrates the latter half of the book had not been written by Jeremiah’s time. Sparks also argues that differences in emphases and styles point to multiple authors. Finally, Sparks says "a sober and serious reading of Isaiah" can only lead to a rejection of the traditional view and an embrace of the critical consensus.

Schultz responds to each of these claims. He notes that acknowledging the possible use of sources for the construction of the patriarchal narratives or the later updating of place names is a far cry from saying a large section of a book was added well over a hundred years later by one or more authors.

Schultz also argues that Allis was not solely motivated by a desire to defend the predictive quality of Isaiah. He does note that the text makes the claim that God fulfills the predictions of his prophets—a claim Allis wished to affirm. This is major claim in the book of Isaiah and one that Schultz could have stressed more in his defense. In response to Sparks’ similar claim, Schultz notes that some of Isaiah 40-66 may be addressing Assyrian exiles in Isaiah’s day. He note that some verses do not fit well with the end of Babylonian exile (e.g., Isa. 43:28).

Schultz responds to Wood’s argument regarding Isaiah 53 by noting the great differences between Deuteronomy 18 and Isaiah 53 make it perfectly plausible to see a prophecy of a succession of prophets in the one and a detailed messianic prophecy in the other. It is not an inconsistency to affirm this.

Schultz finds the argument form the distribution of Isaiah’s name a weak argument considering that many of the occurrences of Isaiah’s name in chapters 1-39 occur in the narrative section in which he is a character. In addition, there are large stretches of text in the first part of the book in which his name does not occur.

The argument that Jeremiah does not reference the latter chapters of Isaiah is doubly weak. In the first place it is an argument from silence—a silence that might be expected given that scholars still discuss the silence of the eighth century prophets regarding their contemporaries, not to mention Jeremiah’s own (often commented upon) silence regarding Josiah. But in addition to the fact that a silence might be expected, Schultz notes that a number of scholars claim they see a dependence of Deutero-Isaiah upon Jeremiah. If the presumption of order is challenged, then there may indeed be evidence for Jeremiah’s recognition of the latter part of Isaiah.

Regarding differences in emphasizes and styles, Schultz demonstrates from the work of Christopher Seitz and others that many of these arguments are now doubted. It seems that Sparks himself recognizes this to be among his weaker arguments.

Sparks’ claim that a "sober and serious reading of Isaiah" can only result in adopting his own conclusions is more bluster than argument. Schultz nevertheless engages it. He selects a few examples from critical scholars who divide up a single passage among into several redaction layers (thus seeing not three but a multitude of authors contributing to Isaiah. He examines the presuppositions of such an approach (e.g., "that a prophet would not reuse, allude to, or elaborate upon his own (earlier) oracles," 256) to demonstrate that such readings are neither sober nor serious.

At the very least Schultz demonstrates that respectable argument can be made for the integrity of Isaiah. This being the case, the question is raised why Sparks and other left-leaning evangelicals are so vitriolic in their opposition to the conservative position? Why the questioning of motives, the impugning of scholarship? Why the name-calling? Why the denigration of pastoral care?

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation. Edited by Timothy McDermott. Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1989. pp. 541-500 (III.60-90).

McDermott has reformatted and abridged the Summa from Thomas’s scholastic form into a more modern paragraph form that focuses on Thomas’s affirmative teaching. This concise translation cannot, of course, replace the unabridged Summa in its original form, but it does provide a helpful summary of Thomas’s thought in his own words.

In January I noted that “I find it surprising, and even disturbing, that so many top evangelical NT scholars praise Webb’s problematic approach.” I was therefore pleased to come across D. A. Carson’s critical evaluation of Webb’s redemptive movement hermeneutic, particularly as it relates to slavery. Carson’s view of the NT situation, his exegesis of Philemon, and the Christian abolition movement coheres with the research that I’ve done in these areas. I think he’s spot on, and commend his comments.

Resources I’ve found helpful in researching Philemon and slavery:

Barth, Markus and Helmut Blanke, The Letter to Philemon, Eerdmans Critical Commentary. Edited by David Noel Freedman. Eerdmans, 2000.

