Exegesis and Theology

The Blog of Brian Collins

Thomas Watson’s Body of Divinity

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Watson, Thomas. A body of Divinity. 1692; Reprinted, Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 1965.

This book is the first part of Thomas Watson’s A Practical Body of Divinity, reprinted in three volumes by Banner of Truth. Watson takes questions and answers from the Westminster Shorter Catechism and expounds them. The sermonic and exhortatory nature of this book makes it useful for personal or family worship, but the content is profound enough to be referenced along with other systematic theologies. For instance, I find Watson’s discussion of what it means to glorify God unrivaled.

Annas on Ancient Philosophy

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Annas, Julia. Ancient Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

This is another superb entry in the Very Short Introduction series. It is not a historical survey of ancient philosophy, moving from one philosopher to another. Rather, each chapter is an essay on a topic related to ancient philosophy. For instance, there are chapters on the difference between humans and animals, why people study philosophy, or ancient views of happiness. Each of these chapters is well-served by being read slowly and pondered.

A brief look at her chapter on happiness may help show the value of the book. Annas helps modern readers enter this ancient world by looking at a story told by fifth century BC philosopher Prodicus in which a man named Heracles is met by two women, one representing Pleasure and the other representing Virtue. Heracles is seeking for happiness, and the two paths for achieving it are pleasure and virtue. According to Annas “Prodicus was one of the first philosophers to make explicit something important; we are all, in our lives, aiming at happiness” (40). Yet this ancient framing of the problem raises a problem for moderns:

Our modern conception of happiness is frequently understood in terms of pleasure and desire-satisfaction (something aided by the wide and confused way we use ‘happy’), and this can make it hard at first to see the appeal of ancient theories of happiness. If happiness is just getting what you want, then the ideas in the Choice of Heracles make no sense. [47]

By contrast, “Happiness in ancient ethical thought is not a matter of feeling good or being pleased; it is not a feeling or emotion at all, it is your life as a whole which is said to be happy or not” (42). So in contrast with a modern understanding in which moments of pleasure are happiness, in the ancient understanding moments of pleasure are often major obstacles to happiness with reference to life as a whole.

Annas defends the ancient idea that happiness is everyone’s last end: “The overall end which unifies all your concerns has to be complete: everything you do or go for is sought for the sake of it, while it is not sought for the sake of anything further. It also has to be self-sufficient: it does not leave out any element in your life that has value as part of living well. . . . And on the level of common sense or intuition, happiness is the only aim, plausible as an aim in your life as a whole, which is complete and self-sufficient” (43). Annas also seems to agree with the ancients in distinguishing happiness from hedonism. Annas observes that “hedonism, the view that pleasure is our ethical end, is always on the defensive in ancient ethics.” There are only two Greek philosophies which make pleasure man’s chief end, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans. The former had trouble defending the idea that always seeking immediate pleasure would bring happiness. The latter so redefined pleasure as seeking the tranquil life in the long term that it seems to no longer be maintaining a hedonistic position (44, 46-47).

A Christmas Meditation

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This year my church began to work on its own church catechism. Our first question and answer is drawn from WSC 1: What is the chief end of man? The chief end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever. We also began this year with a brief sermon series on Psalm 1 (“Blessed is the man”) and a Sunday School series on the beatitudes. There is probably no better way to understand the “and to enjoy Him forever” part of WSC 1 than to meditate on what the Scripture teaches about the blessed (‘ashre, makarios) man.

Interestingly, Thomas Watson, who wrote a marvelous exposition of glorifying God as our chief end in his Body of Divinity speaks of beatitude as man’s chief end in his book on the beatitudes. Jonathan Pennnington in his Sermon on the Mount and Human Flourishing also connects flourishing/blessedness to man’s chief end.

So it should not surprise us when the angelic announcement of Christ’s birth links God’s glory and true human flourishing:

Glory to God in the highest,

and on earth shalom among those with whom he is pleased. [Lk. 2:14]

Review of Alan Thompson, The Acts of the Risen Lord Jesus

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Thompson, Alan J. The Acts of the Risen Lord Jesus: Luke’s Account of God’s Unfolding Plan. New Studies in Biblical Theology. Edited by D. A. Carson. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2011.

This is a superb theology of the book of Acts. Thompson’s identifiers the reign of Christ as the main theme of Acts, and he does an excellent job demonstrating the present reign of Christ while also showing that the suffering of Christ’s marks Christ’s reign in the present with triumph to follow. Related to this central theme are the themes of resurrection, the preaching of the gospel, the inclusion of the Gentiles in the people of God, the gift of the Spirit, and the end of the temple system and the Mosaic law.

These are massive topics, but Thompson works through them with good sense and with clearness and brevity. As an example of how Thompson works through these themes, the following is my summary of Thompson’s chapter about the law in Acts.

