Exegesis and Theology

The Blog of Brian Collins

Carson comments on Webb’s Slaves, Women and Homosexuals

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In January I noted that “I find it surprising, and even disturbing, that so many top evangelical NT scholars praise Webb’s problematic approach.” I was therefore pleased to come across D. A. Carson’s critical evaluation of Webb’s redemptive movement hermeneutic, particularly as it relates to slavery. Carson’s view of the NT situation, his exegesis of Philemon, and the Christian abolition movement coheres with the research that I’ve done in these areas. I think he’s spot on, and commend his comments.

Resources I’ve found helpful in researching Philemon and slavery:

Barth, Markus and Helmut Blanke, The Letter to Philemon, Eerdmans Critical Commentary. Edited by David Noel Freedman. Eerdmans, 2000.

Bercott, David. W. A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1998.

Finley, M. I. Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology. Penguin, 1980.

Fitzmyer, Joseph A. The Letter to Philemon. Anchor Bible. Edited by David Noel Freedman. Doubleday, 2000.

Harris, Murray J. Slave of Christ: A New Testament Metaphor for Total Devotion to Christ. New Studies in Biblical Theology. Edited by D. A. Carson. InterVarsity, 1999.

Lohse, Eduard. Colossians and Philemon. Hermeneia. Ed. Helmut Koester. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971.

Noll, Mark A. The Civil War as a Theological Crisis. The University of North Carolina Press, 2006.

O’Brien, Peter T. Colossians, Philemon. Word Biblical Commentary. Ed. David A. Hubbard and Ralph P. Martin. [Waco, TX]: Word, 1982.

NB: Several of the above works are modernist rather than orthodox in their approach to Scripture.

Athanasius on Fundamentalism

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"I thank the Lord who has given to you to believe in Him, that you too may have eternal life with the saints. But because there are certain persons who, while they affirm that they do not hold with Arius, yet compromise themselves and worship with his party, I have been compelled to write at once . . . For when any see you, the faithful in Christ, associate and communicate with such people, certainly they will think it a matter of indifference and will fall into the mire of irreligion. Lest, then, this should happen, be pleased beloved to shun those who hold the impiety of Arius. We are specially bound to fly from the communion of men whose opinions we hold in execration. If then any come to you, and, as blessed John says, brings with him right doctrine, say to him, All hail, and receive him as a brother. But if any pretend that he confesses the right faith, but appear to communicate with those others, exhort him to abstain from such communion, and if he promise to do so, treat him as a brother, but if he persist in a contentious spirit, him avoid."

Letters of Athanasius, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, 4:564.

Tolerance apart from Morality no Virtue

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Tolerance in its conception took on the cast of a virtue because of its concern for the common good and its respect for people as persons. We endure particular customs, behaviors or habits—sometimes even (relatively) bad habits—of people in the interest of preserving a greater unity. In the Lockean context, tolerance was advocated for religious non-conformists. Never was it construed, however, to imply—much less sanction—morally questionable behavior. Consider, however, the devolution of a concept. What was a public virtue in its prior state becomes a vice if and when it ceases to care for truth, ignores the common good, and disdains the values that uphold a community. The culture of ‘tolerance’ in which we presently find ourselves is a culture in which people believe nothing, possess no clear concept of right and wrong, and are remarkably indifferent to this precarious state of affairs. As a result this transmutation of ‘tolerance’ becomes indistinguishable from an intractably intolerant relativism.

J. Daryl Charles, ‘Truth, Tolerance, and Christian Conviction: Reflections on a Perennial Question—a Review Essay," Christian Scholar’s Review 36 (2007): 212 in D. A. Carson, The Intolerance of Tolerance (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 75.

On the intellectual unseriousness of much secular discourse on moral issues

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"The charge of intolerance has come to wield enormous power in much of Western culture. . . . It functions as a ‘defeater belief.’ A defeater belief is a belief that defeats other beliefs—i.e., if you hold a defeater belief to be true "(whether it is true or not is irrelevant), you cannot possibly hold certain other beliefs to be true: the defeater belief rules certain other beliefs out of court and thus defeats them. . . . Put together several such defeater beliefs and make them widely popular, and you have created an implausibility structure: opposing beliefs are thought so implausible as to be scarcely worth listening to, let alone compelling or convincing." For this reason, "the new tolerance tends to avoid serious engagement over difficult moral issues, analyzing almost every issue on the one axis tolerant/intolerant, excluding all others from the pantheon of the virtuous who do not align with this axis."

D. A. Carson, The Intolerance of Tolerance (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 15.

Books finished in February 2012

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Books

Stapert, Calvin R. Handel’s Messiah: Comfort for God’s People. ChristianAudio, 2010.

Stapert begins this work by tracing the development of the oratorio and the development of Handel as a musician. He also discusses the changes in the performance of Messiah over the years from the smaller choirs and orchestras to massive settings in the nineteenth century and then back toward more authentic performances. The latter part of the book examines the Messiah itself. Stapert examines the organization of texts in the  libretto, and he discusses how Handel utilized various musical techniques to wed the text to music that enhances its meaning. This is the most fascinating part of the book as it explains how Handel harnessed both Baroque conventions and elements inherent in sound and music to communicate. The audiobook includes selections from the Messiah after some of the discussions. More selections would have been welcome Negatively, the reader of the book has an affected style of speech that made listening less enjoyable than it could have been. Thankfully, this was more pronounced at the beginning and less pronounced as the book went on.

Sandel, Michael J. Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.

Sandel does an excellent job of making complex philosophical issues clear and relevant through the many concrete examples that fill this book. His skill as an educator makes this book an enjoyable read. The content makes the book a worthwhile read.

Sandel argues that conceptions of justice are oriented "around three ideas: maximizing welfare, respecting freedom, and promoting virtue. Each of these ideas points to a different way of thinking about justice" (6). Among philosophers, the former two perspectives have proved the most popular, since justice that promotes virtue must judge what is virtuous and what is not—a difficult task in a pluralistic society with no agreed upon moral foundation. Sandel thus begins by examining utilitarianism and libertarianism.

