Exegesis and Theology

The Blog of Brian Collins

Naselli and Gons, “An Examination of Three Recent Philosophical Arguments against Hierarchy in the Immanent Trinity.”

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Naselli, Andrew David and Philip R. Gons, “An Examination of Three Recent Philosophical Arguments against Hierarchy in the Immanent Trinity.” In One God in Three Persons. Edited by Bruce A. Ware and John Starke. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2015.

Naselli and Gons defend Eternal Functional Subordination (EFS), defined as “the Son is eternally and necessarily subordinate to the Father, not in terms of his deity, but in his role in relationship to the Father” (197), against three philosophical arguments brought against it in favor of Eternal Functional Equality (EFE), defined as “the Father and Son are completely equal in all noncontingent ways: all subordination is voluntary, arbitrary, and temporary” (197).

The first EFE argument essentially says that if the Son has the property of being necessarily and eternally submissive to the Father, then the Son is not homoousios with the Father because he has a property that the Father does not have. Naselli and Gons reply that this argument only works by equivocating on the term “essential.” Furthermore, if deployed consistently, the argument would deny the eternal generation of the Son because it would deny that the Son can have the property of being necessarily and eternally generate.

The second EFE argument says that EFS entails that the Father could not have become incarnate, which denies omnipotence to the Father. Naselli and Gons reply that no proponent of EFS assert that “it is not even theoretically possible for the Father or the Spirit to be united to a human nature” (207). Rather, they distinguish between what is “possible” and what is “fitting.” Because it is fitting for the Son, and not the Father and the Spirit, to become incarnate, it is not possible given the wisdom of God and the world he created for the Father or Spirit to become incarnate (possible as used here is not connected with the issue of omnipotence).

The third EFE argument is that if passages about the Father sending the Son point to EFS of the Son to the Father, then the Son is eternally submissive to the Spirit as well because sent by him (Matt. 4:1; Mark 1:12; Luke 4:1). Naselli and Gons reply that these sendings are different. The Spirit sends the incarnate Jesus to the wilderness which is qualitatively different from the Father sending the pre-incarnate Son into the world.

Though this article does not resolve the controversy or demonstrate that EFS is true, it does clearly refute three poor EFE arguments made against EFS.

Swain and Allen on the Obedience of the Eternal Son

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Swain, Scott and Michael Allen. “The Obedience of the Eternal Son,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 15, no. 2 (April 2013): 114-34.

Swain and Allen observe that in the last century numbers of theologians have argued that obedience is part of the Son’s proper work eternally in the external works of the Trinity. This observation includes not only evangelical theologians such as Grudem and Ware but also theologians such as Barth and von Balthasar.

Worryingly for Swain and Allen, “Affirming the obedience of the only-begotten Son has in many cases entailed significant revisions to classical trinitarian metaphysics” (115). They list as examples: “historicizing of the doctrine of God,” “metaphysics of trinitarian kenosis,” “replacing eternal generation with obedience as the Son’s distinguishing personal property,” and “social trinitarianism, which affirms three centers of self-consciousness and willing within the triune God.”

Swain and Allen wish to affirm “the claim that obedience constitutes the proper form of the Son’s divine work in the economy of salvation.” They wish to avoid adjusting “traditional trinitarian metaphysics” (116).

They therefore argue that rather than working from economy back to essence, one should work from essence toward economy: “mode of acting follows mode of being.” With this approach, “the Son’s obedience to the Father in the economy of salvation” is “the economic extension of his eternal generation.” It “constitutes the proper filial mode whereby he executes the Trinity’s undivided work of salvation” (117). The wording here seems significantly precise. The obedience of the Son is something economic, not essential. The work of salvation in which the Son is obedient to the Father is “the Trinity’s undivided work” (that is, there is single will in the Triune God). But the economy works out the way it does because it is grounded in an ontology in which the Father eternally generates the Son.