Bercott, David. W. A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1998.

Finley, M. I. Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology. Penguin, 1980.

Fitzmyer, Joseph A. The Letter to Philemon. Anchor Bible. Edited by David Noel Freedman. Doubleday, 2000.

Harris, Murray J. Slave of Christ: A New Testament Metaphor for Total Devotion to Christ. New Studies in Biblical Theology. Edited by D. A. Carson. InterVarsity, 1999.

Lohse, Eduard. Colossians and Philemon. Hermeneia. Ed. Helmut Koester. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971.

Noll, Mark A. The Civil War as a Theological Crisis. The University of North Carolina Press, 2006.

O’Brien, Peter T. Colossians, Philemon. Word Biblical Commentary. Ed. David A. Hubbard and Ralph P. Martin. [Waco, TX]: Word, 1982.

NB: Several of the above works are modernist rather than orthodox in their approach to Scripture.

"I thank the Lord who has given to you to believe in Him, that you too may have eternal life with the saints. But because there are certain persons who, while they affirm that they do not hold with Arius, yet compromise themselves and worship with his party, I have been compelled to write at once . . . For when any see you, the faithful in Christ, associate and communicate with such people, certainly they will think it a matter of indifference and will fall into the mire of irreligion. Lest, then, this should happen, be pleased beloved to shun those who hold the impiety of Arius. We are specially bound to fly from the communion of men whose opinions we hold in execration. If then any come to you, and, as blessed John says, brings with him right doctrine, say to him, All hail, and receive him as a brother. But if any pretend that he confesses the right faith, but appear to communicate with those others, exhort him to abstain from such communion, and if he promise to do so, treat him as a brother, but if he persist in a contentious spirit, him avoid."

Letters of Athanasius, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, 4:564.

"The charge of intolerance has come to wield enormous power in much of Western culture. . . . It functions as a ‘defeater belief.’ A defeater belief is a belief that defeats other beliefs—i.e., if you hold a defeater belief to be true "(whether it is true or not is irrelevant), you cannot possibly hold certain other beliefs to be true: the defeater belief rules certain other beliefs out of court and thus defeats them. . . . Put together several such defeater beliefs and make them widely popular, and you have created an implausibility structure: opposing beliefs are thought so implausible as to be scarcely worth listening to, let alone compelling or convincing." For this reason, "the new tolerance tends to avoid serious engagement over difficult moral issues, analyzing almost every issue on the one axis tolerant/intolerant, excluding all others from the pantheon of the virtuous who do not align with this axis."

D. A. Carson, The Intolerance of Tolerance (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 15.

Books

Forster, Greg. Starting with Locke. New York: Continuum, 2011.

The publisher says that the "Starting with . . . series offers clear, concise and accessible introductions to the key thinkers in philosophy." Greg Forster lived up to this expectation in Starting with Locke. He helpfully positioned Locke in his historical setting and then showed how his philosophy emerged through wrestling with the major issues of his day in England. According to Forster, England in Locke’s time was politically tumultuous because the religion of the nation was tied to the religion of the rulers. As the rulers moved between Catholicism and Protestantism, the politics of England became bloody. Upon a visit to Cleves, a city in Germany that due to a strange confluence of circumstances practiced religious toleration, Locke realized that religious toleration, far from exacerbating political tensions, would ease them. In his epistemology, Locke seeks to drive his readers to admit the limits of what they can know. Given this, people should be slow to impose their beliefs on others. This does not mean that Locke was not a Christian (though his silence on certain points have raised questions as to what kind of Christian) or that he did not believe the Bible to be revelation from God. He did believe the Bible was God’s revelation. But he believed that natural law, rather than Scriptural revelation, ought to serve as the basis for a societies common morality. This obviated the need for a common religion. The other major question that Locke addressed was who has the right to rule. He argued from Gen. 1:26-28 that all men are given the right of dominion over the earth. Contrary to divine-right theorists, Locke argued that no one could prove a heredity right to rule through a certain line of persons from Adam. Thus if all had the right to rule, then the investiture of that right in an organized government must occur with the consent of the governed, if only tacitly. This therefore underlies Locke’s theory that rebellion is justified when a government violates its trust and turns from a government into a tyranny. Forster closes the book by reflecting on the present political situation in the United States. Here he has two main concerns. First there is a great breakdown of moral consensus on issues far more fundamental than those Locke faced. Second, he notes a divide in American society between those who think of politics from a Lockean perspective (mainly on the right) and those (mainly on the left) who approach it from the perspective of John Stuart Mill. Forster worries that Americans will slip into a kind of confessionalism in which morality (from left or right) is imposed from a particular viewpoint or move into a society in which the "state may simply give up trying to justify itself morally." To avoid these Forster says we must find some way to "maintain moral consensus without religious consensus."