Utilitarianism falls by the wayside in short order. It’s critics charge that it does not give adequate weight to human dignity and individual rights, and that it wrongly reduces everything of moral importance to a single scale of pleasure and pain" (49). John Stuart Mill sought to answer these critics, but Sandel demonstrates that in doing so he "appeals to moral ideals beyond utility—ideals of character and human flourishing" (52). Thus Mill’s attempted defense the "maximizing welfare" approach to justice ends up rooted in a "promoting virtue" approach.

Sandel spends a greater part of the book on the "respecting freedom" conception of justice. He does this with good reason, for while many debates about justice are debates about the three orientations (welfare, freedom, virtue), "some of the most hard-fought political arguments of our time take place between two rival camps within [the freedom group]—the laissez-faire camp and the fairness camp" (20). Since "the philosophies of Kant and Rawls represent the fullest and clearest expression of" the "ambition" to "spare politics and law from becoming embroiled in moral and religious controversies" (243), Sandel devotes a chapter to each. He concludes, however, that their "ambition cannot succeed.” He reasons, “Many of the most hotly contested issues of justice and rights can’t be debated without taking up controversial moral and religious questions. In deciding how to define the rights and duties of citizens, it’s not always possible to set aside competing conceptions of the good life. And even when it’s possible, it may not be desirable. Asking democratic citizens to leave their moral and religious convictions behind when they enter the public realm may seem a way of ensuring toleration and mutual respect. In practice, however, the opposite can be true. Deciding important public questions while pretending to a neutrality that cannot be achieved is a recipe for backlash and resentment. A politics emptied of substantive moral engagement makes for an impoverished civic life" (243).

Thus Aristotle and virtue-ethics come under consideration. This is the view that Sandel himself embraces: "Justice is inescapably judgmental" (261). This view is not a panacea to the conflict of values. Sandel supports abortion, embryonic stem cell research, and extending the definition of marriage to include pairings of the same sex. But he does not take these positions on the grounds that women have the right to choose (for they do not have the right to choose to kill their toddlers) or that it violates a homosexual’s freedom and rights to be denied marriage. Instead, he argues that participants in these discussions must determine the moral issues of whether an embryo or fetus are persons and what the telos of marriage is. The hard work of debating justice in particular instances remain, but Sandel has cleared away problematic general approaches and laid a foundation for those particular discussions to take place.

Keller, Timothy. Generous Justice: How God’s Grace Makes Us Just. New York: Dutton, 2010.

I started this book with chapter seven since the discussion of justice and Christian involvement in the public square coincided with a research project I was working on. In my estimation, this was the best chapter of the book. Keller mediates the insights of Sandel’s Justice and Steven Smith’s The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse through his own Christian understanding. In doing so he demonstrates that freedom, and equality, concepts closely related to justice, are "empty concepts." Freedom and equality are not simply good or bad. They are good or bad in relation to something else. In general, freedom to harm others is not good. But what is harm? Moral disagreement over what is or is not harm demonstrates the impossibility of value-neutral justice. To achieve true justice, Christian morality must enter the public square. Keller believes this is possible because secular theories of justice are each partially true due to the natural law that all people know. There is therefore the possibility of Christians and non-Christians working together for justice in the public square. Keller does not, like some natural law theorists, believe that the Bible must be left to one side. He believes that Scripture, including the Old Testament is relevant to current public policy debates (though he also steers clear of theonomy). In my estimation, this is the best chapter of the book.

The remainder of the book is mixed. Positively, Keller demonstrates that poverty is a concern to God. He addressed it in the legislation given to Israel. The prophets addressed injustice directed toward the poor in their denunciation of Israel’s sin, and Jesus maintained the same perspective in his preaching. In his discussions of helping the poor Keller conveys many helpful insights. For instance, he notes that a barrier to the poor receiving the gospel is raised if the poor hear their denounced by preachers but not the sins of those who oppress the poor. He also helpfully distinguishes between three levels of help: relief, development, and social reform. He notes that the church can help in the first and in lower levels of the second, but as development becomes more complex the institutional church should allow other institutions with more expertise to fulfill their roles in addressing those needs (and Christians should work in such institutions for Christian motivations). On the one hand, Keller says churches should "always try to err on the side of being generous" (138) as they consider helping their communities. On the other hand, he rejects the idea that doing justice is doing evangelism: "Evangelism is the most basic and radical ministry possible to a human being. This is true not because the spiritual is more important than the physical, but because the eternal is more important than the temporal" (139).

Negatively, though Keller is right that historically the poor are more often treated unjustly, his exclusive focus on rendering justice to the poor in chapters 1-6 skews the discussion. Keller’s exhortations to generosity are scriptural, but prudential guidelines on how that generosity is practiced is also biblical (1 Tim. 5).

Keller also seems to think that not giving to the poor is an injustice. But the fact that Matt. 6:1-2 teaches that giving to the needy is righteous does not necessarily mean that it is a matter of justice rather than charity. To be a matter of justice means that the individual has a right to my giving to him (based on Wolterstorff’s theory of justice, which Keller builds upon). But in what way does a poor person have a right to my giving to him? Which poor people? How much? Keller would be better off following Wolterstorff on the issue of charity. Charity is not a matter of giving the poor his rights; it is a matter of fulfilling obligations to God.

Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Justice: Rights and Wrongs. Princeton University Press, 2008.

Wolterstoff’s premise is that justice is a matter of rendering to people their rights. He defends this thesis against those who argue that the rights focus is the bad fruit of the Enlightenment. To the contrary, says Wolterstorff. In a fascinating historical survey he demonstrates that the theory of rights-grounded justice emerged in the medieval period. He continues to move backward through history to demonstrate that the Bible, though not developing a philosophic theory of justice, implies a rights-based approach.

What do people have rights to? Here Wolterstorff argues against the eudaimonistic approach to ethics (he also rejects the deontological and consequentialist approaches) on the grounds that it is incompatible with a rights-based approach to justice. The Christian, vision, he argues is one not merely a well-lived life but an anticipation of flourishing, or shalom, in all aspects of life. Thus the love command grounds Christian ethics.

What is the grounding for rights? Wolterstorff argues that duties, capacities, and even the image of God in man cannot provide a grounding for natural human rights. He argues that human rights are bestowed by God in that he loves all humans.