In the third section of their essay, Swain and Allen seek to ground their theology exegetically in John 1 and 5. Drawing on the exegesis of Thomas Aquinas, they argue that saying the Word is the one through whom the world is created is not an assertion that the Word is the instrument through which the Father created but is instead an assertion that “the Word performs the common trinitarian work of creation in a manner consistent with his distinctive mode of being” (122). This leads to the following thesis: “As the Son’s proper mode of being God consists in the pure relation wherein he receives his being from the Father, so the Son’s proper mode of acting as God consists in the pure relation wherein he receives his actions from the Father” (123-24).

The more significant passage for this argument seems to be John 5:19-30. Swain and Allen see two claims that emerge from this passage: “The first claim is that Jesus does nothing on his own initiative, but only what he sees the Father doing. The second claim is that Jesus, in following his Father’s lead, does everything that his Father does” (124). Swain and Allen assert that the first claim implies that the Son is inferior to the Father and the second claim entails that he is equal with the Father. Not only are “these seemingly contradictory claims” made “within the same context,” but “John 5:19 insists that the former claim is the basis for the latter claim” (124). The theological conclusion drawn: “the obedience of the Son to the Father who sends him constitutes the Son’s opus proprium within the undivided opera Trinitatis ad extra” (126).

In part four of this essay Swain and Allen respond to three questions that their argument has raised. First, does the obedience of the eternal Son imply two wills in the Godhead? Second, does obedience suggest a lack of omnipotence? Third, “does not all this smack too much of a ‘substance ontology'” (131)? In answer to the first question, Swain and Allen assert that “the Son’s obedience to the Father in the work of salvation is not indicative of a second will alongside that of the Father but of the proper mode whereby Jesus shares the Father’s will as the only-begotten Son of the Father” (127). In answer to the second question they assert, “The eternal Son exists receptively as one whose self-existence (autotheos) and almightiness are granted to him by the Father” (128). They key exegetical support for these two answers is found in John 10:17-18. In answer to the third question, they appeal to John 1, which they say “distinguishes the being of the Word…(1:1-2, 18)…from the becoming that characterizes the economy of creation and redemption (1:3, 6, 10, 14, 17…)” (131).

The ultimate conclusion: “the external works of the Trinity are indivisible (opera ad extra trinitatis indivisa sunt), though they are performed by all the persons in their own person-specific, ‘proper’ ways” (133).

Ryken on the Puritans

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Ryken, Leland. Worldly Saints: The Puritans As They Really Were. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986.

The title of this volume doesn’t indicate that the Puritans were worldly in the negative biblical sense. The pairing with “saints” is the tip-off. Ryken’s point is that the Puritans lived in the created world—in the world of work, marriage, family, money, education, and social action—as saints. Thus stereotypes of the Puritans as a dour, cloistered people are incorrect.

In seeking to correct the record Ryken surveys Puritan views on the topics listed above as well as on their views of the Bible, preaching, and worship. Two concluding chapters look at faults to avoid and strengths to learn from.

The book is full of primary source material and suggestions for further reading. It would be a good place to start in learning about the Puritans. The book is not perfect. I wondered at times about its appeal to Milton as a Puritan or if there was perhaps a greater diversity of views among the Puritans in certain areas that were being elided for the sake of summary (for instance, I think the Puritan view of revolution, the Civil War, and the Restoration may have been more varied). But these quibbles aside, this is a book well worth reading.

Review of Kaplan on John Quincy Adams

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Kaplan, Fred. John Quincy Adams: American Visionary. New York: Harper, 2014.

I’ve been interested in reading a biography of John Quincy Adams since reading David McCullough’s renowned biography of John Adams. I selected this particular biography for the unscientific reason that its Kindle edition was on sale. It nonetheless was a satisfying read. Kaplan not only covers the basic political history that is intertwined with Adams’s life, but he also covers Adams’s religious views and his literary interests. For instance, it was interesting to read of a debate John Quincy carried on with his father regarding the Trinity. John Adams favored the unitarian position while his son defended the trinitarian. (This seems to reflect the move toward rationalism by the founding generation and a move back toward orthodoxy in the following generation, due to the influence of the Second Great Awakening, though it should be noted that John Quincy Adams did not entirely embrace orthodox Protestantism.) The political life of John Quincy Adams is fascinating because it spans almost the entire era from the founding to the Civil War. Adams plays an important part in many key national events from negotiating the end of the War of 1812 to opposing Jacksonian populism to opposing slavery. He is involved in these momentous events as ambassador, president, and congressman. He was also the first president to be the son of a president and the only president to later serve in the House of Representatives. His philosophy of public service was to never put himself forward but to never decline if his fellow citizens called on him to serve.