Welch, Edward T. Blame It on the Brain: Distinguishing Chemical Imbalances, Brain Disorders, and Disobedience (Resources for Changing Lives). P & R Pub., 1998.

Welch’s Blame It on the Brain? is a good lay-level introduction to mind-body issues in a counseling context. The details he leaves to other resources (e.g., for the theological debate about dualism vs. monism he refers readers to Cooper’s Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting), but the framework he provides is very helpful. Welch’s basic thesis is that the brain never causes people to sin. Brain injuries may remove the abilities of some to restrain the impulses of a sinful heart, but the brain is not forcing people to sin. In areas less traumatic than head injury, Welch argues that the brain may make certain temptations stronger but that this does not remove the responsibility to resist temptation. Welch does recognize that the complexity of mind-body issues may mean attempting to treat medical aspects of a problem medically and spiritual aspects of the problem biblically.

McCullough, David G. 1776. Simon and Schuster, 2005. [Audio Book]

McCullough knows how to write engaging history. I enjoyed the audio book, narrated by the author.

Austen, Jane. Emma. New York: Modern Library, 2001.

Jacobs, Alan. Original Sin: A Cultural History. New York: HarperOne, 2008.

Jacobs’ work is similar to a historical theology of original sin. He outlines how the doctrine emerged, its historical context, and the thinking of the theologians who formulated and defended it. But Jacobs’ cultural history is much more than a historical theology. He also looks at broader cultural reactions to the doctrine of original sin and cultural events (such as utopianism) in light of original sin. G. K. Chesterton once marveled that people doubted the doctrine of original sin since it is the one doctrine open to empirical verification. Jacobs’ broad cultural sweep seems intended, in part, to document the verification.

Murray, Iain H. David Martyn Lloyd-Jones: The First Forty Years 1899-1939. Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 1982.

Iain Murray always writes biographies for the purpose of edification. This does not mean that he writes hagiographies or that he tolerates historical inaccuracies. It does mean that his biographies are no mere record of events. He attempts, as much as is possible with external records, to chart not only the life events but also the spiritual and theological growth of his subjects. Lloyd-Jones is without a doubt a worthy subject for such a biography. His growing conviction that the world and the church needs not political triumph, engaging drama to draw in crowds, or a new program to bring in the unchurched but that the world and the church need doctrinal preaching needs special enunciation today. Even in many theologically-conservative Reformed circles the church marketing mood of broader evangelicalism has replaced the conviction that mankind has changed only on the surface and therefore the church need not discover a new method or program to reach the lost. This message is found in many of Lloyd-Jones’ sermons, but Murray, in biographical form, contextualizes these convictions so that it becomes plain that they were coupled with loving personal attention to the members of his congregation and community.

Articles

Carson, D. A. “Spiritual Disciplines.” Themelios 36, no. 3 (2011): 377-79.

An excellent, brief article that defines what it means to be spiritual (to have received the Holy Spirit through the new covenant) and thoughts about labeling and practicing of spiritual disciplines (e.g., "unmediated, mystical knowledge of God is unsanctioned by Scripture, and is dangerous"; not every Christian responsibility is a spiritual discipline—a means of grace in conforming us to God).

Hoehner, Harold W. "Jesus’ Last Supper." In Essays in Honor of J. Dwight Pentecost,. Edited by Stanley D. Toussaint and Charles H. Dyer. Chicago: Moody, 1986.