In general, I enjoyed following Wolterstoff’s argumentation, and I learned a great deal about philosophy and ethics along the way. I’m open to his thesis about justice being grounded in rights, though I’d like to read some further interaction from scholars who take the other positions. I was not persuaded, however, with his dismissal of the image of God as the basis for natural human rights. His discussion of the image itself was excellent. He seemed to build a fairly good case for the image as the basis of these rights before dismissing the idea with little argumentation. It was a strange turn. Overall, I found the book a very profitable read.

Shaw, Mark. The Kingdom of God in Africa: A Short History of African Christianity. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996.

Shaw provides a good short history of Christianity in Africa from a generally evangelical perspective. He is strongest when simply relating historical events. He is weakest when providing analysis. He is not theologically discriminating enough about the orthodoxy of various forms of Christianity. Nonetheless, this is a recommended read for anyone who wants a basic overview of African Christianity from the first century through the late 1990s.

MacArthur, John. Slave: The Hidden Truth About Your Identity in Christ. Nashville: Nelson, 2010. [skimmed]

The sensationalism on the dust jacket and in opening chapters prevented me form paying this book much attention for some time. As even MacArthur’s own comments demonstrate there has been no "fraud" or "cover-up" or anything "purposely hidden" by Bible translators. MacArthur rightly notes that older English translations used the word "servant" because of its connections to the Latin word for slave "servus" and because "slave" in the early modern era meant something different that slavery at that time. It is for this reason that many modern translations opt for an alternative such as "bond-servant" (17-18). Once the sensationalism was cleared away, my skim showed that MacArthur did produce a helpful treatment of what it means for Christians to be bond servants of Christ. MacArthur drew heavily on Murray Harris’s Slave of Christ in the NSBT series. For those looking for a more in-depth treatment of the topic, Harris’s book is the one to turn to.

Gowan, Donald E. Eschatology in the Old Testament. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986.

Gowan helpfully identifies the big categories of Old Testament eschatology: The transformation of human society, the human person, and nature. He also rightly sees Jerusalem at the center of Old Testament eschatology. His development of these themes was, in my estimation, disappointing. He takes a Childs-type approach to the text. Though this leads him to focus on the final form of the text, he nevertheless does so in terms of what he thinks the religious state of Israel was at the time. So, to give only two examples, he denies that bodily resurrection is significant to OT eschatology and he thinks messianic ideas are of little importance. Nonetheless, his insight that Ezekiel 36 contains all the elements of OT eschatology is worth pondering.

The structure of his work along with the Scripture he references is useful:

Transformation of Human Society

Restoration to the Promised Land: Isa. 27:13; 35:10; 51:11; 60:4; 66:20; Jer 3:14; 32:37; Ezek 20:33-44; 37:26; Joel 3:20; Mic 4:6-7, 10; Zeph. 3:20; Zech. 2:7; 8:7-8.

 

The Righteous King: Isa. 11:9; 44:28; Jer. 33:16; Zech 4:5-10; 6:12-13; 9:9-10.

 

The Nations (victory over): Isa 34:8; Joel 3:1-21; Obadiah 16; Mic. 4:11-13; Zech. 1:14-15; 12:2-9; 14:1-3, 12-19.

 

The Nations (peace with): Isa 2:2-4 = Mic. 4:1-4.

 

The Nations (conversion of): Isa. 66:18-23; Jer. 3:17; Zech. 2:11; 8:20-23.

 

Transformation of the Human Person

Eschatological Forgiveness: Isa. 33:24; 40:2; Ezek. 20:40-44; 43:7-9; Zech. 13:1; cf. repentance in Isa. 59:20; Jer. 39:10-14; Ezek. 16:59-62.

 

The means of Re-Creation: Isa. 30:20-21; 59:21; Jer. 32:39-40 (cf. v. 36—city).

 

The New Person: Isa. 33:24; 35:5-6 (cf. v. 10—Zion); 65:20; Jer. 33:6; 50:5; Ezek. 16:60; Joel 3:17.

 

Transformation of Nature

Abundant Fertility: Isa. 4:2; Joel 2:23; 3:17-18.

 

A New Natural Order: Isa. 11:6-9; 65:25.

 

A New Earth: Isa. 35:1-10; 65:17-18; Ezek. 47:1-12; Zech. 14:4-8, 10.

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Wright, Nigel G. Free Church, Free State: The Positive Baptist Vision. Paternoster, 2005.

I found Wright most helpful in arguing for believers baptism and a gathered church ecclesiology. I found him less helpful in his section on government. He leans toward an anabaptist view in which the state is defined in terms of having the monopoly on sanctioned violence. Since, in his view, Christians are committed to following Christ in a path of non-violence, Christians who serve in state capacities place themselves in a difficult position. His ecumenical leanings also show through at various places throughout the book, so a section on religious tolerance in society is followed by a section on tolerance within the church.

Johnson, Julian. Who Needs Classical Music? Cultural Choice and Musical Value. Oxford University Press, 2002.

Johnson argues against the currently popular view that cultures and cultural choices are relative. He argues that far from cultural choices being matters of mere preference, some cultural choices are more valuable than others. More specifically, he argues that classical music has more cultural value than pop music. This is in part because it requires a level of thought and a way of thinking not demanded by pop music. To those who charge Johnson with elitism, he replies that the way to counter elitism is not to bring everyone down to the lowest common denominator. The way to counter elitism is to ensure that education (in this case in classical music) is provided to people of every walk of life.

Veenhof, Jan. Nature and Grace in Herman Bavinck. Translated by Albert M. Wolters. Sioux Center, IA: Dordt College Press, 2006.

The essence of Bavinck’s view, as explicated by Veenhof is that "Grace does not abolish nature, but affirms and restores it" (17). In expounding this view, Bavinck sets his view apart from both Roman Catholicism and Protestant pietism. According to Bavinck, Roman Catholicism teaches that nature is good, but that it does not reach to the supernatural. Grace is needed to elevate nature to the supernatural. The Protestant conception of grace, Bavinck says, is ethical. The purpose of grace is to remove sin, not to raise man above his nature.