Thompson’s view of the law in Acts can be summed up in chapter 6’s subtitle: “the law is no longer the direct authority for God’s people” (175). Thompson observes that there are those, like Jervell, who hold that for Luke “the law is not invalidated, abridged or outmoded” (176, quoting Jervell), and there are those who align Luke with the Pauline teaching that Christians are under “the law of Christ” rather than the law of Moses. That is, the observance of the Mosaic law is not required for salvation, but, because it is now a matter of “indifference,” the Mosaic law can be observed for other reasons (e.g., “to win those under the law”) (176-77). Thompson argues that Acts presents the locus of authority having shifted from the Mosaic law to the apostles (1:2, 8, 21-23, 25-26; 2:37, 42; 5:17-42) (178-89). In some places in Acts the emphasis is on the law being fulfilled, such as when Acts 4:34 indicates that Deuteronomy 15:4 is being fulfilled because there are no poor among them. Note also Acts 6:2-4 in which widows are cared for in fulfillment of Deuteronomy (180-81). However, in other instances the emphasis is on the abrogation of the law. Thompson argues that the dietary laws are shown to be abrogated in the Cornelius account (“In the narrative of Acts, Peter has clearly made the connection between the vision concerning the abrogation of food laws (Acts 10:15) and the association with and acceptance of Cornelius (10:28; 11:12; 15:9)”; 182). Likewise in Acts 15 circumcision is clearly not required for salvation (184). Regarding the “requirements” of Acts 15:20; 15:29; 21:25, Thompson rejects the idea that this is requiring Gentiles to “keep that part of the Law required for them to live together with Jews” (184, quoting Jervell) and the view that these “are essentially ad hoc requirements just for this situation out of concern for the sensitivities of Jews” (185). Instead, he adopts Witherington’s view that these four items were connected to “pagan practices associated with temple idolatry.” In other words, keeping the Mosaic law is not necessary for Gentiles, but turning away from idolatry is (186-87). Paul’s circumcision of Timothy does not tell against this view of the law because Timothy was not circumcised out of necessary obedience to the Mosaic law. His circumcision was voluntarily and was for the purpose of enabling ministry to the Jews without hindrance. Likewise with Paul’s fulfillment of the temple vow. Paul is willing to keep the law out of concern for “Jewish sensibilities,” even though his message remains “the proclamation of Jesus as the one who fulfils and replaces the temple” (190-91).

Review of James Dolezal, All that Is in God: Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Classical Christian Theism

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Dolezal, James E. All that Is in God: Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Classical Christian Theism. Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2017.

Key Issues and Persons

Dolezal identifies his purpose at the outset: “The chief problem I address in this work is the abandonment of God’s simplicity and of the infinite pure actuality of His being” (loc. 117). Later he says, “The underlying and inviolable conviction is that God does not derive any aspect of His being from outside Himself and is not in any way caused to be” (loc. 182). In contrast to his own view are those he labels “theistic mutualists.” Of them he says, “This ontological openness to being changed by creatures, whether initiated by God or by creatures themselves, is the common denominator of all forms of theistic mutaliusm. Thesitic mutualists may disagree among themselves on precisely how much process and development to allow in God or even over what the ultimate source or cause of such development might be. But all hold to a divine ontology that allows for God to acquire and shed actuality of being” (loc 216).*

Dolezal’s list of theistic mutualists is a who’s who of evangelical scholars: J. Oliver Buswell, D. A. Carson, William Lane Craig, R. L. Dabney, John Feinberg, John Frame, Charles Hodge, Ronald Nash, Donald Macleod, J. P, Moreland, K. Scott Oliphint, J. I. Packer, Alvin Plantinga, Robert Reymond, Kevin Vanhoozer, Bruce Ware, Nicholas Wolterstorff. But Dolezal holds that on his side are Thomas Aquinas, Francis Turretin, John Owen, Herman Bavinck, and the Reformed confessions.

For Dolezal the stakes of this debate are high. He quotes favorably Eastern Orthodox theologian David Bentley Hart that any god other than that of classical theism “can never be more than an idol: a god, but not God; a theos, but not to Theos; a being, not Being in its transcendent fullness.” Dolezal himself goes on to say, “The reason for these strong objections to mutualist understandings of God is that such a God is inevitably mutable and finite and as such is unworthy of worship” (loc. 256). Though Dolezal at times softens his rhetoric, indicating that he thinks that some of the men above know not what they teach, the charge is still serious. It amounts to a charge of heresy, and for the Reformed men, at least, an abandonment of their confessions.

Theological Methodology: Scripture and Confessions

At the root of the division that Dolezal outlines is a methodological debate within evangelicalism between exegetically-focused theologians and historically-focused theologians. On the one side are the exegetically-oriented theologians who wish to tie their theological conclusions tightly with exegesis. On the other side are the historically-oriented theologians who make much of how the creeds and confessions were understood in the past.

An exegetically-focused theology that is historically uninformed can end up in serious error. The theologian may not recognize that his formulations have already been tried and found wanting because they carry theological implications not consistent with the rest of Scripture. If an exegetically-oriented theologian is departing from confessional tradition, he should do so hesitantly and having interacted carefully with the opposing arguments. On the other hand, it is not sufficient for the historically-oriented theologian to reject new formulations from an exegetically-oriented theologian simply because great theologians of the past, or even church confessions, take a different position. The historically-oriented theologians must demonstrate the exegetical feasibility of their position.