A helpful essay which deals with chronology and background

Weithman, Paul. "Nicholas Wolterstorff’s Justice: Rights and Wrongs: An Introduction," Journal of Religious Ethics 37, no. 2 (2009):179-92.

A summary of Wolterstorff’s book with some comments about the articles to follow

O’Donovan, Oliver. "The Language of Rights and Conceptual History." Journal of Religious Ethics 37, no. 2 (2009): 193-207.

O’Donovan identifies three problems with Wolterstorff’s approach to justice. First, "a political problem with the language of rights, which is its apparent serviceability to the subversion of working orders of law and justice" (194). In other words, a rights approach to justice lends itself to revolutions. Second, "a conceptual problem with the language of rights: it appears to be in conflict with the language of right" (194). By this O’Donovan is asserting his counter-view that rights derive from what is right, or that moral order precedes rather than is derived from rights. Third, "a historical problem: the use of the word [rights] in the plural is not found in the ancient world" (195). By establishing this final assertion O’Donovan says that he calls in question Wolterstorff’s attempt to claim that while the Bible does not speak of justice in terms of individual rights, it presupposes the idea. For instance, Wolterstorff says that the wronging of individuals in Scripture implies they had rights that were violated; O’Donovan says this only means that a wrong (a violation of moral order) occurred. Why does this matter? The difference, says O’Donovan is of moral ontology: "Multiple rights expresses a plural ontology of difference, the difference between each right-bearer and every other, instead of a unitary ontology of human likeness. Suum cuique, to each his own, is their formula for justice, not similia similibus, like treatment for like cases. This has the effect of setting what is due to each above every idea of moral order" (202). Another way of putting this is that for Wolterstorff murder is wrong because of the other’s right to life; for O’Donovan he has a right to life because murder is wrong. Finally, O’Donovan criticizes Wolterstorff for cutting the tie between justice and righteousness. In O’Donovan’s words, Wolterstorff says that morality "is not confined to the language of rights" whereas "justice is based on rights, and justice is based only on rights." Thus the link between morality and justice, between righteousness and justice, have been severed.

Attridge, Harold W. "Wolterstorf, Rights, Wrongs, and the Bible." Journal of Religious Ethics 37, no. 2 (2009): 209-19

Attridge is sympathetic to Wolterstorf’s position, but he concludes from a survey of δικαιω- words that Luke’s emphasis is on conformity to what God requires rather than on fulfilling obligations to neighbors in recognition of their rights. (Less related to Wolterstorff’s thesis, Attridge notes that Wolterstorff’s preference for δικ- words to be translated in terms of justice rather than righteousness moves the focus from virtue to objective rights and wrongs. Attrdridge is more sympathetic translating these terms with "righteousness" language, while still acknowledging a justice aspect.) Attridge thinks that Luke’s material is compatible with Wolterstorff’s approach, but he doesn’t think that Luke himself was thinking in terms of rights-based justice.

Moo, Douglas J. "A Review of John M. Frame, Doctrine of the Christian Life (A Theology of Lordship Series; Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), ETS National Conference, New Orleans, 2009.

See previous post.

Colin J. Humphreys, "The Number of People in the Exodus from Egypt: Decoding Mathematically the Very Large Numbers in Numbers I and XXVI," Vetus Testamentum 48, no. 2 (1999): 196-213.

Humphreys presents a fairly detailed and conservative argument for understanding ‘elp as "troop" rather than "thousand" to reduce the large numbers in Exodus and Numbers. But in the end he resorts to conjectural emendations which I find less plausible than the solutions to the main objections to large numbers that he raised in the first place.

Andy Naselli recently posted a review of John Frame’s The Doctrine of the Christian Life by Douglas Moo. If Moo or Frame write a book, I tend to purchase it and attempt to read it. I found it interesting, therefore to read a review by the one of a book by the other. I also found surprising , given the influence of both of these authors on my own thinking, the amount of disagreement highlighted by Moo.