Bavinck’s disagreement with the Pietists rests not on their understanding of the nature of grace but with their understanding of its extent. The danger Bavinck sees in pietism is that the grace, the gospel, and salvation is placed in a personal spiritual sphere and the rest of culture and life is placed an another sphere. But sin has invaded all of life, and man must function in all of life, not just in the spiritual part. The pietist therefore is in danger of aiding and abetting secularism. His critique is not one-sided, however. Bavinck realizes that the pietists have seen the real dangers of "unbridled and unbroken cultural optimism" (29). They also have centered their attention on "the one thing needful"—personal fellowship with God (30). Bavinck appeals to his readers to maintain this as the center of the Christian life while also recognizing that as a human other aspects of life are good, necessary, and in need of grace.

To state Bavinck’s view positively, nature is the good creation of God, but it has been pervasively affected by sin (thus the negative use of "world" in Scripture). This corruption is not something essential to nature, but (in Aristotelian terms), accidental. Thus God’s grace will restore nature (but merely by a return to Eden but in eventually achieving the goal God had for his creation from the beginning).

Jordan, William Chester. Europe in the High Middle Ages. Penguin, 2004.

Jordan’s history of the high middle ages is less detailed than Chris Wickham’s study of the previous era (both are in the Penguin History of Europe). Jordan is much more readable, however. His chapters can be read in a sitting and provide a good overview of the time and place covered. He does a good job of covering both what some historians seem to consider the "core" of Europe: Holy Roman Empire, France, Britain along with what they seem to consider fringes: Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. Jordan also covers the Crusader kingdoms in Middle East. Jordan did not cover religion as deeply as Wickham, though he does have brief coverage of both the investiture controversy and the realism/nominalism controversy.

Articles

Harmless, William. "Confessions." In Augustine in His Own Words. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010.

Harmless, William. "Augustine the Philosopher." In Augustine in His Own Words. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010.

Harmless does a good job of selecting significant selections that exemplify key aspects of Augustine’s thought and of selecting important excerpts from his major works. Brief commentary places each selection in context.

Justice requires virtue, not merely freedom to choose

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Does a just society seek to promote the virtue of its citizens? Or should law be neutral toward competing conceptions of virtue, so that citizens can be free to choose for themselves the best way to live?

 

According to the textbook account, this question divides ancient and modern political thought. In one important respect, the textbook is right. Aristotle teaches that justice means giving people what they deserve. And in order to determine who deserves what, we have to determine what virtues are worthy of honor and reward. Aristotle maintains that we can’t figure out what a justice constitution is without first reflecting on the most desirable way of life. For him, law can’t be neutral on questions of the good life.

 

By contrast, modern philosophers—from Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century to John Rawls in the twentieth century—argue that the principles of justice that define our rights should not rest on any particular conception of virtue or, or of the best way to live. Instead, a just society respects each person’s freedom to choose his or her own conception of the good life. So you might say that ancient theories of justice start with virtue, while modern theories start with freedom. . . . But it’s worth noticing at the outset that this contrast can mislead.

 

For if we turn our gaze to the arguments about justice that animate contemporary politics—not among philosophers but among ordinary men and women—we find a more complicated picture. It’s true that most of our arguments are about promoting prosperity and respecting individual freedom, at least on the surface. But underlying these arguments, and sometimes contending with them, we can often glimpse another set of convictions—about what virtues are worthy of honor and reward, and what way of life a good society should promote. Devoted though we are to prosperity and freedom, we can’t quite shake off the judgmental strand of justice. The conviction that justice involves virtue as well as choice runs deep. Thinking about justice seems inescapably to engage us in thinking about the best way to live." 9-10

Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 9-10.

Books and Articles Finished in January

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Books

Lunde, Jonathan. Following Jesus, the Servant King: A Biblical Theology of Covenantal Discipleship. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011.

Jonathan Lunde expounds the biblical covenants, the Christian’s relation to the law, the Kingdom of God, and Christology in the service of laying the foundations for faithful Christian living. The themes that Lunde has selected to form the theological basis of this work are ones that theologians and biblical scholars have long recognized as among the most important in Scripture. Sadly very few lay-level books have approached these themes. Lunde’s work nicely fills this gap. What is more, despite the complexity and disagreements that surround these issues, Lunde, for the most part, arrives at what I believe to be the best interpretation. For instance, though he believes all of the biblical covenants are grounded in grace, he also recognizes that the Mosaic covenant differs from the others by providing stipulations with blessings and curses. The others are gift covenants. Lunde also does a good job handling the issue of the law’s relation to the believer and noting both the continuities and the discontinuities involved.

Throughout the whole, Lunde makes applications to the Christian life. He structures the book around three questions: (1) "Why should I be concerned to obey all of Jesus’ commands if I have been saved by grace?" (2) "What is it that Jesus demands of his disciples?" (3) How can the disciple obey Jesus’ high demand while experiencing his ‘yoke’ as ‘light’ and ‘easy’?"

In answer to his first question Lunde expounds the biblical covenants. He notes that they are all grounded in grace, that certain of the covenants are unconditional in nature, and yet that all the covenants maintain expectations for both parties. Thus even though Jesus has fulfilled the new covenant’s requirements, this does not relieve the Christian of his duties toward God. In answer to the second question Lunde primarily expounds the law as it had been transformed by the arrival of Jesus. He notes that while Jesus has fulfilled the law, the expectations on believers are now higher, not lower. In answer to the third question, Lunde focuses on the enabling grace given to believers in the new covenant.

Overall, Lunde does an excellent job of maintaining a grace focus and recognizing the responsibilities that are vital to Christian discipleship. As with any book, a few weaknesses do emerge. I’m not convinced of the idea that Genesis presents two Abrahamic covenants, one conditional and one unconditional. Nor was I convinced by his argument that the servant in Isaiah 53 is first Israel and then ultimately Christ; furthermore, this lengthy digression didn’t advance the point he was making in that section of the book. Finally, some of his mission talk, though brief, seemed loose.

The strengths of this work far outweigh its weaknesses. It deserves a wide reading since it will both inform lay readers of important but neglected aspects of biblical teaching while at the same time relating practically to their daily Christian walk.

Tripp, Paul David. What Did You Expect? Redeeming the Realities of Marriage. Wheaton: Crossway, 2010.