Herman Bavinck outlines a proper theological methodology in volume one of his Reformed Dogmatics. He observes, “A good dogmatic method…needs to take account of all three factors, Scripture, church, and Christian consciousness (1:84). But these three factors are not equal. Bavinck grants, “In every branch of learning, the practitioner begins by living from the tradition. He always gains his first acquaintance of the field from an authority…. It is no different for the dogmatician.” Though this is true “pedagogically,” Bavinck  concludes, “Scripture is the sole foundation (principium unicum) of church and theology. In the case of conflict between them, the possibility of which can never be denied on a Reformational view, church and confession must yield to Scripture. Not the church but Scripture is self-authenticating (αὐτοπιστος), the judge of controversies (iudex controversiarum), and its own interpreter (sui ipsius interpres). Nothing may be put on a level with Scripture. Chruch, confession, tradition—all must be ordered and adjusted by it and submit themselves to it…. The confession deserves credence only because and insofar as it agrees with Scripture and, as the fallible work of human hands, remains open to revision and examination by the standard of Scripture” (1:86). As the remainder of Bavinck’s Dogmatics reveals, Bavinck is by no means dismissive of historical theology or the creeds and confessions. But he also attempts to ground his theological exegetically. He begins with exegetical work, moves to history and philosophy, and concludes with his theological formulation.

Though Dolezal claims to be defending the Reformed confessions his methodology is not aligned with the Reformed methodology outlined by Bavinck. A comparison between Dolezal’s treatment of immutability and Bavinck’s demonstrates this. Commendably, Dolezal does begin his discussion of immutability with a discussion of Scripture. However, it is not clear that the Scripture passages he cites actually prove what he seeks to prove. For instance, does Malachi 3:6 really prove that God is pure actuality: “For I the LORD do not change; therefore you, O children of Jacob, are not consumed”? In addition, Dolezal does not deal with the passages that seem to indicate that God does change. Instead, he notes that that Bible speaks of God’s body parts, or his moving through space, and of his changing his mind. He notes that these are anthropomorphic passages and asserts that “when the Bible speaks of God as experiencing changes of relation, affection, or agency” these texts should be understood in the same way. There is no exegetical engagement with why some understand a reference to God’s nostrils as anthropomorphic but cannot understand a reference to God’s anger as anthropopathic (Psalm 17:7-8).

Bavinck, on the other hand, observes the variety of passages that would seem to count against immutability as well as the different ways in which the Bible teaches that God does not change (e.g., with regard to “existence and being” but also with regard to “thought and will” and “plans and decisions”). When Bavinck, after surveying the history of the doctrine and its philosophical implications, formulates the doctrine, he takes all of the biblical data into account. He affirms that God is immutable in “essence,” “knowledge,” and “will.” He also holds that scriptural language about God changing is anthropomorphic. But he also observes, “This immutability, however, should not be confused with monotonous sameness or rigid immobility. Scripture itself leads us in describing God in the most manifold relations to all his creatures. While immutable in himself, he nevertheless, as it were, lives the life of his creatures and participates in all their changing states.” Nonetheless, Scripture, Bavinck avers, “prohibits us from positing any change in God himself” (2:153-59).

Because Bavinck dealt with the full range of Scripture, I found his account of immutability more satisfying than Dolezal’s even though they allegedly hold to the same position. In Dolezal there was a great deal of emphasis on the implications of God being pure actuality without Bavinck’s qualification that this cannot mean that God exists in a “rigid immobility” that prevents his “manifold relations to all his creatures.”

Theological Methodology: The Role of Philosophy

Dolezal’s largely philosophical approach is not a minor aspect of his methodology. In his discussion of simplicity Dolezal says,

The medieval scholastic theologians, as well as the seventeenth-century Protestant scholastics who followed them, had articulated the doctrine of simplicity in terms of an elaborate scheme of denials in which the four causes known through Aristotelian metaphysics (final, formal, efficient, and material) were carefully denied of God. But one would need to presuppose the basic accuracy of Aristotelian metaphysics (or at least that version of it as modified by Aquinas and others) for such elaborate denials to continue to make sense. After Hume and Kant’s attack on the perennial Aristotelian philosophy, many a Christian theologian opted to abandon, rather than defend, the metaphysical structure (regarding being, becoming, and causation) in terms of which simplicity had been so meticulously developed. Indeed, many Christian theologians and ministers retreated from the field of metaphysics altogether and retrenched themselves in their Bibles, assuming that the Bible’s teaching could be successfully preserved without committing oneself to a particular understanding of being. [loc 1390-98]

This may be one of the most important methodological statements in Dolezal’s book. It states that Dolezal believes that Aristotelian metaphysics are essential to formulating an orthodox doctrine of God.** This is a massive claim, and it would commit Dolezal, one would think, to demonstrating that the Scripture itself requires, or at least implies, an Aristotelian metaphysic. Failing this, I think Dolezal’s insistence on an Aristotelian metaphysic violates the Reformation principle of the sufficiency of Scripture.

Timothy Ward observes the doctrine of Scripture’s sufficiency has two aspects: “‘Material sufficiency’ asserts that Scripture contains everything necessary to be known and responded to for salvation and faithful discipleship…. ‘Formal sufficiency’ claims that Scripture as the word of God ought not ultimately to be subject to any external authority of the church or a Spirit-filled individual, and so is significantly ‘self-interpreting'” (“Scripture, Sufficiency of,” DTIB, 730). Though Ward does not mention the external authority of a philosophical system, such an authority would contradict the formal sufficiency of Scripture.