Leithart on Macbeth

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Leithart, Peter. “If It Were Done When ‘Tis Done: Macbeth.” In Brightest Heaven of Invention: A Christian Guide to Six Shakespeare Plays. Moscow, ID: Canon, 1996.

Leithart’s analysis is illuminating and enhanced my enjoyment of the play. Here’s an example:

Whether or not Macbeth will act on his ambition depends on his answer to the question, What does it mean to be a man? Two answers to this question are presented by the play, and Macbeth is forced to choose between them. When Lady Macbeth urges him to kill Duncan, he protests, ‘I dare do all that may become a man; who dares do more is none’ (1.7.46-47). On this view, one cannot be a man without placing limitations on desires and actions. Whoever tries to do more than ‘becomes a man’ becomes less than a man. Lady Macbeth, by contrast, operates on the view that you are not a man unless you act on every single desire. She asks her hesitating husband, ‘wouldst thou have that / Which thou esteem’st the ornament of life, / And live a coward in thine own esteem, / Letting ‘I dare not’ wait upon ‘I would’ (1.7.41-44), and adds, ‘When you durst do it, then you were a man’ (1.7.49). Any effort to control desire, to deny and suppress evil, or to place any limits whatever on action—all these for Lady Macbeth amount to nothing but cowardice.
. . . . . . . . .
His assault on the order of the world turns him into a beast. Having tried to lift himself above his place, he ends up falling into an abyss (see Ezekiel 28:1-10). As a consequence of his ambition to be more than human, he becomes less than human (see Daniel 4:1-37). By the end of the play, Macbeth is being seen, and even sees himself, as a subhuman creature: a baited bear, a hell-hound, a devil. He has dared do more than becomes a man, and at the last he is none. [162-63]

The one drawback is that the book is without footnotes or endnotes. Are all these observations simply Leithart’s or is he drawing on other sources?

Warfield on New England Theology

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Warfield, Benjamin Breckinridge. “Edwards and the New England Theology.” In Works of Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield. Edited by Ethelbert D. Warfield, William Park Armstrong, and Caspar Wistar Hodge. 1932; Reprinted, Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003.

Warfield proceeds along chronological lines, beginning with Edwards’s youth and proceeding to the New England theology which developed after Edwards’s death. Warfield observes that it was in Edwards’s youth and collegiate years that he gave attention to scientific and metaphysical matters. He claims that in this period, independent of Berkeley, Edwards developed a system if idealism. Warfield observes that though Edwards did not continue with these philosophical writings after this period, the philosophical conclusions he reached in this period continued to inform his thought.

When Edwards became a pastor at Northampton, his writing turned to the pastoral. He produced sermons and practical works such as “Narrative of Surprising Conversions” and Religious Affections. Once removed from Northampton to Stockbridge, Edwards produced his major theological works on original sin, the freedom of the will, the chief end of man, the nature of true virtue, and the history of redemption. Though Edwards had long collected in notebooks thoughts on these subjects, this was the period in which he was able to bring these thoughts together into coherent works.

Warfield observes that the New England Theology that followed Edwards was influenced by the Edwards of the Awakening and by his theological method. Their theology, however, developed into something quite opposed to Edwards. Warfield observes that, like Edwards, their method of theology was philosophical and the result of “independent reflection.” But, unlike Edwards, they were not as rooted in historical theology. As a result, they developed a unique theology of which Warfield says, “it is only right frankly to describe as provincial.”

In the article Warfield observed that much of Edwards’s writing remained in manuscript at Yale. Since Warfield wrote those words much of this material has been transcribed and published. As a result, Edwards scholarship has developed. Nonetheless, this article remains a helpful introduction to Edwards and the New England THeology that followed him.

Warfield on Darwin and Evolutionary Science

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Warfield, Benjamin B. “Darwin’s Arguments against Christianity and against Religion.” In Benjamin B. Warfield: Selected Shorter Writings. Volume 2. Edited by John E. Meeter. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1973.