The strength of this book is that it offers no secrets to a happy marriage. Tripp instead presents basic biblical teaching about sanctification and applies it to marriage. Tripp is correct to present sanctification as something at which Christians must work, but he also rightly highlights the grace of God as that which enables Christians to progress in sanctification. If there is a weakness it is Tripp’s tendency to repeat himself. Sometimes this reinforces points; other times it does not seem as effective.

Forsythe, Clarke D. Politics for the Greatest Good: The Case for Prudence in the Public Square. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2009.

The first chapter bears the weight of the subtitle. It is there that a case is argued philosophically/theologically for the role of prudence in politics. This is followed by three chapters of example: American founders, Wilberforce, and Lincoln. Chapter 5 responds to Colin Harte’s Changing Unjust Laws Justly, a book that stands in direct opposition to Forsythe’s proposal. The final two chapters apply his insights to abortion and related issues. I found the first chapter the most interesting (and convincing) and wish he had taken more space to make the argument he made there.

Aniol, Scott. Sound Worship: A Guide to Making Musical Choices in a Noisy World. Religious Affections Ministries, 2010.

Though he is swimming against the flow in many areas, I believe Scott is absolutely correct on his main points. His treatment of the sufficiency of Scripture is especially well done. He corrects some common misapprehensions about the doctrine that have become popular despite lacking biblical support, let alone a informed understanding of the doctrine’s history. His chapter on evaluating musical communication also provides an excellent paradigm that works not only for making music choices but also for guiding choices in every area of the Christian life. I also find myself inclined toward his view that beauty is not simply subjective, but that was one part of the book where I desired more argumentation. I look forward to reading Scott’s larger book as well as Roger Scruton’s book on beauty. In all, this is an edifying book on a controversial topic because it generates more light than heat. Even if there were no controversy (and may that be so in the future), Scott’s book would remain a useful guide for applying the Scripture to music, worship, and life.

Carson, D. A. Christ and Culture Revisited. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008.

Niebuhr’s typology is reductionistic: this is Carson’s primary point in Christ and Culture Revisited. Since most of Niebuhr’s types are grounded in some part of revelation, Carson argues that it is wrong to force people to choose between them. Rather, insofar as they are biblical, each type contributes to an overall biblical view. Carson also critiques several other approaches to the Christianity and culture debate and addresses related issues like democracy or church and state relations at greater depth. Again in these discussions Carson’s goal seems to be to combat reductionisms.

Two critiques: In his final chapter Carson lists "fundamentalism" as one response to culture. However, the fundamentalism he described sounded to my ears more like a certain strand of evangelicalism. Some fundamentalists may have fit in that category, but many others would better fit in some of the other options listed in that chapter. Since both fundamentalism and evangelicalism are "big tent" movements, neither is monolithic on these issues.

More significantly, as much as I benefited from Carson’s incisive critiques, I think the book would have benefited from a positive vision. This appeared at places, but it was never brought together. As a result Carson’s careful critiques could lead merely to the conclusion that this situation is complex and multifaceted.

Neither of these critiques vitiate the real value of the book. The reductionisms that Carson combats need combatting. His careful discussions of the biblical storyline, democracy, church and state, postmodernism, etc. are tremendously helpful.

Hiebert, Paul G. The Gospel in Human Contexts: Anthropological Explorations for Contemporary Missions. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2009.

This book provides an introductory-level view to contextualization and anthropology. It is helpful when read discerningly. Negatively, it seemed to be a collection of articles without a unifying argument.

Wickham, Chris. The Inheritance of Rome: Illuminating the Dark Ages 400-1000. New York: Viking, 2009.

Wickham’s work on the early middle ages does an excellent job of presenting the reader with the political, cultural, and religious history of the period. He covers a wide geographical range that includes the Middle East and North Africa. At the beginning of the book he does an excellent job of showing the continuities and discontinuities that existed after the Roman Empire. In many ways culture did not drastically change since the barbarians were Romanized, but politically the state fragmented and the tax and trade structure fell apart, which did affect aspects of culture such as architecture. Wickham’s coverage of religion, especially the iconoclastic controversy, was also well done. His weakness, as others have pointed out, is a large amount of detail with little summarization that attempts to bring things together. Though this is, in his view, a strength that maintains the purity of the history, it does make it difficult to retain all the information provided.

McPherson, James. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

According to the cover the Washington Post Book World declared The Battle Cry of Freedom, "The finest single volume on the [Civil] war and its background." This strikes me as an accurate assessment. McPherson covered equally well the political, cultural, and military aspects of this decisive period in American history.

Saucy, Robert L. The Case for Progressive Dispensationalism. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1993.

The title of this work may obscure the extent of what Saucy covers in this book. The first chapter does deal with the differences between dispensational theologies and between dispensational and non-dispensational theologies. But the rest of the book is not so much a cumulative case as studies of key biblical issues from Saucy’s dispensational perspective. One part of the book looks at several of the biblical covenants as well as the theme of the kingdom in Scripture. Another part of the book examines aspects of ecclesiology. The final section of the book looks at the purpose of Israel in God’s plan, prophecies about Israel in the OT and NT, and the fulfillment of those prophecies. A book that covers this range is difficult to summarize. Suffice it to say that I found the book full of exegetical and theological insights and that I took more notes from this book than any other that I’ve recently read.

Budziszewski, J. Evangelicals in the Public Square: Four Formative Voices on Political Thought and Action. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006.

Budziszewski here provides a review of four evangelical thinkers (Henry, Kuyper, Schaeffer, and Yoder) with the conclusion that natural law theory is the missing element of Evangelical political interaction. I’m not convinced of the thesis, but Budziszewski is always enjoyable to read, and I found myself gleaning a good amount of helpful information along the way.

Chapell, Bryan. Why Do We Baptize Infants? Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2006.

Foundational to Chapell’s argument for infant baptism is an equation between the Abrahamic covenant and the Covenant of Grace (interestingly, Chapell did not use the Covenant of Grace language, but his argument ran along the same lines in that he concluded that believers are under the Abrahamic covenant). While Christians today participate in many aspects of the Abrahamic covenant, and while we can truly be called sons of Abraham, it does not follow that the Abrahamic covenant in its entirety is our covenant or is equated to a Covenant of Grace. The Abrahamic covenant includes national aspects that relate to the nation of Israel and not to the church. It seems patent, then, that the Abrahamic covenant in its entirety is not applicable to the church.