Leinsle, in his Introduction to Scholastic Theology, observes that this was precisely the issue that faced the medieval church with the recovery of Aristotle: “The old formula that philosophy is the ancilla [handmaid] of theology presupposed a philosophy restricted to instrumental disciplines. Could this formula still be applied to an independent, comprehensive pagan interpretation of the world, as found in Aristotle’s works, or did scholars have to redefine the relationship [between theology and philosophy” (134, brackets supplied by the translator). Whether Thomas managed to keep philosophy in its ancillary position or not remains a debate until the present day. However that historical debate is solved, Dolezal’s insistence that theologians must accept an Aristotelian metaphysic makes Aristotle no longer an ancilla but a lord over theology, violating the sufficiency of Scripture. Once again in defending what he understands to be the classic Reformed doctrine of God, it seems that Dolezal has departed from the theological method of the Reformation and Post-Reformation.

A practical problem that flows from this problematic methodology is Dolezal’s tendency to come to conclusions on the basis of what logically must be despite Scripture statements to the contrary. For instance, noting agreement that God does not possess nostrils (having no body) or move through space (being omnipresent), Dolezal argues that references to God’s anger or mercy should be understood as anthropopathisms: “God alters the revelation of Himself without altering Himself ontologically. He unchangingly wills change in His ad extra dealings with creatures without willing or experiencing a corresponding change of agency in His own intrinsic actuality. The proper locus of all change is in the revelation of God … and in the effects of His sovereign administration.”*** But does this mean, as some have said, that a Christian is not someone who was formerly under God’s wrath but is now under God’s grace, being, instead, someone who moved to a knowledge of always being under God’s grace? Or is Dolezal saying that when the Scripture speaks of God’s anger that it is not speaking of any affections in God but only of his ad extra acts of punishment? If so, logic seems to be running roughshod over revelation. I would want to affirm immutability and to affirm the move from wrath to grace. And while recognizing that God is impassible, I would not want to deny the affections of love, anger, jealousy, compassion, etc. to God. While recognizing that our language with reference to God is analogical rather than univocal, I want to guard against taking the Scripture’s language about God to be equivocal. This, I think, Dolezal was sometimes in danger of doing. It cannot be that Scripture gives us inadequate and misleading ways of speaking about God that can only be fixed when translated into a philosophical mode of speaking. This is not to deny the theology the role of synthesizing revelation about God; it is to insist that God’s revelation of himself take priority over our deductions of what must be.

A final problem to note with this philosophically-oriented approach is Dolezal’s failure to address problems that his position might logically lead to. For instance, when he claims that relative attributes in God are not ontologically relative, does he make creation necessary? If not, why not? If he is going to critique those who wish to affirm classical theism but who also wish to account for Scripture statements regarding God’s affections or other relations that he has with people for their logical consequences, does he not also have to deal with logical consequences as well? And if the answer at some point is that these things are mysterious (as indeed they are!) why does he draw the line of mystery where he does?

Theological Methodology: Categorizing Classical Theists and Theistic Mutalists

A final methodological problem has to do with Dolezal’s classification of people into the two categories of classical theist and theistic mutalist. There are great differences between those Dolezal groups in the theistic mutualist category. For instance, William Lane Craig does not hold to God’s timelessness and, according to Dolezal, holds to “a form of social trinitarianism.” This puts him at some distance from, say, J. I. Packer. Dolezal, in his discussions of individuals, is clear about these differences. However, in his evaluations they are all lumped back together as theistic mutualists.

On the other hand, there are significant differences among classical theists that are not raised. As noted above, some classical theists seem to argue that a Christian has not moved from wrath to grace but that he has moved to a knowledge that he is under God’s grace. Other classical theists seem to argue that there is a move from wrath to grace, but that that move happens in us rather than in God. Our position as sinner placed us in a wrath relationship to God and at salvation we moved into a grace relationship with God. God didn’t change; our relationship to God changed. I would find the latter position acceptable but the former completely unacceptable, that is unbiblical.

Conclusion

I would not recommend this book as the way forward in the debates about theology proper. Its incendiary charge of idolatry and its problematic methodology renders it an unfit guide. More particularly, Dolezal’s philosophical/speculative approach tends towards saying that what God has revealed cannot really be so because it conflicts with certain philosophical deductions.

My theological method gives weight, though not an authoritative weight, to historical theology and confessions. So I am open to the idea that theology from Hodge to Vanhoozer has taken a wrong turn in theology proper. But that wrong turn and the alternative need to be demonstrated and established on the basis of sound exegesis. Elements of theology proper that are deduced from good and necessary consequence must be good and necessary consequences that flow from rightly exegeted Scripture. As a way forward I would recommend reading the primary sources: Aquinas, Turretin, Owen, Bavinck, Hodge, Oliphint, Horton, Vanhoozer, and Frame. Evaluate their positions according to a methodology that gives due weight to tradition as an ancilla to theology but which retains Scripture as the foundation for theology.