My thoughts on their disagreements are as follows:

I find myself more in agreement with Frame than with Moo in the section on Sola Scriptura. Having read a fair bit on natural law in the past few months I’m convinced that Van Til and Frame have a very high view of natural law that comports well with Paul’s use of it in Romans while at the same time recognizing the limitations and difficulties of natural law argumentation. Frame in DCL demonstrates quite easily that certain natural law arguments divorced from Scripture are fairly unconvincing (the Roman Catholic arguments against contraception are the example that come most readily to mind). Moo wonders if the Van Tillian/Framian approach will cripple efforts in the public square. Frame does address that point: he notes that when speaking in the public square, one need not cite Scripture to make one’s arguments; his point was simply that a Christian should be dubious about natural law arguments for ethical positions if those positions lack support in Scripture. Also in response to Moo one could note that natural law arguments are often not given any more respect in the public square than Scripture arguments. [For two recent articles that address these issues, see Paul D. Miller, “Christ and Culture: Engaging the World,” The City (Summer 2011): 39-57; Dan Strange, “Not Ashamed! The Sufficiency of Scripture for Public Theology,” Themelios 36, no. 2 (Aug 2011): 238-60.]

Regarding adiaphora, I find myself in sympathy with Frame’s general direction. Moo’s caveat is significant, but I think Christians would be better served by approaching their lives in general as if large categories of adiaphora did not exist. In other words, Moo may be more technically correct, but the general attitude that Frame’s approach fosters may be more fruitful.

Regarding William Webb, I am in firm agreement with Frame. I find it surprising, and even disturbing, that so many top evangelical NT scholars praise Webb’s problematic approach. Frame is correct that "Webb’s approach violates the authority of Scripture . . . , since it allows us to do what Scripture forbids, and denies the sufficiency of Scripture . . . , since it requires us to find ultimate principles of ethics outside of Scripture—principles of authority equal to or greater than those of Scripture" (641). One could add that Webb’s view also profoundly misunderstands why the transitions that do take place from Old Covenant to New Covenant did take place. These systematic theology issues must be reckoned with before Webb’s hermeneutical proposals can be seriously entertained. Moo raises his own set of questions to Frame: "Why, since the biblical writers explicitly speak to Christian slave owners about their responsibilities, do they not simply forbid Christians to own slaves? Were the biblical writers suddenly overcome with a case of “cultural cowardice,” reluctant to tackle a moral evil because it was so deeply rooted in their culture? Or were the biblical writers themselves not fully aware of the implications of the principles they themselves enunciated?" It seems that these questions are more easily answered than the theological questions raised about Webb’s approach. Second, Frame does offer some brief answers to Moo’s questions. In his discussion of Greco-Roman slavery (658-60) Frame notes that it was not cultural cowardice but lack of cultural power that caused Christians not to tackle the problem of slavery in the first century. Frame also implies that it may be that early Christians were not fully aware of the implications of their principles. Related to this, it must be granted that the horrors of slavery may be more thoroughly impressed on the modern mind than on the ancient mind. There is also the ethical issue of how to deal with systemic injustice. Are there times when one tries to mitigate the evil rather than seek (fruitlessly) to eliminate it immediately. What would the effects be of all Christians freeing their slaves immediately? Would they have been better than all Christians beginning to treat their slaves as image bearers of God? In other words, the slavery question raises complicated issues, but other answers than Webb’s theologically problematic hermeneutic are available.

On issues of Frame’s use of the law and the Decalogue, I find myself divided. I am in greater agreement with Moo’s framework for how the law relates to the new covenant believer than with Frame’s. In other words, I agree with Moo that the Mosaic law is not binding on the new covenant believer. He is not under that covenant. And yet within that framework, I think that Frame’s insistence on the continuing relevance of the OT law is important. It seems to me that the NT authors do make a great deal of use of the OT law in orienting Christians to their responsibilities. It seems that an understanding of both the OT law and the redemptive-historical transformations are necessary for Christians to develop the mind of Christ in all sorts of areas not directly addressed in Scripture.