This being so, Chappell cannot assume, as he does, that baptism replaces circumcision as the covenant sign of a Covenant of Grace. This misunderstands the movement from a national covenant that included a mixture of regenerate and unregenerate people within the same covenant to the new covenant which is not a national covenant but is a covenant for the regenerate alone. Thus the NT brings about the end of circumcision while not ever equating it with baptism.

The best treatment of these issues that I’ve read is Stephen J. Wellum, "Relationship between the Covenants,” in Believer’s Baptism: Sign of the New Covenant in Christ , ed. Thomas R. Schreiner and Shawn Wright (Nashville: B&H, 2007), 154-55. [This chapter is available for free here.]

Owen, John. The Works of John Owen: Volume VI [Temptation and Sin]. Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 1967.

The first book bound in this volume, "The Mortification of Sin in Believers," is probably the best book written on how to war war against sin. It is worthy of being read often. The other books bound with it, "Of Temptation," "The Nature, Power, Deceit, and Prevalency of the Remainders of Indwelling Sin in Believers," and "A Practical Exposition upon Psalm CXXX," do not rise to the same level, but they too are worth reading. The latter, on one of my favorite Psalms, is a classic Puritan exposition, moving form detailed work on the words of the passage in Hebrew through to doctrine and practical application given at length under multiple subheadings.

Articles

Grudem, Wayne. "Pleasing God by Our Obedience: A Neglected New Testament Teaching." In For the Fame of God’s Name: Essays in Honor of John Piper. Edited by Sam Storms and Justin Taylor. Wheaton: Crossway, 2010.

Grudem says, "This topic seems important to me because I think that evangelicals today are generally afraid of teaching about ‘pleasing God by obedience,’ for fear of sounding as if they disagree with justification by faith alone. But when the need to please God by obedience is neglected, we have millions of Christians in our churches who fail to see the importance of obedience in their daily lives" (273). Grudem surveys the NT to show that pleasing God by obedience is a significant theme in the NT and that it is not contradictory to justification by faith alone. He rightly argues that sanctification, unlike justification, involves not only God’s enabling grace but also our working. Grudem demonstrates from the NT that our obedience pleases God and our disobedience displeases him (though displeasure and discipline do not remove God’s love for his children). Grudem faithfully captures the full balance of the NT’s teaching by noting that obedience to God brings great blessing but also may lead us down paths of suffering.

Kuyper, Abraham. "Calvinism and Politics." In Lectures on Calvinism. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1931.

In this lecture Kuyper expounds his view of sphere sovereignty. The government, social institutions, and the church each gain their authority directly from God and therefore government should not seek to usurp the rights of society or church. It does police the boundaries between the various spheres. Kuyper’s view of sphere sovereignty commits him to the ideal of a free church. He also condemns earlier Calvinists for advocating state-enforced adherence to their confession. Kuyper’s theorizing is interesting, but he does not seem to have firm exegetical support for his major concepts.

Michael J. McClymond and Gerald R. McDermott, "Public Theology, Society, and America." In The Theology of Jonathan Edwards. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Helpfully outlines Edwards view of the roles of government (1. "secure property," 2. "protect citizens’ rights," 3. "maintain order," 4. "ensure justice," 5. "national defense," 6. "make good laws against immorality," 7. "help the poor," 8. give "support to true religion."), his views of good and bad patriotism, and his views on slavery, the slave trade, and race

Is Law-Keeping Legalism?

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Edwards concluded Religious Affections by answering the objection that this emphasis on practice might seem like a new legalism. To the contrary, he said, it was all carefully premised on standard Calvinist doctrine that a genuine work of grace would lead to keeping God’s commandments. Edwards was dedicated to the old New England way that celebrated grace and lived by law.

George Marsden, Jonathan Edwards: A Life, 289

Books and Articles Finished in December

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Books

Forster, Greg. Starting with Locke. New York: Continuum, 2011.

The publisher says that the "Starting with . . . series offers clear, concise and accessible introductions to the key thinkers in philosophy." Greg Forster lived up to this expectation in Starting with Locke. He helpfully positioned Locke in his historical setting and then showed how his philosophy emerged through wrestling with the major issues of his day in England. According to Forster, England in Locke’s time was politically tumultuous because the religion of the nation was tied to the religion of the rulers. As the rulers moved between Catholicism and Protestantism, the politics of England became bloody. Upon a visit to Cleves, a city in Germany that due to a strange confluence of circumstances practiced religious toleration, Locke realized that religious toleration, far from exacerbating political tensions, would ease them. In his epistemology, Locke seeks to drive his readers to admit the limits of what they can know. Given this, people should be slow to impose their beliefs on others. This does not mean that Locke was not a Christian (though his silence on certain points have raised questions as to what kind of Christian) or that he did not believe the Bible to be revelation from God. He did believe the Bible was God’s revelation. But he believed that natural law, rather than Scriptural revelation, ought to serve as the basis for a societies common morality. This obviated the need for a common religion. The other major question that Locke addressed was who has the right to rule. He argued from Gen. 1:26-28 that all men are given the right of dominion over the earth. Contrary to divine-right theorists, Locke argued that no one could prove a heredity right to rule through a certain line of persons from Adam. Thus if all had the right to rule, then the investiture of that right in an organized government must occur with the consent of the governed, if only tacitly. This therefore underlies Locke’s theory that rebellion is justified when a government violates its trust and turns from a government into a tyranny. Forster closes the book by reflecting on the present political situation in the United States. Here he has two main concerns. First there is a great breakdown of moral consensus on issues far more fundamental than those Locke faced. Second, he notes a divide in American society between those who think of politics from a Lockean perspective (mainly on the right) and those (mainly on the left) who approach it from the perspective of John Stuart Mill. Forster worries that Americans will slip into a kind of confessionalism in which morality (from left or right) is imposed from a particular viewpoint or move into a society in which the "state may simply give up trying to justify itself morally." To avoid these Forster says we must find some way to "maintain moral consensus without religious consensus."