Endnotes

*Not all whom Dolezal places in the category of theistic mutalist would agree with this description of their position. Dolezal, however, maintains that these theistic mutalists misunderstand their own position because they misunderstand the nature of being: “Part of the reason many evangelical theistic mutalists do not recognize that they have already adopted a form of ontological becoming in God is because they have lost sight of what ‘being’ means. They mistakenly assume that ‘being’ indicates merely ‘nature’ or ‘essence.’ Rather it denotes any actuality or ‘is-ness’ whatsoever, that is, any participation in the act of existing (in esse, or ‘to be’)” (loc. 272).

**Dolezal’s insistence that the Bible must be understood through the lens of an Aristotelian metaphysic helps explain the previous endnote. Dolezal describes those he identifies as theistic mutalists in terms that not all would accept on the grounds that they don’t understand “what ‘being’ means.” What he means by this is: they don’t accept an Aristotelian view of being.

***It is worth noting that there is some incongruence in arguing for anthropopathism on the grounds that everybody acknowledges anthropomorphism. In the first place, many of the anthropomorphisms used of God are idiomatic expressions. For instance, Jeremiah 48:25 says “The horn of Moab is cut off, and his arm is broken, declares the LORD.” Clearly, “arm” is idiomatic for strength or power, and we should expect, when we read God say in Isaiah, “Was my arm too short to deliver you?” (Isa. 50:2) the idiom to also refer to power. So when Numbers 32:10 says that Yhwh “was hot in the nostrils” this is clearly not an statement regarding God’s body; it is an idiom regarding anger. This the translation: “And the Lord’s anger was kindled on that day.” But, having rendered the Hebrew idiom into an English idiom are we now required to argue that God’s anger cannot be kindled because God is immutable and impassible? Can we not affirm immutability, impassibility and that it is proper to ascribe the affection of anger to God?

Edited 3/26/2020

Tim Miller on the Relation between Union with Christ, Justification, and Sanctification

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Miller, Timothy. “The Debate Over the Ordo Salutis in American Reformed Theology,” Detroit Baptist Seminary Journal 18 (2013): 41-66.

In this piece Tim examines the different ways in which union with Christ, justification, and sanctification are related to one another by individuals connected with either Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia (Gaffin, Tipton, Garcia, Evans) or Westminster Seminary California (Clark, Fesko, Horton, VanDrunen, and Godfrey). In unpacking this debate Miller first examines the Lutheran ordo salutis since some accuse those on the Westminster Seminary California (WSC) side of adopting a Lutheran ordo. Lutheran theologians have rejected the idea that union with Christ is the unifying soteriological category and that soteriological benefits flow from union. Instead, Lutherans have all soteriological benefits, including union with Christ, flow from justification.

Miller then turns to the WSC ordo. First, those aligned with WSC argue that Lutherans and the Reformed share the same conception of justification. Second, they affirm that all other soteriological benefits flow from justification. This does not mean that theologians, such as Michael Horton, wish to deny that the other soteriological benefits are all connected to union with Christ. But “he also believes that within the unfolding drama of human history, justification is the source of the other soteric benefits” (48). This position raises the issue of how justification and sanctification relate to each other as “distinct–yet-inseparable.” Third, and as a result of the first two points, union with Christ is distinguished into a forensic union and a renovative union. This is not a claim that there are two unions but that the one union has two aspects.

Having outlined the WSC ordo Miller then outlines the ordo associated with Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia (WTS). In contrast to WSC, those aligned with WTS distinguish Lutheran and Calvin’s conceptions of justification in that Calvin affirmed that “so long as we are without Christ and separated from him, nothing which he suffered and did for the salvation of the human race is of the least benefit to us” (Institutes 3.1.1). (On this point Calvin is said to differ from late Reformed federal theology.) Justification therefore flows from a union with Christ that is obtained by faith. From union with Christ flow the double benefits of justification and sanctification. These two benefits are inseparable as they both come from union with Christ, but they are also distinct. Finally, instead of distinguishing between forensic and renovative aspects of union, those associated with WTS seek to relate the historia salutis with the ordo salutis. Miller summarizes this in four points: “First, the historical bodily resurrection of Jesus includes within it His adoption, justification, and sanctification (57-58). Second, “believers are united with Christ into His life history—His death, burial, and resurrection” (59). Third, “the redeemed share with Christ all of His soteric benefits in union with His person and work” (60). Fourth, “because Christ contains in Himself all the soteric benefits, union with Him provides all benefits simultaneously, distinctly, and inseparably” (61).

Having outlined the debate Miller probes the significance of the two positions. First, if the WTS position is correct, the Roman Catholic objection that Protestantism leads to “immoral living” is answered. Sanctification is inseparable (though district) from justification as a benefit of union with Christ. Second, the WTS position more clearly guards the forensic nature of justification by not having sanctification flow from justification. Third, the WTS ordo emphasizes the centrality of Christ rather than subsuming Christ as one benefit among others within the ordo.

As should be clear, Miller favors the WTS view. Unreflected in this summary, but present in the article, are the exegetical arguments that lead Miller to favor the WTS viewpoint. I found this to be a clear and compelling article and recommend it to all interested in this issue.