Warfield opens this article by noting that numbers of scientific thinkers had abandoned religion. Here he examines Darwin’s autobiography to understand why. Darwin observes that he rejected Christianity when he could not harmonize Genesis with his theory of Evolution. In addition, Darwin said he could find no irrefutable proof for the veracity of the rest of Scripture. In his discussion of this last point, Warfield observes, “Nothing short of a miracle would then have convinced him, and nothing short of a miracle could have convinced him of a miracle. Surely a man in such a state of mind would be refused as a juror in any case.”

Darwin later rejected theism on the grounds that the argument of design falls to natural selection, the argument of the good order of the world falls in the face of suffering, the argument that most people in the world throughout history have been inwardly convinced of a god is unreliable (Darwin observed he once had such feelings and lost them). Darwin granted that the argument that the universe could not arise by chance had some weight with him. But then he thought, “Can the mind of a man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions.” Warfield observes, “Thus the last and strongest theistic proof fails, not because of any lack in its stringent validity to the human mind, but because so brute-bred a mind as man’s is no judge of the validity of the proof.”

Warfield concludes that Darwin’s “absorption in a single line of investigation and inference had so atrophied his mind in other directions that he had ceased to be a trustworthy judge of evidence. Whatever may be true in other cases, in this case the defection of a scientific man from religion was distinctly due to an atrophy of mental qualities by which he was unfitted for the estimation of any other kind of evidence than that derived from the scalpel and the laboratory, and no longer could feel the force of the ineradicable convictions which are as ‘much a part of man as his stomach or his heart.'”

Of course, the deep question is whether this was due merely to an atrophy that came about by working in a single direction of whether this is an example of “suppressing the truth” (Rom. 1).

Warfield, B. B. “On the Antiquity and the Unity of the Human Race,” The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield, 9:235-58.

The thesis of this article is that the age of humanity has no theological significance whereas the unity of mankind is highly significant to theology.

As to the former, Warfield argues that science and Scripture are not as much at odds as was often supposed. For one, the evolutionary scientists shortened their estimates of the age of mankind. On the other hand, Warfield argues that the genealogies prior to Abraham were not meant to provide chronological data. That that was not their purpose may be agreed on. That they don’t actually provide this data is another matter. Warfield’s assertion that they do not seemed superficial and not up to his usual work. He doesn’t satisfactorily account for the details of the text, such as the fact that Genesis 5 provides the length of time that a person lived until he fathered the next person in the genealogy.

More enduring is Warfield’s argument for the theological necessity of a unitary human race descended from Adam. The unity of the human race is still granted by evolutionists, but the descent from Adam is denied by may theistic evolutionists, leading them to revise key doctrines. Here Warfield’s insistence on the theological necessity of a unified human race descended from Adam remains relevant and necessary.

One could adapt Warfield’s thesis to the present debates and say that the age of the earth has no theological significance whereas the unity of the mankind is highly significant to theology. This sounds persuasive in the abstract, but when one asks what was happening in the long ages before the creation of Adam and Eve, the answer typically entails death, suffering, and natural evil. As I’ve noted elsewhere:

The problem of death and suffering before the Fall is far more serious than most theologians seem to realize. The conflict between evolution and Scripture is often seen as the chief apologetic challenge of the present time. But the chief philosophical challenge to Christianity is the problem of evil, and attempts to harmonize Scripture with evolutionary theory make defending Christianity against this challenge difficult if not impossible. The problem of evil has become more pointed as scientists learn more about certain animals’ sentience, capacity to experience pain, abilities to remember, and so forth. This has led many to conclude that animal suffering and death is a great evil. On this point the Bible is in agreement with modern science and philosophy. The Bible evidences concern for the wellbeing of animals (Prov. 12:10). The suffering of the non-human world is described as a condition of bondage, groaning, and pain as a result of sin (Rom. 8:20; Gen. 3:17-19). The earth awaits redemption (Rom. 8:23), and included in that redemption is the end of animal suffering and pain (Isa. 11:6-9; 65:25).