I am similarly sympathetic with Moo’s criticism of Frame’s attempt to root all ethical commands in the Decalogue. However, the fact that some OT scholars think that other parts of the law, especially Deuteronomy, follow the outline of the Decalogue in broad strokes prevents me from entirely dismissing the approach of Frame and the tradition in which he stands. In regards to the appropriateness of the Decalogue as a framework for NT ethics, the Decalogue overall focuses broadly on commands that remain valid across the convents. In this way it seems similar to the two greatest commandments. Thus while largely agreeing with Moo’s approach to law issues, I’m willing to value and benefit from Reformed authors who use the Decalogue as a framework for NT ethics.

Finally, Moo criticizes Frame for his focus on the normative perspective. On the one hand, there is little that I would want to see cut from Frame’s 1,000+ page book. If anything some of his discussions could be expanded; some sections would make worthy books in their own right. Nonetheless, even Frame would have to admit the deficiency of examining ethics primarily from one of his three perspectives. A volume by Frame or in sympathy with his approach that examined ethics from the existential and situational perspectives would therefore be most welcome.

Poythress, in ch. 10 of the The Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses, looks at Deuteronomy 13:1-18 and the conquest of Canaan in Joshua as primarily types for the Christian’s inner struggle against Satan and the spread of the gospel throughout the world. I think this overly spiritualizes the matter. I prefer to go where Poythress goes at the end of the chapter: to the Second Coming as the final fulfillment of what is anticipated in Deuteronomy and Joshua.

Thus, in Joshua, God is setting apart a pure land where his kingdom and people may exist as a beacon to the nations, to draw them to come and worship him. Therefore the land and the people had to be purified of false worship. The physical, land aspect of this is not unimportant; it ought not be presented as a type to spirituality in the NT/NC era. The real culmination of what happens in Joshua is the Second Coming of Christ. The tribulation and return of Christ to earth is a purification and conquest of the land (in this case, the whole earth) for the setting up of Christ’s kingdom on earth.

The reason the church does not carry out the death penalty for false worship or conduct holy wars against pagan nations is that it is not a national entity like Israel, and its purpose is not to establish a physical earthly kingdom. Rather, in God’s grace, a gap has appeared between the inauguration of Christ’s kingdom and its consummation in which all nations are invited and commanded to repent and enter the kingdom before the judgment arrives. Its role in God’s kingdom plan therefore differs from Israel’s and these Mosaic stipulations do not directly apply. They do apply as a warning against the greater wrath that is to come.

Christian liberty seems to me to consist of three parts. First, the consciences of believers, while seeking the assurance of their justification before God, must rise above the law, and think no more of obtaining justification by it. For while the law, as has already been demonstrated (supra, chap. 17, sec. 1), leaves not one man righteous, we are either excluded from all hope of justification, or we must be loosed from the law, and so loosed as that no account at all shall be taken of works. For he who imagines that in order to obtain justification he must bring any degree of works whatever, cannot fix any mode or limit, but makes himself debtor to the whole law. Therefore, laying aside all mention of the law, and all idea of works, we must in the matter of justification have recourse to the mercy of God only; turning away our regard from ourselves, we must look only to Christ. For the question is, not how we may be righteous, but how, though unworthy and unrighteous, we may be regarded as righteous. If consciences would obtain any assurance of this, they must give no place to the law. Still it cannot be rightly inferred from this that believers have no need of the law. It ceases not to teach, exhort, and urge them to good, although it is not recognized by their consciences before the judgment-seat of God. The two things are very different, and should be well and carefully distinguished. The whole lives of Christians ought to be a kind of aspiration after piety, seeing they are called unto holiness (Eph. 1:4; 1 Thess. 4:5). The office of the law is to excite them to the study of purity and holiness, by reminding them of their duty. For when the conscience feels anxious as to how it may have the favor of God, as to the answer it could give, and the confidence it would feel, if brought to his judgment-seat, in such a case the requirements of the law are not to be brought forward, but Christ, who surpasses all the perfection of the law, is alone to be held forth for righteousness.

Calvin, Institutes (trans. Beveridge), 3.19.2.