Welch, Edward T. Blame It on the Brain: Distinguishing Chemical Imbalances, Brain Disorders, and Disobedience (Resources for Changing Lives). P & R Pub., 1998.

Welch’s Blame It on the Brain? is a good lay-level introduction to mind-body issues in a counseling context. The details he leaves to other resources (e.g., for the theological debate about dualism vs. monism he refers readers to Cooper’s Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting), but the framework he provides is very helpful. Welch’s basic thesis is that the brain never causes people to sin. Brain injuries may remove the abilities of some to restrain the impulses of a sinful heart, but the brain is not forcing people to sin. In areas less traumatic than head injury, Welch argues that the brain may make certain temptations stronger but that this does not remove the responsibility to resist temptation. Welch does recognize that the complexity of mind-body issues may mean attempting to treat medical aspects of a problem medically and spiritual aspects of the problem biblically.

McCullough, David G. 1776. Simon and Schuster, 2005. [Audio Book]

McCullough knows how to write engaging history. I enjoyed the audio book, narrated by the author.

Austen, Jane. Emma. New York: Modern Library, 2001.

Jacobs, Alan. Original Sin: A Cultural History. New York: HarperOne, 2008.

Jacobs’ work is similar to a historical theology of original sin. He outlines how the doctrine emerged, its historical context, and the thinking of the theologians who formulated and defended it. But Jacobs’ cultural history is much more than a historical theology. He also looks at broader cultural reactions to the doctrine of original sin and cultural events (such as utopianism) in light of original sin. G. K. Chesterton once marveled that people doubted the doctrine of original sin since it is the one doctrine open to empirical verification. Jacobs’ broad cultural sweep seems intended, in part, to document the verification.

Murray, Iain H. David Martyn Lloyd-Jones: The First Forty Years 1899-1939. Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 1982.

Iain Murray always writes biographies for the purpose of edification. This does not mean that he writes hagiographies or that he tolerates historical inaccuracies. It does mean that his biographies are no mere record of events. He attempts, as much as is possible with external records, to chart not only the life events but also the spiritual and theological growth of his subjects. Lloyd-Jones is without a doubt a worthy subject for such a biography. His growing conviction that the world and the church needs not political triumph, engaging drama to draw in crowds, or a new program to bring in the unchurched but that the world and the church need doctrinal preaching needs special enunciation today. Even in many theologically-conservative Reformed circles the church marketing mood of broader evangelicalism has replaced the conviction that mankind has changed only on the surface and therefore the church need not discover a new method or program to reach the lost. This message is found in many of Lloyd-Jones’ sermons, but Murray, in biographical form, contextualizes these convictions so that it becomes plain that they were coupled with loving personal attention to the members of his congregation and community.

Articles

Carson, D. A. “Spiritual Disciplines.” Themelios 36, no. 3 (2011): 377-79.

An excellent, brief article that defines what it means to be spiritual (to have received the Holy Spirit through the new covenant) and thoughts about labeling and practicing of spiritual disciplines (e.g., "unmediated, mystical knowledge of God is unsanctioned by Scripture, and is dangerous"; not every Christian responsibility is a spiritual discipline—a means of grace in conforming us to God).

Hoehner, Harold W. "Jesus’ Last Supper." In Essays in Honor of J. Dwight Pentecost,. Edited by Stanley D. Toussaint and Charles H. Dyer. Chicago: Moody, 1986.

A helpful essay which deals with chronology and background

Weithman, Paul. "Nicholas Wolterstorff’s Justice: Rights and Wrongs: An Introduction," Journal of Religious Ethics 37, no. 2 (2009):179-92.

A summary of Wolterstorff’s book with some comments about the articles to follow

O’Donovan, Oliver. "The Language of Rights and Conceptual History." Journal of Religious Ethics 37, no. 2 (2009): 193-207.

O’Donovan identifies three problems with Wolterstorff’s approach to justice. First, "a political problem with the language of rights, which is its apparent serviceability to the subversion of working orders of law and justice" (194). In other words, a rights approach to justice lends itself to revolutions. Second, "a conceptual problem with the language of rights: it appears to be in conflict with the language of right" (194). By this O’Donovan is asserting his counter-view that rights derive from what is right, or that moral order precedes rather than is derived from rights. Third, "a historical problem: the use of the word [rights] in the plural is not found in the ancient world" (195). By establishing this final assertion O’Donovan says that he calls in question Wolterstorff’s attempt to claim that while the Bible does not speak of justice in terms of individual rights, it presupposes the idea. For instance, Wolterstorff says that the wronging of individuals in Scripture implies they had rights that were violated; O’Donovan says this only means that a wrong (a violation of moral order) occurred. Why does this matter? The difference, says O’Donovan is of moral ontology: "Multiple rights expresses a plural ontology of difference, the difference between each right-bearer and every other, instead of a unitary ontology of human likeness. Suum cuique, to each his own, is their formula for justice, not similia similibus, like treatment for like cases. This has the effect of setting what is due to each above every idea of moral order" (202). Another way of putting this is that for Wolterstorff murder is wrong because of the other’s right to life; for O’Donovan he has a right to life because murder is wrong. Finally, O’Donovan criticizes Wolterstorff for cutting the tie between justice and righteousness. In O’Donovan’s words, Wolterstorff says that morality "is not confined to the language of rights" whereas "justice is based on rights, and justice is based only on rights." Thus the link between morality and justice, between righteousness and justice, have been severed.

Attridge, Harold W. "Wolterstorf, Rights, Wrongs, and the Bible." Journal of Religious Ethics 37, no. 2 (2009): 209-19

Attridge is sympathetic to Wolterstorf’s position, but he concludes from a survey of δικαιω- words that Luke’s emphasis is on conformity to what God requires rather than on fulfilling obligations to neighbors in recognition of their rights. (Less related to Wolterstorff’s thesis, Attridge notes that Wolterstorff’s preference for δικ- words to be translated in terms of justice rather than righteousness moves the focus from virtue to objective rights and wrongs. Attrdridge is more sympathetic translating these terms with "righteousness" language, while still acknowledging a justice aspect.) Attridge thinks that Luke’s material is compatible with Wolterstorff’s approach, but he doesn’t think that Luke himself was thinking in terms of rights-based justice.