Traditionally, Christians have defended against the problem of animal suffering and death by pointing to the Bible’s teaching that it is a result of the Fall (Rom. 5:12; 8:20). In seeking to defend Christianity against those who say it is scientifically ill-informed, Christians who seek to harmonize the Bible and evolution have removed the biblical explanation of the problem of evil in the animal world.

I would therefore argue that both the age of the earth (not in the abstract, but given the theological implications that attend an old earth) and the unity of mankind are highly significant to maintaining orthodox theology.

Related Posts:

Accommodating Evolution and the Problem of Evil

Review of Article on the Problem of Evil and Animal Death

Review of Biblical Authority after Babel by Kevin Vanhoozer

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Vanhoozer, Kevin J. Biblical Authority After Babel: Retrieving the Solas in the Spirit of Mere Protestant Christianity. Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2016.

Kevin Vanhoozer’s Biblical Authority after Babel was written on the five-hundredth anniversary of the Reformation in defense of the Reformation. Vanhoozer takes seriously critiques of the Reformation made popular by Christian Smith and Brad Gregory, namely, that the Reformation led to interpretive chaos (and thus to an increasingly splintered Christianity) and secularism.

Vanhoozer rejects these claims. For instance, he observes that secularization is not a result of the Reformation. It is the result of reading the Bible in an academic, critical way rather than as Scripture. In other words, secularism is directly contrary to the Reformation approach to Scripture. Furthermore, Vanhoozer demonstrates that neo-scholastic Thomism was more amenable to secularism than the theology of the Reformation (this is a point also made by Roman Catholic Ressourcement theologians in the mid-twentieth century; see Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith [Oxford University Press, 2008], kindle loc., 486-603).

Perhaps more plausible is the claim that Protestants cannot agree on their interpretations of Scripture, which is a problem that leads to fragmentation. However, Vanhoozer argues that “Mere Protestant Christians” actually agree on the fundamentals of the gospel story. This does not make disagreement unimportant, but it does reveal a fundamental unity that lies back of that disagreement.

Nevertheless, Vanhoozer does not leave the matter there. He engages with the issue of epistemology. He rejects an epistemology based on the church’s magisterial authority. He also rejects epistemologies based on the authority of the scholar or the autonomous individual. Instead, he argues for an epistemology based on the testimony of Scripture as self-authenticating through the work of the Spirit. As already noted, Vanhoozer by this is not advocating a raw individualism. Like the Reformers, tradition plays an important role in his theological and exegetical method. Tradition does not exercise magisterial authority, but it does serve the interpreter. The Bible alone is the final authority, but tradition gives important testimony regarding right interpretation.

So how does the preceding impact church polity and unity? Vanhoozer argues that local churches are given authority to make judgments regarding right belief and practice. They have the responsibility to rule on what Scripture teaches in these matters for the sake of “the integrity of the gospel.” (Churches typically exercise this responsibility by adopting confessions of faith and catechisms.) Vanhoozer further argues that these “local churches have an obligation to read in communion with other local churches.” (This can be seen by the way different local churches adopt the same confessions as other churches or adapt the confessions of other churches.)

Vanhoozer grants that there is a tension sometimes between unity and the purity of the gospel. As a result, he rejects ecumenism and sectarianism. He affirms denominations that hold strongly to their beliefs and that also can cooperate with denominations that differ with them.

In the end, I think that Vanhoozer successfully defends the Reformation from recent critiques. I also think his model for church unity and diversity in the present age is correct. However, based on what I know of Vanhoozer’s ecclesial situation, our judgments about implementation differ. I think this demonstrates that models can only take us so far. Spiritual wisdom is always needed to apply the model.

More on Littlejohn and Two Kingdoms Theology

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A friend emailed after I posted my review of Bradford Littlejohn’s book on the two kingdoms asking for more specifics. The following is a slightly edited version of my reply to him:

In my review I flagged the big historical contribution. Littlejohn shows clearly that the two kingdoms division was not between institutional church and institutional state, as R2K/W2K folks like Van Drunen (DVD) say. I think Littlejohn showed this conclusively, and historically this is important because DVD wants to use R2K to enforce a kind of separation of church and state, or as Littlejohn puts it, “the religious neutrality of modern liberal politics.” Historically, that’s hard to see in Luther and Calvin, and Littlejohn shows why. Their two kingdoms are different from those of R2K.