Ryan McGraw Reviews Systematic Theologies by Michael Horton and John Frame

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McGraw, Ryan M. “Shifting Paradigms in Reformed Systematic Theology: A Review Article of Michael Horton’s The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way,” Puritan Reformed Journal 5, no. 2 (July 2013): 245-59.

McGraw praises Horton for writing an orthodox, well-organized, systematic theology that addresses contemporary challenges. However, McGraw critiques Horton for adopting new paradigms in three areas.

First, Horton weaves speech-act theory throughout his treatment of theology, connecting the Father with locution, the Son with illocution, and the Spirit with perlocution. McGraw observes, “The advantage to this theory is that it involves all three persons of the Godhead simultaneously and distinctly; the disadvantage is that it makes everything that God does a speech-act or declaration” (248). One infelicitous effect noted by McGraw is the tendency to subsume all of soteriology under the forensic declaration of justification. He is also concerned that it “adopts too many aspects of a post-modern metaphysic and epistemology” (249).

Second, Horton also makes use of the essence/energies distinction common in Eastern Orthodox Trinitarian theology. While Horton sees a convergence with Reformed theology and Eastern Orthodox theology at this point, McGraw does not. He argues that this distinction leads to viewing God as “unknowable” rather than “incomprehensible.” He also thinks that “this distinction threatens to shift soteriology from solving an ethical problem to addressing an ontological one.” Horton clearly does not want to embrace the latter and probably would not want to embrace the former, but McGraw thinks the essence/energies distinction pushes him in those directions.

Third, McGraw critiques Horton for viewing the entire ordo salutis through the lens of justification. By making justification, rather than union with Christ, the central reality of soteriology from which the other benefits flow, all of soteriology, even regeneration, become forensic. This approach also leads Horton to minimize the accomplished/application distinction and opens the door (though Horton does not proceed through it) to antinomianism.

I found McGraw’s review helpful to keep in mind as I use Horton’s The Christian Faith and as I work through his more detailed four book set theology.

McGraw, Ryan. “Toward a Biblical, Catholic, and Reformed Theology: An Assessment of John Frame’s Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief.” Puritan Reformed Journal 8, no. 2 (2016): 197-240.

McGraw’s assessment of Frame’s Systematic Theology can be summarized in a paragraph at the beginning of his review:

“His theology is simultaneously brilliant, innovative, and eccentric. Its primary strengths are the clarity of his arguments, his extensive use of Scripture, and his ability to interact critically with unbelief. The primary weakness of his theology lies in its lack of connection to historic Reformed theology. This is a problem because the absence of historical theology will almost always result in detachment from the confession of the church and an interpretation of the Bible that detracts from rather than promotes church unity. [198]

Despite general positive comments here and at the end of the review, McGraw’s treatment is otherwise entirely negative. He first faults Frame for focusing on the doctrines of God, the knowledge of God, and Scripture to the comparative neglect of Christology, soteriology, and ecclesiology. This is true enough, but as it reflects the emphasis in Frame’s teaching and writing ministry, it seems hard to fault him on this point. I don’t have the impression that Frame was attempting to write a standard classroom textbook.

McGraw also critiques Frame for building his theology around the concept of Lordship. He thinks that organizing theology around the attributes of Lordship, defined as authority, control, and presence, undermines the doctrine of simplicity by singling out some attributes at the expense of others. He also observes that in the Bible Yhwh refers to God in his totality rather than just to his lordship. Finally, Lordship is a relative attribute, one that has to do with God’s relationship to his people rather than to God himself. Regarding the first of these critiques, while I’ve not found the control, authority, presence triad as useful as some of Frame’s other triads, I don’t think Frame’s point is ontological. It is a heuristic device. The third point may have some merit, but as the Bible itself focuses on revealing God in relation to his people, I wouldn’t make too much of this point. The second point is valid. I have long thought that Frame’s move from Yhwh to the title of “Lord” was exegetically untenable and theologically thin.

Related to this critique is a critique of Frame’s multiperspectivalism. McGraw seems to think that Frame’s normative, situational, and existential perspectives remove Scripture from its place of ultimate authority, but this is clearly a misreading of Frame which he addresses in his Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (I don’t know if he addresses it in his ST as I’ve not read Frame’s ST).

McGraw also dings Frame for defining theology as “the application of Scripture, by persons, to every area of life.” McGraw says that historically the Reformed affirmed “that theology was both theoretical and practical.” He does not think Frame’s definition captures this. But Frame’s definition is not much different from Ames who, according to McGraw, “famously defined theology as the doctrine of living to God.” McGraw could also have mentioned William Perkins’s definition: “the science of living blessedly forever.” Frame is not substantially different from these historic definitions, and he does not deny the theoretical side of theology. So it is difficult to see the nit that is being picked here.

McGraw next faults Frame for holding to a covenant of creation district from the covenant of works and for over-reliance on studies of ANE covenants in framing his doctrine of the covenants. I’m with McGraw on these criticisms.

Finally, McGraw critiques Frame for a methodology that is “something close to biblicism.” The value of these critiques vary. The knock against triperspectivalism because “this construction does not arise from simple and straightforward exegesis” misses Frame’s own point about his methodology. It seeks to hold Frame to a standard he hasn’t set for himself. As the standard is neither Frame’s nor McGraw’s own, the critique seems unnecessary. The critique that Frame fails to engage with historical theology is valid. I’ve long thought that this is Frame’s greatest weakness. The objection that Frame does not hold strictly to creeds or confessions is more difficult. Creeds and confessions are important but they are not infallible. If I am disturbed by Frame’s lack of engagement with historical theology (and I am), I am also concerned about those who want to settle theological debates by appealing to creeds or historical theology without also making the exegetical case for their position.