Moo, Douglas J. "A Review of John M. Frame, Doctrine of the Christian Life (A Theology of Lordship Series; Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), ETS National Conference, New Orleans, 2009.

See previous post.

Colin J. Humphreys, "The Number of People in the Exodus from Egypt: Decoding Mathematically the Very Large Numbers in Numbers I and XXVI," Vetus Testamentum 48, no. 2 (1999): 196-213.

Humphreys presents a fairly detailed and conservative argument for understanding ‘elp as "troop" rather than "thousand" to reduce the large numbers in Exodus and Numbers. But in the end he resorts to conjectural emendations which I find less plausible than the solutions to the main objections to large numbers that he raised in the first place.

Review of Douglas Moo’s Review of John Frame’s Doctrine of the Christian Life

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Andy Naselli recently posted a review of John Frame’s The Doctrine of the Christian Life by Douglas Moo. If Moo or Frame write a book, I tend to purchase it and attempt to read it. I found it interesting, therefore to read a review by the one of a book by the other. I also found surprising , given the influence of both of these authors on my own thinking, the amount of disagreement highlighted by Moo.

My thoughts on their disagreements are as follows:

I find myself more in agreement with Frame than with Moo in the section on Sola Scriptura. Having read a fair bit on natural law in the past few months I’m convinced that Van Til and Frame have a very high view of natural law that comports well with Paul’s use of it in Romans while at the same time recognizing the limitations and difficulties of natural law argumentation. Frame in DCL demonstrates quite easily that certain natural law arguments divorced from Scripture are fairly unconvincing (the Roman Catholic arguments against contraception are the example that come most readily to mind). Moo wonders if the Van Tillian/Framian approach will cripple efforts in the public square. Frame does address that point: he notes that when speaking in the public square, one need not cite Scripture to make one’s arguments; his point was simply that a Christian should be dubious about natural law arguments for ethical positions if those positions lack support in Scripture. Also in response to Moo one could note that natural law arguments are often not given any more respect in the public square than Scripture arguments. [For two recent articles that address these issues, see Paul D. Miller, “Christ and Culture: Engaging the World,” The City (Summer 2011): 39-57; Dan Strange, “Not Ashamed! The Sufficiency of Scripture for Public Theology,” Themelios 36, no. 2 (Aug 2011): 238-60.]

Regarding adiaphora, I find myself in sympathy with Frame’s general direction. Moo’s caveat is significant, but I think Christians would be better served by approaching their lives in general as if large categories of adiaphora did not exist. In other words, Moo may be more technically correct, but the general attitude that Frame’s approach fosters may be more fruitful.

Regarding William Webb, I am in firm agreement with Frame. I find it surprising, and even disturbing, that so many top evangelical NT scholars praise Webb’s problematic approach. Frame is correct that "Webb’s approach violates the authority of Scripture . . . , since it allows us to do what Scripture forbids, and denies the sufficiency of Scripture . . . , since it requires us to find ultimate principles of ethics outside of Scripture—principles of authority equal to or greater than those of Scripture" (641). One could add that Webb’s view also profoundly misunderstands why the transitions that do take place from Old Covenant to New Covenant did take place. These systematic theology issues must be reckoned with before Webb’s hermeneutical proposals can be seriously entertained. Moo raises his own set of questions to Frame: "Why, since the biblical writers explicitly speak to Christian slave owners about their responsibilities, do they not simply forbid Christians to own slaves? Were the biblical writers suddenly overcome with a case of “cultural cowardice,” reluctant to tackle a moral evil because it was so deeply rooted in their culture? Or were the biblical writers themselves not fully aware of the implications of the principles they themselves enunciated?" It seems that these questions are more easily answered than the theological questions raised about Webb’s approach. Second, Frame does offer some brief answers to Moo’s questions. In his discussion of Greco-Roman slavery (658-60) Frame notes that it was not cultural cowardice but lack of cultural power that caused Christians not to tackle the problem of slavery in the first century. Frame also implies that it may be that early Christians were not fully aware of the implications of their principles. Related to this, it must be granted that the horrors of slavery may be more thoroughly impressed on the modern mind than on the ancient mind. There is also the ethical issue of how to deal with systemic injustice. Are there times when one tries to mitigate the evil rather than seek (fruitlessly) to eliminate it immediately. What would the effects be of all Christians freeing their slaves immediately? Would they have been better than all Christians beginning to treat their slaves as image bearers of God? In other words, the slavery question raises complicated issues, but other answers than Webb’s theologically problematic hermeneutic are available.

On issues of Frame’s use of the law and the Decalogue, I find myself divided. I am in greater agreement with Moo’s framework for how the law relates to the new covenant believer than with Frame’s. In other words, I agree with Moo that the Mosaic law is not binding on the new covenant believer. He is not under that covenant. And yet within that framework, I think that Frame’s insistence on the continuing relevance of the OT law is important. It seems to me that the NT authors do make a great deal of use of the OT law in orienting Christians to their responsibilities. It seems that an understanding of both the OT law and the redemptive-historical transformations are necessary for Christians to develop the mind of Christ in all sorts of areas not directly addressed in Scripture.

I am similarly sympathetic with Moo’s criticism of Frame’s attempt to root all ethical commands in the Decalogue. However, the fact that some OT scholars think that other parts of the law, especially Deuteronomy, follow the outline of the Decalogue in broad strokes prevents me from entirely dismissing the approach of Frame and the tradition in which he stands. In regards to the appropriateness of the Decalogue as a framework for NT ethics, the Decalogue overall focuses broadly on commands that remain valid across the convents. In this way it seems similar to the two greatest commandments. Thus while largely agreeing with Moo’s approach to law issues, I’m willing to value and benefit from Reformed authors who use the Decalogue as a framework for NT ethics.

Finally, Moo criticizes Frame for his focus on the normative perspective. On the one hand, there is little that I would want to see cut from Frame’s 1,000+ page book. If anything some of his discussions could be expanded; some sections would make worthy books in their own right. Nonetheless, even Frame would have to admit the deficiency of examining ethics primarily from one of his three perspectives. A volume by Frame or in sympathy with his approach that examined ethics from the existential and situational perspectives would therefore be most welcome.