Littlejohn argues that the Reformers’ 2K doctrine is not about dividing the life into two distinct spheres but are different ways to look at all of life. So, Luther argues that “inwardly, before God, the Christian is not subject to the mediation of any human authority, or conscience-bound by its commands” (Littlejohn’s summary, p. 16). But because of love for neighbor, the Christian does outwardly submit to human rulers. I’ve read the treatises Luther wrote on this subject, and I’d say Littlejohn’s summary is accurate. But I’m not convinced that Luther is right! So I still find myself at variance from a 2K approach. Calvin is, I think, better in his formulations than Luther, though he like Luther is using the formulation to defend Christian liberty. (And here Littlejohn makes a helpful clarification: “not Christian liberty in the sense we often mean it today—the freedom of individual believers to act as they wish in matters where Scripture is silent—but is fundamentally soteriological, the proclamation of the freedom of the believer’s conscience from the bondage of external works” (p. 26). As Calvin develops it, he is not saying that “human authorities cannot prescribe outward conduct for believers in matters indifferent,” because that would do away with all government (p. 27). But he means that the conscience cannot be bound.) So government and church alike can make laws concerning church order or about things indifferent, but neither state nor church can say about such things: “this you must do to be right with God.”

As he goes on with the historical survey Littlejohn turns to Hooker’s response to the Puritan objection to various ceremonies and forms being imposed on them. Littlejohn likes Hooker, so here’s where my sympathies diverge from Littlejohn. Littlejohn sees Hooker make use of the 2K distinction of Luther and Calvin to oppose Puritanism. Littlejohn summarizes: “We can now see why Hooker’s Lawes represents such an important contribution to Protestant two-kingdoms theology, even if we might resist the conclusions Hooker himself draws for religious uniformity and royal supremacy. However oppressive these might seem to us today, they were, at least as understood and defended by Hooker, much less so than the Puritan legalism he opposed, which brooked no opposition and left no room for discretion in the outward ordering of the Christian community. Hooker deserves credit for freeing Christian consciences from the tyranny of Scripture conceived as an exhaustive law-book, desacralizing human authority in both church and state, and resisting the Puritan tendency to immanentize Christ’s eschatological rule in the visible church. In all this he both re-affirmed the core agenda of Luther’s reform, but he also clarified and filled out Luther’s sometimes paradoxical formulations by spelling out how it was that the visible church had a foot in both kingdoms, so to speak.” I’m not convinced that that Hooker stood in the breach against those bad Puritan legalists. I rather think that the Puritans were correct about their church worship concerns. So I remained unconvinced of the benefits of 2K.

As to the chapters on practical implications in the spheres of church, state, market, etc., I’m of two minds. I liked a number of conclusions he reached and disagreed with others. But I think I can get to the applications that I found insightful apart from 2K theology.

Review of Bradford Littlejohn’s Two Kingdoms: A Guide for the Perplexed

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Littlejohn, W. Bradford. Two Kingdoms: A Guide for the Perplexed. Davenant, 2017.

This brief book is helpful contribution to the discussion of Two-Kingdoms theology. Littlejohn states in the introduction, “I will argue that both the R2K advocates [Reformed Two Kingdoms view associated with David Van Drunen and Westminster Seminary, California] and their critics have largely missed something much richer, more fundamental, and more liberating and insightful for the church today: the original Protestant two-kingdom doctrine, as articulated by such giants as Martin Luther, John Calvin, and Richard Hooker” (6). I did find Littlejohn’s historical survey to be more accurate than what I’ve found in Van Drunen. He rightly notes that the distinction between the two kingdoms historically was not a distinction between the institution of the church and other institutions. Thus in the historical view the institutional church is part of the temporal rather than spiritual kingdom. When he surveys the impact of this historic two kingdoms theology on church, state, and market, I found Littlejohn’s applications a mixed bag. In the end, I’m still not convinced that “two kingdoms” is the best model for Christian involvement in the world. I would recommend Littlejohn’s book as a good entry way into understanding the debate.