In general this was a helpful review, but I think McGraw would have enhanced the force of his best critiques if he had replaced his weakest critiques with measured praise of specific aspects of Frame’s work.

 

Albert Martin’s The Forgotten Fear: Where Have All the God-Fearers Gone?

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Martin, Albert N. The Forgotten Fear: Where Have All the God-Fearers Gone? Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Press, 2015.

Martin argues that “the fear of God, which is the soul of godliness, is a fear that consists in awe, reverence, and honor, and all of these things in a profound measure of their exercise” (54). In this book, he argues that “fear of the Lord” is one of the Bible’s central ways of describing godliness. The book is in large measure an exhortation to stir up God’s people to fear him. Martin roots the fear of God in the new covenant and in the forgiveness of sins. Fear of God is not produced by human effort, but it can be fostered by the believer by means of Scripture, prayer, and meditation. This is the kind of book that repays slow and repeated reading.

Articles and Notes on Holiness and Sanctification

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Peter J. Gentry, “The Meaning of ‘Holy’ in the Old Testament,” Bibliotheca Sacra 170, no. 677–680 (2013): 400–417.

Gentry challenges the traditional understanding of holiness as denoting “moral purity,” and “transcendence” or set-apartness. He first challenges the idea קדש can be defined by means of the surmised etymological link with קד, “to cut.” Gentry proposes that a usage study, done by Claude Bernard Costecalde in 1986, of both the Hebrew word and its equivalent in congate languages does not support either “moral purity” or “transcendance” as the meaning of holy. In line with Costecalde’s analysis Gentry concludes: “The basic meaning of the word is ‘consecrated’ or ‘devoted.'” Gentry surveys texts in Exodus 3, 19, and Isaiah 6 to establish this point.

In the end, I’m sympathetic to the idea that the basic meaning of קדש is “devoted,” but I didn’t see “set apart” or “moral purity” to be as decisively excluded from the range of meaning as Gentry argues. Gentry also seems to have a fairly negative view of the discipline of systematic theology in comparison to biblical studies: “Indeed, systematic theologians of the last five hundred years have not been helpful in explaining what Scripture teaches on this topic due to reliance on doubtful etymologies and connection of the term with moral purity and divine transcendence.” But more than Gentry’s exegesis, it was a theological observation from Sinclair Ferguson’s Devoted to God that convinced me that at its root holiness about being devoted. Ferguson observes that holiness, as an attribute of God, has to have a meaning that works apart from the created order. Being transcendent or set apart does not work theologically whereas devoted does.

O’Donovan, Oliver. “Sanctification and Ethics.” In Kelly M. Kapic, ed. Sanctification: Explorations in Theology and Practice. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2014.

I find O’Donovan’s writings difficult to comprehend, as if I’m not yet acquainted with his dialect. In this essay I at points wondered about his commitment to the Reformation distinction between justification and sanctification. More positive were his helpful reflections on the relation of ethics to dogmatics and his observation that age does not confer sanctification. Each period of life has its own challenges to holiness that must be met.

Eglinton, James. “On Bavinck’s Theology of Sanctification-As-Ethics.” In Kelly M. Kapic, ed. Sanctification: Explorations in Theology and Practice. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2014.

Eglinton argues that Bavinck was just as much an ethicist as he was a dogmatician. He was actually working on a Reformed Ethics at the same time he was writing the Reformed Dogmatics. He seemed to give up the ethics project when he moved to the Free University and the professor of ethics there was writing, and completed, a Reformed Ethics. At that point Bavinck turned to writing essays that were, in effect, applied ethics. Eglington’s article is largely helpful historical situation of Bavinck as ethicist with a brief summary of his approach and with many useful works to follow up in the footnotes.

Bavinck on Sanctification

The kingdom of God is a gift granted by God according to his good pleasure (Matt. 11:26; 16:17; 22:14; 24:22; Luke 10:20; 12:32; 2:29), yet it is also a reward, a treasure in heaven, which has to be aggressively sought and gained by labor in the service of God (Matt. 5:12, 20; 6:20; 19:21; 20:1ff.; and so forth). Believers are branches in the vine who cannot do anything apart from Christ, yet at the same time they are admonished to remain in him, in his word, in his love (John 15). They are a chosen people, and still have to be zealous to confirm their call and election (2 Pet. 1:10). By a single offering of Christ they have been sanctified and perfected (Heb. 10:10, 14). God effected in them that which is good (13:21), yet they must still persevere to the end (3:6, 14; 4:14; 6:11-12). They have put on the new self and must continually clothe themselves with the new self (Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10). They have crucified the flesh with its desires, and must kill its members who are on the earth (Gal. 5:24; Col. 3:10). They are saints and sanctified in Christ Jesus, and must nevertheless become holy in all their conduct (1 Pet. 1:15; 2 Pet. 3:11), pursuing and perfecting their sanctification in the fear of God (2 Cor. 7:1; 1 Thess. 3:13; 4:3), for without it no one will see the Lord (Heb. 12:14).

Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4:254.

On the one hand this union of believers with Christ is not a pantheistic mingling of the two, not a ‘substantial union,’ as it has been viewed by the mysticism of earlier and later times, nor on the other hand is it mere agreement in disposition, will, and purpose, as rationalism understood it and Ritschl again explained it. What Scripture tells us of this mystical union goes far beyond moral agreement in will and disposition. It expressly states that Christ lives and dwells in believers (John 14:23; 17:23, 26; Rom. 8:10; 2 Cor. 13:5; Gal. 2:20; Eph. 3:17), and that they exist in him (John 15:1-7; Rom. 8:1; 1 Cor. 1:30; 2 Cor. 5:17; Eph. 1:10ff.). The two are united as branch and vine (John 15), as are head and members (Rom. 12:4; 1 Cor. 12:12; Eph. 1:23; 4:15), husband and wife (1 Cor. 6:16-17; Eph. 5:32); cornerstone and building (1 Cor. 3:11, 16; 6:19l Eph. 2:21; 1 Pet. 2:4-5). This mystical union, however, is not immediate but comes into being by the Holy Spirit….The very first gift that believers receive is already communicated to them by the Spirit, how takes everything from Christ (John 16:14). It is he who regenerates them (John 3:5-6, 8; Titus 3:5); gives life to them (Rom. 8:10); incorporates them into fellowship with Christ (1 Cor. 6:15, 17, 19); brings them to faith (2:9ff.; 12:3); washes, sanctifies, and justifies them (6:11; 12:13; Titus 3:5); leads them (Rom. 8:14); pours out God’s love into their hearts (5:5); prays in them (8:26); imparts to them an array of virtues (Gal. 5:22-23; Eph. 5:9) and gifts (Rom. 12:6; 1 Cor. 12:4), especially the gift of love (1 Cor. 13); prompts them to live by a new law, the law of the Spirit (Rom. 8:2, 4; 1 Cor. 7:9; Gal. 5:6; 6:2); and renews them in intellect and will, in soul and body (Rom. 6:19; 1 Cor. 2:10; 2 Cor. 5:17; 1 Thess. 5:23). In a word, the Holy Spirit dwells in them and they live and walk in the Holy Spirit (Rom. 8:1, 4, 9-11; 1 Cor. 6:19l Gal. 4:6; and so forth)

Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4:250-52.

Justification and sanctification, accordingly, while distinct from each other, are not for a moment separated. They are distinct: those who mix them undermine the religious life, take away the comfort of believers, and subordinate God to humanity. The distinction between the two consists in the fact that in justification the religious relationship of human beings with God is restored, and in sanctification their nature is renewed and cleansed of the impurity of sin. At bottom the distinction rests on the fact that God is both righteous and holy.

Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4:249.

But there is something else as well: the moral law that confronts us in the Decalogue, in the Sermon on the Mount, and further throughout the Old and New Testaments is not the case of ‘precept upon precept, line upon line, here a little, there a little’ [Isa. 28:10, 13] but comprises universal norms, great principles, that leave a lot of room for individual application and summon every believer to examine what in a given situation would for them be the good, acceptable, and perfect will of God (Rom. 12:2). Since the moral law is not a code of articles we merely have to look up in order, from moment to moment, to know exactly what we must do, there is in its domain a freedom that may not be curbed by human ordinances but must—precisely to safeguard the character of the moral life—be recognized and maintained. On the one hand that freedom includes the permissible, the adiaphora, and on the other what Rome calls the ‘counsels.’ Error begins in both schools of thought when the adiaphora and the counsels are located outside or alongside of, below or above, the moral law and are therefore detached from the moral life. There is no right or reason for this either in the one or in the other case. There are cases in which what is in itself permissible becomes impermissible (Rom. 14:21, 23; 1 Cor. 8:13; 10:23); and there are also circumstances in which abstention from marriage (Matt. 19:11; 1 Cor. 7:7), giving up remuneration (1 Cor.9:14-19), the renunciation of all earthly goods (Matt. 19:21), or the like is a duty. But in ‘doing’ these good works one is not accomplishing anything that is outside the moral law or surpasses it. For there is a difference between a law that furnishes universally valid rules and a duty that is inferred from that law in a given case for everyone personally. Those who lose sight of this and assume the existence of a series of good works that really lie outside of and surpass the moral law fail to honor its unity and universality and degrade it.

Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4:259-60.

Naselli, No Quick Fix

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Naselli, Andrew David. No Quick Fix: Where Higher Life Theology Came From, What It Is, and Why It’s Harmful. Bellingham, WA: Lexham, 2017.

This book, a popularization of Andy’s first dissertation, does just what its subtitle says it does. It gives a history of higher life theology, describes what it is, and provides ten reasons for rejecting it. An appendix provides resources that make a positive contribution to understanding and applying the doctrine of sanctification.

The book is brief, the writing is clear, the theology it espoused is sound. At times Andy provides exegetical treatments of key passages (e.g., Ephesians 5:18). These were often so good that I dropped them into my notebooks on those passages. Highly recommended.